IMMORTALITY AND MONADISTIC IDEALISM
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Like boisterous winds that whirl about the door,  
But leave the ashes on the hearth unstirred,  
The voices our America has heard,  
Press, pulpit, and time serving orator  
Have pared the truth, but not revealed the core,  
On course and end pronounced no marriage word,  
But shunned the backward look, by fear deferred,  
Lest to reflect would be but to deplore.  
Time will at last assort the false and true,  
Assay the hosts fed on forbidden fruit,  
The salvage sift for aught of any worth,  
And measure out to all what is their due.  
Sires may be silent: sons will not be mute  
In scorn when they look back on wisdom's dearth.

ISAAC RUSLING PENNYPACKER.

ARDMORE, PENN.

IMMORTALITY AND MONADISTIC IDEALISM.

To reply to the interesting criticisms of my views which Mr. Tsanoff published in the April number of The Monist would, I fear, take too long. I will content myself with mentioning two points in which, as it seems to me, he has mistaken what my views are.

He says, "it is presumably taken for granted by Dr. McTaggart that a self's character does not admit of its being involved in such intimate communion with more than one person." I do not take this for granted, because I do not accept it at all. It is possible—for it is often cited—that A should love both B and C, even sub specie temporis and at the same time. A fortiori, it seems to me, would this be possible sub specie aeternitatis.

Again, he quotes my remark: "it does not follow, because a self which has a body cannot get its data except in connection with that body, that it would be possible for a self without a body to get data in some other way." Then he adds the following (the italics are mine): "That is to say, it does not follow, because a conscious self
requires sufficient data for its mental activity, that a non-conscious self need be similarly limited.” I am at a loss to conceive how Mr. Tsanoff can have interpreted my sentence in this way. I did not speak of an unconscious self at all, nor of any self which had not sufficient data for its mental activity. What I maintained was that, while a conscious self with a body could not get sufficient data without the help of that body, it was possible that a conscious self without a body could get sufficient data in some way which did not require the help of a body.

J. Ellis McTaggart.