Derek Parfit: a bibliography

What interests me most are the metaphysical questions whose answers can affect our emotions, and have rational and moral significance. Why does the Universe exist? What makes us the same person throughout our lives? Do we have free will? Is time’s passage an illusion?

• Derek Parfit, Improving Scanlon's contractualism, in Markus S. Stepanians and Michael Frauchiger (eds.) Reason, justification, and contractualism: themes from Scanlon, Berlin ; Boston, 2021, pp. 109–117
• Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume 3, Oxford, 2017
• Derek Parfit, Future people, the non-identity problem, and person-affecting principles, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 45, no. 2, 2017, pp. 118–157
• Derek Parfit, Responses, in Simon Kirchin (ed.) Reading Parfit: On what matters, London, 2017, pp. 189–236
• Derek Parfit, Conflicting reasons, Etica & politica, vol. 18, no. 1, 2016, pp. 169–186
• Derek Parfit, Can we avoid the repugnant conclusion?, Theoria, vol. 82, no. 2, 2016, pp. 110–127
• Derek Parfit, Personal and omnipersonal duties:, The Harvard Review of Philosophy, vol. 23, 2016, pp. 1–15
• Derek Parfit, Another defence of the priority view, Utilitas, vol. 24, no. 3, 2012, pp. 399–440
• Derek Parfit, We are not human beings, Philosophy, vol. 87, no. 1, 2012, pp. 5–28
• Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume 2, Oxford, 2011
• Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume 1, Oxford, 2011
• Derek Parfit, Persons, bodies, and human beings, in Dean W. Zimmerman, Theodore Sider, and John Hawthorne (eds.) Contemporary debates in metaphysics, Oxford, 2008, pp. 177–208
• Derek Parfit, Is personal identity what matters?, 2007
• Derek Parfit, Kant's arguments for his formula of universal law, in Christine Sypnowich (ed.) The egalitarian conscience: Essays in honour of G. A. Cohen, Oxford, 2006, pp. 56–69
• Derek Parfit, Normativity, in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford studies in metaethics, Oxford, 2006, pp. 325–380
• Derek Parfit, Postcript, in Jesper Ryberg and Torbjörn Tännsjö (eds.) The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics, Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 257
• Derek Parfit, Justifiability to each person, Ratio, vol. 16, no. 4, 2003, pp. 368–390
• Derek Parfit, What we could rationally will, in Grethe B. Peterson (ed.) The Tanner lectures on human values, Salt Lake City, 2004, pp. 285–369
• Derek Parfit, Rationality and reasons, in Dan Egonsson et al. (ed.) Exploring practical philosophy: from action to values, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 17–39
• Derek Parfit, Bombs and coconuts, or rational irrationality, in Christopher W. Morris and Arthur Ripstein (eds.) Practical rationality and preference: Essays for David Gauthier, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 81–97
• Derek Parfit, Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes, Philosophical topics, vol. 26, no. 1-2, 1999, pp. 217–270
• Derek Parfit, Why anything? Why this?, London Review of Books, vol. 20, no. 3, 1998, pp. 22–25
• Derek Parfit, Why anything? Why this?, London Review of Books, vol. 20, no. 2, 1998, pp. 24–27
• Derek Parfit, Equality and priority, Ratio, vol. 10, no. 3, 1997, pp. 202–221
• Derek Parfit, Reasons and motivation, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, vol. 71, no. 1, 1997, pp. 99–130
• Derek Parfit, Acts and outcomes: a reply to Boonin-Vail, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 25, no. 2, 1996, pp. 308–317
• Derek Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, in Henry Harris (ed.) Identity: Essays based on Herbert Spencer lectures given in the University of Oxford, Oxford, 1995
• Derek Parfit, An interview with Derek Parfit, Cogito, vol. 9, no. 2, 1995, pp. 115–125
• Derek Parfit, The indeterminacy of identity: A reply to Brueckner, Philosophical Studies, vol. 70, no. 1, 1993, pp. 23–33
• Derek Parfit, Paul Seabright: Pluralism and the standard of living, in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya K. Sen (eds.) The Quality of Life, New York, 1993, pp. 410–417
• Derek Parfit, Who do you think you are?, Times higher education supplement, 1992, pp. 19–20
• Derek Parfit, The puzzle of reality: Why does the universe exist?, Times literary supplement, 1992, pp. 3–5
• Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Against the social discount rate, in Peter Laslett and James Fishkin (eds.) Justice between age groups and generations, New Haven, 1992, pp. 144–161
• Derek Parfit, Isaiah Berlin, Times literary supplement, 1991, pp. 13
• Derek Parfit, Why does the universe exist?, Harvard review of philosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, 1991, pp. 2–5
• Derek Parfit, Equality or priority, Lawrence, 1991
• Derek Parfit, What we together do, What we together do, no. unpublished, 1988
• Derek Parfit, A response, in A. R. Peacocke and Grant Gillett (eds.) Persons and personality: a contemporary inquiry, Oxford, 1987, pp. 88–98
• Derek Parfit, A reply to Sterba, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 16, no. 2, 1987, pp. 193–194
• Derek Parfit, Divided minds and the nature of persons, in Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield (eds.) Mindwaves: thoughts on intelligence, identity and consciousness, Oxford, 1987, pp. 19–28
• Derek Parfit, Comments, Ethics, vol. 96, no. 4, 1986, pp. 832–872
• Parfit1986OverpopulationAndQuality
• Derek Parfit, Rationality and time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 84, no. 1, 1984, pp. 47–82
• Derek Parfit, Reasons and persons, Oxford, 1984
• Derek Parfit, Energy policy and the further future: the social discount rate, in Douglas MacLean and Peter G. Brown (eds.) Energy and the future, Totowa, New Jersey, 1983, pp. 31–37
• Derek Parfit, Energy policy and the further future: the identity problem, in Douglas MacLean and Peter G. Brown (eds.) Energy and the future, Totowa, New Jersey, 1983, pp. 166–179
• Daniel Dennett et al., Summary of discussion, Synthese, vol. 53, no. 2, 1982, pp. 251–256
• Derek Parfit, Personal identity and rationality, Synthese, vol. 53, no. 2, 1982, pp. 227–241
• Derek Parfit, Future generations: further problems, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2, 1982, pp. 113–172
• Derek Parfit, Correspondence, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2, 1981, pp. 180–181
• Derek Parfit, An attack on the social discount rate, Philosophy & public policy quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, 1980, pp. 8–11
• Derek Parfit, Is common-sense morality self-defeating?, Journal of philosophy, vol. 76, no. 10, 1979, pp. 533–545
• Derek Parfit, Correspondence, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 8, no. 4, 1979, pp. 395–397
• Derek Parfit, Prudence, morality, and the prisoner's dilemma, Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 65, 1979, pp. 539–564
• Derek Parfit, Innumerate ethics, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 7, no. 4, 1978, pp. 285–301
• Derek Parfit, Lewis, Perry, and what matters, in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) The identities of persons, Berkeley, California, 1976, pp. 91–107
• Derek Parfit, On doing the best for our children, in Michael D. Bayles (ed.) Ethics and population, Cambridge,Mass, 1976, pp. 100–115
• Derek Parfit, Rights, interests, and possible people, in Samuel Gorovitz et al. (ed.) Moral problems in medicine, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1976, pp. 369–375
• Derek Parfit, Later selves and moral principles, in Alan Montefiore (ed.) Philosophy and personal relations: an Anglo-French study, London, 1973, pp. 137–169
• Derek Parfit, On "The importance of self-identity", Journal of philosophy, vol. 68, no. 20, 1971, pp. 683–690
• Derek Parfit, Personal identity, Philosophical review, vol. 80, no. 1, 1971, pp. 3–27
• Derek Parfit, The Eton College chronicle, in Anthony Cheetham and Derek Parfit (eds.) Eton microcosm, London, 1964, pp. 100–103
• Derek Parfit, The fish, in Anthony Cheetham and Derek Parfit (eds.) Eton microcosm, London, 1964, pp. 182–183
• Anthony Cheetham and Derek Parfit (eds.), Eton microcosm, London, 1964
• Derek Parfit, Like pebbles, ISIS, 1963, pp. 21–22
• Derek Parfit, Photograph of a Comtesse, The New Yorker, 1962, pp. 24

With thanks to David Edmonds, Johan Gustafsson, and Matthew van der Merwe.

What now matters most is how we respond to various risks to the survival of humanity. We are creating some of these risks, and we are discovering how we could respond to these and other risks. If we reduce these risks, and humanity survives the next few centuries, our descendants or successors could end these risks by spreading through this galaxy.

Life can be wonderful as well as terrible, and we shall increasingly have the power to make life good. Since human history may be only just beginning, we can expect that future humans, or supra-humans, may achieve some great goods that we cannot now even imagine. In Nietzsche’s words, there has never been such a new dawn and clear horizon, and such an open sea.