DEONTOLOGY

together with

A TABLE OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION

and

THE ARTICLE ON UTILITARIANISM

edited by

AMNON GOLDWORTH

CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD

This volume contains three of Bentham's hitherto unpublished works: *Deontology,* A *Table of the Springs of Action*, and *Article on Utilitarianism.* These three are connected by virtue of the fact that together with Bentham's *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* they provide the Bentham scholar, the specialist in Victorian studies, the moral philosopher, and the intellectual historian with a comprehensive picture of Bentham's psychological and ethical views.

The only previously published version of *Deontology,* that of 1834, edited by John Bowring, is essentially a paraphrase of Bentham's text with additions by Bowring. This edition is based entirely on manuscripts in Bentham's hand or in the hands of his amanuenses. A portion of *A Table of the Springs of Action* was published in 1817 and is contained in the present edition as well as the original unpublished Introduction and eight hundred and fifteen marginals which refer not only to the 1817 portion and Introduction but also to a lost manuscript of over three hundred pages. Bentham's *Article on Utilitarianism* was written for the editor of *The Westminster De view* in 1829 but was not published. Two versions are published here.

This edition is equipped with a full editorial introduction providing a history of the manuscripts for each of the three works. Each of the edited works is accompanied by a full complement of critical and explanatory notes.

The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham

The new critical edition of the works and correspondence of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is being prepared and published under the supervision of the Bentham Committee of University College London. In spite of his importance as jurist, philosopher, and social scientist, and leader of the Utilitarian reformers, the only previous edition of his works was a poorly edited and incomplete one brought out within a decade or so of his death. The overall plan and principles of this edition are set out in the General Preface to *The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham* vol. 1, which was the first volume of the *Collected Works* to be published.

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PREFACE

The thanks of the Bentham Committee are due to the British Academy, the Social Science Research Council, and University College London, for financial help towards the cost of editorial work on this volume; and the editor is indebted to the National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington, D.C., for a grant awarded in 1969 for research on the *Deontology*. The Committee is also grateful to the Pilgrim Trust for a grant towards the costs of publication.

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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

		Space left in MS
[to]	Word(s) editorially supplied
(so)	Conjectural restoration of	mutilated word (or phrase)
(.. .)	Word torn away
[?]	Reading doubtful
[...?]	Word(s) proved illegible

Apart from standard abbreviations the following should be noted:

CW:	this edition of *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham.*
Bowring:	*The Works of Jeremy Bentham,* published under the superintendence of . . . John Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1838-43.
UC:	refers to the Bentham papers in the Library of University College London, Lower-case roman numerals refer to the boxes in which the papers are placed, arabic numerals to the sheets in each box.
BL:	British Library (formerly British Museum).
An Introduction:	Bentham's *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.*
Springs:	Bentham's *A Table of the Springs of Action.*
MS orig.:	the first manuscript reading of a word or phrase.
MS alt.:	an alternative manuscript reading, usually interlinear or marginal.

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME: A GENERAL VIEW

The printing of the three works found here under one cover calls for a brief explanation. What is it that connects them and justifies their being published together? One may begin the answer to this question by citing David Baumgardt's remark that 'a systematic exposition of Bentham's ethics should start, not with a dogmatic reference to the principle of utility, as is usually done, but with the theory of moral motives that contains Bentham's attempt to justify his utilitarianism critically'.[1] The theory Baumgardt was referring to is found in *A Table of the Springs of Action.*

In *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,* Bentham recognized the need to speak of the springs of action, for in the very first lines of this book he tells us that mankind has been placed under the governance of pleasure and pain. It is by a desire for the one and an aversion to the other that human beings are motivated to act. He goes on to point out that pleasure and pain are not only the sole motivational determinants of human behaviour but that reference to them alone tells us how human beings ought to behave. Thus the concepts of pleasure and pain function in two ways for Bentham: they serve as the foundation for a theory of human motivation, and also as the foundation of a theory of morals.

However, Bentham did not present these two theories in their final form in *An Introduction to the Principles.*[2] Although that work contains a substantial chapter entitled 'Of Motives',[3] his theory of motivation was developed more fully in A *Table of the Springs of Action,*[4] which was printed thirty-five years after *An Introduction* was first put into print; and his theory of morality was expounded further in *the Deontology,* which was still not complete at the time of his death.

[1] David Baumgardt, *Bentham and the Ethics of Today,* Princeton, 1952, p. 374.

[2] Bentham was quite aware that his treatment was incomplete. *See An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (CW), p. 3.

[3] Ibid., ch. X.

[4] The earliest evidence of Bentham's work on such a table is a single manuscript sheet dated 27 Nov. 1804 and entitled 'Table of Motives as deduced from their correspondt Pains and Pleasures: distinguishing the Motives into Neutral, Eulogistic and Dyslogistic' (UC xlvii. 422).

As if to confirm the connection between 'is' and 'ought' enunciated in the opening lines of *An Introduction,* Bentham wrote the major portion of the *Deontology* at the same time as he was writing the *Springs.* He wrote the latter between 1813 and 1815, and about 140 sheets of manuscript for the *Deontology* are known to have been written in 1814 (though he was to return to this subject spasmodically during the remaining years of his life). In addition, there is a quite explicit connection made in subject matter between *the Deontology* and the *Springs,* for deontology is specifically referred to in the title of the *Springs* and is discussed in its manuscripts.[1]

The crucial link between Bentham's psychological and moral theories, between what is and what ought to be, was provided by his greatest happiness principle, or the principle of utility; and the *Article on Utilitarianism,* written in two versions in 1829, contains his mature views on the evolution and significance of that principle. It can thus be seen that what the three works presented in this volume have in common is that they are all attempts to supplement and fill out the theories of behaviour and morality propounded in *An Introduction.* The *Deontology* is the main work in the volume. But since it rests on the theory of motivation found in the *Springs,* the latter of these two works has been placed before the former.

'A TABLE OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION'

The story of the writing and publishing of *A Table of the Springs of Action* is a strange one. For in it we encounter a work published without the introduction that was written for it, and a title which is partly without a text. It is also a story which provokes the question why Bentham saw fit to publish only a small part of what he had written.

In 1813 Bentham initiated a study of motivation that led to the printing of the *Springs* in 1815 and its publication in 1817. The work as printed and published consists of a large folding table, with eleven pages of'Explanations' and twenty pages of 'Observations'. The 1817 version consists of the printed table[2] and text of 1815, with a new title page and contents page. The wording of the title and list of contents is the same in both versions, but the print and arrangement have been changed. The title page of the 1817 volume contains some

[1] See facsimiles of the title-pages of *A Table of the Springs of Action,* pp. 3 and 4 below, and marginals 726-70 at pp. 66-70.

[2] In the 1815 version (of which there is a copy at University College London) the table is bound at the front of the volume; in the 1817 version it is at the back.

alterations and additions,[1] including the insertion on the verso of a quotation from Helvétius's *De l'esprit** and the verso of the contents page contains a list of corrigenda[3] and an advertisement for Bentham's *Plan of Parliamentary Reform* and *Swear not at all.*

What accounts for the delay between the printing of the work and its publication without substantial alteration two years later? The answer to this question is that Bentham had in mind a much longer work than that printed in 1815, and much of the material for this longer version was actually written, but he gave up the idea of completing and publishing it some time before the 1817 publication. The evidence for this is to be found in the title of the *Springs,* in a set of marginal summaries (or 'marginals') abstracted from material written for the extended work, and in a general outline of the work as a whole.

If the long title of the 1815/17 version of the *Springs* is compared with the content of that work as published, it becomes evident that the latter part of the title—from the words 'indicative of the applications'—refers to topics of which there is little or no discussion in the text. The title was in fact intended for a much longer work which included discussion of these topics; and that most of this work was actually written is apparent from the marginals. Sixty-nine sheets of these survive,[4] and they summarize the contents of, first, an introduction which was not included in the 1815/17 version; second, the 1815/17 text; and third, material relating to most of the topics mentioned in the latter part of the 1815/17 title. Alongside many of the marginals there are numbers referring to the manuscript pages from which they were taken, and by counting these numbers it can be estimated that the entire work was composed of approximately 370 sheets of manuscript. The introduction consisted of seventeen sheets, the 1815/17 text was based on twenty-five sheets, and the rest of what Bentham wrote amounted to 300 sheets or more. The only part

* See facsimiles of these title-pages at pp. 3 and 4.

[3] The insertion reads as follows: 'Since the printing of this tract, the following apposite passage from Helvetius was discovered, and pointed out to the author: "Chaque passion a done ses tours, ses expressions, et sa manière particulière de s'exprimer: aussi l'homme qui, par une analyse exacte des phrases et des expressions dont se servent les dif férentes passions, donneroit le signe auquel on peut les reconnoitre, mériteroitsansdouteinfiniment de la reconnoissance publique. C'est alors qu'on pourroit, dans le faisceau de sentiments qui produisent chaque acte de notre volonté, distinguer du moins le sentiment qui domine en nous. Jusques-là les hommes s'ignoreront eux-memes, et tomberont, en fait de sentiments, dans les erreurs les plus grossières." ' Helvet. *de I'Esprit.* Tom. ii. Disc. iv. Ch. ii. p. 305.

[3] This list was unnecessary, as the corrections had already been made in the text of the 1815 version.

[4] With the exception of some additions and emendations which are in Bentham's hand, the marginals were written by several amanuenses.

of the manuscript that survives among the Bentham MSS at University College London is the first thirteen sheets of the introduction. It was Bentham's habit, when a work was printed, to destroy the manuscript on which it was based, but he did not usually dispose of manuscripts that did not correspond to what was put into print. It is surprising, therefore, that this large batch of unpublished material should be missing from his papers.[1]

The structure of the work as a whole is, in large part, indicated in the general outline that Bentham composed on 9 February 1814 under the title 'Springs of Action Table. Contents of the sheets of marginals'.[2] At first sight, it displays a confusion of headings and subheadings, numberings in roman and arabic numerals, brackets, additions, and emendations, but on closer examination it does provide valuable evidence concerning the form and evolution of the work. The outline is divided into three major sections: 'I. Supplemental Explanations'; 'II. Observations'; 'III. Uses'. If these are compared with the 1815/17 version of the *Springs,* it can be seen that I and II refer to 'Explanations' and 'Observations', and that III refers to the topics cited in the part of the title which follows the phrase 'indicative of the applications'. Below 'II. Observations' in the outline, Bentham wrote: 'To which is added utility versus ipsedixitism or etc.' This addition refers to a part of the outline which is bracketed and which originally belonged to the section headed 'HI Uses'. The part concerned relates to a discussion of the principles of asceticism, caprice, and sentimentalism, which were all opposed to utility, and it appears that Bentham, perhaps at some time after the 1815 printing, decided to transfer it to the section entitled 'Observations'. To distinguish this material from the 'Observations' found in the 1815/17 version, it—or rather the set of marginals referring to it—is classified in the present edition as 'Added Observations'.

The outline of 9 February 1814 suggests that by that date the bulk of the work had been written, and this is confirmed by the fact that most of the sheets of marginals bear dates between mid-June 1813 and February 1814. It is clear, however, that Bentham did further writing for the *Springs* in the summer and autumn of 1815 and in the early part of 1816. On 8 July 1815 he wrote the introduction.[3] The surviving manuscript, as already noted, consists of thirteen

[1] It is possible that the missing manuscripts are still in existence, but a search at University College London and the British Library, and in archives in Ireland, Switzerland, and the Soviet Union, proved fruitless.

[2] UC clviii. 52.

[3] A note that Bentham wrote to himself in the general outline seems to indicate that he intended to do so as early as February 1814.

sheets,[1] and these include alongside the text thirty-three numbered marginals written in pencil in Bentham's hand. The marginals are also recorded separately in the hand of a copyist,[2] together with twelve additional ones which indicate that there are at least four sheets missing from the end of the manuscript. The sheets which survive form an important addition to the published version of the *Springs,* as the analysis of real and fictitious entities which they provide removes an opaqueness in the meaning of parts of the 1815/17 text.[3] Yet Bentham decided not to use these sheets for their original purpose. On the first sheet, the heading 'Table of Springs of Action: Introduction' was crossed out, and Bentham wrote beneath it in brackets: 'Not employed in the printed copies July and August 1815,' He also added *a new* heading, 'Logic'. In the body of the introduction he wrote that he would make two observations demonstrating the importance of the distinction between real and fictitious entities—one as applying to the field of ethics and politics, the other to the field of logic.[4] He then proceeded to deal with logic in some detail, but his only reference to ethics and politics occurs in the last paragraph of the extant introduction. The last twelve marginals, however, indicate that the missing section of the introduction did contain a discussion relating to ethics and politics. It is likely that when Bentham decided not to include his introduction in the published version of the *Springs,* and re-headed it 'Logic', he removed the last sheets as not pertaining to the future use of the thirteen sheets preceding them. Why he did not have the introduction printed in 1815, and did not include it in the 1817 published edition, is not quite clear. Probably, it was envisaged as an introduction to the work as a whole, and he delayed sending it to the printers until he had completed the entire manuscript. When the effort to finish the latter was abandoned and the decision was made to publish the material already printed, he may not have considered it worth while to revise the introduction and arrange for its incorporation in the work.

As is shown by Bentham's manuscript note mentioned above, it was in July and August that the 1815 version of the *Springs* was printed. Further evidence relating to the printing of the work includes a postscript added by James Mill on 14 August 1815 to a letter of his to Ltienne Dumont at Geneva.

You are going to receive six copies of the table, now printed, of springs of action, formerly called Motive table, of which you have heard, and six copies, if they can be got in time out of the hands of the printer, of the explanations, etc. with

[1] UCxiv. 22-34. [1] UC clviii. 103-5.
[3] In particular, I(m), 9,10, and 11, and II, §1.
[4] UC xiv. 30 (p. 77 below).

which the said table is to be accompanied. Now, Geneva is a place where people are found in abundance, who write not only French but Italian, and German. I am desired to suggest to you, that the translation of this table with its appendages, and that in as many languages as possible, would be a most desirable event. The author is aware that it contains so many extraordinary terms, partly new, and partly old, that the fastidiousness of the French language will make it very difficult to shape for it a French dress—but he thinks the Italian might answer better, and that the German would answer admirably. I am therefore to request of you to put a copy into the hand of an Italian, and another into that of a German to see (if you know of any likely to undertake such a task) what they think of the production: and if you yourself should be too much engaged with more important matters, to make the same proposal to some master of the French tongue. As some of the latter part of the explanations must be sent to you from the printers without being corrected by the author, you will need to make allowance for typographical blunders.[1]

Dumont was evidently sent uncorrected proof sheets of the *Springs,* and copies were also sent to Sir Samuel Romilly before he left London on 20 August to travel to Geneva.[2] On 11 September the printer, Arthur Taylor of Shoe Lane, sent Bentham a note (which survives in James Mill's Common Place Book), saying: 'If Mr. B. has corrected and will return the proof of the *Table* part of the "Springs of Human Action" the other matter shall be added to it, and a complete impression sent to Mr. Bentham.'[3]

Mill's postscript, quoted above, raises, incidentally, the question of how far he himself had a hand in the preparation of the work. Leslie Stephen said in *The English Utilitarians*[4] that A *Table of the Springs of Action* was 'edited with considerable modification by James Mill', but he did not provide any evidence for this statement. That Mill did advise Bentham about the work is suggested by the following note, made by the latter in pencil on the first sheet of the marginals relating to the introduction: "To J. M. Quere whether it may not be best to

[1] DumontMSS, 33/III, fo. 40, Bibliothfcque Publique et Universitaire, Geneva. The main part of the letter (fos. 38-9) is dated 1 Aug. 1815.

[2] On 3 Oct. 1815 Bentham wrote as follows to Sir Samuel Romilly, who was then on a visit to Geneva: 'At the eve of your departure for the continent you received I hope and believe certain copies of my Springs of Action Table 6, 7 or 8 I forget which. They were put up for fear of missing you in the utmost hurry before the last sheet or two had been revised by me. A revision has since then produced the following list of corrigenda, six copies of which you will find in this paper, sent to the end that if it be not too much trouble to you one may find its way to each of the persons to whom a copy of the papers may have been delivered.' Dumont MSS, 72/(5)/(f). The list of corrigenda sent with the letter is identical to that printed in the 1817 edition. For the date of Romilly's departure from London, see *Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly,* ed. by his sons, 3 vols., London, 1840, iii. 201.

[3] Common Place Book of James Mill, ii. 55, London Library.

[4] 3 vols., London, 1900, i. 251.

end here omitting the content of the two other sheets.'[1] Also, another note elsewhere in the marginals, dated 31 July 1815, shows that Bentham was then working on *Springs* material at Ford Abbey, where Mill was staying with him;[2] and it is worth observing that Mill referred to Bentham's theory of motivation in the article which he published in August 1815 reviewing the second volume of Dugald Stewart's *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.*[3] However, the extent to which Mill was responsible for the form taken by the work and for the decisions relating to its printing and publication cannot be determined.

Evidence is also lacking on the questions of when and why Bentham decided to publish only a small part of the material he had written. It is clear that he continued to write occasionally on *Springs* material for some time after the 1815 printing. Several sheets of marginals headed 'Springs Table' are dated 2 and 3 February 1816,[4] and four sheets of manuscript dated 10 April 1816, which discuss the 'exegetic' and 'deontological' senses of the principle of utility, are headed 'Springs or Influence or etc.'.[5] But in 1816 he was becoming very preoccupied with his writings on religion, *Church-of-Englandism* (or 'Church Catechism') *andNotPaul, but Jesus.* Also, he may have come to feel that the unprinted sections of the work had become very large and diffuse and that in some places they were only indirectly related to the theory of motivation which formed the nucleus of the *Springs.* It seems probable that, in this instance as in many others during his career, he became pessimistic about the possibility of completing the work as a whole and rendering it fit for publication, and that he consequently decided to publish without addition the booklet printed in 1815. That he had seen this, at the time when it was printed, as a work that *could* stand on its own is apparent from the fact that he asked Dumont to get it translated into other languages.[6]

[1] UC clviii. 103 (p. 8 n. 1 below).
[2] UC clviii. 72 (p. 10 n. 1 below).
[3] *British Review,* vi (1815), 197.
[4] UC clviii. 109-15.
[5] UC xviii. 172-5.
[6] The publication of the work in 1817 seems to have made little or no impact. No references to or advertisements for the work have been found in contemporary newspapers or periodicals. The work was reprinted in *The Works of Jeremy Bentham,* ed. John Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1838-43, i. 195-219. Apart from a few small changes of punctuation and spelling, and the substitution of the word 'inborn' for 'indigenous' in the title of § VI of the 'Observations', the 1817 text was reproduced without alteration.

The Organization of this Edition of 'A Table of the Springs of Action'

The entire work consists of six distinct parts: 1. Introduction; 2. Table; 3. Explanations; 4. Observations; 5. Added Observations; 6. Uses. Had the work as a whole been published, parts 4 and 5 would doubtless have been combined. Substantive writing exists for parts 1, 2, 3, and 4. The text of part 1 is taken from the thirteen numbered sheets that survive in manuscript; and since there are no manuscripts for parts 2, 3, and 4, the text of these is provided by the printed 1815/17 version. Marginals exist for parts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. It has been decided to include these marginals in the present edition, on the grounds, first, that those which correspond to the surviving text provide Bentham's own summary of it and help to elucidate it in places, and, second, that those which refer to manuscripts now lost provide a valuable outline of what they contained.[1] The marginals as transcribed by his amanuenses were recorded in vertical columns, with four columns to each manuscript sheet.

In this edition they are printed across the page. They have been arranged under five headings: I. Introduction; II. Explanations; III. Observations; IV. Added Observations; V. Uses. In addition, column headings have been included where appropriate as unnumbered subheadings. The marginals for the work as a whole have been numbered editorially as one complete sequence.

The ordering of the marginals has presented certain problems, and has been carried out in the following way. The order of the marginals for the 'Introduction' follows the sequence set out in the manuscripts; and the order of the marginals for 'Explanations' and 'Observations' follows the order provided by the 1815/17 printed text.[2] In the absence of a manuscript or printed text for 'Added Observations' and 'Uses', the arrangement of the relevant marginals has been determined by Bentham's numberings of different sets of marginals, by evidence of topic sequence, and by the general outline. As noted above, the general outline reveals an alteration in Bentham's plan, in that a group

[1] Although the manuscript sheets of marginals are in the handwriting of amanuenses, it is almost certain that these were transcribed from marginal summaries written by Bentham himself alongside the original manuscript text. This is indicated by the pencilled marginals in Bentham's hand that are to be found on the surviving sheets of the 'Introduction'. The gaps left by the amanuenses on the sheets of marginals presumably represent places where they were unable to read his writing.

[2] The marginals cover the topics listed in the table of contents of the 1815/17 version; but it should be noted that there are no marginals for the paragraphs in 'Explanations' numbered (e)2 to (q) 6.

of numbered sections was bracketed and shifted from 'Uses' to 'Observations'. The marginals for these 'Added Observations' are taken, in the order of their presentation in this edition, from the following manuscript sheets: UC clviii. 54-60, 65, 94-100, 102, 83-93, 109-13, 116-22. The first set of marginals in this sequence is numbered in the manuscripts from one to eighty-eight. These numbers are also found in column four of the general outline, where they are arranged in a non-sequential fashion under topic headings. Many of the numbers appear more than once, under different headings. UC clviii. 83-93, 94-100, 109-13, and 116-22 also constitute separate sets of numbered marginals. The numbering of these sets is not referred to in the general outline, but each set contains subject-matter that seems to fall under more than one of the headings in that outline. Probably, the various sets of ordered marginals refer to different written drafts which ultimately would have been unified. Whether this unification was ever achieved, one cannot be sure; but it seems unlikely. By contrast, the part of the work called 'Uses' does seem to have achieved unity. This is apparent from the fact that the sequence of marginals for this part corresponds, without duplication, to the various divisions under 'Uses' in the outline.

'DEONTOLOGY'

On 22 June 1830 Bentham wrote the following words in the birthday album of Maria Lewin Bo wring, eldest daughter of John Bowring:

> Create all the happiness you are able to create; remove all the misery you are able to remove. Every day will allow you,—will invite you to add something to the pleasures of others,—or to diminish something of their pains. And for every grain of enjoyment you sow in the bosom of another, you shall find a harvest in your own bosom,—while every sorrow which you pluck out from the thoughts and feelings of a fellow creature shall be replaced by beautiful flowers of peace and joy in the sanctuary of your soul.'

Although lyrical in tone, this in substance is the message of the genuine deontologist or deontological teacher. For sixteen years before these words were written, Bentham had been preparing the manuscript of the *Deontology* to provide both a theoretical foundation and practical guidance for behaviour along these lines. There is some evidence that he began to entertain thoughts concerning this subject as early as 1793-5.[2] But serious work began in 1814, and it was in August of that year that the word 'deontology'—from the Greek *rd Seóv* meaning 'that which is proper' or 'what ought to be'—first appeared in

' UCclxxiv. 80. [2] UCxiv. 15-17.

his manuscripts.[1] Bentham sometimes used the term 'deontology' in a broad sense to cover both public and private ethics,[2] and it is clear that at one time he planned a separate work on 'political deontology', sections of which were actually written in 1816-17.[3] But it was chiefly to private ethics that the term 'deontology' came to be applied, and Bentham himself often used it as an abbreviation for his fuller term 'deontology private'. The surviving manuscript of the *Deontology* (in this sense) is divided into two parts. The first or theoretical part analyses what, according to the principle of utility, constitutes virtue, and what the relationship is between interest and duty; the second or practical part indicates ways in which an individual can promote his own well-being while enhancing, or refraining from diminishing, the well-being of others.

As indicated at the beginning of this introduction, the *Deontology* supplements the theory of morality found in An *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.* The nature of this addition, as found in the theoretical part of the *Deontology,* may now be explained further. It will be observed that more than half the sections of this part of the *Deontology* are concerned with the virtues and vices. In contrast, there is nothing in *An Introduction* on the virtues and vices except for the following explanation for their absence from the text.

> As an introduction to the principles of *morals,* in addition to the analysis it contains of the extensive ideas signified by the terms *pleasure, pain, motive* and *disposition,* it ought to have given a similar analysis of the no less extensive, though much less determinate, ideas annexed to the terms *emotion, passion, appetite, virtue, vice,* and some others, including the names of the particular *virtues* and *vices.* But as the true, and, if he conceives right, the only true ground-work for the development of the latter set of terms, has been laid by the explanations of the former, the completion of such a dictionary, so to style it, would in comparison of the commencement, be little more than a mechanical operation.[4]

The prominence given by Bentham to the analysis of the virtues and vices in the theoretical part of the *Deontology* indicates that the mere 'mechanical operation' referred to in the above quotation was insufficient. Other topics covered in the *Deontology* which are either not discussed or discussed very briefly in *An Introduction* include

[1] Bentham gave the following definition of the word in his *Chrestomathia,* Part II, London, 1817, p. 213 n. (Bowring, viii. 93 n.): 'Deontology—an account or indication of that which, on the occasion in question, whatsoever it be, is—(i.e. by him who speaks or writes is regarded as being)---------*fit, fitting, becoming, proper.*'

[2] e.g., 'Essay on Logic', Bowring, viii. 289.

[3] UC xv. 3-83.

[4] *An Introduction* (CIV), p. 3.

the following: the correct function of the moralist; well-being and ill-being; the *Summum Bonurrr,* religion as a cause of immorality; the relationship between interest and duty; the passions.[1]

In spite of these differences, both works express the same fundamental tenets. But there is one aspect of Bentham's moral theory that was altered sufficiently in the later work to deserve special mention. In *An Introduction,* chapter III, Bentham wrote of the four sanctions: the physical, the political, the moral or popular, and the religious. As the sources or, more specifically, the efficient causes of pleasure and pain, these were intended to represent all of the psychological inducements to behaviour. By 1814, however, these four sanctions had proved insufficient. Bentham was now emphasizing the ubiquitous character of the social affection of sympathy or benevolence;[2] and whereas in *An Introduction* he had treated the motive of benevolence as a branch of the physical sanction,[3] in 1814 he was referring to a separate, fifth, sanction called the social or sympathetic.[4] Although some elements of his discussion of sympathy in the theoretical part of the *Deontology* are to be found in *An Introduction,* the later work contains a more fully developed thesis about its role in the moral life of the individual.[5]

The composition of 'Deontology'

According to the dates that were written, as was Bentham's habit, in the top left-hand corner of each manuscript sheet, he worked on the

[1] The explanation offered in the quotation above for the absence of any discussion of virtue and vice in *An Introduction* also explains the absence of any discussion of the passions.

[2] UC xiv. 45 (dated 6 Sept. 1814) and xiv. 140 (dated 18 Sept. 1814); pp. 148 and 194 below.

[3] *An Introduction (CW),* p. 145.

[4] UC xv. 179^{v} (p. 151 n. 1 below). The date pencilled in the top left-hand corner of this sheet is hardly legible, but may be 19 Sept. 1814. For a fuller discussion of the sympathetic sanction, dated Dec. 1817, see UC xiv. 202-8 (pp. 201-4 below). In a letter to Etienne Dumont dated 29 Nov. 1821 (Dumont MSS, 74, fos. 41-2, Bibliothfcque Publique et Universitaire, Geneva), Bentham suggested the addition of two further sanctions, the antipathetic and the retributive.

[5] This thesis allowed Bentham to deal with the objection which declares that there is no connection between the assumption that each individual seeks to maximize his or her own happiness and the Utilitarian requirement that the aggregate happiness of the community is to be maximized. See below, pp. 192-3 and 201. In addition, the role of sympathy must be considered by those who argue that Bentham's theory is compatible with a grossly unequal distribution of happiness. For the social affection or social sanction appears to rule out the possibility that maximum happiness may be achieved by the greater portion of happiness being possessed by a relatively few individuals.

Deontology at various times between 1814 and 1831.[1] In *his Article on Utilitarianism* (Long Version), Bentham said of the manner in which he worked on the *Deontology:* '. . . he has occasionally been at work in his way for years, making occasional additions at the moment of their presenting themselves, and on the occasion of each without recurring to former ones.'[2] The main portion of the theoretical part was written between 1814 and 1819. But the *Deontology* was still not finished when Bentham died. This is indicated by the incompleteness of several sections of the theoretical part, and by the fragmentary nature of the extant manuscripts for the practical part. But just how much of the work *was* completed is a matter of conjecture. When the surviving *Deontology* manuscripts attributable to Bentham are compared with the edition of the work published by John Bowring in 1834, it is apparent that the latter contains considerably more written material, especially in the practical part, than the former. How far Bowring added material that he had composed himself independently of any Bentham manuscripts, and how far he based parts of his edition on manuscripts which have subsequently disappeared, cannot be determined. But it does seem that parts of Bentham's original manuscript have not survived. On 26 November 1822 the following entry was made in a diary kept for Bentham by one of his secretaries: 'Put into Mr. Thompson's hands two packets of Deontological matter. 1. Packet I Theoretical pp. | | 2. Packet II Practical pp. 147.'[3] William Thompson, an Irishman from County Cork (later to be well known as a socialist and feminist writer) who stayed for five months at Bentham's house in 1822, was handed a larger number of manuscript sheets on the practical part than is now, so far as can be ascertained, in existence.[4] Nevertheless, it seems likely from the state of the surviving manuscripts that the theoretical part was much closer

[1] Although Bentham did not begin writing the *Deontology* until 1814, evidence of his interest in this topic is found as early as 1793. On 23 May of that year he wrote a nine-column outline of the art of pleasing (UC xiv. 15). Two years later, on 12 September, he prepared a seven-column outline headed 'Moral Entities' (UC xiv. 17) in which he drew a distinction between the theoretical and practical parts of the subject, listed moral entities, discussed the *Summum Bonum,* and provided a catalogue of the virtues according to the Oxford *Ethices Compendium.* For further details about the *Compendium,* see p. 137 n. 1 below.

[1] See p. 306 below.

[3] BL Add. MSS 33563, fo. 114.

[4] Another indication of *Deontology* material that has gone astray is provided by the American author John Neal, who stayed with Bentham for nearly eighteen months between December 1825 and April 1827. He wrote in his edition of Bentham's *Principles of Legislation,* Boston, 1830, p. 270 n.: 'At some future day, I hope to give a summary view of Mr. Bentham's unpublished system of *Deontology.* I have it in MS., as I took it down from his own lips.' This dictated material cannot now be traced among Neal's papers in the United States.

to completion than the practical part. As will be apparent from the discussion below, Bentham left fuller and more detailed information about how the former part was to be organized than he did about the organization of the latter.

The organization of this edition of 'Deontology'.

The organization of the two parts of the *Deontology* (which will be referred to henceforth as *Deontology* I and *Deontology* II) into sections, and of each section into pages, was based on three kinds of evidence: brown folders used by Bentham to contain manuscript sheets; outlines; and the headings, content, dates, and page numbers found on the manuscript sheets themselves. There is not, as there is for most of the *Springs,* a detailed scheme of the entire work or of either of the parts.

So far *as Deontology* I is concerned, there is not even a general outline which provides an adequate account of the intended arrangement of this part of the work. What serves instead is the information recorded on the brown folders.[1] There are headings written on all the folders, and subheadings written on many of them. In addition, many folders have one or two numbers recorded in their top left-hand corners and some have letters alongside the numbers. What seems at first to be a complex array of numbers and letters yields the following progressive sequence: 1, *2,* 3, 3A/4, 3a/5, 4/6, 4/7, 4a/8, 5/9, 6/10, 6A/11, 7/11, 8/12, 9/13, 10/14, 10a/15, 11/18, 12/19, 13, 14/21, 15/22, 16/24. This sequence, with the appropriate headings and subheadings reproduced below, provide the arrangement of much of *Deontology* I.

1. Of Deontology in general / Deontology I. Theoretical / 7 July 1815.
2. Private Deontology or Ethics / Part I—Expository or Exegetic Part—Definitions, Explanations, and Arrangements / Ch. I. Place of Ethics or Private Deontology in the system of Eudaemonics: i.e. of Arts and Sciences considered in respect of their subserviency to happiness / Ch. 2. Of Happiness and Unhappiness—Pleasure and Pain, good and evil: and the corresponding desires, motives, emotions, attractions, passions.
3. Deontology / I.[2] [3] Theoretical / Ch. | | Of Well Being and

[1] The arrangement of *Deontology* I could not be influenced by what manuscript sheets were found in each folder, as one cannot be sure that the folders now contain the sheets originally placed in them by Bentham.

[2] 'Logic or Ethics' was crossed out.

Ill-being in general—Happiness and Unhappiness / §1. Well-being, what—Happiness not synonymous to it / §2. Well-being, its dependence on particular sensibility / §3. Quantity of well-being in human life—its preponderance over that of ill-being *I* Religion apart existence a conclusive proof of well-being / §4. Well-being—its preponderance perpetually on the increase / §5. Summum Bonum—the notion of its existence absurd and mischievous.

3A/4.[1] Deontology[1] [2] / I. Theoretical / Ch. I | Summum Bonum: consummate[3] nonsense.

3a/5. Deontology[2] / I. Theoretical / Ch. | | Universal End of Action, or Object of Pursuit—viz. Well-being—Is *impropriety* predicable of it?

4A/6. Deontology[2] / Deontology: I. Theoretical / Pleasure and Pain, their relation to Good and Evil.

4/7.[4] Deontology[2] / I. Theoretical / Ch. 1. Virtue what: according to the principle of Utility.

4a/8. Deontology[2] / I. Theoretical / Ch. 2. Virtue what: according to Aristotle and Oxford.

5/9. Deontology[2] / I. Theoretical / Ch. 1. Of Propriety and its connection with Utility.

6/10. Logic or Ethics / Deontology—*ad calcem*[5] / Ch. | I Of the Causes of Immorality—viz. in the degree in which it is at present prevalent.

6A/11. Deontology / 1817 / 1. Theoretical / Ch. | | Definitions § 1. Right / § | | Principle—man of .principle / § | | Conscience.

7/11. Interests and Duties / 1819 Apr. 28 / Part I. Theoretical / Ch. 1 General Explanations / §1. Relation between interest and duty considered in general / §2. Interest in relation to pleasures and pains—happiness and unhappiness—value of a pleasure or pain—its elements / §3. Interest, pleasures and pains: their relation to good and evil / §4. Interests, pleasures and pains—their relation to desires and motives / §5. Interests, pleasures and pains, and motives—-their relation to the several sanctions / §6. Interest, modifications of—interest of the moment, the subject, the occasion—interest of the whole of life—interest true and false, what / §7. Obligation and duty, their relation to

[1] '3' was crossed out.
[2] 'Logic or Ethics' was crossed out.
[3] MS orig. 'solemn'.
[4] '6' was crossed out.
[5] 'near the end'.

interest—and to certain of the sanctions—obligation and duty how created—Duty, proper sense of the word.

8/12. Interests and Duties / Part I. Theoretical / Ch. 2. General Explanations continued. Primary[1] virtues—secondary[2] virtues / §1. Principal Virtues: 1. Self-regarding, Prudence; 2. Extra-regarding, Beneficence including Benevolence / §2. Aristotle's the current list of virtues—Cardinal Virtues—Ordinary Virtues not Cardinal / §3. Aristotle's Cardinal Virtues—defectiveness of the list—Beneficence and Benevolence / §4. All other virtues modifications of the two principal—one or the other or both of them / § 5. Aristotle's Golden Mean—its nothingness.

9/13. Interest and Duties *I* Part I. Theoretical *I* Ch. 3 § 1. Human instruments of good and evil, 1. Thought, 2. Action (external at large), 3. Discourse: N.B. Except in so far as it may influence action, to self alone can *thought* be an instrument of good or evil. / §2. Thought §3. Action—positive and negative. / §4. Discourse, actual and virtual: virtual is 1. silence, 2. deportment, i.e. action.

10/14. Deontology I.[3] Theoretical *I* Ch. 2. Of Propriety as between Prudence, Probity and Beneficence.

10a/15. Logic or Ethics / Ch. or § | | The virtues or modifications of Virtue classed.[4]

11/18. Logic or Ethics / Ethics—Theory / Ch. or § | | Of Temperance.

12/19. Deontology[3] / Subordinate Virtues / Ch. or § | | Of Fortitude / §1. its relation to the primary virtues according to the principle of Utility / §2. Account given of it by the Aristotelians.

13. Deontology[3] / Deontology? / Justice—its relation to the three primary Virtues.

14/21. Deontology / I. Theoretical / Ch. | | Of Pride and Vanity.

15/22. Deontology /1. Theoretical / Ch. | | § | | Of Purity, considered in relation to Pain and Pleasure.

16/24.[5] Deontology / Theoretical *I* Ch. | | Of the Passions.

[1] MS orig. 'Principal'. [2] MS orig. 'subservient'.

[3] 'Logic or Ethics' was crossed out.

[4] Beneath this folder there is another brown folder, unnumbered, on which is written the following: 'Deontology / 1. Theoretical / Ch. 3. Virtue its modifications and divisions------the Virtues and Vices classed / § 1. Virtues primary and secondary / § 2. Opposite and corresponding Vices / § 3. Of Prudence [...?] and its corresponding Vice, Selfishness / § 4. Probity and Improbity / § 5. Beneficence and Benevolence. Maleficence and Malevolence.'

[5] '17' was crossed out.

Bentham's use of the same number (with letters alongside) for different sections suggests that he may have considered merging at least some of the sections so numbered. This, for instance, is indicated in the case of section 3 and section 3A/4, where the last subheading in 3 introduces the topic of discussion in 3A/4.

The gaps in the right-hand sequence of numbers suggest that Bentham intended to add some new sections to the theoretical part. This is supported by the fact that among the unnumbered folders there are two (on amity and fictitious entities) for which complete written sections exist.[1] * * * The following is written on the first of these folders:

> Logic or Ethics *I* Deontology / Effective Benevolence 1. Negative / Ch. | | Of Propriety, with reference to the pleasures and pains of Amity / §2. Opposition made by an error of the popular sanction to the pursuit of those pleasures.

On the second is written:

> Logic or Ethics / Ch. | | Fictitious Entities deriving their import from the Pleasures and Pains of the Moral Sanction—their import—their corruptive influence.

The decision to include these two unnumbered sections in the text of *Deontology I* was also based on the fact that both are referred to in the section entitled 'Of Propriety as between Prudence, Probity and Beneficence'.[2] The decision to place them between the sections called 'Justice—its relation to the three primary Virtues' and 'Of Pride and Vanity' was influenced by their content as well as by the fact that they were written at approximately the same time.

With the exception of the two sections just mentioned, the sequence of sections *ton Deontology* I follows the numbered sequence. The data found on the folders provided the basis for the organization of the content of each section. The following are the titles and the exact sequence of manuscript sheets employed in each of the sections of *Deontology* I.

I. 1. Of Deontology in general—UC xiv. 232, 273, 233-6.
I. 2. Expository or exegetical part: definitions, explanations, and arrangements—UC xiv. 215 (par. 1), cii. 202, xiv. 215 (pars. 2-3), 216-18,186-8.
I. 3. Of Well-being and ill-being in general: happiness and unhappiness—UC xiv. 34-41.
I. 4. Summum Bonum: consummate nonsense—UC xiv. 43, 57-79.

[1] See UC xv. 27 2^{V} for a detailed outline concerning amity.
[2] See pp. 194 and 206-7 below.

I. 5. Universal end of action—UCxiv.44-8.
I. 6. Pleasure and pain: their relation to good and evil. Aphorisms —UC xiv. 49-53.
I. 7. Virtue what—according to principle of utility—UC xiv. 84, 86-93,85.
I. 8. Virtue what—according to Aristotle and Oxford—UC xiv. 108-12.
I. 9. Of propriety and its connection with utility—UC xiv. 135-8.
I. 10. Of the causes of immorality: religion misapplied—xiv. 126-34.
I. 11. Definitions: right, obligation, principle—xiv. 180-5.
1.12. Interests and duties: general explanations—xiv. 190-1, 277-9.
1.13. Primary and secondary virtues—UC xiv. 266, 265, 267, 227, 230-1, xv. 84, 87, 86, 551^{v}, 544-50.
1.14. Human instruments of good and evil—UC xiv. 219-24.
1.15. Of propriety as between prudence, probity, and beneficence —UC xiv. 81-3, xv. 310^{v}, 150^{v}, xiv. 139-41, cii. 211, xv. 278^{v}, 276v, 275^{v}, xiv. 197-214.
1.16. The virtues or modifications of virtue classed—UC xiv. 281-5, 94-9.
1.17. Of temperance—UC xiv. 123-4.
1.18. Of fortitude—UC xiv. 113-21.
1.19. Justice—its relation to the three primary virtues—UC xiv. 103-7.
I. 20. Propriety with reference to the pleasures and pains of amity—UC xiv. 154-6, xv. 273^{v}, xiv. 157-65.
I. 21. Fictitious entities deriving their import from the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction—UC xiv. 166-73.
I. 22. Of pride and vanity—UC xiv. 242-54.
I. 23. Of purity, considered in relation to pain and pleasure—UC xiv. 54-6.
I. 24. Of the passions—UC xiv. 256-63.

Details concerning the manuscript sheets employed as the basis of the respective sections will be found in the notes. However, some additional attention needs to be paid here to sections 12,13, and 14.

On 16 April 1819 Bentham wrote an outline with the heading 'Deontology—Private. Rudiments' which contains a title beginning 'Man's Interests and Duties'.[1] On 26 April 1819 Bentham produced another outline with the heading 'Deontology Ch. 1 Rudiments—anticipated Contents', which begins 'Of man's interests and duties in

[1] See UC xiv. 226 and p. 119 below (note on title-page for *Deontology)* for the complete title dated 16 Apr. 1819.

general'.[1] This phrase is similar to the heading of section 1 recorded on the brown folder numbered 7/11. The headings for sections 2-7 are also found on a set of empty sheets dated 28 April 1819.[2] On 24 June 1819, Bentham produced a sheet of marginals with the heading 'Marginals revised'.[3] These correspond to the discussion in UC xiv. 232-5, dated 11 June 1819, which is the basis of I. 1. On the same day (24 June) Bentham recorded another title beginning 'Man's Interests and Duties'.[4] This phrase is also used as the major heading on folders 7/11, 8/12, and 9/13.

What happened in April-June 1819 indicates a revision in the structure of the *Deontology,* which was now to centre on man's interests and duties. 'Interests and Duties' is not the title of a section in the way that 'Summum Bonum—consummate nonsense' or 'Virtue what —according to Aristotle and Oxford' is, but is rather like 'Deontology Private', which refers to an entire work. And indeed, what we find indicated on folders 7/11, 8/12, and 9/13 is Part I, Chapters 1, 2, and 3, of a book whose title begins 'Man's Interests and Duties'.

Sections 12,13, and 14 of this edition were in 1819 to be the opening sections of a book. But Bentham apparently changed his mind about this arrangement. This is indicated partly by the folder numbers, which, it is assumed, were written in some time after the headings and subheadings, and which place the relevant manuscript sheets in the middle of *Deontology* I; and partly by the fact that there are no other outlines which refer to interests and duties and no other folder descriptions similar to those on folders 7/11, 8/12, and 9/13.

Deontology II is based on sixty-five manuscript sheets. Aside from scraps and some repetitive fragments, this is all that is now available. As mentioned above, Bentham gave or lent William Thompson 147 pages of *Deontology* II. But we do not know whether these pages were different from the extant set of manuscripts or whether the latter is all that remains of the former. However, it is clear that Bentham's surviving writings on the practical part are not in the same state of completion as the manuscripts for the theoretical part. Although there are brown folders enclosing the manuscript sheets in the practical part, none are numbered. Moreover, the headings and subheadings found on these folders do not reveal the intended organization of this part.

Fortunately, Bentham left a skeletal plan of the *Deontology,*

[1] UC xiv. 228.

[1] UC xv. 160^{v}-166^{v}. UC xiv. 229 is another blank sheet, with the same heading as the one for § 8 on the folder numbered 7/11.

[3] UC xiv. 240.

[4] See UC xiv. 241 and note on title-page for the *Deontology,* p. 119 below.

written on 26 February 1821,[1] which provided a broad indication of the main sections to be employed in the practical part. In addition, the headings and content of the manuscript sheets provided indications of the subsections to be used within a given section. On the basis of this evidence, the following arrangement of sections, subsections and manuscript page sequences was arrived at:

II. 1. Introduction.
- (i) Expository—UC xiv. 274-5.
- (ii) Mode of exercising the function of the practical moralist —UC xiv. 142-5,148-53.
- (iii) Effective benevolence: its pleasures how new—UC xiv. 90-2.

II. 2. Self-Regarding Prudence.
- (i) Command of mind over thoughts—UC xiv. 238, xv. 387^{v}, 402^{v}, 409^{v}, 405^{v}, xiv. 196.

II. 3. Extra-Regarding Prudence: Negative.
- (i) Introduction—UC xv. 110, 473, 580^{v}.
- (ii) Modes of annoyance—UC xv. 561^{v}, 517^{v}, 518^{v}, 480, 519^{v}, 503^{v}, 481, 514, xiv. 239, clxxiii. 72^{v}, 71^{v}, 77, xv. 533^{v}, 516, 510, 513, 94, 523-4, 526-9.
- (iii) Of relations between men and men—UC xv. 459^{v}, 464^{v}, 454-5,457^{v}, 456.
- (iv) In using the sanctions—xv. 88.
- (v) Interrogation: an instrument of tyranny—xv. 431^{v}.
- (vi) Arrogance in communication of alleged facts—xv. 492.
- (vii) Good breeding—UC xv. 111.
- (viii) Ill-will—UC xv. 474, 553.

II. 4. Extra-Regarding Prudence: Positive.
- (i) Positive effective benevolence—UC xv. 575-6, 543^{v}.
- (ii) Art of ingratiating—UC xv. 449^{v}, 448^{v}.

A Comparison between this Edition and the Bowring Edition of 'Deontology'

The only previous edition of the *Deontology* is that produced by John Bowring, Bentham's literary executor, and published in two volumes in 1834. In the preface to volume i of his edition, Bowring wrote:

> This work was In the course of preparation for the press when its great Author's earthly labors were suddenly closed. He had, up to the latest period of his existence, been accustomed to record the desultory thoughts which occurred to his

[1] UC xiv. 267-72. Sheet 269 contains the title dated 26 Feb. 1821 (see note on title-page for *Deontology,* p. 119 below).

mind on the important subject of which the volume treats; and I had the advantage, in my intimate communion with him, of seeking such guidance from him as was necessary for the understanding and arrangement of the mass of undigested fragments which he from time to time placed in my hands.[1]

In the Preface to volume ii, Bowring wrote: 'The materials out of which this volume has been put together, are, for the most part, disjointed fragments, written on small scraps of paper, on the spur of the moment, at times remote from one another, and delivered into my hands without order or arrangement of any sort.'[2] So far as one can judge from the existing manuscripts, what Bowring said about the materials for the practical part is essentially correct. But what he said about the theoretical part is quite misleading. There is no 'mass of undigested fragments', and Bentham's arrangement of this part, as has been shown in this Introduction, is fairly clear.

Before more is said about Bowring's approach to the editing of the work, a survey may usefully be provided of the relationship between the present edition, which is based exclusively on Bentham's surviving manuscripts, and the edition produced by Bowring. In the following table, the left-hand numbers refer to the part, section, and pages of the present edition; the right-hand numbers—referring to the volume, chapter, pages, and paragraphs of the Bowring edition, denote passages which are related to the identified portions of the present edition.[3]

Theoretical Part

I. 1,121	Vol. i, I, 11
1,122-4	15-16
I. 3, entire	Vol. i, V, entire
I. 4, entire	Vol. i, III, 39 (par. 2)-55
I. 5,148	Vol. i, VI, 83 (par. 2)-84 (par. 2)
I. 6, entire	Vol. i, IV, 59-62 (par. 2)
I. 7, 155-9	Vol. i, X, 143 (par. 2)-150 (par. 2)
I. 8, entire	Vol. i, X, 150 (par. 3)-154
I. 9, entire	Vol. i, II, 35-7

[1] *Deontology; or. The Science of Morality: in which the harmony and coincidence of duty and self-interest, virtue and felicity, prudence and benevolence, are explained and exemplified. From the MSS. of Jeremy Bentham. Arranged and edited by John Bowring,* 2 vols., London and Edinburgh, 1834, i, p. vii.

[3] Ibid, ii, pp. ix-x.

[3] This survey is not an attempt to record every detail of the relationship between the two editions.

I. 10,165-7	Vol. i, VIII, 126 (par. 3)-128 (par. 2)
1,11,171-4	Vol. i, IX, 133 (par. 3)-135
1.12,176-7	Vol. i, VII, 89 (par. 2)-121
1.13, 179	Vol. i, X, 145 (par. 3-5)
180	140 (par. 5)-141 (par. 2)
181-2	Vol. ii, II, 90-1
184-6	V, 259-65 (par. 2)
1.14,186-8	Vol. ii, II, 82 (par. 2)-85 (par. 1)
189-90	107-9 (par. 1)
1.15,193	Vol. i, II, 23
198-205	XII, 167-75
205-7	I, 7-10
1.16, 208	Vol. i, X, 139 (par. 2)
211	155
212-13	XIIL 176-7
1.17, entire	Vol. i, XV, 200-1 (par. 1)
1.18, entire	Vol. i, XV, 196 (par. 4)-200 (par. 1)
I. 20, entire	Vol. i, XV, 204 (par. 2)-211
I. 21, entire	Vol. i, VII, 92-6 (par. 3)
I. 22, entire	Vol. i, XV, 211-20
I. 23, entire	Vol. i, IV, 75 (par. 4)-77
I. 24, entire	Vol. i, XVIII, 263-8 (par. 1)

Practical Part

II. 1 (i), 249	Vol. i, II, 21
II. 2 (i), 258	Vol. ii, II, 92
II. 3 (i), 260-1	Vol. ii, IV, 193 (par. 8)-194
II. 3 (ii), 263-4	Vol. ii, IV, 201
265	219 (par. 4)-220
266	231 (par. 3)-232
267-70	235-44
II. 3 (iii), 271-2	Vol. ii, III, 180-1 (par. 2)
II. 3 (vii), 276-7	Vol. ii, IV, 239-40 (par. 1)
II. 3 (viii), 277	Vol. ii, IV, 195-6 (par. 1)
II. 4 (i), 278-9	Vol. ii, V, 286-8 (par. 1)
II. 4 (ii), 280	Vol. ii, III, 165-6 (par. 3)

A comparison of the corresponding section and chapter numbers shows considerable differences in the sequences of topics employed in the two editions. Also, some differences have arisen from the fact that material treated as distinct sections in the present edition formed part of a single chapter in the Bo wring edition; and volume i of the

Bowring edition contains two chapters (XVI, 'Hume's Virtues', and XVII, 'False Virtues') which are not included in the present edition of the *Deontology*. More broadly, it is quite clear that the text of the two Bowring volumes is much longer than the text of the present edition.

When the substance of the two editions is examined, the following facts emerge. Bowring's Christian belief led him to alter or omit anti-Christian passages written by Bentham. Thus Bowring's volume i, chapter V, in comparison with section I. 3 of the present edition, puts less emphasis on the role of religion in negatively affecting the well-being of mankind; it does not say as starkly as Bentham did that since suicide was justified for Jesus it must be justified on Christian principles for any human being; and it omits the discussion of Otho, who, according to Bentham, resembled Jesus in that he committed suicide for the good of others. Also, because of their anti-Christian flavour the discussions found in I. 10, pp. 168-70,1. 18, pp. 216-17, and I. 22, p. 240, were omitted from the Bowring text. With regard to other topics, it appears from those parts of the Bowring volumes that can be compared directly with surviving Bentham manuscripts that Bowring was quite conscientious in adhering to Bentham's ideas.

However, it is clear that the wording of virtually the whole of Bowring's edition was his rather than Bentham's. The bulk of the manuscript from which it was printed is preserved among the Bentham MSS (UC xv. 131-592); and with the exception of a few sections in the handwriting of Bentham's amanuenses, and a small number of sheets —all incorporated in the text of volume ii—which are in Bentham's own hand, the whole of the manuscript was written by Bowring. A considerable amount of it was written on the blank side of sheets which Bentham had previously used for his own writings on deontology. How much of Bentham's original manuscript was actually thrown away by Bowring, and how far the sections of his edition which do not correspond to any surviving Bentham manuscripts were based on manuscripts which are now lost, it is impossible to say. What is clear is that where Bowring did base his own text on material composed by Bentham, he did not stick very closely to the original. He sometimes summarized what Bentham said, sometimes enlarged on it, and frequently paraphrased and simplified his sentences.

Bowring's conception and execution of his role as editor can, with some degree of conjecture, be sketched as follows. He was very closely associated with Bentham from 1820 onwards, and was in the habit of discussing the *Deontology* with him during the last years of his life. When Bentham died and left him the manuscripts, he was confident that he knew the essentials of what Bentham had in mind; but he did not feel obliged to follow the details of the arrangement

indicated (for the theoretical part) by the brown folders, or to adopt the exact form of what Bentham had written. Instead, he arranged the topics and the manuscripts relating to them as he saw fit, rewrote Bentham's sentences with the intention of making them more readable, and probably composed a substantial amount of supplementary material himself.[1]

'ARTICLE ON UTILITARIANISM'

In March 1829 the *Edinburgh Review* published—anonymously, as was the practice of the quarterly reviews—the article by Thomas Babington Macaulay entitled 'Utilitarian Logic and Politics', which was a critique of James Mill's *Essay on Government.*[2] Bentham does not appear to have read the article; but, perhaps at the request of Thomas Perronet Thompson, the proprietor and editor of the *Westminster Review,* he wrote in the early part of June 1829 two versions of an essay to which he gave the title *Article on Utilitarianism.* Although this was clearly not meant to be a direct reply to Macaulay, it was presumably intended as an article, or as the basis for an article, which would protect Utilitarianism against misrepresentation by giving an explicit and authentic account of the evolution and significance of the principle of utility.

Neither version of Bentham's essay was well adapted to polemical use, and Perronet Thompson, in the reply to the *Edinburgh Review* which he published in the *Westminster* in July 1829,[3] drew on only a few parts of the longer version. The *Westminster* article, however, had been advertised in advance of publication in the following terms: 'Greatest Happiness Principle Developed.—With Mr. Bentham's latest improvements, now published for the first time: and an Answer to the attacks of the Edinburgh Review.'[4] Consequently, when Macaulay

[1] In later life Bowring treated the *Deontology* as his own work. In his *Autobiographical Recollections* (London, 1877) he provided a list of his principal writings, being careful to indicate that some of these were based on Bentham's manuscripts; but the *Deontology* was included without any reference to Bentham.

[2] *Edinburgh Review,* xlix. 159-89. For this article and the ensuing controversy, see Jack Lively and John Rees (eds.). *Utilitarian Logic and Politics: James Mill's 'Essay on Government', Macaulay's critique and the ensuing debate,* Oxford, 1978; and Louis Werner, 'A Note about Bentham on Equality and about the Greatest Happiness Principle', *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* xi (1973), 237-51.

[3] *Westminster Review,* xi. 254-68. Perronet Thompson reprinted this article in his collection of essays entitled *Exercises, Political and Others,* 6 vols., London, 1842, i. 121-36.

[4] The advertisement is quoted in *Westminster Review,* xi. 527 n., and in Werner, op. cit., p. 245 n.

wrote a further article replying to the *Westminster,* he entitled it 'Bentham's Defence of Mill: Utilitarian System of Philosophy', and made the assumption throughout that Bentham himself had written the *Westminster* article.[1] This led Bentham to write a letter to the *Examiner*—published in the issue of 5 July 1829—in which he disclaimed responsibility for the article in the following way:

> Hearing in general terms, that in an article in an *Edinburgh Review,* the *Greatest Happiness Principle* had been hardly dealt with, I either offered or consented (I forget which) to furnish, and did accordingly furnish, a few pages composed of memorandums, forming a sort of history of that principle from its birth to the present time: a heap of rough materials which, were I ever to see them in the form, whatever it may be, that has been given to them by the Editors, I should expect to find employed to much better advantage than by the original compiler they had been or could have been. So much as to that part of the article in the *Westminster.* But as to anything which in that article may have been said of the *Edinburgh,* and as to anything which in the *Edinburgh* may have been said to the disadvantage of any individual,—on neither of these topics, in that or any other paper of mine, has anything been at any time said by me.
>
> Neither of the one article nor of the other has time as yet permitted me to take cognizance, otherwise than as above: nor is its ever doing so very probable.

The Manuscripts of the Two Versions of the 'Article on Utilitarianism'

The surviving manuscripts show that Bentham's remark in the letter just quoted about 'a heap of rough materials' is misleading. The versions he wrote were considerably more finished and coherent than the phrase suggests.

The long version of the *Article* survives in two sets of manuscripts, both of which are dated 2-9 June 1829. The following sheets constitute the first set, which will be referred to as A: UC xiv. 317-54, 423-5, 432-3, 438-9, 446-7, 450-1. The second set, which will be referred to as B, is UC xiv. 358-97. There are also, at UC xiv. 314-16 and 355-7, two complete sets of eighty-four numbered marginals, both transcribed by an amanuensis, and reproducing the marginals which are found alongside the text in both A and B. The first page of the first set of marginals carries the following note: 'N.B. The pages referred to are the pages of the original'; and the page numbers subjoined to each marginal are also to be found on the appropriate sheets of A. The first page of the second set of marginals carries a similar note, indicating that the page numbers attached to the marginals refer to 'the copy'; and these numbers correspond to those found on the appropriate sheets of B. A substantial amount of A is in fact

[1] *Edinburgh Review,* xlix (1829), 273-99.

in the handwriting of an amanuensis, but twenty-four complete sheets of it are in Bentham's hand.[1] The whole of B was written by amanuenses.

The reason why several sheets of A are not to be found with the main group of this set of manuscripts (UC xiv. 317-54) is that they were extracted by John Bowring and incorporated in the manuscript of his own 'History of the Greatest Happiness Principle', which he published at the end of volume i of his edition of the *Deontology.* The text of the long version of the *Article on Utilitarianism* printed below is based primarily on A ('the original'); but B ('the copy') was of use in indicating how A should be reconstituted from the scattered sheets belonging to it.

The manuscript of the short version, dated 9-11 June 1829, is at UC xiv. 399-411, and will be referred to as C. At UC xiv. 398 there is a sheet of twenty-five marginals, dated 10 June and bearing the title 'Article on Utilitarianism, in W. R.'[2] These are transcriptions, in the hand of an amanuensis, of the marginals which appear, in the same hand, alongside the text on sheets 399-406. Apart from these marginals, and a few lines at the bottom of sheet 406, the whole of C is in Bentham's hand.

There are several notes in the manuscripts which indicate that Perronet Thompson and Bowring were assisting Bentham with the *Article-,*[3] but the ways in which they respectively used his manuscripts were quite different. Thompson, in his article for the *Westminster Review* of July 1829, based two passages on portions of A.[4] Bowring, in his 'History of the Greatest Happiness Principle', made use of both A and C. For the most part, he followed the sequence of topics presented in C, while putting the material into his own words. But he also supplemented this treatment by inserting and adding passages that were either based on, or taken verbatim from, A.[5]

* These are UC xiv. 325-8, 332-3, 335-8, 340, 344-54, 432-3, 450-1. Two of the original sheets were torn into two parts: see sheets 350 and 432, and 344 and 450.

[2] The sheets of marginals for A and B carried the title 'Article on Utilitarianism'.

[3] UCxiv. 336, 379, 405.

" pp. 258-60 were loosely based on sections 2-15, and pp. 267-8 on sections 17-21 and 54-8.

[5] The sections of A that were incorporated directly in Bowring's version are as follows, with the corresponding page numbers in *Deontology* (1834), i: 7-8 (pp. 298-300), part of 13 (pp. 315-16), part of 14 (pp. 316-17), part of 30 and 31-3 (pp. 300-2), part of 44 and 4 5-6 (pp. 323-5), part of 54 and 55-8 (pp. 328-30), 74-7 (pp. 308-10).

PRESENTATION OF THE TEXTS

Some of the manuscripts on which this edition is based, such as the surviving part of the introduction to A *Table of the Springs of Action* and the two versions of the *Article on Utilitarianism,* appear to have been written with a direct eye to publication and are in a relatively finished form. The sheets of marginals, however, were not intended for publication, and the various *Deontology* manuscripts are for the most part rough drafts, some of them in the handwriting of amanuenses. In this edition, Bentham's spelling has not been changed, but obvious misspellings by his amanuenses have been silently corrected. Particular problems have arisen over punctuation. Bentham's own punctuation, especially in the *Deontology* manuscripts, is erratic and perfunctory, and in some of the material written by his amanuenses there is hardly any punctuation apart from an occasional full point. As these deficiencies often make Bentham's convoluted sentences difficult to follow, some editorial liberty has been exercised in supplying and adjusting punctuation marks. Also, when Bentham was discussing a particular word or phrase as a term he tended to underline it, but in this edition such words and phrases have been placed in quotation marks, italics being reserved for instances where Bentham used underlining for purposes of emphasis.

As regards Bentham's habit of writing alternative words and phrases, usually above the line, without deleting the original, the practice has been followed of generally preferring his 'second thoughts'. Cases where there seems to be a significant difference between the two readings, and cases where for reasons of clarity or consistency the original reading has been preferred, are recorded in editorial footnotes. Bentham's own footnotes are indicated by suprascript letters and editorial footnotes by suprascript numerals, with a separate sequence for each page of the text.

N.B. The five Appendices (A-E) which are printed below (pp. 331-77) have brief introductions, which for ease of reference have been printed immediately before the Appendices to which they respectively relate.

A TABLE OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION

A

TABLE

OF

THE SPRINGS OF ACTION:

Shewing the several Species of PLEASURES and PAINS, of which Man's Nature is susceptible; together with the several Species of Interests, Desires, and *MOTIVES,* respectively corresponding to them : and the several Sets of Appellatives *Neutral, Eulogistic,* and *Dyslogistic,* by which each Species of *MOTIVE* is wont to be designated:

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

EXPLANATORY NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS,

Indicative of the applications of which the matter of this TABLE is susceptible, in the character of a *Basis* or *Foundation,* of and for the Art and Science of MORALS, otherwise termed ETHICS,—whether ***PRIVATE,*** or ***PUBLIC*** *alius* POLITICS—(including LEGISLATION)—***THEORETICAL,*** or ***PRACTICAL*** *alias* DEONTOLOGY—***EXEGETICAL*** *alias* ***EXPOSITORY,*** (which coincides mostly with ***THEORETICAL,)*** or ***CENSORIAL,*** which coincides mostly with DEONTOLOGY : also of and for PSYCHOLOGY, in so far as concerns ETHICS, and HISTORY (including BIOGRAPHY) in so far as considered in an ***ETHICAL*** *point* of view.

BY J E R EM Y BENTHAM, Esa.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY RICHARD AND ARTHUR TAYLOR, SHOE-LANE.

1815.

A

TABLE

OF

THE SPRINGS OF ACTION:

SHEWING

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BY JEREMY BENTHAM, Esa.

LONDON:

SOLD BY ft. HUNTER, ST. PAUL's CHURCHYARD,

1817

A TABLE OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION: MARGINALS

I. INTRODUCTION[1]

Entities, real and fictitious; Names of entities

1. Every noun substantive is the name of a real or fictitious[2] entity.

2. Real entities alone can be the subjects of strictly true propositions.

3. Abstractedly from all relations to real entities, a proposition having for its subject a fictitious entity has neither truth nor meaning.

4. The above observations true, follow two axioms: 1. A term [not][3] significative of a real entity can not be clearly understood otherwise than by means of some relation which the import of it is seen to bear to the import of some term significative of a real entity.

5. 2. The relation of the import of a term significative of a fictitious entity to a ditto significative of a real entity can not be made apparent otherwise than by making up out of the two terms two propositions of which the signification shall be the same.

6. The same more shortly: 1. A fictitious entity can not be understood but by its relation to the correspondent real entity.

7. 2. A proposition having for its subject the name of a fictitious entity can not be understood without having for its interpretation a proposition.

8. Setting aside its relation to a proposition having for its subject a real entity, a ditto having for ditto a fictitious ditto is but falsehood or nonsense.

9. No imputation is, by this, conveyed on the use of fictitious entity propositions. Fictitious entity propositions are necessary to all discourse other than such as might be carried on by inferior animals.

10. For discourse having fur its subject the state or any operations of the mind, fictitious entity discourse is necessary, real entity discourse being inapplicable.

[1] The sequence of marginals for this section is taken from UC clviii. 103-5. The fourth column of sheet 103 contains an outline of the section, which is not reproduced here. Marginals 1-33 correspond to the surviving part of Bentham's MS 'Introduction', which is printed below (pp. 74-9). For elucidation of these marginals, see the text itself and editorial notes on it.

[2] MS 'factitious'.

[3] The sense of the paragraph (p. 74 below) requires this insertion.

The definition explains and is proved by the Table

11. Of the truth of these observations, the ensuing Encyclopedical Table will afford exemplification and proof.

By their relation to real, the import of divers fictitious entities will be made perceptible.

12. In all language two parts: 1. real; 2. fictitious. In the real, the fictitious will be seen throughout to have its root.

13. Fictitious entities in question: 1. Desires and aversions; 2. Wants; 3. Hopes and Fears; 4. Interest.

14. Correspondent real entities in which these fictitious entities have their root: *Pleasures* and *Pains.*

Entities, what real, what fictitious, controverted

15. Pleasures and Pains are, doubtless real entities. Of their existence, the evidence is more immediate than that of bodies or of mind.

16. Sensation with or without pleasure or pain are the only immediately *perceptible* entities. AU others are but *inferential.*

17. By *materialists,* mind, separated or not from body, has, as also God, been ranked with fictitious entities. Berkeley, as if in retaliation, did so by *body.*

18. These abstruse portions of the field not the only ones on which the question as between real and fictitious entity has been started. Thus, light and heat have had their *aphotists* and *athermists.*

19. But, here, the ruling few, not having regarded themselves as interested, have kept the question open to free discussion without employing light or heat in the shape of penal fire to settle it.[1]

20. After what is above, the question about real and fictitious entities will not be pronounced practically unimportant.

21. For further exemplification and proof of this importance, take the words ‘right’ and ‘obligation’.

22. Definition being the acknowledged instrument of clarification, in case of doubt or dispute, a man commonly applies it to the leading term. Yet, commonly, after the operation, the subject is found to [be] less intelligible than before.

23. By definition, the only mode of exposition commonly understood is that *per genus et differentiam.* (This term explained.)

24. Where the word is the name of a fictitious entity, frequently it has no superior genus. And then, that mode of exposition is inapplicable.

[1] Below this marginal is written the following note in Bentham’s hand: ‘To J. M. Quere whether it may not be best to end here omitting the contents of the written sheets?’ (‘J. M.’ stands for James Mill.)

25. In that case, the ordinary reasoning is at best a synonym by which no information is conveyed, no dispute decided.

26. *Conceditur,*[1] names of fictitious entities which have superior genuses are not absolutely without example.

27. Witness, 'privilege' and 'exemption', immediately superior genus, 'right'.

28. But in comparison of those which have none, those which have others above them in the Porphyrian tree are few. And those that have any have seldom more than one.

29. Example, 'right'. What [is] a right? Answer: a right is not *a* any thing. The genus it distinguishes has none above it.

30. Here, then, is an example of a case in which a definition in the ordinary sense is impossible.

31. It is, notwithstanding, susceptible of *exposition.* If it were not, that class of words which stands most in need of it would be destitute of it.

Paraphrasis—where the substitute to definition

32. The mode of exposition suited to the case is *paraphrasis:* the name of the fictitious entity in question is made parcel of a *phrase,* which contains in it the correspondent and *expository* real entity. Appellatives alethosemantic and plastosemantic or pseudosemantic [?].

33. Form of such a paraphrasis in the case of a *right:* 'A man is said to have a right when, etc.'.

34. In this place, no room for completing the exposition. Of right, there are many species, some of them requiring different paraphrases.

Paraphrasis the substitute. Obligation expounded; its sources various

35. For [exposition][2] of *right,* use would be made of *obligation:* which, being a fictitious entity, could not be expounded but by paraphrasis. This brings us to observation 2.

36. For exposition of obligation, *convenience* might recommend the bringing to view its connection with *expressions* of *will* and *command:* necessity requires ditto as to pleasures and pains.

37. General Rule. Sources or modes of obligation, as many as sources of pain and pleasure, thence of motives.

38. [Sanctions][3] sources of *pain* and *pleasure,* thence of *motives:*

[1] 'Granted'. [2] MS 'expression'. [3] MS 'Sensations'.

1. Political, including legal; 2. Popular or moral; 3. Religious; 4. Sympathetic; 5. Physical.[1]

39. Limitations necessary: 1. To constitute obligation requires force greater than can be exerted by pleasure.

40. 2. The motive is not regarded as constitutive of *obligation* except where its prevalence is regarded with approbation.

41. 3. By the mere physical [sanction],[2] obligation is not regarded as constituted. Fear of the pain of burning suffices in ordinary cases to withold a man from thrusting his hand into the fire. But so far from his being under obligation not to do so, in certain cases he is considered as under obligation to do so, ex. gr. to save a wife or child.

Obligation—its sources various; conflicting obligations

42. So favourably regarded is the sympathetic sanction, every one is ready to regard it as constitutive of obligation. But in what cases and to what effect?

43. Of these [five][3] sanctions, the social or sympathetic is, continually, according to the magnitude of the scale, presenting opposite courses of action, thus, acting at variance with itself: the others influencing, and thus supporting or opposing one another. Direction taken by the *popular* depends, in great degree, upon ditto given to it by the political: e *contra,* so does that of the political by the direction | | taken by the popular. The religious is in some countries tyrant over, in others tyrannized by, the political. In every country, in various parts of the field of action, these forms are irreconcilably opposite. In no country are they in complete subjection to the principle of utility. (The principle defined.)

44. In this confusion and uncertainty, self-interest and conceit when supported by power or influence see nothing but *certainty.* Calling for prostration of the will and understanding, thus demonstrate self-contradictory propositions.

Obligation and Right: Exposition—its difficulties

45. On the above grounds might be constructed paraphrastic expositions of 'right' and 'obligation': whereby, in a form as precise as definitive, the import of 'right' and 'obligation', of 'right' through 'obligation', might be explained, viz. by indications of the connections

[1] In *An Introduction,* Bentham identified four sanctions: the physical, the political, the moral, and the religious. The sanction identified here as the 'sympathetic' constitutes a fifth sanction. See *An Introduction (CW),* pp. 34 ff. and *Deontology* I, p. 151 n. 1 and p. 1 77, below.

[2] MS 'sensation'.

[3] MS 'four'.

which import of these fictitious entities has with that of the corresponding real ones, viz. 'pleasure' and 'pain'.

46. Obligations form different sanctions acting in opposite directions. In which lies the rule of right? Cases of this sort are strewed over the whole field: they form a large part of the Dramatist's and Moralist's stock. For decision, scarce has any sober rule been laid down by any one. The side which best suits with his interests and prepossessions he espouses. For reasons, strong expressions—viz. tending to bring down hatred or contempt on gainsayers.

47. In this state of things, *per dictum (Edinburgh] Review)* the field of Ethics is exhausted, *every* thing done and produced in it that can be.[1] Truer to say, *nothing* done. Vegetation indeed plenty, but all weeds sowed by *ipsedixitism.* Identical propositions—Eulogistic and Dyslogistic appellations—strong, i.e. rancorous expressions: vague generalities which may mean nothing or any thing what suits the personal purpose.

Principle of Utility, the only Source of Solution

48. Principle of general utility the only trustworthy guide, but every where opposed.

49. Principles of utility two, or if but one, it is understood in two senses—viz. *the censorial* and the *expositive* or *exhibitive.* (Censorial, what. Expository, what.)

50. Meantime, the principle of utility has been pronounced *dangerous:*[2] as good, say security, is dangerous or danger [is] safe.

51. *Conceditur,* in a certain sense, i.e. to certain classes, that principle is dangerous, viz. to the interests of the ruling and influential few, in so far as adverse to those of the many; to the non-ruling influential who have the monopoly of the reputation-market, whose trade would be destroyed, if by the principle of utility the rottenness of their wages were exposed.

[1] Bentham may be referring to Francis Jeffrey's review of Bentham's *Traités de législation civile et penale* (ed. Étienne Dumont) in *Edinburgh Review,* iv (1804), 1-26. Jeffrey wrote (p. 13) that 'the established rules and impressions of morality' afforded 'the nearest approximation to a just standard of the good and evil that human conduct is concerned with, which the nature of our faculties will allow'.

[2] Alexander Wedderburn (1733-1805), Baron Loughborough 1780, Earl of Rosslyn 1801, was Solicitor-General in 1776 when Bentham's first published work, *A Fragment on Government,* appeared. Wedderburn pronounced that the principle of utility defended by *A Fragment* was a dangerous principle. See *An Introduction (CW),* p. 14 n.

II. EXPLANATIONS[1]

52. Springs of action, viz. applying to the *will* immediately; for ditto through the understanding, see (12) Motives.[2]

53. The leading terms are here psychological entities necessarily framed for the purposes of discourse; item of thought: ideas not being any more than communicable but by words.

54. To motives alone is 'springs of action' immediately applicable; to these others, only as they become *motives.* Psychological dynamics —its basis; ditto pathology.

'Pleasures', their synonyms. States of mind in respect of them.

'Pains', their synonyms. States of mind in respect of them.

55. Equivalents of *exemptions* to pleasures; *losses* to *pains.*

56. *Original.* From these the *derivative* derive their existence.

Original pleasure and pain, i.e. | | are accompaniments or | | results of perception. Sensations are 1. physical; 2. psychological.

57. Derivative pleasures are derived: viz. by *memory* or *imagination.*

58. Derived from imagination if the conception entertained of them be accompanied with belief of their future existence, they are ditto *of expectation;* and if pains, of apprehension: if not, ditto *of imagination* merely.

59. From recollection of pleasures may be derived pleasures or pains of imagination: and so from recollection of pains.

60. *Pleasure* is a spring of action no other than as action is regarded as a means of obtaining it—and so of *pains,* putting *avoidance* instead of *obtainment.*

61. *Inert* pleasures are: 1. Ditto of mere recollection; 2. Of mere imagination; 3. Of expectation, where not regarded as capable of being rendered by action more *certain,* or *speedy,* or *greater.*

62. Objection. By recollection of *pain from injury* is produced *desire of revenge* and thereby, action.

Answer. In so far as *desire,* so is *expectation* of *eventual pleasure:* in which, and not in the *pain,* the action has its immediate source.

[1] The sequence of marginals for this section is taken from UC clviii. 72 and 76 (sheets dated 22 January 1813). These marginals correspond to parts, though not the whole, of the 'Explanations' in the 1815/17 version of the *Springs* (pp. 87-98 below). At the top of sheet 72 Bentham wrote: '31 July 1815: from Col. III. 3, the *Text* is here at the Abbey: what precedes was employed in what is in print.'

[2] See 'Explanations', (m) 12 (p. 94 below).

63. From a pleasure of the imagination derived from a physical source (say, a picture), if a desire of possessing the source be produced, the pleasure to which such desire corresponds is not a pleasure of imagination, but a pleasure of | |.

64. Simple. The above pleasures and pains are all *simple* and *elementary.* Of this may be compounded others *ad infinitum,* having their appropriated denominations: which, when single-worded, will give the *compound object* the appearance of simplicity. Examples:

I. Pleasure of the Bottle.[1] Elements: 1. Pleasure of the palate; 2. Ditto of exhilaration—seat, the nervous system; 3. Ditto of sympathy or goodwill towards co-partners.

65. II. Love (the passion). Elements: 1. Sexual desire; 2. Ditto enhanced by beauty; 3. Desire of goodwill; 4. Goodwill; 5. Sympathy from contemplation of the agreeable qualities, intellectual or moral, ascribed to the object.

66. III. *Lbve of justice.* Elements: 1. Desire of self preservation in so far as, etc.; 2. Sympathy for the individual; 3. Ditto for public; 4. Antipathy towards the individual; 5. Ditto towards the Judge.

67. IV. Love of liberty. Elements: 1. Desire of self preservation against *misrule;* 2. Sympathy for the community at large; 3. Sympathy for special sufferers; 4. Antipathy towards profiters; 5. Love of power, viz. exercisable in opposition.

68.[2] A motive, if not found in this Table, is a *motive to the understanding:* if such it will be the consideration of something expected to operate as a *means* to the gratification of the desire correspondent to some *motive to the will.*[3]

III. OBSERVATIONS[4]

Pleasures and Pains the basis of all the Springs

69. Pleasures and pains, the basis of all the springs of action. Pleasures and pains exist without the springs; not *vice versa.*

[1] The material from this point down to the end of marginal 67 (UC clviii. 72, cols. 3-4) refers to the five paragraphs found in 'Explanations', (r), 'Compound Pleasures exemplified' (pp. 96-8 below).

[2] Just before this marginal, Bentham wrote: 'Employed 16 Aug. 1815.'

[3] At this point Bentham wrote: 'Composed a text from this marginal.'

[4] The sequence of marginals for this section, parts of which correspond to Bentham's 'Observations' in the 1815/17 version, is taken from the following sources: UC clviii. 76, col. 1 to col. 2, 2nd marginal (nos. 69-77); 73 to 75, col. 1, 1st marginal (nos. 78-98); 77, col. 2 (nos. 99-102); 75, col. 1, 2nd marginal, to col. 2, 1st marginal (nos. 103-6); 108 (nos. 107-28); 76, col. 2, 3rd marginal to col. 3 (nos. 129-35); 75, col. 2, 2nd marginal, to col. 3, 2nd marginal (nos. 136-41); 107, col. 4 (nos. 142-7); 77, cols. 3, 4, and 1 (nos. 148-57); 75, col. 3, 3rd marginal to 5th marginal (nos. 158-60); 67 (nos. 161-71); 106 (nos. 172-202).

70. *Conceditur, motive,* the necessary and sole immediate spring: but without the pleasure or the pain, *motive* presents no clear idea.

71. Of motive and pleasure or pain, clear ideas formed. So are they of: 1. Desire; 2. Aversion; 3. Interest—all which necessarily have had place.

72. Phenomena otherwise inexplicable and of practical importance, thus explained.

No act *disinterested.* No *bad* motives.

73. No act disinterested, for to every motive corresponds an *interest.*

74. By disinterestedness has been meant (in so far as truly) absence of self-regarding interest, excepting perhaps of regard for reputation or of fear of God. Both self-regarding, though not perhaps noted as such.

75. The most disinterested man is not less under the dominion of interest than the most interested. The interest corresponding to *sympathy* not being less an *interest* than any other. Only in practice, the word has not received the correspondent extension.

76. By being the product of interest, an act commonly called *disinterested* has not the less its merit.

77. In a case of sympathy, not less need of the word *'interest'* than in a self-regarding case. So practice: 'I take a lively *interest* in his fate.'

Comparative Numbers, Cause of them'

78. Cause of the abundance or penury of appellations eulogistic, dyslogistic, and neutral, interest which, in forming language, men feel in the propagation of the above persuasions.

79. Of these judgments is the force of the tribunal of public opinion, i.e. of the moral or popular sanction, composed. By the expression of any such judgment, *a* man gives the vote he has in that tribunal, endeavouring thereby to gain other votes, as many as may be.

80. He acts as leader of a band, calling on others to join in chorus.

81. On this as on every occasion, whatever is said or done is the result of *interest* operating as a motive. In the different directions in which in different situations the interest operates is the cause of the above diversities.

82. Appellatives wanting, understand single-worded ones: many-worded ones never can be.

83. Eulogistic, none. Instances: Numbers I, II, III, V, VI, XII, XIII, XIV.[1] [2] Cause: no advantage reaped by men in general from what each man does in gratification of the desire.

[1] The marginals under this subheading (nos. 78-97) refer to the discussion found in 'Observations', §111 (pp. 100-5 below).

[2] The roman numbers here and in marginals 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 96, and 97 refer to the numbers of the Table in the *Springs.*

84. Objections as to II. On what is done by A for gratification of his desire depends B's gratification. Answer. It answers not a person's purpose to speak of the simple desire otherwise than as made up into the compound desire—*love.*

85. Eulogistic, abundant. Instances: Numbers IV, VIII, IX, X. Cause: by men in general, advantage is reaped from what is done by others for the gratification of these desires. But as to IV, see below.

86. Dyslogistic, none. Instances: none. Cause: no desire such but that by what is done in gratification of it by one man, another is frequently prejudiced.

87. Dyslogistic, abundant. Instances: all but No. XIV with little distinction. Cause, see III.

88. For No. II, sexual desire, dyslogistic particularly abundant. Causes: 1. Intensity of the desire; 2. Apt as it is, to run into combination with others, as in love; 3. Frequent importance of the consequences; 4. Variety of ways in which A's interest may be thwarted by B's pursuit. Examples: 1. Rivals by | |; 2. Husbands by gallants, so wives; 3. Parents and other guardians by wards; 4..Legislators, Moralists and Divines by all persons; This compound desire being protected by its necessity to existence, | | is confined to the simple one.

89. Neutral, abundant. Instances: none. Cause: seldom has a man occasion to speak of a pleasure or pain or desire etc. without considering the gratification or pursuit as promotive or destructive of his interest.

90. Neutral: none. Instances: many, viz., Numbers II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, XII, XIV.

91. Eulogistic and Dyslogistic, both abundant. Instance IV: love of wealth. Cause: see | |.

92.1. The matter already in hand. Of some, it is the interest that disbursement should have place. By them, eulogistics will be applied to disbursement; dyslogistics to non-disbursement. Of others that it be not performed; by these, dyslogistics will be applied to disbursement, eulogistics to non-disbursement.

93. 2. The matter not in hand. *Generaliter,* rivalry and opposition of interests apart, it will be the interest of a man's connections that he increase his wealth. By these, eulogistic appellations will, accordingly, be sought for the desire. But, by the prevalence of jealousy and envy, finding the desire less unprovided with eulogistics, they will be driven by necessity to employ for their purpose a desire which in truth does not exist but which, if it did, would be of kin to it, viz. the desire and love of labour, termed by the single-worded appellation, 'industry'.

94. Taken by itself, and for its own sake, labour is *not* ever an object of desire. As a means to ends, *yes.* For example, health, sport, or wealth, or the gratification of any other desire—yes.

95. 4. *Conceditur,* for 'the love of wealth', 'frugality' and 'economy', both eulogistic, are in use. But both suppose it already in hand: in the eulogistics 'thrift' and 'thriftiness', if desire of acquiring wealth be included, it is covertly and obscurely.

96. Eulogistics, modes of supplying: 1. To a neutral or weakly dyslogistic appellative, apply a eulogistic adjunct. Examples: 1. (No. III.) Dyslogistic appellative, 'sensuality': eulogistic adjunct, 'refined';
2. Dyslogistic appellative, 'luxury': eulogistic adjunct, 'elegant'; 3. (No. V.) Neutral or faintly dyslogistic appellative, 'ambition': eulogistic adjunct, 'honest', 'virtuous', 'laudable', 'noble'; 4. (No. VIII.) Dyslogistic appellative, 'pride': eulogistic adjunct, 'honest', 'virtuous', etc.

97. In some instances, more odium is heaped on by the dyslogistic appellative, than can be outweighed by any eulogistic adjunct. Examples: Number I, Gluttony, Drunkenness; Number II, Lewdness, etc.; Number VII, Scurrility; Number XI, Malignity, etc.

Motives—good and bad'

98. Of themselves, every pleasure and exemption being good, every pain and loss evil, no motive but eventual expectation of pleasure or exemption, hence, no bad motives. No motive *good* to the exclusion of any other. Still, however, perpetual are the expressions 'good motives' and 'bad motives'.

No Motives bad: *Practical Errors*

99. Practical errors from this erroneous language-—viz. in penal procedure. 1. Exclusion of prosecutors on the score of bad motives.
2. Ditto of witnesses on the score of interestedness.

100. Of both, particularly the last, injustice a continued result.
1. In penal | |. Impunity granted or satisfaction denied because the prosecutor has been rendered so by ill-will or has been culpable.

101. 2. In civil, testimony rejected, right taken away, because testimony would not be an effect without a cause.

102. For a merely nominal interest A's testimony rejected, while though under the influence of the most irresistible interests, B is admitted.[2]

[1] The marginal under this subheading refers to the beginning of 'Observations', §4 (pp. 105-6 below).

[1] Below this marginal, Bentham wrote the following note: 'Make mention here of the cases in which badness of motives has been made a ground for expelling

103.[1] Practical errors flowing from these speculative misconceptions: 1. Under the notion of their being produced by bad motives, useful acts prohibited and prevented, useful and even necessary acts which could not by any other motives have been produced. Example: prosecution of delinquents. Necessary motive: revenge.

104. *Conceditur, some* motives, self-regarding or dissocial, are particularly liable to produce bad effects; others, particularly adapted to the restraining of excess in the operation of those others.

105. But follow up this notion to the punishing every act produced by these supposed bad motives, rewarding every act produced by the supposed good ones, mankind will presently be destroyed.

106. As well might watches be perfected by inserting two *regulators* and no *mainspring.*

107. Consistently pursued, the notion that the *badness* of prosecutive motives should suffice for absolving delinquents would suffice to substitute anarchy to government.

108. By 'bad motives', on such an occasion, is always meant *revenge.*

109. The act prosecution for being *bad,* and as such made an offence, prosecution can not but be *good* (I | saving cases meet for pardons, etc.).

110. Punishment good, so must prosecution be. To deny this is to approve the end, yet disapprove the indisputable means—a gross self-contradiction.

111. Objection. Good and proper motives public spirit, etc.; these alone ought to be the actuating motives.

112. Answer.[2] Of punishment and prosecution, the effects are not better when these are than when revenge is the motive.

113. Impossible to know what motives have concurred or in what proportion.

114. Revenge the most frequently, the most | | actuating of all motives in this case. Revenge is a desire universally necessary and universally existing.

Prosecutors from the Army, notwithstanding the conviction of the Defendants. Viz. 1. Maj. Gen. Clay's prosecution as per Morning Chron. 5 February 1814: 2. Col. Beaufoy's prosecution as per Examiner, Sunday 6 February 1814.' In both these cases the junior officers who preferred the charges were dismissed from the Army on the grounds that in prosecuting their superiors they had not been motivated solely by a concern for the good of the service.

[1] Marginals 103-6 refer to the second, third, and fourth paragraphs of 'Observations', §4 (pp. 106-7 below).

[2] Here and before the start of marginal 113 the word 'Addend' appears in brackets.

115. Public spirit is the rare production of a high degree of mental culture.

116. In a quantity capable of overweighing the burdens of prosecution, viz. to ill-will, its rarity is extreme.

117. No judge will deny what is above.

118. No Judge will say, 'My intention is to prevent prosecution generally.'

119. What if, without such desire, a judge means ever to frustrate prosecution on the ground of prosecutive bad motives, he must undertake to know: 1. That in A's instance the rare motive has been the predominant or sole; 2. Reverse in case of B.

120. Cause of these maxims, pretext afforded for arbitrary power and partiality under the cloak of restraint.

121. A prosecutor ought to come with clean hands. By this, the defendant may be exempted in most instances.

122. Prosecution ought not to have been produced by bad motives. By this, defendant may be exempted in any instance.

123. This an instance of the double fountain. See Scotch Reform.[1]

124. Suppose arbitrary power due to the motives of Judge-made law, these maxims accounted for. On the contrary supposition, they are effects without a cause.

125. Public spirit operates not with sensible effect except in a few highly cultivated minds belonging to the best educated classes.

126. Love of the matter of wealth and of revenge have necessarily place in all minds.

127. Yet, among the founders of English law, insensibility to both these desires has been set up as a *sine qua non* to admission to the service of justice as plaintiff or witness. Such, if sincere, was their ignorance of the springs of action.

128. The highly educated Judge, who will not serve without wealth (besides power and dignity), more than maintains individuals by hundreds, excludes men from all chance for justice, because in him or some other, revenge and wealth, were not, it is supposed, wholly without action; excludes every man who is not through public spirit content to view himself I |.

No Motive Bad

129. No bad motive, for: 1. No bad pleasure, no bad exemption;
2. No motive but may have bad consequences. Examples: 1. From

[1] *Scotch Reform: considered with reference to the plan proposed in the late Parliament, for the regulation and administration of justice in Scotland . . . ,* London, 1808, p. 25 (Bowring, v. 14).

regard for reputation, child-murder, witness-murder; 2. From piety, persecution; 3. From sympathy, murder, etc.

130. Ergo, 'bad and good motives' pregnant with error. Mischievous practical consequences: 1. Do *any* act from a good motive; 2. Do no act from a bad motive.

131. *Conceditur,* some *motives* more apt to produce bad actions, viz. *dissocial* and *self-regarding.* Others, good actions, viz. *social.* But to the self-regarding belong those on which the existence of the species depends, viz. *desire of food* and *drink* and *sexual desire.*

132. Motives most apt to be called good motives are restrictives, viz. 1. Regard for reputation; 2. Piety; 3. Sympathy; 4. Self-preservation. But except sympathy, all these are *self-regarding.* Sympathy, the only *non self-regarding,* is the weakest restrictive.

133. By sympathy, if exercised for the few against the many, as much mischief may be done as by antipathy.

134. Conclusion: unless consequences be taken into account, 'bad' and 'good motives' can not be said without teaching error.

135. For the effects, good and bad, of motives on the consequences of actions, reference to *Introduction* and *Dumont.*[1]

136. Measure goodness by necessity to existence—best of all, love of good drink and sexual desire: the one not a good motive; the other endeavoured to be exterminated on the score of badness.

137. *'Self-regarding'".* all the interest that is not social (No. X) or not dissocial (No. XI).[2] Extirpate self-regarding interest, you extirpate the species. Yet, 'self-regarding' has none but dyslogistic appellatives.

138. In a savage state, scarcely any influence is exercised by Fear of God (No. IX), Sympathy (No. X), or love of reputation (No. VIII): i.e., best motives. No bar (this deficiency) to existence.

139. Of the best motives, the goodness of the effect depends on the direction in which they operate, viz. according as pleasure or pain is the predominant consequence. From a wrong direction, | | pain to any amount may result, viz. 1. From fear of God, persecution, extirpation. 2. From sympathy, the object being equally *narrow,* as much mischief as from selfishness.

[1] Bentham, *An Introduction* (CW), chaps. XI-XII.The Dumont reference may be that cited below, p. 107 n. 1. At UC clviii. 107, where another copy of this group of marginals appears, Bentham wrote at this point the following notes: 'Add. Act bad, consequences the worse, the more persons are liable to be engaged in the commission of the like act by the like motive.' 'Addend. 9 Aug. 1815. In the case of the *species* of act of which the consequences are good, ought the act of any individual to be condemned on the score of the nature of the *motive* by which it was produced?'

[2] The roman numbers here and in marginal 138 refer to the Table in the *Springs.*

140. 3. From love of reputation, infanticide and, more mischievous, murder.

141. *Conquest,* including every mischief on the largest scale, is capable of being produced by love of reputation, even unaided by love of wealth, by love of power, or by antipathy.

142. Only of consequences, tendencies, intentions and thence actions, can badness and goodness be, with propriety, predicated.

143. Motives: none are bad; none are good, to the exclusion of scarcity, in preference to any other.

144. Talk about goodness or badness as applied to intention, though neither inaccurate in expression nor false in fact, may yet be irrelevant.

145. Properly speaking, as no bad motive, so no *vitious pleasures* any more than virtuous pain. Though of vitious pleasures, so much is said; of virtuous pains, nothing—

146. Viz. no vitious *species* of pleasure, if each species of pleasure, one as well as another, may be vitious according to consequences.

147. In the minds of the unreflecting multitude, 'vitious' a vague expression of disapprobation, void of determinate grounds. Cause of disapprobation: the act of a sort not affording pleasure to the disapprover; or pleasure obtainable by him in other ways at a cheaper rate.

Sinister Interests, what

148. Correspondent to badness in a *motive* is sinisterness in an interest.

149. *Question.* If no *bad motives,* how *sinister interests'!*

150. Answer. *Sinister,* any interest, in so far as the tendency of it is to operate in a sinister *direction*—in a course opposite to any prescribed by Utility, whatsoever be the species of interest, pleasure, pain, etc.

151. *Question.* Sinister *direction,* what?[1] Answer: Any the effect or tendency of which is to serve a *less* at the expense of a *more* extensive interest; or in the case of an individual, an interest of *less,* at the expense of one of a greater, *value.*[2]

152. Examples within the field of the political and popular sanction.

[1] Here Bentham inserted: *15 Aug. 1815. Suppress what follows?'

[2] In the margin, Bentham wrote the following alternative answer: 'Answer substituted? Any interest of which, so far as it operates and is therefore productive of a desire, the tendency is in the character of a motive to give birth to a bad action, to an action which, whether preceded or not by a bad intention, and therewith consciousness of the probable badness of its consequences, is productive of bad consequences.'

Acts punishable and disreputable are the results of sinister interest or interests.

153. Faculty operated upon by sinister interest, the *volitional:* result: delinquency or immorality or both; the intellectual, error: with or without misconduct, criminal or immoral or both.

154. Indigenous (intellectual) weakness, adoptive weakness, perceptibly operating sinister interest, and interest begotten prejudice—their mutual relation.

155. Commonly an act is the result of the difference in force between an instigating motive or motives and a restraining ditto.

156. On every occasion it is at the absolute command of *motives* and corresponding *interest.*

157. —whether *necessity* or *free will* be the terms employed.

Motives—substitution of

158.[1] *Good* motives: such as a man would like best to be thought most influenced by. Bad: the reverse. This the most congruous definition.

159. Divers motives conspiring, to the best will the man and his friends be most disposed to ascribe his conduct; to the least good, his adversaries.

160. If, among the motives actually operating towards the production of the effect, some be found good enough, to the most approved of the really operating motives will be substituted such better motive as is most difficultly distinguishable from it: i.e., the real motive will be changed for a better. Thus by self and friends; vice versa by adversaries.

161.[2] Thus, in party and other contentions, is the same act ascribed by different persons to different motives.

162. Examples. In relation to the really efficient motive, the supposed better termed the *covering* one.

163.1. (No. I)[3] Love of food and drink. *Covering: sympathy,* love of good cheer, love of the social bowl. N.B. For the pleasure when solitary, no eulogistic appellative is to be found.

164. 2. (No. II) Sexual desire. Covering: *Love,* the compound

[1] Marginals 158-60 refer to the beginning of 'Observations', §8 (pp. 112-13 below).

[2] Marginals 161-71, which refer to the discussion at the end of 'Observations', §8 (pp. 113-15 below), are found in UC clviii. 67. Written at the top of the sheet is the following note by Bentham: '31 July 1815. No text found for this: presumption that it is with printers.' The last two columns contain outlines of various subsections.

[3] The roman numerals here and in marginals 164, 165, 169, and 170 refer to the Table in the *Springs.*

affection. Roman Lawyers' absurdity in assigning as the sole motive to marriage the desire of having children, a desire peculiar to affluence.

165. 3. (No. IV) Love of wealth. Covering: *industry.* If put for love of labour simply, this is love of pain, an impossible motive.

166. 4. Love of power. Covering: *Patriotism* or Love of country, viz. a man's own—i.e. sympathy for the inhabitants; Love of mankind without distinction, i.e. Philanthropy.

167. *b.Love of duty*—an impossible motive—duty being synonymous to obligation, i.e. involving coercion. Love of duty is love of the pains employed in coercion.

168. 6. *Sense* of duty—synonymous to love of duty.

The act which A would coerce B to do, B might like to do, but the coercion he can *not* like.

169. 7. (No. VII) Desire of Amity. Covering: 1. Sympathy at large;
2. Gratitude, i.e. sympathy produced by benefits.

170. 8. (No. XI) Antipathy. Covering: 1. Public Spirit; 2. Love of Justice—the compound affection, as above, especially in case of prosecution, whether at the legal or the public bar.

171. Of these six[1] desires, scarcely will a man or his friends acknowledge him to have been influenced by any one: viz. in any degree, much less exclusively. These, the unseemly parts of the mind; the above coverings, *fig leaves.*

172.[2] In a public trustee, allegation of the goodness of his motives an argument irrelevant and impertinent.

173. So, but for the folly of the heavens, weak. Reasons. 1. This no proof of the propriety of the measure advocated. Beneficial or pernicious, any sort of act may have had for its cause any sort of motive.

174. 2. Nor of the state of the speaker's mind in respect of motives. Falsity is unproveable. By badness of his motives, no man can be restrained from declaring them good.

175. Almost on every occasion a man is acted upon by divers motives, concurrent or conflicting.

176. Of this multiplicity, seldom is he conscious unless scrutinizing into his mind for the purpose.

177. By public trustees especially, such scrutinizing is seldom practised. Effect of it, substituting to pleasurable delusion, painful knowledge.

[1] Whether Bentham meant six or possibly seven or eight is difficult to determine, since he misassigned the numbers.

[2] The discussion summarized in marginals 172-202 is not found in the 1815/17 version of the *Springs,* and may have been eliminated because of its strong and partisan language.

178. Bitten rather than kissed would be the information-conveying hand.

179. This the Science hated by Burke, etc., under the name of *Metaphysics.*[1]

180. Yet, seldom a debate in which the inquiry is not obstructed and the hearer annoyed by such declarations.

181. Cause—general hatred of instruction on this subject. In the picture of the springs of action in *man,* he would see his own. He prefers keeping them shut.

182. Falsehood commonly embraced in lieu of the above truths. My motives and those of my friends, *good)* the adversary's, *bad.*

183. Most men experience or expect to experience in the credence given to their own account of their own motives the benefit of this illusion.

184. Truth sooner or later flashes in their face, notwithstanding. Of the many annoyed by the impertinence, some will contest the *verity* of it. Among those annoyed by it may be not only adversaries but supporters and even friends.

185. Remedial Rule proposed. Motive-trumpet heard, call the trumpeter to order: in default of such rule, employ coughs and scraping.

186. | | the proper word. This being no more than what every man could, on every occasion, say for himself if he knew how and expected evidence.

187. Already, for ascribing badness to another man's motives, a man is called to order. Why not for ascribing *goodness* to his own?

188. One reason why the practice of our pertinence in this shape is so general, as also why it will not speedily be put an end to, is general ignorance. The more capable a man feels himself of judging a question on its own merits, the less will he feel the need of looking out for the opinions, real or pretended, of others for guides to his own.

189. On any considerable portion of the field of politics, to be able to form a set of independent opinions requires more labour and time than a man in any such desirable situation will commonly give, if he can enjoy the situation without doing so.

190. In one house, all, in the other house, almost all, see it in their power to enjoy the situation without sacrifice. Hence, the seats in general filled by bodies animated by unfurnished minds: minds which, having little information of their own, feel great need of it from others.

[1] For passages in which Burke denounced metaphysical thinking in politics, see *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke,* 8 vols., London, 1792-1827, i. 573-4 *(Speech on American Taxation)* and iii. 93 *(Reflections on the Revolution in France).*

191. He whose power is the same in both cases, i.e. whether he understand any thing of the matter or not, can not reasonably be expected to be at all the pains of forming an opinion of his own: scarcely of endeavouring to learn that of another.

192. Contents of both houses in the present state of things: 1. indigence without probity; 2. opulence without intelligence.

193. By the indigent without probity is the business mostly conducted. In so far as it [is] by opulence without intelligence, it is still worse: by place holders, without any to apply to them any thing like a constant check but place hunters sharing in their sinister interests.

194. By the ablest, so much only of the art and science of government will be endeavoured to be learnt as seems necessary to enable them to obtain or keep their places: *speaking,* above all things, because that may do without any thing else, nothing else without that.

195. Motive-trumpeter's speech. Such is your ignorance: on not one in a hundred of the questions on which your duty calls you to decide, is one out of a hundred of you able to form a judgment for himself. Thence, when having no point to gain by doing ill you are disposed to do well, you see no other chance of doing so than the looking out for some other opinion to which to ascribe that rectitude of the non-existence of which you are conscious in your selves.

196. Well-matched with such ignorance is your folly. In cases where detection is impossible, your supposition is that dishonest men will abstain from falsehood and give you a true account of the motives by which they are actuated.

197. My Lords—What has placed you where you are, such of you as are the first of your families (viz. half of you), is the having found favour with the King or Minister, the rest of you the being descended from some one who did.

198. Gentlemen—What has placed you where you are is either: 1. A share by descent in that property by virtue of which all other property is, without responsibility, disposed of; or 2. Gift or sale of it by an owner of such property; [or] 3. Spending or threatening to spend for the purchase of a chance of such a share more than any other man is at once able and willing to spend for the purchase of such a chance.

199. In no one of these cases does your possession of the seat depend on your fitness for the duties or qualifications in point of intelligence or probity, or attendance.

200. Consequences: with conceptions too few to have any practical effect, be the matter what it may, you know nothing about it. For months or years many of you never visit the place in which it is learnable. For the whole time taken together, not one fourth of you

—of those who if the power had obligations attached to it would be there constantly.

201. Trusting to that ignorance and that folly, its natural concomitant, you take (if he side with you) any man's word for the goodness of motive and intention, of the non-existence of which in his own breast each of you is conscious, or he would not sit still under a system in which that ignorance is rendered perpetual and irremediable.

202. Having an adequate personal point to gain there you are; otherwise, not. Thinking yourselves fit for taking a part in what is doing there, would you be there but a quarter of the time your duty calls you there had you any regard for it?

IV. ADDED OBSERVATIONS[1]

203. Of this as of other sciences,[2] a man's view is the more correct and complete the fewer the leading terms under which he has been able to reduce it. By every coincidence, | I the correctness and completeness is increased [and] the mind's grasp strengthened.

204. Examples: 1. Cosmography. Coincidence between large and small scale attraction of gravity.

205. 2. Chemistry. Coincidence between attraction of gravity and ditto elective.

206. 3. Ditto between the potash | | from the different substances—its practical utility, saving of expence.

207. Order, method, classification, in every line of action, speculative or practical, physical or psychological, intellectual or moral, private or public, is always useful, sometimes necessary.

208. Examples: 1. Natural History; 2. Chemistry; 3. Domestic Economy.

209.1. It is a guide to what is known. 2. A useful if not necessary instrument of discovery, i.e. guide to things unknown. Examples: 1. Attraction of gravity; 2. Attraction elective; 3. Electricity—see Galvanism.[3]

210. Yet for | | classification is useless, viz. in morals and

[1] The sequence of marginals for this section is taken from the following sheets: UC clviii, 54-60 (nos. 203-78); 65 (nos. 279-97); 94-100 (nos. 298-356); 101, cols. 3-4 (nos. 357-67); 102 (nos. 368-9); 83-93 (nos. 370-469); 109-13 (nos. 470-513); 116-22 (nos. 514-653).

[2] UC clviii. 54 is headed 'Psychology'.

[3] Luigi Galvani (1737-98) was a lecturer in anatomy at the University of Bologna and professor of obstetrics at the Institute of Arts and Sciences of Bologna. During the 1780s he investigated animal electricity and he published *De viribus electricitatis in motu musculari commentarius* in 1791.

legislation; viz. | | which found classes each having twelve common characters where no such class had been delineated before.

211. Course pursued by the critic for finding a pretence for this condemnation: the same as that pursued by the intolerant bigot; viz. condemnation of reason. Exposed by method, he condemns *method.*

212. Confusion to all order—the Bacchanalian toast this critic recommends.

213. Classification he denies to be useful for establishment of, discovery of, truth. According to him, no better than push-pin.

Mischievousness

214. In so far as utilitarianism is promotive of happiness, any principle adverse to it is obstructive of it.

215. Obstructive is every one that is not subordinate.

216. Directly adverse: *asceticism.*

217. Indirectly adverse: *ipsedixitism,* setting up *sense* or feeling, real or pretended, as a sufficient reason for even obligation to act in opposition to utilitarianism: discarding calculation, disregarding consequences in respect of pleasure and pain.

218. Useless where employed in support of an act recommended by utilitarianism, it is adverse and pernicious when employed in a contrary direction.

219. Employ the word 'philosophy'. Utilitarianism is the utilitarian philosophy; *ipsedixitism,* the *ipsedixit* philosophy.

Acceptance Causes; Advocative Causes

220. Convenience of *ipsedixitism* for the support of all otherwise indefensible acts and opinions. Even in the case of defensible ones, it saves time and labour.

Inculcation Causes; Acceptance Causes

221. It is particularly commodious to the feeblest minds. It puts them on a level with the most vigorous. It enables them to appear to say something when in truth they say nothing.

222. It renders the worst cause a service it could not receive elsewhere. It puts it on a level with the best.

223. It is apt to operate with a degree of efficiency greater than utilitarianism; viz. it employs intimidation, affording a cloak for arrogance. Not having this sense, you are an imperfect being no more warranted to decide on a question of morals than a blind man can colours.

224. Mind being better than body, this imperfection degrades you more than blindness would.

225. Problem: to find a form of speech by which (anywhere in morals) acceptance may be obtained for your opinion, without and against reason.

226. For morals, solution by Shaftesbury: 'moral sense'.[1] Opinion exposed to error: *secus,*[2] sense. 'I have a moral sense. By it actions are pronounced praiseworthy, blameworthy and indifferent. I and all others rightly constituted.'

227. Means by which this gains acceptance. By teacher, actions, say twelve, thus pronounced upon. In eleven disciple being disposed to pass the same judgment, and without reflection, concludes teacher to be in the right as to the existence of the sense, the notion being I | to the *love* of ease. Pleased by the discovery, awe-struck by the ingenuity, he gives up his own *judgment* and takes teacher's sense for his guide in this twelfth case.

228. *'Moral* sense' confined to *thelematology,* 'common sense' extends to *noology.*[3]

229. *Ipsedixitism* branches: 1. 'Moral sense', form of demonstration. I and mine have a sense which, as such, cannot be deceived. Speak with us and you have it, and *sound:* against us, you have it not, or *unsound:* or falsely pretend not to have it. In any such case, you are unworthy of regard.

230. So, *'common* sense'. But here, the more universal the sense, the greater the shame of not having it, having it unsound, or disusing it.

Definition

231. Utilitarianism—Utilitarian philosophy—Utilitarian principle of utility: 'Act according to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.'

232. Sentimentalism—Sentimental philosophy—Sentimentalist, *Ipsedixit* principles: 'Act contrary to it.'

233. Sentimentalist, in saying, 'Act against your interest', strives

[1] Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) argued that man is equipped with a moral sense which promotes a harmony between the individual and society. See his *Inquiry concerning Virtue* (1699); and see also Bentham's *An Introduction* (CIV), p. 26n.

[2] 'not so'.

[3] Cf. Bowring, viii. 289-90: Tn so far as the will is concerned in the production of any result, the field of the corresponding branch of science which takes cognizance of such result, may be termed the field of *Thelematology.* In so far as either the will has borne no part in the production of the result in question, or the field of its operation has been confined within the precincts of the mind, —the field of the corresponding branch of science may be termed the field of noology.'

to create in you an interest in so acting and to make you act according to it.

234. So in making as if he would have you act without a *motive.*

235. *Ipsedixit* philosophy: not the Pythagorean. By his disciples was Pythagoras' *'ipse-dixit'* given as the standard of truth and rectitude—not by himself.[1]

236. Per *Ipsedixitists:* ethics not susceptible of ulterior improvement, that is, nothing more than is at once *true, useful* and *new.* If so, then not in this *Table.* Judge, reader, whether not here, so not elsewhere.

237. Inculcation, causes: Sinister interest by which men are prompted to advance such notions; celebrity obtained by these from, and dependent on, the teaching of the doctrines generally received, viz. interest of the trumpet—love of reputation the correspondent motive.

238. The more indistinct the current notions, the easier. By the use of eulogistic and dyslogistic expressions, a self-sufficient man will produce in his readers a persuasion without any, or with deceptious, information.

239. In so far as a man's reputation depends upon the faculty of disseminating error or | |, every step towards clearness, correctness or completeness, will be felt by him as a profit made at his expence.

240. Hence, pro *tanto,* it lies to his interest that no useful discovery should be *received* or *made.* Without pain of humiliation he can not rid himself of error. The more confirmed in his error, the greater his chance of keeping others in it.

241. Ipsedixitism: causes of its prevalence. To employ it, teach it, receive it, require not any useful moral or intellectual principles.

242. By any such useful principle, a man would be rendered so much the less fit to employ, teach or receive it.

243. Persons to whom ipsedixitism is commodious: 1. Despotic Monarchists; 2. Oligarchists and Aristocrats; 3. Religionists; 4. Teachers of the already-received systems.

244. Of such teachers, the observation was made by Hon. Charles Yorke: Appendix to Warburton's Correspondence with Hurd,[2]

245. Effects of it in keeping men wide of the truth in the perpetu-

[1] Cf. Cicero, *De deorum natura,* 1. 5. 10: 'Pythagorei respondere solebant, ipse dixit.'

[2] See Charles Yorke to William Warburton, 1 July 1742, *Letters from a late eminent Prelate to one of his Friends,* London, n.d., p. 369: 'After all, it is a serious and melancholy truth, that when speculative errors are to be reformed, and received opinions either rationally opposed or defended, that matter cannot be attempted without much censure.'

ation of error worse than ignorance. By the whole length of it, a man who has learnt this is below the level of sheer ignorance.

246. In *thelematology,* the use of ipsedixitism extended by Hutchinson of Glasgow and Hume.[1]

247. To *noology,* its use extended by Reid, Campbell and Beattie?

248. Principle of credulity: the application of it most serviceable to its employer. It serves for justifying, and if admitted producing belief of, any the most improbable fact.

249. Being innate, it cannot err; antecedent to, it cannot be overpowered by, experience.

250. *Noology*. Chief use made of it: overruling objections and securing credence for miracles.

251. For this, Priestley saw no need of it, so rejected it?

252. Neither Reid nor Campbell, nor even Priestley, observed that if good for *proving* Christianity, so for proving Mahometanism and Brahmanism—so *disproving* Christianity.

253. That which is most conformable to the experienced course of nature, say, to experience, is in every instance most probable. Error and mendacity are more conformable to experience than miracles are.

254. *Per* Reid and Campbell: T believe the fact. My believing it is a more conclusive proof of its being true than any disconformity to experience can be of its being false.'

255. 'Whatever any man believes is true.' If not to this, it amounts to nothing.

256. What if that which A believes true, B believes false? Perhaps the *ipsedixitists* may say it is then *true,* for there is no principle of incredulity as there is of credulity.

257. But disbelief of any proposition is belief of the opposite one.

[1] For an earlier reference by Bentham to the 'moral sense' theories of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, see *An Introduction,* p. 26 n.; and for a further comment on Hume's oscillation between the principle of utility and 'the *ipse dixit* principle, under the name of the moral sense', see Bowring, vi. 240 n.

[2] Thomas Reid (1710-96) was a professor first at Aberdeen and then at Glasgow, and is generally regarded as the leading representative of the 'common sense' school of moral philosophy. He published in 1764 *An Enquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.* George Campbell (1719-96) and James Beattie (1735-1803) were also professors at Aberdeen, and with Reid and others formed a Philosophical Society there in 1758. Among Campbell's works was *A Dissertation on Miracles,* Edinburgh, 1762; and Beattie's most notable philosophical work was *An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth,* Edinburgh, 1770.

[3] The works of Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) contain several discussions of miracles. Bentham may have had in mind his *Observations on the Increase of Infidelity,* London, 1796, pp. 55-7.

Here, then, the principle of credulity [is] disbelief—what says the ipsedixitist to this?

258. As by real connection discovered, science and art are advanced, so by imagined disconnection they are thrown back.

259. Independent principles in multitudes imagined by a host of Scotch Sophists erroneously accounting for psychological phenomena already correctly accounted for by few principles: for each phenomenon a separate innate principle.

260. Hence a *School* which, still flourishing, has, in so far as its instructions have been received, banished clear ideas from psychology and its dependences.[1]

261. Its all commanding principle: the principle of caprice (add afterwards the *ipsedixit* principle). Adverse to utility, it recognizes not pleasure and exemption from pain as sole *fit* ends nor as the sole *efficient means.*

262. Causes of these errors: 1. | | for observing the | | of the *means',* 2. Through want of social sympathy, the *end* a matter of indifference;

263. 3. Its complete subserviency to every sinister purpose. It sets a man free from the check applied by utilitarianism to abuse in government, i.e. to sacrifice of subject many's interest to ruling few's —| | capacity for labour: it converts into a | | for commanding eloquence.

264. It is Eloquence's interest that every possible subject be kept in the maximum of uncertainty. Facts ascertained by absurd and incompetent rules of evidence: law by imaginary substituted to real law and real law | |.

265. By such discoursing desires are employed to corrupt judgement. Deny the moral sense and you acknowledge yourself destitute of that which distinguishes man from beasts. There is your infamy: admit it, to judge every thing without labour or examination.

Thus, by *ipsedixitism* the power of this moral or popular sanction is employed to mislead the judgment, as by Popery that of the religious Professor and his school are the Church.

266. In the sinister interest by which ipsedixitism is propagated, all parties concerned share.

From the duties imposed by utilitarianism, they are free, viz. sacrifice of interest of ruling few to interest of subject many. Professor and pupils are of the ruling few; subject many the sheep fleeced and slaughtered. Teacher, without labour, obtains the reputation

[1] The 'common sense' school of Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart and others was also known as the 'Scottish School', and it is to them that Bentham refers in the preceding marginal as 'Scotch Sophists'.

of teaching whatever is to be taught; so pupils, of having learnt whatever is to be learned.

267. In both, the reasoning faculty is thus | |. But its absence is no loss. They feel no want of it. They have learnt to despise it. They do better without it than they would have done with it. Servitude to this principle is perfect freedom.

268. To its partisans, such sinister purposes are not necessarily in view. But when they *are,* it is not the less fit to be applied to the worst of purposes.

269. In the prevalence of utilitarianism the ruling few behold the only obstacle to their sinister designs, constantly pursued to the prejudice of the subject many.

270. Support ipsedixitism has of late received from written eloquence.

271. In Jeffrey[1] are combined the anti-utilitarian interest and vitious sensibility of the lawyer, the politician, and the literary dictator.

272. A. Smith:[2] his *teaching* the principle, an example of the effect of *ipsedixitism* in substituting smoke to light.

273. Ingredients in this principle: 1. Desire to acquire wealth; 2. Desire to part with wealth, viz. but not but in the hopes of getting more, his longwinded name for the desire of wealth so circumstanced.

274. Perplexity the supposed discovery involves him in—the passage quoted.

Fortunate for him self and readers that, pronouncing it irrelevant, he pursued it no farther. The passage quoted.

275. What he sees not is—*transactions,* two; desire, but one.

276. Of this desire, the double transaction, viz. acquiring for a price, is even more common than the simple one, viz. acquiring *gratis* otherwise than by a man's own labour.

277. Of any such double propensity or desire as he | | there exists no example: one of its supposed ingredients, viz. the aversion to wealth, having no place in the human breast.

278.1. Recognizing the irrelevancy of the supposed discovery, he can not part with it without having another touch at it. None such (says he) in any other animal, neither his, nor any other contract.

2. *Conceditur,* this species of contract, not even the simple desire of wealth.

3. It requires *abstraction,* being the desire of all *pleasures* and *exemptions* obtainable by means of it: *physical* most obvious, seldom obtainable but by *exchange.*

[1] Francis Jeffrey (1773-1850), editor of the *Edinburgh Review.*

[2] Marginals 272-9 refer to book I, chapter II of Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.*

4. Men *and* dogs treasure up flesh to eat; not dogs, to exchange. The man knows that by parting with the flesh he may get other things that he likes; the dogs, not.

279. Not *subject,* a principle is *adverse* to utility.

280. Adverse: *asceticism* and *caprice.*

281. Per *asceticism,* forego pleasure, not to avoid pain, but on its own account: so as to embracing pains. This is utility opposed directly.

282. *Per* caprice, on this or that occasion forego pleasure, or embrace pain, without regard to consequences. This is utility opposed *indirectly.*

283. Hence, in proportion to *extent* of application, asceticism and caprice are destructive and obstructive of happiness, their supporters adversaries to happiness.

284. Instrumental precepts subservient to the above primary one:
1. To utility, *calcualtion:* which collecting the items on both sides of the account of pleasures and pains considered as produced by action;
2. to asceticism *item calculation',* 3. to caprice, *ipsedixit, ipsedixitism.*

285. *Calculation* rejected, ipsedixitism is the only instrumental principle that can be employed.

286. Ipsedixitism, what? By ipsedixitist his own opinion, howsoever disguised, .is given as a sufficient reason for whatever opinion, precept, advice, or recommendation he gives.

287. Ipsedixitism: 1. unimpassioned; 2. impassioned. Ipsedixitism: 1. cool-blooded; 2. warm-blooded.

288. Sentimentalism: warm-blooded ipsedixitism. Sentimentalists: the warm-blooded ipsedixitists.

289. Course employed in support of sentimentalism, pointing against opponents and resistants hatred and contempt by instruments borrowed from poetry or rhetoric.

290. Hence, against *calculation,* the credit of which it must destroy or acknowledge its own inanity and mischievousness.

291. Hence, calculation termed *cold, frigid,* etc.

292. Against utility, sentimentalism says nothing directly (for fear of exposure) but much in the way of *insinuation.*

293. Insinuation couched under the adjunct *cold.* To utilitarian, happiness (his own excepted) an object of *disregard-,* to sentimentalist alone, of *regard.*

294. The notion thus insinuated being too palpably false to be directly asserted, the falsity too glaring to pass unobserved in case of scrutiny, the hatred and contempt is pointed that way to prevent scrutiny by intimidation.

295. In case of mercantile economy, to reprobate calculation would be too glaringly absurd, but calculation cannot be more necessary to

good conduct on a mercantile occasion than it is on every other. Money has no *value* but in respect of the pleasures and pains it tends to confer and avert.

296. To fly into a passion and act without *calculation,* i.e. without *thought,* would not be better *advice* for other conduct than for *mercantile.*

297. By such advice if taken by a shopkeeper, nobody but himself and his particular connections can be injured: by ditto given or pursued by moralists or rulers, all mankind may.[1]

Principles adverse

298. As above, it might be expected that the reception given to the principle of utility would be universal: taught by all teachers, learnt by all learners.

299. *E contra,* with few if any exceptions, by leading men opposed and by the multitude unheeded or treated with indifference.

300. Like other effects, this has its cause.

301. The interests which oppose it being seen, little matter will remain for surprises.

302. Principle of Utility allows no rival. Whatever is not under is opposite to it.

303. *Directly* opposite: the principle of asceticism; indirectly: every other.

304. Principle of caprice or groundless fancy: under this head may every such other be placed, utility being the only principle ever supported by argument.

305. Principle of sympathy and antipathy: the name given in *Introduction* to the principle of caprice.[2]

306. Not quite ample enough was that denomination.

307. Function embraced by it: application of matter of evil and matter of good as *means-,* viz. as matter of punishment and matter of reward.

308. Function not embraced by it: application of ditto immediately to the end; viz. the matter of *good* as the instrument of subsistence, abundance and security; neither of *evil,* as matter or instrument of burden necessary to the existence and security of the matter of good, under the several applications made of it as above.

[1] The following note appears at this point in Bentham's hand: 'Imputations: 1. Selfishness; *2.* Systematicalness; 3. Coldness; 4. Expediency-Convenience.'

[2] To his discussion of 'the principle of sympathy and antipathy' in *An Introduction,* Bentham added the following note in January 1789: 'It ought rather to have been styled, more extensively, the principle of *caprice.'* See *An Introduction (CW),* 21 n.

Definitions

309. Principle of *ipsedixitism* (with its conjugates): that field of thought and expression from whence alone (reference not being made to pleasurable or painful consequences) war is waged against the principle of utility. Source, no other than the experience, real or pretended, of the author and of those who think or speak as he does.

310. *'Ipsedixit':* a term known to erudite and inerudite.

311. By erudite, taken from the language of Pythagoras' scholars[1] as reported by liars.

312. This the earliest recorded instance in which, without the aid of religious terrors, the opinion of A was sought to be imposed upon B in the character of conclusive circumstantial evidence, probative of all sorts of propositions.

313. In that original case the yoke sought by the speaker to be imposed was the work, not of himself, but another person, and that person but one. In the modern cases it has been the work always of the speaker himself, in conjunction with others or not. On whatever part of the field of *thought* and [action],[2] his statement conclusive [and] circumstantial; hence, his will a law.

Dogmas of the Ipsedixitist[3]

314.1. That *happiness* is not composed of pleasures and exemptions; 2. That there exists duty independent of all regard for happiness; 3. That there exists a justice independent of utility—of happiness—of pains and pleasures;[4] 4. That man ought not to be governed by the consideration of his own interest, i.e. of his own happiness, pleasures, etc.; 5. That in general he is not—at any rate that an honourable man is not; 6. That the greatest happiness of the greatest number is not the proper end of the legislator or the moralist, but the production of *abstract* happiness (via sensible) as above, or observance of duty, or dignity of character, etc.; 7. That if matters were so arranged, that in general each man should have more regard to his own happiness, pleasure, etc., than to that of any other creature or creatures, it would be a bad arrangement.

Reasons mounted for the support of these dogmas

315. That for judging of duty the faculty of judgment, applying itself to the calculation of the quantity of happiness likely to be

[1] Cf. p. 26 n. 1 above. [2] MS 'notion'.

[3] Marginals 314 and 315 (UC clviii) are in Bentham's hand.

[4] Here Bentham added a note in brackets: 'Pity *happiness* had not been a conjugate of *pleasure.*'

produced by one cause or another, is not the proper instrument, but a sense made on purpose. 'Tis taken, the moral sense, common sense, etc.

Principles adverse

316. Sentimentalism, its modes: 1. calculation neglecting; 2. calculation scorning or purely phantastic mode.

317. Exaggerating mode, its submodes: 1. Omission of some items in the account of pain and pleasure; 2. Omission or underrating of some element of value; 3. Addition of false *items',* 4. Overrating *items* or elements.

318. Ex. gr., bringing to account some narrow, to the exclusion of some more extensive, interest: the interest of one or a few to the exclusion of the interest of the many.

319. An interest is apt to be more impressive the more it is concentrated, however narrow: the interest of one who is present or known, more than of many absent or unknown.

320. Example: 1. Spendthrift preferred to creditors; 2. Highwaymen to passengers; 3. Seducer to seduced.

321. Here, though calculation is neglected, the principle of utility is perhaps not abjured or rebelled against, only negligently and improperly applied. But the result may be as erroneous and mischievous as if the principle acted upon were asceticism or pure caprice.

322. Calculation scorning, or purely phantastic mode: catching up and holding up as a fit source of action some popular word of indeterminate import by which no relation to human feelings, i.e. to pleasures and pains, is expressed.

323. Generally, the word such as is apt to excite sympathy or antipathy.

324. Ex. gr., 'Honour', 'Glory', 'Dignity': Demons to which lives by the hundreds of thousands—money by hundreds of millions—have been sacrified. I | an opposite appellative.

325. Grounds of antipathy: 1. Difference of opinion; 2. Difference of taste; 3. Misdirected sympathy.

326. In each case, the object of the different desire has been the destruction of him by whom the antipathy has been excited.

327. On the ground of difference of opinion and difference of taste, the antipathy exerted has been stronger than on difference of competition between self-regarding interests.

328. On the field of opinion, no subject of dissention too unimportant to excite it.

329. It has been more or less intense according as it has found support or check in positive law.

330. On the ground of religion, it has been such as to produce in England three parties, viz. Church of England, Catholic and Puritan, each at one time labouring without disguise at the extirpation of the two others.

331. Taste—on this field the quarter in which antipathy has been most intense has been that which regards the mode in which sexual desire seeks gratification. Here to sharpen it, antipathy has had religious opinion and, thence, positive law operating with its utmost force.

332. Antipathy clings more pertinaciously active on this field than on the field of religious opinion. Here each party finds opponents; there all join. No contest but who shall | | most firmly against the common enemy.

333. Effects of antipathy thus directed | | oppressive [and] destructive. Object of *Utility* is, on all occasions, to minimize these and all other evils. Object of sympathy and antipathy, working by Sentimental and impassioned I |, to screw and sharpen them up to the highest pitch of intensity—to *maximize* them.

Production of pleasure the object, *merit* consists (such is the notion) in *self-denial-,* production of pain the object, in *self-gratification.*

334. Misdirected sympathy. Example: infanticide. | | utility intensity of sympathy is directly as ditto of the exciting sufferance.

335. Under sentimentalism, acting under the impulse of antipathy excited by misdirected sympathy, the antipathy is here inversely as the exciting sufferance: greatest where (as in the infant) sufferance from death is but nominal; least where (as in the mother) it is real and intense. Interval between offence and punishment filled by shame and fear of punishment.

336. The line of conduct which the calculation-scorner makes a merit of pursuing and calls upon every one to pursue is in substance that which being proved causes a man to be committed to custody in the character of an idiot or lunatic.

337. Paradox-brandishers' fallacy: the fallacy employed by sentimentalism to infamize calculation. How, in proportion to its flagrancy, absurdity operates as evidence of truth.

338. Insinuation, to the exclusion of direct averment, the instrument of the sentimentalist, as of every other conscious advocate of a bad cause. Completely and correctly exhibited, the falsity of his intimations would be apparent. He, therefore, throws out no more than a fragment, trusting to sinister interests, interest-begotten prejudice, or indigenous weakness to make the most of it.

Acceptance of Ipsedixitism: Causes

339. Cause of the inattention to the principle of utility. Common notions imperfect and | | as they are serving tolerably well for common purposes, as being in themselves most derived from the principle of utility, though for its dictates no determinate expression is any where to be found. Hence, the erroneous notion that for practical purposes common notions are sufficient.

340. In sentimentalism or asceticism, crimes and follies find justification and excuse, and therein frequently their cause.

341. Conceditur, so in Utilitarianism, viz. in so far as misapplied. But the principle right, error by recurrence to it is corrected; *secus,* when the principle is wrong.

342. In a contest between two cold-blooded Ipsedixitists, each having laid down his groundless and perhaps senseless disguise, there the matter rests. In a contest between two hot-blooded ditto, darkness dashed with corruscations is the result. Each rummages poetry and rhetoric for *strong things.* Victory is his who has let fly the strongest.

343. By coinciding with those of utility, sentimentalists' conclusions are not rendered innoxious. Acknowledging the supremacy of the false principle, they strengthen and extend its influence. They send me for instruction to an erroneous source. Whatsoever instruction flows from it alone is pernicious.

344. He who, on whatever subject or occasion, discards *calculation,* i.e. reason, to follow the dissocial passion is an enemy to mankind, no less than the Savage whom he takes for his model.

345. Utilitarianism, working by calculation, is consistent and solicitous beneficence. Sentimentalism, in so far as independent of utilitarianism, is in effect a mask for selfisheness or malignity, or both for despotism, intolerance, tyranny.

346. Self-regard actually and *properly* the universally *predominant* motive. Acknowledgment virtually and impliedly made of this truth by sentimentalists in the height of their declamation against it. End in view of their declamation, to point against self-regard the force of the popular sanction. So all [are in] favour of sympathy, and occasionally in favour of antipathy. But for this all the pains they take would be thrown away—they could not encrease a *sense.*

347. Mischiefs may be to any amount. Ambitious sentimentalism, useless honour and glory, a sufficient cause of war. Amorous sentimentalism sacrifices every other interest to that of the beloved object. Suppress calculation and you let loose dissocial as well as social affections.

Utility opposite to Experience

348. *Objector:* You are an *Ipsedixitist* since you condemn all principles that come in competition with your own.

349. Answer. *Conceditur, pro tanto,* lam an ipsedixitist. But giving thus my opinion, I give it as such, not disguising it, nor giving it for more than it is worth, viz. in my own estimate nothing.

350. In so doing, I submit the propriety of it to each man's own judgment, viz.:

1. In its preceptive or censorial sense, in which it indicates to moralist and ruler *their* only *proper end-* ,

2. In its simply *declarative or enunciative* sense, in which, stating each man's own happiness (rightly understood) as his only *actual* end, it indicates the effects producible in relation to his happiness as *their* only actual *means.*

351. Sole cause of my thus bringing to view my own opinion: the impossibility of avoiding it; viz. without express warning of its being but my opinion, and as such calling for examination, which warning I accordingly give.

352. In so doing to each man's own opinion on the subject do I appeal. In the *censorial* sense, do you not, on most occasions, obey utility? If yes, on what can you consistently avoid so doing?

353. So in the enunciative sense.

Say you that to the extent of his sympathy a man pursues the interest of others? *Conceditur,* but even here, his own at the same time, even though it be without thought about his own.

354. Pursuing another's, it follows not that he pursues not his own. His own is the breast in which the pain and pleasure of sympathy are seated.

355. With you I acknowledge sympathy as an efficient principle: to what end then by practically useless distinctions disturb the simplicity of the system of utility?

356. In correspondence to all other pains and pleasures, the term 'interest' is in continual demand and use. Why seek to banish it here where demand is the same, and no substitute?

Utility, Prejudices opposing: Useful versus pleasurable

357. False notion of the repugnancy of the useful to the pleasurable. Conjugate of 'utility' is 'useful'. It is commonly opposed to 'agreeable'. The agreeable is universally acceptable to it: more so than *pleasure,* on which envy seeks to fasten an unpleasant accompaniment.

358. In the *useful* a man is apt to behold an object to which he has

been in the habit of making forced sacrifices of the pleasant and agreeable.

359. Utility associated with *study,* hard labour; agreeableness, with play. Otherwise *utile dulce* a hard task.

360. Difficult to | | such inveterate associates.

361. Between *utility* and *pleasure,* the connection is not constant. One mode of being useful is the merely preventing *pain,* and for *this, sacrifice* of pleasure is often necessary. The word 'pleasure' is commonly employed when it is considered as *present',* the word 'useful', when absent.

362. Desirable but not possible to find a word in which by grammatical relation, i.e. by etymology, the connection of utility to pleasure, and pain to happiness and unhappiness, should be *indicated.*

363. This relation would have been afforded had *pleasure* alone and not *pain* existed.

364. Thus, by pain not only itself is introduced into feelings, but complication and obscurity into language.

365. A word could not be a conjugate of 'pleasure' and 'pain' at the same time.

366. To denote a state in which pleasure predominates over pain, required a word which should be a conjugate of neither: viz. 'happiness'.

367. 'Utility' could not be a word designative of *happiness.* The word 'needful' was one that should serve indifferently to express a tendency to produce pleasure and avert pain, howsoever slight or intense. By 'happiness', no pleasure could conveniently be indicated but what was pure and exclusively intense.

Cautions as to application of the principle of Utility

368. Per Objector, Utility a *dangerous* principle: *how,* not said, insinuation being easier than demonstration or specification.

369. *Per* J. B. *Conceditur,* in one way, danger *may* attach upon the use of it.[1]

Per utility, greatest happiness of greatest number the *end.* Suppose your own state at war with one more populous. *Per* Utility, you ought to sacrifice your own to the hostile state.

Opposition to Utility—Causes of

370. According to utility, *proper* end: greatest happiness of greatest number. Actual end: each man's own. Hence, from each, in so far as his interest is or appears to him to be adverse to ditto of greatest

[1] At this point Bentham added the following note: 'Write a chapter or section on this subject.'

number, opposite to the principle of utility will naturally be to be expected.

371. Unexpected, perhaps, the number and variety of these opposite interests and situations, opposing with or without concert.

372. Here, as elsewhere, causes of false reasoning: 1. Sinister interest; 2. Interest-begotten prejudice; 3. Indigenous weakness; *4.* Adoptive prejudice.

373. Sinister interest, first cause here noted. Interest, the universal cause of all action, being the most obvious and surely operative cause of common action of those faculties, volitional and thence of intellectual.

374. *Beason* against man; man against Reason. So *Truth.*

375. In censorial sense, direct opposition scarcely made to Utility.

376. Scarcely even by the most arbitrary despot in a civilized state. This object is every person's happiness, but *I* alone, not he, understands it.

377. Natural notion, hence, that still less would any individual who has no such sinister interest.

378. True: no direct denial applying *in toto* will anyone oppose.

379. *Secus* indirect: viz. by setting up other standards, conformity to which, if total, is irreconcileable to it.

380. Every such standard act is irreconcileable with utility. No saving clause can reconcile it.

381. Admitting utility to a limited extent, in some point the partizan of any such other principle always opposes it.

382. Ex. gr., to some act to which utility would not attach punishment or shame, he attaches one or both: for example, as being irreconcileable to virtue, religion, or duty.

383. Though not a direct opposition, setting up one of these words as an independent principle is an incontrovertible one.

384. This indirect is more efficient than a direct one—the paradoxicality of it, by which some might be prevented from embracing it, being thus kept out of sight.

385. *Virtue, religion, duty,* being in aboriginal possession of universal homage, *utility* a thing of yesterday, no wonder that in case of opposition utility should be the object of unconquerable aversion.

386. Most promising course for surmounting this aversion, showing the incontrovertibility of *utility* in its enunciative sense: viz; that man cannot be made to sacrifice what he thinks happiness to these or any other words or considerations. By impossibility, all endeavour is rendered idle.

387. *Religion.* By Jesus, at any rate, no such sacrifice is expected. Witness heaven and hell, on which is the avowedly sole dependence.

388. *Conceditur-*. by some religionists, resignation to any suffering and love of Jesus for his own sake has been preached. But, as under an earthly despot, the stronger the fear of punishment, the stronger the expressions of unbounded love.

389. *Virtue.* To *say,* 'I prefer *virtue* to happiness', is as easy as the contrary. But upon any such saying, no other person ever places dependence.

390. Suppose the precept, 'prefer virtue to happiness', delivered and even productive of effect. *Conceditur,* it might be productive of virtue. But if so, not by any such means as that of producing an intentional sacrifice of happiness to virtue.

391. Means by which, without such sacrifice, it might be productive of virtue: 1. By applying to this purpose the power of the popular sanction, operating by reward or punishment, or both—the preceptor acting as a member of the tribunal of public opinion, making or supporting and voting for a motion to this effect.

392. 2. By exercise of the influence of understanding on understanding—by his intellectual authority inducing or contributing to induce a persuasion that the conduct recommended will be regarded as laudable, its opposite as illaudable, i.e. rewarded or punished by that tribunal.

Enunciative Sense

393. Distinction as to the *enunciative* sense: 1. Persuasion *entertained;* 2. Ditto *professed.* Cause of the *entertainment.* Ditto of the *profession.* Consider first the cause of the *profession* as being the simplest case, profession being all that appears directly, etc., certainly in discourse and writing.

394. Causes of the profession: 1. Self-regard; 2. Sympathetic regard.

395. Motive, self-regarding causes of the profession: 1. Desire of being regarded as being himself actuated by purely disinterested affections.

396. 2. Desire of disposing other men to sacrifice, in case of competition, their interest to his.

397. To the accomplishment of this desire, it might appear an insuperable obstacle even to acknowledge the total absence of disinterestedness, or the constant predominance of self-regarding interest in all cases, since supposing the existence of such a state of things, it would be in vain to struggle against it.

398. Here, as elsewhere, sole means of engaging him over whom he has no particular power to act in conformity with his wishes: lauding them if they *do,* vituperating them if they *do not.*

399. But, if what they are thus exhorted to do were not in their

power, vain would be the exhortation. Shewn above how such exhortation contributes to the effect, viz. by giving them self-regarding interest in so doing.

400. Equally necessary may the same means appear where, combined with the *self-regarding,* is a *social* end.

401. Ruling few, their interest: in the discredit[ing] of the principle of utility in its *moral* or *censorial* sense. Proper end of action in this sense, greatest happiness of greatest number; actual end, in its *enunciative* sense, each man's own happiness.

402. As the sacrifice which, in the conflict of contending self-interests, each member of the ruling few will be forced and most disposed to make will be made not to the interests of the subject many, but to his co-members, hence each will feel himself disposed to set his face against this all-embracing principle.

403. As of interest, so will here be the tendency of interest-begotten prejudice.

404. Sole consideration which disposes them to tolerate it: alledgeable inability of the subject many rightly to comprehend and agree on pursuing their own aggregate interest.

405. *Conceditur,* with some exceptions this is true. But whence comes this inability? From the forbearance of the ruling few to prevent the removal of either of those points of inability.

406. To the hands by which power shall be exercised, not to the *end* to which or the *mode* in which it shall be exercised, does this plan of the ruling few apply. And as the mode in which by the pursuit of their *particular* interest they will be disposed to exercise it will or may be different from that which would be prescribed by the principle of general utility, hence the tendency to defend it remains.

407. Consequences—To a member of the ruling few, the sound of this principle will be unpleasant, even in its most general expression.

408. Still more in any of those explanations by which it is brought down and applied to particulars, viz. 1. By the translation of happiness into pleasures, thence to the effect of I | on the tangible instruments of pleasure and security; 2. By the use made of *calculation* under it.

409. Leading terms which by them will be preferred to it, terms not determinately nor so visibly connected with pleasure and security as happiness is, viz.: 'order', 'established order', 'good order'.

410. Ex. gr. *Constitutionalitur,* 'order', *etc. Diplomaticé,* 'honour', 'glory', 'dignity'. *Ecclesiasticé,* 'decency', 'dignity'. In none of these would despotism, tyranny, [or] misrule, spy cause of umbrage.

.411. So thither in the simply enunciative sense will the ruler be

disposed to admit it. Yes, you and yours are governed by *interest: secus,* I and mine. Two classes, good and bad. Good: I, always, and my friends. Bad: my adversaries, and my friends when become adversaries.

412. This, in general and in public. But in case of a complete exposure of a practice palpably irreconcileable to general good, then among confidants he will | I utility in this its enunciative sense, and without making the requisite allowance for social and anti-social affections.

413. In proportion as utilitarian language is irksome, ipsedixital and sentimental will [it] be acceptable. By cold-blooded ipsedixitism every man is left to profess his interest without disturbance.

414. *Conceditur,* sentimentalism finds practices against which its language bears harder than that of utilitarianism does against any. But in case of *addiction* to commit it, the sentimentalist will be but the more violently sentimental in his language.

415. In its censorial sense, in so far as a man takes for his guide the principle of utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is what his conduct tends to, by definition.

416. In so far as he takes for his guide a principle the dictates of which | | from that of utility, the tendency of his conduct is to detract from this greatest happiness.

417. In its *enunciative* sense following utility, he entertains a right conception of the springs by which *past* conduct has been produced, thence a *right* anticipation as to *future.*

418. Neglecting *utility* and following *ipsedixitism,* a wrong anticipation as to future. This the short, and *pro tanto* correct, account of ipsedixitism.

419. Extent of the mischief of *ipsedixitism.* For the most part not only the *fields* but | | on those fields I | still remains a deplorably extensive portion on which ipsedixitism is in rebellion against utility.

Of this debateable ground a full and correct map would be useful. No more than a | | and slight outline can here be attempted.[1]

420. The mischief of ipsedixitism is not confined to the spot in which it reigns to the expulsion of utility. It is liable to spread into the demesne of utility in all directions.

421. From every appeal made to it, ipsedixitism gains strength. Thence, where its dictates coincide with those of utility, appeal made to it is, to an indefinite extent, pernicious.

422. As to opinions, sole causes of evil, non-application or misapplication of utilitarianism.

[1] A note appears at this point, in brackets: 'Quere if any?'

423. Small the evil produced by misapplication. True standard referred to, correction may come at any time.

424. From non-application, evil is produced by substitution of asceticism and caprice, *alias* ipsedixitism: small the evil from asceticism uncombined with ipsedixitism.

425. From this substitution, boundless the evil. Any the most mischievous courses may be advocated, the most beneficial reprobated.

426. Utility put aside, all notions are upon a level. None too extravagant or mischievous to be supported, to all alike is the characteristic ipsedixitist formulary applicable: ex. gr., 'Law of Nature', 'fitness of things', 'moral sense', 'common sense'.

427. Ipsedixitism, its modes of warfare: 1. Direct: by setting up its own standard and so causing nonapplication of utilitarianism.

428. 2. Indirect: viz. by reprobating calculation and so causing misapplication of utilitarianism for want of it.

429. Consequences of rejection of calculation in ethics and politics the same as of rejecting weights and measures in medicine: opium in pounds, carbonated water in drops.

430. Besides the use of this Table as ministering to the application of the principle of utility, it helps to expose all false principles.

431. i.e. those which are in any point adverse to the principle of utility above defined, viz. by allowing any act it condemns or condemning any act it allows.

432. Every principle adverse to utility which requires the least pleasure to be given up or pain embraced.

433. Of such adverse principle, suppose this the expression of the end, 'the greatest unhappiness of the greatest number'. This *adverse* in toto to the *principle of utility.*

434. No principles to this extent ever started. This principle would answer the ends as ascribed to the *Devil.*

435. No principle except in part adverse to the principle of utility yet started.

436. The repugnance of the adverse principles may be direct or indirect.

437. Of *asceticism,* the repugnance direct and declared.

438. On many occasions it requires its adherents to give up pleasure for pain, without expectation of preponderant advantage in any shape: having in each case regard to these consequences at the time.

439. Caprice—of this principle, the repugnance to utility indirect and undeclared.

440. Do so or do not so, it says, without regard had to the consequent pleasure or pain. The consequences may thus be conformable oj unconformable to the principle of utility to any degree.

441. The repugnance, however, indirect, undeclared.

442. Call asceticism anti-rational and caprice irrational.

443. No man embraces the ascetic principle by a course of reasoning, but by imagination only—and the course is directly opposite to that of reason: thus 'anti-rational' strictly applicable.

444. Two classes of ascetics: philosophical and religious. The philosophical ascetics known by the name of Stoics. All religionists ascetics in so far as the wilful abjection of pleasure is a means of recommending themselves to God.

445. The term 'irrational' brings to view the relation of caprice to asceticism as well as utility.

446. The principle of caprice may receive different names according to the subject it applies itself to.

447. Applied to any moral precept or any law which is to distribute good and evil, it may be called the *irrational* principle.

448. Applied to any moral precept or law which is to give effect to a rule of distribution, it may be called the principle of *Sympathy* and *Antipathy:* of Sympathy where reward, of Antipathy where punishment is employed.

449. According to this principle: punish where you hate, reward where you love, the whole duty of man.

450. Of these principles, the conception is not adequate without a conception of the supporting instruments for the attainment of the respective ends.

451. By the principle of utility, calculation—by caprice, ipsedixitism—the instruments employed by the contending principles.

452. Of calculation, the nature understood generally.

453. The instrument employed by the principle of utility is calculation. What is calculation? Answer: reasons applied to the subject in the manner best adapted to the subject.

454. At hazard in the business of insurance, the object is to get money. For what is it worth getting? For the uses capable of being made of it. For the pleasures attainable and the pains avoidable by it. In these and all public and private businesses, a man employs himself to attain those things without which money would have no value.

455. For the purpose of obtaining pleasure and security on the best terms, where [is] the impropriety of applying reason in the way of calculation, more than for the purpose of getting money or any thing else?

456. To calculate is to take an account of quantities (under the principle of utility) of such pleasures and pains as seem likely to be the result of the line in question.

457. No mercantile teacher has forbidden accounts; no pharmacist, weights; no architect, a foot rule.

458. Yet many writers on morals have reprobated the application of calculation to moral conduct with every mark of contempt. These works not visible in circulating libraries only, but in academical lecture rooms.

459. *Ipse dixit* perhaps familiar to all readers.

460. The knowledge of the origin, perhaps not so. Speaking of Pythagoras' School, Cicero shews the blind admiration of his followers by relating that his opinion was conclusive evidence of its own rectitude: *avro<; etpa,*[1] *ipse dixit,* was thus applied to this infallible person.

461. *Non constat*[2] that he himself preferred any claim to such infallibility, at least on the face of this passage. By other persons, his disciples, was this rare and desirable quality ascribed to him.

462. This expression now employed to designate arrogance, not devotion.[3]

463. The cast of philosophy intended to be denoted here is not incapable of existing without arrogance. This quality is naturally sought to be concealed from the person addressed and, in this case perhaps not unfrequently, successfully sought by the philosopher from himself. As instances and persons are brought to view, the difference between *ipsedixitism* and arrogance will become apparent.

464. Differences in temper distinguish two classes of *ipsedixitists.*

465. To the didactic unimpassioned one belongs the term *'cold-blooded* ipsedixitist'. Of these are *moral* philosophers.

466. To the other class, whatever their discourse, some passion, selfish, social, or dissocial, is mixed with it, and on this they appear to depend for the effects they expect to produce.

467. When a man's behaviour betokens passion, it may be sincere or not sincere. From this difference result two classes, sentimental or hypocritical sentimentalists.

468. In Psychology as in Physics, elements are seldom absolutely pure. Of an emotion expressed by any individual, part may be sincere, part counterfeit. Without an exercise of the will, one part is produced by the circumstances of the case. Desirous to produce in others like persuasion, he exhibits for the emotion he feels not.

469. Thus besides the pure enthusiast and the pure hypocrite is the hypocritical enthusiast.

[1] 'He himself has said'. Cf. p. 26 n. 1 above.

[2] 'It is not certain'.

[3] At this point the copyist wrote: 'Something here W. did not understand.' The reference may be to Walter Coulson (17947-1860), who was an amanuensis of Bentham at this time.

Ipsedixitism—cool-blooded—disguise

470. Various and many the disguises of ipsedixitism. No easy task to count them. In the field of morals, the ipsedixitist bethinks what he writes to thought, to approve or disapprove. This done, he includes in the mouth description of some respected fictitious entity all the things he wishes, or would be thought to wish, to have done or left undone.

471. 'Moral sense' one of the predominant among these fictions. Not but on occasion it employs A's former rivals.

472. Created in England by the Earl of Shaftesbury, it thence passed into Scotland where it has long reigned absolute.[1]

473. The best adapted to its purpose of its tribe, certainly the great object of teacher and scholar, to obtain it with as little trouble as possible their wish.

In both these instances, sense being the faculty called into exercise, morals the subject to which it is applied, 'Moral sense' are the words of fairest promise. Demonstration, being the operation by which certainty is produced, was a term long in the exclusive possession of the Mathematicians.

474. The confidence which this word, by association, was calculated to produce, it was the object of every teacher, whatever his department might be, to obtain.

475. The least adapted the subject to this degree of assurance, the more anxious was each man to obtain it for it as an assistance to his labours.

476. Morals ever the subject of debate. To end all uncertainty, Descartes introduced this all-succeeding instrument: 'Whatever is, is.' The first step-—it could at this rate be applied to all science. But at the first step, a man stuck without the possibility of advance.[2]

477. Thus stealing a few words from mathematicians, various men conceived themselves enabled to give certainty, or at least persuasion, to their notions which were regarded peculiar to mathematics.

478. Thus, Gilbert[3] pronounced a record a diagram for the demonstration of right superior in force to all evidence—a tissue of lies.

[1] Cf. p. 25 n. 1 above.

[2] This is a comment on the tautologous nature of mathematical demonstration. Descartes never said 'Whatever is, is'; but this remark may have been intended to refer to Descartes's rule never to accept anything as true unless it is recognized with certainty to be so. See Descartes's *Discours de la méthode,* part II.

[3] The reference is to Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, *The Law of Evidence* (first published 1760), 6th edn., London, 1801, p. 6. For other references by Bentham to Gilbert's analogy between records and diagrams, see Bowring, vi. 184, 565;vii. 71-2.

479. Warburton undertook to demonstrate the divine legation of Moses and demonstrated his own arrogance.[1]

480. The more flagrant an absurdity, the greater the need of demonstration. The most flagrant absurdity, a contradiction in terms. For years in print shops a demonstration of the trinity.

481. Warburton applied demonstration to History, Woolaston[2] to Morals. Warburton's only effort a string of sentences in mathematical pomp. Woolaston proceeds even to axioms and corollaries.

482. Clarke and Bentley[3] demonstrated the being and attributes of God. This an irrefragable demonstration, the charge of atheism hanging over all gain-sayers.

483. Shaftesbury with his 'moral sense' had gone beyond them all. Demonstration necessitates study and admits scrutiny, sense excludes it. Demonstration may err, sense can not. Where sense is declared, contradiction an affront. Demonstration is for drudges, sense for gentlemen. If demonstration fail of producing your assent: 'You are no Mathematician.' 'If you have no sense, you are no man.'

484. Physical baculinism[4] out of vogue. Psychological baculinism remains. Ex. gr., in all its forms they talk about sense and feeling.

485. To demonstration, thought is necessary. Thought long banished from.the two Houses.

Feeling a convenient substitute. Thought will do for theorists, feeling for men of business.

Ipsedixitism—Hot-blooded

486. These (as above) the disguises of cold-blooded ipsedixitism.

487. Any of these diguises will do for hot-blooded ipsedixitism. But to his force, on which he depends for success, some are more convenient than others.

The power of the cold-blooded, in delusion; the hot-blooded ditto in intimidation.

488. The sentimentalist, amiable and formidable. By his amiable character, he engages assent; by his formidable character, he renders dissent unsafe.

[1] Bentham is referring to William Warburton's *The Divine Legation of Moses,* 2 vols., London, 1737-41.

[2] Bentham refers to William Wollaston (1660-1724), whose principal work, *The Religion of Nature Delineated,* was published in 1724. Cf. Bentham's *An Introduction (CW),* p. 27 n.

[3] Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) was the author of a *Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God; cf.* Bentham's *An Introduction (CW),* p. 27 n. Richard Bentley (1662-1742), scholar and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge (1700-42), delivered in 1692 the first set of Boyle Lectures in defence of Christianity.

[4] 'flogging'.

489. Of hot-blooded, 'common sense' the most convenient instrument. The hatred or contempt of the man who uses this word your only choice if you differ from him.

490. His opinion must be yours if you have common sense. Not assenting to it, you are mad. Assenting and not declaring your assenting, you are void of common honesty. Thus you are an idiot or a proper ass.

491. In the words 'moral' and 'common' may be seen the two species of ipsedixitists.

492. Not to possess *moral sense* is vulgar; not to possess *common sense* [is] to be a brute.

493. In politics, common sense the weapon of Paine.[1] In religion, of Beattie, into whom the soul of Bonner[2] had passed.

494. Between believers and unbelievers the question one on evidence. The latter, Beattie calls murderers of souls.[3] Against them (more detestable than common murderers, as infinite is to finite) in 1770 he railed—in 1550 he would have burned them. As it was, he tried to make them miserable.

Proving himself in earnest, he received from Warburton the palm denied to the cold-blooded ipsedixitists.

Conclusion

495. The largest scale, as far as theory is concerned, on which a man can act as an enemy to mankind is by opposing or slighting the principle of utility or depending on rival principles.

This principle, the incontestable consequence of the definition as above, given of it.

496. In politics, religion and morals every man clings to the notions most accordant to his prepossession, and all turn a deaf ear to truth which might shackle their will while it enlightened their understanding. Each man wishes to do his will. Truth, if subservient to this, is acceptable; if obstructive, odious.

497. If any man make an erroneous calculation under the principle of utility, advantage is taken of it by its enemies, and it will be laid to the principle itself, not to the misapplication of it. As if a razor were condemned because a man had cut his face with it.

498. To say that the principle which pronounces the well-being of

[1] Thomas Paine (1737-1809) published his famous pamphlet *Common Sense* in January of 1776.

[2] Edmund Bonner (c. 1500-69), Bishop of London, was notorious as a persecutor of heretics during Mary's reign.

[3] James Beattie, *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth,* London, 1773, pp. 55-6.

every creature to be its rule of action and the well-being of all to be the principle of government for a community is dangerous, is as absurd in psychology as to say in physics that to take aim diminishes the chance of hitting a mark.

499. Even the utility of utility has been denied by sinister interest. By the denial it is proved. In its expository sense it took the mark from sinister interest. 'He has told every one's secret' the remark on Helvetius when the principle was first developed.

500. Helvetius' *Sur I'Esprit,*[1] a work admirable for its genius but unfortunate for its title. Every hypocrite beheld in it its most dangerous enemy.

501. *Principes* spoken of by Napoleon as *'ouvrage de genie'.* In his code, honourable mention, but little use made of it.[2]

A book setting up as a standard of right the happiness of the greatest number he must soon have perceived could not suit a government which sacrificed every thing to one individual.

502. M. Degerando and so many others fashioned their sentiments to the interest of their sovereign and expressed generous abhorrence —Quote.[3]

503. Thus concisely has M. Degerando confuted Utility. Dugald Stewart[4] (his admirer and admired of him) more concisely. Helvetius had no existence for him, nor *Principes*—not even by the *Edinburgh Review* whose ipsedixitism it threatened to supplant.

504. The device of the Professor not original but borrowed from the jest book: Irishman who thrust his head into a hedge to hide himself from his enemy.

[1] Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-71) published *De I'esprit* in 1758.

[2] *'Principes'* was Bentham's name for his *Traités de législation civile et pénale,* ed. Étienne Dumont, 3 vols., Paris, 1802. According to Bentham, this work was put into Napoleon's hands one afternoon by Talleyrand, and was returned to him the following day with the remark, 'Ah! c'est un ouvrage de génie' (Bowring, x. 565). No reference to the *Traités* has been found in any of Napoleon's codes; but Théophile Berber (1761-1844), the lawyer and politician who prepared sections of these codes, referred to the work as 'un traité récent et estimé' in a speech expounding the *Code pénal* to the Corps législatif on 5 Feb. 1810 *(Code pénal, suivi de l'exposé des motifs présenté par les orateurs du Gouvernement,* Paris, 1810, p. 62).

[3] Joseph Marie, Baron de Gérando (or Degerando) (1772-1842), French philosopher and administrator. For his hostile remarks about Bentham's philosophy, see M. Dacier (ed.), *Rapport historique sur les progrès de l'histoire et de la littérature ancienne depuis 1789, et sur leur état actuel,* Paris, 1810, p. 230.

[4] Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh, was a leading exponent of the Scottish 'common sense' school of philosophy. For his refutation of the theory of utility, see his *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human mind,* 3 vols., London, 1792-1827, ii. 481. (Volume ii was published in 1814.)

505. Harrowby's speech on Norway quoting utility principle.. . ?

506. Grenville in answer abusing it.[1] [2]

507. Letter of Criticus in *The Examiner* abusing calculation.[3]

508. Expression respecting Cochrane Johnstone (in Cobbett).[4]

509. A new species of sentimentalism. In others, all calculation is excluded: here calculation is admitted without consequences.

510. Consequences mean the consequences to the well-being of persons other than himself, viz. purchasers of stock above its just value.

Importance

511. The question of utility not one of mere theory, but practical and to an extent beyond all others.

512. If the principle of utility be the only standard of propriety, any man who tries to prevent its application is an enemy to human happiness. If he perceives its tendency, he is a hater of mankind; but if he does not, he is equally mischievous.

513. In one case only, he is intentionally an enemy. In both, he is an enemy in effect.

Causes of opposition to principle of utility: Generalia

514. That a principle of good to all should be opposed by all, an apparent paradox—but in reality, natural. *Conceditur,* supposing this conception right, even if all classes would join it.

515. But all particular interests opposed occasionally to the general ditto.

[1] Dudley Ryder, 1st Earl of Harrowby (1762-1847) was at this time Lord President of the Council. In his speech in the House of Lords, 10 May 1814, on Earl Grey's motion on the blockade of Norway, he referred to 'general utility' as 'the test of all public law' (Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates,* xxvii. 787).

[2] William Wyndham Grenville, Baron Grenville (1759-1834), a former Foreign Secretary and First Lord of the Treasury, said in his reply to Harrowby (ibid., col. 791): 'I should, indeed, think myself criminal if I did not attempt to recal your attention to the old established and true principles of national law, in opposition to the new-fangled doctrine of utility, or, in other words, the subversion of all moral principle, the abandonment, or, at best, the discretional exercise, of every moral duty.'

[3] The reference may be to the article of 'Criticus' entitled 'Parliamentary Criticism. Mr. Rose', *Examiner,* 1 May 1814, in which George Rose was disparagingly described as 'a man who has passed all his life in calculation*'.

[4] It is not clear which expression is meant; but *Cobbett's Weekly Political Register* of 19 and 26 Mar. 1814 carried editorial articles defending Lord Cochrane and his uncle, the Hon. Alexander Cochrane Johnstone, against the charge that they had been responsible for a 'hoax' on the Stock Exchange in the previous month.

516. The more concentrated an interest, the more warmly is it defended by its sharers.

517. Self-regarding predominate over social interests—undeniable while hunger, thirst and sexual appetite exist.

518. And as necessary to the preservation of the species as those appetites.

519. 'Sacrifice, as I do, interest to duty,' says the hypocrite. 'Duty can not be made to coincide with interest.'

520. Per Utilitarianism: 'Cause duty and interest to coincide. If you trust to a man's acting against his interests you will be deceived.'

521. *E contra,* in Church government, Parliament and Judicature, altogether; in Navy and Army, very often. Consequences seen but oftener felt.

Causes of opposition to principle of utility: Rhetoricians

522. These, though not rulers, are influential.

523. They have no direct interest against utility principle.

524. But, having an interest to support ipsedixitism, they have an interest to discredit the only true and useful principle.

525. Correct calculation of pains and pleasures resulting from certain acts, the province of the utilitarian.

526. Misrepresentation, *e contra,* the province of the rhetorician and the essential character of his art. While he confines himself to truth, he is a narrator and logician not a rhetorician.

527. Misrepresentation, to be useful, must be detection-proof. Quantity, the field in which falsehood delights, is least open to detection. Easier task to falsify magnitudes than to affirm falsely the existence or non-existence of a thing so as to obtain credence. So the terms used as to quantity be indefinite, detection must follow; however great the misrepresentation, detection must follow.

528. *Conceditur,* the object of the rhetorician to rouse the affections, but wherefore except to cause misrepresentation?

529. As chemistry extends itself, the quack is injured. So as Utilitarianism spreads, the political and ethical quack is exposed.

530. Per Burke: 'I hate Metaphysics." *Per* J. B., because they substitute clear ideas in Psychology to the obscure ones in which he triumphed.

Causes of opposition to utility: Poets

531. As the interest of the rhetorician, so is that of the poet. Some poets merely describe inanimate objects, but when they treat of man,

[1] See p. 21 n. 1 above.

they are rhetoricians more mischievous and of more extensive currency than those in prose.

532. Of rhetoric, in verse as in prose, misrepresentation a main feature.

533. In poetic morality, correctness intolerable. Few general propositions correct or applicable without exceptions. But exceptions, limitations, definitions, explanations and calculations, are intolerable in poetry.

534. As he hesitates not, neither does he tolerate within his own province the Satirist as infallible. Whoever opposes him is a rebel, *a* sinner against judgment. What others possess by investigation, he possesses by invention.

535. He depends on the influence of his passions and imagination on those of his readers. If he appeal to their reason, he perfects his title. If he use his judgment he must conceal it.

536. Two means of Poetry: Physical and Psychological. The one addresses itself directly to the imagination. So the other indirectly, viz. by measured sound.

537. Verse applicable to every science. Witness Coke's reports in verse,[1] Sternhold and Hopkins,[2] etc.

538. By its psychological part it can apply itself to no subject but at the expence of utility and truth. Misrepresentation its work, misconception its truth.

539. Diversity of interest between poets and Utilitarians: 1. End. 2. Means.

540. The end of the Utilitarian, the greatest happiness of the greatest number—the pleasure of sympathy and reputation from his exertions.

541. The object of the poet, the amusement of his readers, a small part of the species, and the reputation arising therefrom.

542. Against the good of that amusement is to be placed the evil of encouraging propensities of which poetical reading is productive.

543. For success, the Utilitarian depends on correctness, especially on the estimate of pain and pleasure resulting from every action.

544. But it is his interest that correctness should be generally applied to every subject and that logical operations should be reached in perfection.

[1] *The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Kt., in Verse. Wherein the name of each case, and the principal points, are contained in two lines,* London, 1742.

[2] Thomas Sternhold (1500-49) was celebrated for his version of the *Psalms* in verse, the first edition of which dates from 1547. See also *A Defence of the Book of Psalms, collected into English metre by T. S. J, Hopkins and others* . . . , London, 1710.

545. The alliance of the interests of poetry and despotism, both hostile to utility, intimate and durable. The sinister interests of the ruling few and their hostility to the true principle of government shewn *supra.* Politics and morals being connected, it is their interest that both should be covered with darkness, and this is effected by the poet.

546. It is the interest of the Utilitarian that all public and private prejudices which obstruct the progress [of] utility should be rooted out of the public mind.

547. *E contra,* the interest of the poet and rhetorician that they should regain their hold.

548. Poetry, of all species of reading, requires least labour. Utilitarianism offers much trouble and little amusement. To choose utilitarianism when Poetry beckons is the choice of Hercules.

549. The interest *of the* despot is that in morals and politics, all things be confused. To this end the poet [is] the most efficient instrument possible.

550. As a man relishes utilitarianism, so he relishes poetry, and vice versa.

551. As a man is fitted for an utilitarian, so is he fitted for a poet, and vice versa.

552. To the utilitarian, the sacrifice of imagination and passion to judgment, necessary. He seeks for the distinction of things. The poet hunts after resemblances and shuns distinctions. He strives to intoxicate his mind and confound all ideas. *E contra,* the utilitarian.

553. The state of mind fit for poetry is midway between dreams and the sober reason of the utilitarian.

554. The utilitarian sacrifices all sinister interests and prejudices. Hatred from the few and indifference from the many he must expect.

555. No sacrifices are called for from the Poet.

556. Poetry keeps both author and reader in non-age.

Of youth, strength of imagination and passion, deficiency of judgment and experience, the state.

He sees nothing clearly and only the surface of any thing.

557. By definition, division, classification and calculation, poetry would be set at its just value. To divest men from such pursuits by scorn and ridicule, by any means, is the endeavour of the Poet.

Causes of opposition to principle of utility: Divines

558. To utility principle as defined, all divines not hostile. For example: Browne, Paley, Priestley, Law.[1] From Priestley, the definition given of it was purloined.

[1] The clergyman John Brown (1715-66) wrote *Essay on the Characteristics,* London, 1751, the second part of which contained a clear statement of what

559. Some of these spontaneously qualify it (others if pressed would have done so) by the will of God, i.e. a tissue of *ipse-dixits* from holy texts.

560. As to its definition, he is at ease. But when he begins to operate, the divine finds it too hot for his mind. Jesus no ascetic, but his followers who improved upon him were. They hated the flesh and the world as well as the devil.

561. In the divine's hands, utility a weapon against the moral sense. That battle done, he lays it aside for ipsedixitism.

562. Utility, a damper to rhetoricians. The divine in part is a Rhetorician.

Causes of opposition to the principle of utility by particular classes: Lawyers

563. The interest of his part of the influential few irreconcilable to that of the many.

564. Their interest is to put down utility and fight up its adversaries.

565. Uncertainty of all possessions to their interest. Uncertainty the source of litigation—litigation of fees: such the interest of the judge if paid by fees—such his interest also in respect of power, dignity, ease, etc.

566. As utility principle gains ground, their arbitrary power and reputation is pared away. Their rules from earliest times, inconsistent *ipsedixits,* hostile to utility.

567. As the system of utility makes its way, reason takes place of their productions. Utility requires a substitution of real to the present medley of sham law and real law, a substitution of legislative to judicial authority.

568. Shewn *supra* how adverse utility to the lawyer's interest. But the lawyer is half his time, i.e. when on the wrong side, a rhetorician; and also when on the right side—to obtain more than his right.

came to be known as 'utilitarian' moral theory. William Paley (1743-1805), Archdeacon of Carlisle, published in 1785 his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,* the utilitarian character of which probably hastened the publication of Bentham's *An Introduction:* cf. *Correspondence* (CIV), iii. 490-1. Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), Unitarian theologian, published in 1768 an *Essay on the First Principles of Government,* which Bentham at the end of his life regarded as the source of his formula 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number': see p. 291 below. Edmund Law (17 03-87), Bishop of Carlisle, was the author of *Considerations on the State of the World with regard to the Theory of Religion* (Cambridge, 1745), in Part III of which he extolled the usefulness of recent advances in the arts and sciences and denied that they were unfavourable to religion.

Causes of opposition to the principle of Utility by particular classes: Females

569. The female sex banished from the dominion of utility by the rod of decorum.

570. For the benefit of the ruling few, as the bodies of some men, so the minds of all women are castrated. Pretended ignorance and insincerity forced on them, by knowledge alone are they disgraced.

571. A respect for utility and calculation, the greatest ennui imputed to Miss Edgeworth by Envy.

572. Though she turned her back on it (see *Practical Education)* her use of it too visible.[1]

573. Nature and art preserved Madame de Stael from this error.

574. Happiness left by her to the swinish multitude, *perfectionnement,* though it means increase of happiness, the only gem recognized by her eye.[2]

Adverse classes: Men of the world

575. To all men, coercion is a cause of sufferance; liberty, a pleasure. To this liberty the principle of utility an inflexible restraint.

576. The irrational principle often leaves a man free where the principle of utility would bind him to self denial. And when left at liberty, a sinister interest opposed to the general interest is often found to hurry him away.

577. Ipsedixitism and sentimentalism, both inflexible and obsequious rules. When the public opinion is divided between two sentimentalists on any line of conduct, he adopts that best suited to his interest.

Adverse classes: Ethical Professors

578. Censorial sense.

1. Operation of sinister interest: A professor, to occupy his station, must not fall short of, nor rise far above, the ordinary mark. Falling short, he incurs contempt—rising above, he incurs hatred.

579. 2. Operation of adoptive prejudices. What a man has been used to hear of as true, that he speaks of as such, unless some reason

[1] Maria Edgeworth (1767-1849), Anglo-Irish author and daughter of Richard Lovell Edgeworth. They were joint-authors of *Practical Education, 2* vols., London, 1798. The closing chapter begins (ii. 713): 'The general principle, that we should associate pleasure with whatever we wish that our pupils should pursue, and pain with whatever we wish that they should avoid, forms . . . the basis of our plan of education.'

[2] See Anne Louise Germaine de Stael, *De I'influence des passions sur le bonheur des individus et des nations,* Lausanne, 1796, pp. 308-9.

intervenes. If it be false, his persuasion is called prejudice. Being derived from others, it is *adoptive* ditto.

580. The system most advantageous to the Teacher is that in which he finds readiest acceptance. This is not utility (which runs counter to so many sinister interests and prejudices) but *ipsedixitism.*

581. Wide difference between Ethical and physical professors.

582. No interest operates against truth in physics, but in favour of it an addition of reputation to every man for its discovery—except as far as depends on rivals, on whom a professor does not immediately depend.

583. No new truth in physics wounds any of the ruling or influential few. *E contra* in Ethics: no new step can be taken without wounding them.

584. Of all ipsedixits, the moral sense embellished by Shaftesbury has found most favor in Britain.

585. No regal road to Geometry.

586. *Secus* to moral science: a short cut found by Shaftesbury, viz. moral sense.

587. To find the criterion of right and wrong, a work of labour and judgment. But with moral sense in his mouth, a man eludes without trouble.

588. When every thing is done by feeling and talking about feeling, the task of a teacher is not difficult.

589. Moral sense now transported to Scotland: Hume, Reid, Smith, etc. vied in cultivating it. No wonder it fitted every one and proved all *desiderata* without skill or practice.

590. In English universities, religion kept Ethics out of the schools and drove her to Scotland. The Scotch universities received those who looked for instruction. The English and Irish, those who looked for patronage. Subscriptions not exacted in Scotland.[1]

591. In morals, instruction could be delivered without thought so as to please every man.

592. Thus, in Scotland and so in England, have proselytes and half-proselytes to Utility. Morals is what a gentleman pleases. Every man dreams he understands morality and wishes not to be awaked. The Editor of *Edinburgh Review*[2] has certified that every gentleman understands morality. So he knows what pleases himself, he cannot fail to understand it.

[1] Students at the Scottish universities were not required to subscribe to the Articles of Faith.

[2] Cf. p. 29, n. 1 above.

Opposition—causes of—to utility; conclusion and recapitulation

593. The interest of the many destined in this case to be long overborne by that of the few. That this interest should prevail spite of high sounding pretences seems a tautologous proposition. But where sinister interest commands, a tautologous proposition may be denied, a self contradictory one asserted, and often successfully.

594. Exposure, its necessity. These mischievous opposers of public interest can not be too steadily combated. In matters of taste, vanity and selfishness [are][1] only at the expence of the competitors. In morals and legislation, at the expence of all mankind.

595. The apparent mischief not proportionable to the real ditto. Any punishment they can incur bears no proportion to that which would be necessary to engage them to think before they speak.

596. No bounds to their mischief. The exterminating sword ever called for by them.

597. A defalcation of admiration, which they clamour for, the only punishment of which offence is susceptible.

598. Suppose their punishment severe. It is on the scale of unity —their transgressions, on the scale of millions.

Utility not selfish

599. Utility, *per ipsedixitism*, is selfish.

600. The principle of the greatest happiness to the greatest numbers is opposite to selfishness.

601. 'The principle of utility is selfishness, and its preachers are selfish,' says the dreamer.

602. *Vide supra* the prejudices against the principle of utility, cherished by the sentimentalist. These the utilitarian opposes himself singly.

603. So against the sinister interests in which many of those prejudices have root.

604. The utilitarian can never serve his sinister interests by his doctrine. The sentimentalist, often. He preaches self-denial, generosity, etc., that others may practice it for his benefit.

605. It is only by pleading weakness the sentimentalist can escape the charge of hypocrisy.

606. *Per* sentimentalist, utilitarianism confesses selfishness. Interest the source of all his notions—he does not lay claim to disinterestedness.

[1] MS'is'.

607. 'To us, self is not an object of regard. You are all body, a body of dirt; we a soul of fire.'

608. Answer. The end proposed by the Utilitarian is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, not the temporary gratification of any. In this maxim is no selfishness. The charge of selfishness only arises from the enunciation of the principle.

609. Even [in] the enunciation of the principle is there a colour of selfishness.

610. To mould men to any purpose, they must be known. To deny the selfish principle would not diminish its force: but to diminish its force, the knowledge of it is essential. To diminish the principle is impossible. To direct it so that it may agree with the general interest is practicable, but to that end knowledge is necessary.

Ipsedixitists' inconsistency

611. Of *error,* inconsistency is a natural accompaniment—not so of *truth.*

612. Hume[1] acknowledges the dominion of utility but so he does of the moral sense: which is nothing more than a fiction of ipsedixitism.

613. So before him Hutchinson[2] of Glasgow.

614. Here then is a compromise of incompatible contradictions—necessary result, inconsistency.

615. Application of this compromise to utility in the censorial sense: cases in which happiness is a fit object of regard; others in which it is *not.*

616. Ditto to ditto in the expository or enunciative sense: cases in which a man has regard to his own happiness; others in which he has none.

617. No effect without a cause. For the cause of this compromise see *post.*

Prejudices adverse: Generalia

618. To the principle of association alone are words indebted for their import. For the import which you wish to express, if you can find no other word than one to which other words, to which other imports which require to be distinguished from it, are associated, here is an unavoidable difficulty.

619. Foreign imports associated with that of *utility:* 1. Disagreeableness; 2. Improbity.

620. No term existing by which the import in question could be expressed, these encumbrances unavoidably submitted to.

[1] See p. 27 n, 1 above. [2] See ibid.

621. Tasks incumbent upon a man in relation to | | leading term as he finds it necessary to employ: 1. To fasten closely upon them all relevant ideas; 2. To detach from them all irrelevant ones.

622. To an individual the second is particularly difficult. He is but one: the persons by whom the irrelevant import has been attached, and will continue so to be, are thousands.

Absurdity of Ipsedixitism: Paradox why employed

623. No absurdity, as well as error, but may be imposed on the many by effrontery and improbity.

624. Grossness of the absurdity and facility.

625. In morals and politics, ninety-nine in one hundred have any but an adoptive judgment.

The apparent credence of the master the measure of the persuasion of the pupil.

626. But the apparent absurdity of the opinion uttered supposes an extraordinary degree of force in the arguments which have convinced the utterer.

627. Thus, in religion, self-contradiction more firmly believed than plain truths.

628. This infirmity of nature taken advantage of by the observing. Hence, propensity to paradox.

629. While the supporters of reason trust to logic, the opposers of ditto recur to paradox.

Absurdity of Ipsedixitism: Calculation reprobated

630. In the war of *ipsedixit* v. *utility,* the paradox kept out of sight.

631. *Calculation* the instrument of utility. But | | of paradox and an exemplification of its forces.

632. Without calculation, the principle of utility might float useless in the sea of words with other phantoms of the imagination.

633. Calculation *(as supra)* an application of reason, quantity being the subject.

634. To reprobate an attention to quantity of pleasure and pain, the maximum of paradox and absurdity.

635. Suppose the principle practised a day by any man. A madhouse the only place fit for him in respect of his own safety, or that of others.

Expedience—improbity

636. Connection between *expediency* and *improbity.*

637. *Mathmatice accordantia simile concordant inter se.*[1]

[1] 'Like things in mathematics agree in like ways with one another.'

638. These notions, though vague, yet mischievous.

639. A line of conduct which is mischievous to mankind may be expedient for the accomplishment of any mischievous object.

640. Suppose the purpose salutary to mankind, the word 'expediency' is inapplicable.

641. 'Utility' the proper attribute.

642. The word 'expediency' used to recommend *mischievous* and *disreputable* projects.

643. Many things too absurd for assertion; nothing, for insinuation. Many things too mischievous for direct recommendation; nothing, for insinuation.

644. Insinuation gives a chance of acceptance and shifts of responsibility. If the proposition be accepted, well; if disapproved, you can explain it away.

645. Expediency is applied to mischievous acts. It may be applied to really useful ones.

646. Without marked impropriety *vice* principle of utility.

647. By insinuation, persons and principles may receive character opposite to their real character.

648. 'Expediency' a term to confound opposite qualities.

649. Principle of utility (say they) is the principle of expediency, ergo, a screen for flagitious designs.

650. Advantages from blackening *utility principle, two:*

651.1. Manifestation of sagacity on the part of the traducer;

652. 2. Manifestation of a love of virtue and abhorrence of pretended vice.

653. Such the attack of the hypocrite sentimentalist; the enthusiastic ditto follows him.

V. USES[1]

Uses of this Table: Explains and supports Utilitarianism

654. Uses of the table. General description comprising them all. Facilitating the conception and application, it helps to establish the supremacy, thence to increase the use, of the principle of utility.

655. Principle of Utility: 1. In its *censorial* sense, it holds up the

[1] The sequence of marginals for this section is taken from the following sheets: UC clviii. 61, first four marginals (nos. 654-8); 62 to 64, col. 3, fifth marginal (nos. 659-700);61, col. 1, fifth marginal (no. 701); 68-9 (nos. 702-25); 78-82 (nos. 726-77); 64, col. 3, last three marginals (nos. 78-80); 53, cols. 1-2 (nos. 781-92); 70-1 (nos. 793-815).

greatest happiness of the greatest number as the only universally *desirable* end.

656. 2. In its *enunciative* sense, each man's own happiness, his only *actual* end.

657. Thence, for the influencing his conduct, influencing his happiness the only means.

Utilitarianism, what: it indicates End and Means

658. Utilitarianism states as the only proper *end* in view of the moralist and legislator the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

659. And as the only *means* by which any individual can be engaged to operate toward it, the happiness of that same individual: viz; either by indicating or creating an *interest* operating upon him as a motive and engaging him to operate towards that end.

660. Modes in which a mere moralist destitute of political power is, as such, capable of promoting general happiness: 1. Indication of existing motives; 2. Creation of fresh motives.

661. Character in which the private moralist as such may create motives operating toward this end: that of a leading member of the tribunal of opinion applying to this end the force of the popular or moral sanction.

662. Difficulties here opposed by language to the conveyance of correct notions. Current terms deficient and ill adapted. These employed, error is propagated. Proper ones substituted, mental weakness, sinister interest, and interest-begotten prejudice stop men's ears.

663. Principal leading terms: 1. Happiness or felicity or well being; 2. Pleasure; 3. Exemption; 4. Unhappiness o- infelicity; 5. Pain; 6. Loss, viz. of Pleasure.

664. Of happiness, sole elements or ingredients: pleasures (and exemptions).

As of a *pound,* pence.

665. By the accountants no difficulty is found in acknowledging his pounds composed of pence.

666. By moralists, great difficulty in acknowledging his happiness composed of pleasures.

667. No accountant foolish enough to say, 'The pound is valuable, the pence are not.'

668. Many moralists foolish enough to say, 'Happiness *is* valuable; certain pleasures, *not.'*

669. So delicate this taste for happiness, no pleasure enters into the composition of it. Their apple pie must have nothing in it but quinces.

Matter of Happiness

670. Moralists' difficulties about *happiness* are analogous to political economists' difficulties about *wealth.* The word 'matter' could remove both.

671. Even by those who would admit pleasure to be the sole matter of happiness, it would not be admitted to be *happiness* unless in greater quantities than it is found in.

672. The slightest imaginable pleasure (eating a morsel of bread) is as much matter of happiness, and *pro tanto happiness,as* the most intense.

673. 'Matter of happiness': pain of pronouncing so unfashionable a phrase is intolerable. In comparison of it, all knowledge, all happiness, are valueless.

674. So as to *wealth.* A rug is not *wealth.* But it is *matter* of *wealth*: three cartloads worth a pound of gold. A penny is not wealth, but certain pence are.

675. Matter—In the case of light, heat, etc., no scruple of applying this word. Physical philosophers fear not *novelty,* nor, since alchemists and astrologers have vanished, *truth.* Novelty they fear not more than the huntsman the hare. Among them, no *particular* adverse to *general* interest, no self-blinded patience, no irreclaimably determined dupes or deceivers.

676. Equally well may it be applied to: 1. Good; 2. Evil; 3. Reward; 4. Punishment; 5. Wealth; but will not be so long as the natural enemies of utility, i.e. of mankind can help it. Admitting it, they would admit lights by which the obliquity of their interests—thence of their conduct—would be exposed.

677. *Conjugates,* what. Words having the same grammatical root, part of their signification in common.

678. Connected as they are in signification, what a light thrown on ethical science, had 'pleasure', 'exemption', 'happiness', and 'utility' been conjugates.

679. *Quasi conjugates* are words having different grammatical roots, but, in signification, connected as conjugates.

680. 'Pleasure', 'happiness', 'utility', 'agreeableness'—quasi conjugates. 'Utility'and 'useful'—conjugates; so 'agreeableness' and 'agreeable'.

681. *Springs Table, its general uses,* viz. applicable to all *disciplines* without distinction. Shewing all the Springs at one view.

682. By shewing pleasures and pains to be their bases, shewing their dependence on ditto, i.e. on human *feeling.*

683. In the whole chain, shewing the relation of each *link* to its common support, thence to all the *rest.*

684. Of each link, shewing the different names; thence, its identity, notwithstanding the difference; thence, except what may be produced by difference in the occasion, the | | of all difference in the *thing* itself.

685. Shewing how each pleasure or pain may be *end* or *means.* Shewing the only true nature and origin of moral good and evil.

686. Shewing the only precise import of ditto good and evil, by this reference.

687. Shewing that, of itself, each pleasure is good, each pain evil; except with reference to pain or greater pleasure, evil not an attribute of pleasure, nor, except greater good, of pain.

688. Pointing out divers improprieties of speech, viz. 1. *Bad motive* —its relation to *propriety,* 2. *Disinterested action,* its relation to propriety.

689. Shewing through what motives actions are commonly referred to other motives than those by which they were produced.

690. Shewing the meaning of sinister interest.

691. Guarding men against the undue and deceptious influence of censorial impassioned appellations for 'pleasures', 'pains', 'interests', 'motives'.

692. By shewing the only sound basis of *Ethics* and *Dynamics,* affording a standard and a touchstone by which all unsound ones may be exposed.

693. Example: *Summum bonum.*

694. Affording the only means of surmounting the difficulties offered by the imperfection of language to a right conception of the fundamental principles of Ethics.

695. Serving for the exposure of the falsity of all false principles of morals and legislation.[1]

Instruments of Utility

696. Serving as instrument for applying the only true principle of Morals and Legislation, viz. the principle of *utility,* to all its purposes moral and political.

697. Principle of utility, what. 1. Indication of what *ought* to be, it indicates as the only universally desirable *object* and *end,* greatest happiness of greatest number.

698. 2. Indicative of what is (acknowledging sympathy and antipathy to have their corresponding *interests),* it states as the sole actual *object* and *end* of every man's every action, his advancement of his own interest.

[1] Marginals 694-5 are in Bentham's hand.

699. —thereby exhibiting to moralist and ruler the only *means* they can employ.

700. Applying this *means* to its above *end* is bringing *particular interest* to coincidence with *universal,* thence, with *duty.*

701. Descriptions of knowledge to which the Table will thus be subservient, placing them each on its only proper footing. History. Politics (including Legislation). Ethics. Dynamics. Only by placing the elements of that which, as above, is the common end and means of action and the common subject matter of all those disciplines, can this service be rendered.[1]

702. Branches of knowledge to which this Table may be rendered subservient: 1. History; 2. Legislation; 3. Morals; 4. Psychology at large.

703. 1. As to *history.* In history, sole source of *interests,* results as to happiness. 2. Of *instruction,* connection between these results and the *actions performed* or *intended.*

704. In this Table will be seen the springs of every act performed or intended.

705. Of this if no view be given, no instruction is afforded. In so far as the view is incorrect or incomplete, deceptious instruction is the result.

706. Ex. gr., if of a statesman public spirit, of a lawyer love of justice, of a clergyman fear of God, be represented as the sole influencing motive.

707. In such incorrect and incomplete indications may be seen one cause why the probity and intelligence of past acts are so generally overvalued.

708. *Secus,* the extinction of classical lights by the barbarian invaders; the earlier the time of writing, the less the experience of the historian, thence the more incorrect and incomplete the views given of psychological causes and effects. By the monkish historians, nothing exhibited but external events: marriages, births, deaths, crimes, devastations, battles, sieges.

709. By the interest-begotten prejudice as well as sinister interest of public men, the above ignorance and misconception are fostered: old established abuses, indefensible on an any other ground, are defended on the ground of the pretended wisdom and probity of their authors.

[1] After this marginal Bentham wrote the following note: '14 Feb. 1816. Just mention here the existence of *false* principles---------- passing off the definition and explanation of them till after the uses general and particular have been delivered.'

To Legislation (a branch of Politics)

710. As to Legislation. To the Legislator the Table exhibits all the *ends* he can pursue—all the *means* he can employ in the pursuit.

711. On the field of distributive law, it shews all the *interests* he can have to provide for.

712. On ditto of *penal* and *remunerative* law, and of *administration,* all the causes of all the acts which it can be his endeavour to produce or prevent; the true measure of whatsoever good or evil it can happen to him to produce or prevent; and together with the nature and force of all punishments or rewards employable as means for the attainment of those ends. Ex. gr., by homicides for depredation, more alarm is produced than by ditto for revenge.

713. On ditto of evidence, all the causes by which, so far as depends on the state of the *will,* correctness and completeness is probabilized and improbabilized; the blindness by which no more than one is considered as capable of improbabilizing it; and by which, on the ground of exposure to the action of that one alone, testimony is rejected, while, though exposed to the action of any number of others, it is admitted.[1]

To Legislation; Constitutional Law

714. See ditto of Constitutional law: the only justifiable end, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, as above. Whereupon, according to his situation and frame of mind, he *will* take for his *actual* object or end, the happiness of the subject many or ditto of the ruling few. Objection: Be his situation what it may, he *ought* to prefer ditto of the subject many to ditto of the ruling few. Candour therefore says he *will.*

715. Answer. By saying he *ought,* how do you *probabilize* his so doing? (What motive do you give him for it?) In this way, if in any, as a member of the tribunal of public opinion, you declare your eventual approbation or disapprobation, thence your own eventual good or ill offices towards him, and the force of your authority, operating by the influence of understanding on understanding directed to the purpose of engaging others to do the like.

716. Fancy not, not pretend to fancy, that by saying 'ought' or 'ought not' you can create a duty: no, nor probabilize the fulfilment of one otherwise than as above.

' Here Bentham wrote the following note: 'For its Uses with reference to Morals, i.e. Ethics, viz. Speculative Ethics, and thence to Psychology at large of which it is a branch, refer to § I I General Uses.'

717. As to *means,* in the Table he will, here too, behold all the sources from which he can experience assistance or opposition.

718. No otherwise than in so far as the articles in it become familiar to his mind will he be able to form an adequate conception of the vast extent to which the interest of the subject many finds opposed to it ditto of the ruling few: that narrow interest by the concentrated force of which is produced mediately or immediately all the imperfection in the conduct of the one, all the suffering on the part of the other.

719. The predominance of self-regarding over social interest being not only undeniable but necessary, thence of the ruling few it cannot but be the constant object to sacrifice to their own interests that of the subject many.

720. To this purpose it will be their constant aim to preserve and increase abuses by which this, their sinister interest, is promoted, [and] to prevent every improvement by which it may be thwarted —thence to give currency to whatsoever notions tend to reconcile men to this sacrifice, or to prevent their seeing it.

721. Acts seen by the subject many to be prejudicial to them will, in words and shew, be subjected to prohibition and punishment. But in so far as seen by the ruling few to be beneficial to themselves, it will be so ordered that it will remain their interest to practice those acts.

722. Cooperating without need of concert with the rest of the opulent of all classes, they will so order matters as to have, without the malice and odium, the benefit of a *licence* for inflicting on the subject and unaffluent many all the miseries out of which they can contrive to extract profit for themselves.

723. Another constant endeavour will thence be to prevent the subject many from entertaining a true conception of their own interest: giving all possible currency to fallacies directed to that object; doing what can be done towards the suppression of discourse tending to the exposure of these fallacies.

724. For every wrong they will pretend to have provided a remedy, but having rendered the remedy inaccessible to all but the ruling and other affluent few, they will then have given to themselves and company a licence for operating injuries, as above.

725. The laws, through which alone the remedy could be applied or made known will be kept mostly either not existent or not intelligible, such as they are. The benefit of them will be refused to all who cannot pay the last price which for that purpose is set upon it.

Morals (or Ethics): 1. Speculative; 2. Practical = Deontology

726. Ethics, Morals—Moral Philosophy: Practical part, *deontology.* In this Table will the Deontologist see all the elements of happiness, whether considered as an end or as a means, viz. as above.

727. To the legislator, to the moralist as to everybody, these means being the same, the sole difference is [that] by the legislator is exercised an *unlimited* power of creating as well as applying such *means,* viz. *motives',* by the moralist no farther, nor otherwise, than as above: as to the rest, all he has to do with *motives* is to *indicate* them.

728. Of moral *duty* or *obligation,* he will behold in these motives the only actually operating causes.

729. Practical services rendered by it to the deontologist. 1. As to happiness considered as the *end* of action. Shewing the folly of the ascetic as towards himself his maleficence, thence, his improbity as towards others; viz. by endeavouring by intimidation or deception, to engage them to sacrifice elements of happiness that are in their own power.

Morals or Ethics: Speculative—furnishes principles for the Deontologist

730. He will thus see that: 1. Pleasures and exemptions are the only elements of happiness.

2. Taken by itself, and considered as certain, every pleasure is *great* in the just ratio of its intensity and duration.

3. Consequences apart, magnitude the same, one pleasure is as good as another.

4. By expressions of contempt or otherwise, to seek to deprive any person of any pleasure not productive of preponderant pain is not beneficence, but maleficence.

731. He who, on the score of impurity in respect [of] connection with preponderant pain, calls upon a man to give up a pleasure ought to be prepared to shew what that pain is and to make manifest its preponderancy.

732. Elements of the value of a pleasure or pain:

I. Considered with reference to a determinate individual:

1. Intensity; 2. Duration; 3. Certainty; 4. Propinquity.

II. Considered with reference to the numbers of partakers:

5. Its extent.

III. Considered in respect of its tendency to produce other sensations of the same kind: fruitfulness or unfruitfulness.

IV. Of the opposite kind: impurity or purity.

733. Fruitfulness (or fecundity) and impurity may seem properties

rather of the act by which the pleasure or pain is considered as produced than of the sensation itself; this for correctness of conception: in practice supposed not to be material.

734. By no deontologist have those elements been altogether left undecided, viz. in the judgments of approbation or disapprobation passed on the | | *acts.* By no one has any correct, complete and regular plan of calculation been pursued, judging of the utility and, thence, of the morality of an act, according to the balance on the side of pleasure or pain.

735. Yet, if happiness be the only proper, as it is the only actual, end of human action, it is only by this sort of *calculation* that any substantial ground can be made for the ordinances of the legislator or the suggestions of the deontologist.

Moralist—his function: 1. Indicational; 2. Rectorial

736. Moralist—his function, proper and actual. In regard to *ends:* 1. So far as man's self-regarding interest alone is concerned, to strive to engage him to prefer greater remote to less present interest.

737. 2. So far as the interest of the community is concerned, to engage each man in his pursuit of self-regarding interest, to pay as much regard as possible to the social interest.

738. In regard to *means,* viz. *motives:* 1. To point out such existing ones as act in the above directions.

739. 2. To add new ones. Sole means of this applying to this purpose—the vote he has in the tribunal of the moral or popular sanction. Of the *indicational* function, the exercise has been scanty; of the *rectorial* function, abundant. Causes of this—

740. For *indicating* such existing motives, many endowments in a high degree are necessary: attention, penetration, discernment, I | active talent, industry.

741. For *creation,* as above, no such endowments are necessary: only *mental courage* in the shape of *self-sufficiency* and *arrogance.*

742. Wantonness with which the *rectorial* is exercised. Wanton calls to men to give up pleasures to subject themselves to pains for no other reason than the moralist's *will* disguised in the garb of *opinion.* 1. Pleasure to be given up for the sake of a *happiness* not composed of pleasures. 2. Lose this happiness for the sake of a *moral excellence.*

743. Equivalent for this sacrifice, I | his *smile,* antecedent to the laugh in his sleeve.

Self-regard: actuality and necessity of its predominance

744. By the most enlarged benevolence, or say, | | to the production of the maximum of universal happiness, would a man's endeavours be directed.

745. But to self-regarding, such extra-regarding affections not only are inferior in force, but were they not, the species with all its happiness would be extinct.

746. Ruling few, the persons on whom the pursuit actually made of that end will depend. Circumstances on which depends a I I chance of seeing his recommendations adopted, they being directed to that end: 1. Influence of that end on the *will* of the ruling few;
2. Influence of public opinion on the will of the ruling few, viz. as far as *the people* have a correct and complete conception of their common interest: item *their leaders',* being, moreover, proof against seduction by the ruling few.

Morals, rational: Deontology proper

747. Use, affording a foundation to | |, alias moral casuistry. Information for man's guidance in the several occasions of life.

748. *Casuistry*: generally unpopular; the enquiry deemed trifling, speculative results from use: the enquirer, weak or insincere and hypocritical.

749. Cause of the imputation as far as | | standard | | not utility, but | | notions of religion, particularly revealed.

750. *Whole Duty of Man.*[1] Object of this book to shew a man's *duty* on every occasion of life.

751. Of the work here in question, rather what is man's *interest,* between which and *duty,* according to common notions, there exists a perpetually recurring opposition with a concomitant call to sacrifice *interest.*

752. In the *Whole Duty,* sole standard of reference: will of God as expressed in the texts of the history of Jesus.

753. *Conceditur,* in such a work, 'duty'is consistently and properly employed. *Secus* where it is employed (as in I I work it so commonly is) without reference to that, or any other, determinate standard. As also its synonym, 'obligation', i.e. after the manner of *ipsedixit* philosophy, *alias ipsedixitism,* of which below.

754. Religion apart, the field of *deontology* is the [...?] of that of *legislation,* saving the extraordinary cases in which the dictates of

[1] See p. 338 n. 1 below.

deontology may be in opposition to government, evasion, or even resistance or insurrection being prescribed by it.

755. Heads to which every lesson of deontology will be referable: dictates of prudence or enlarged *benevolence.* See *Introduction.*[1]

756. Under benevolence comes | | justice: a dictate of justice the observance of which, if it defalcated from the maximum of happiness, would be unworthy of regard.

757. Sole rational method of forming a system of deontology: taking account of *feelings* on all sides, an account, though not of pounds and shillings, yet of those things to which they are indebted for their whole value. To reprobate calculation as absurd in mercantile economy as in deontology.

758. For deontology, first principle of division the list of pleasures and pains with corresponding interests, desires, etc. Question under each head. On the present occasion, this desire—shall I yield to it or not? When to all such questions—idiosyncracies of *situation* and personal constitution, physical and psychological, taken into account —answers have been provided, the field of deontology will have been travelled over.

759. Of deontology, all suggestions agree in this, viz. that the tendency of them is, to recommend a sacrifice of the present to the future: for if the *present* alone be regarded, this may be as well done without, as with, deontology.

760. On the principle of utility, the sacrifice suggested must be of the less good to the greater: of the agent in question, say self-regarding *prudence-,* of some other or others, say *benevolence*—viz. both referring to the *immediate* end. For ultimate end, no man's act can have other than his own *good,* his pleasures and pains of sympathy being as much as any others *his* pleasures and pains.

761. Sole interest affected, the agent's: sole dictates those of *prudence.* Interest affected, that of another: dictates of *benevolence* are generally those of *prudence* likewise.

Reason. Scarce an individual is so insulated, but that, by the eventual agency of another whose interests are affected by his agency, his interest may be affected: and, if not by ditto of the individual thus immediately affected, by ditto of *other* individuals considered as members of the tribunal of public opinion, applying the force of the popular or moral sanction.

762. So much as to *ends. Means* the deontologist can have no other to work with but pleasures and pains. In so far as they are not of his *creation,* they will be *suggested* as likely of *themselves* to result

[1] *An Introduction* (CW), pp. 116-17.

from the supposed act in question: viz. applying to his self-regarding or social interest, as above.

763. How the deontologist, as such, is capable of creating such means as above: i.e. interests operating as motives. N.B., in so far as the means applied consist of *power,* whether political, domestic, or even that which is attached to opulence, he who applies them acts not as a deontologist.

764. Sole mode of applying *means* in the character of a deontologist is exhibiting your *opinion,* which carries with it the effect of *a vote* in the tribunal of public opinion and, with the weight possessed by your authority, tends to engage others on the same side.

765. Prudence is: 1. Purely self-regarding; 2. Extra-regarding.

766. Purely self-regarding, where by the conduct in question no other's interest will be affected, viz. or ex. gr. conduct as to: 1. Recollection; 2. Expectation; 3. Imagination at large.

767. Rule of self-regarding as to pleasures of expectation—particular pleasures or sources of ditto in view, fix your mind on the most valuable. If exertion be necessary and conducive, think of the *means.* Thus, by pleasure of expectation, pleasure of possession will be probabilized.

768. ' Exertions not conducive, ex. gr., in case of repose think of the most pleasurable mode of employing such sources (ex. gr., money) as you have at command.

769. At this time that the pleasure of *expectation* may be the purer, the more certain ditto of *possession* the better.

770. Possession considerably uncertain, contemplate it or not as the aggregate of the pleasure of expectation, or ditto of pain of disappointment, seems likely to be the greater.

Morals, irrational; Deontology, vulgar; i.e. Ipsedixital

771. Different has been the course hitherto pursued, viz.: 1. Of these elements, one or more employed to the exclusion of the rest;

2. Without notice taken of any of them, naked opinion or will expressed ; 3. viz. in terms of phrases eulogist or dyslogistic; 4. frequently more or less impassioned. For the influence they endeavoured to be exercised on others' understandings, instead of *calculation,* as above, *eloquence* trusted to; i.e. *imagery* addressed to the imagination or *pathos* to the passions.

772. Endeavour being thus used to give to the authority of this one voice in the tribunal of public opinion an influence exceeding as much as possible what is due to it, by odium and contempt endeavouring at the same time to intimidate and to I | gainsayers.

773. Thus is rendered to legislation and morals the same sort of

service as would be rendered to a merchant's economy, a panegyric on the excellence of this or that one of the articles he deals in, instead of a set of Account Books.

774. Sometimes the efficiency of the opinion is trusted to bare and | | *ipsedixit.* And especially if strengthened by prior *ipsedixits,* applied to a yet unfurnished mind, it may produce persuasion without expence either of imagery or pathos.

775. *Scoticé,* for a set of instruments for the *ipsedixit* to operate with, innate principles coined *ad libitum* in any of the four.

776. Innate, the principle would no more need indication than any of the five senses.

777. Not recognizing any such innate principle, a man is ignorant or perverse. In either case, his vote is unfit to be received.

778. To moralist and ruler, this Table is what Anatomical ditto is to Medical men.

779. In *Anatomical Tables* are shewn the seats of physical enjoyment and sufferance and the source of physical action; in *this,* psychological ditto.

780. Here seen at a view the subjects of two main branches of *psychology,* viz. psychological *pathology* and psychological *dynamics.*

Psychology

781. Purely *speculative,* it were no better than *push-pin.* But it is practically applicable: furnishing to History, Laws and Morals, ends, materials and instruments.

782. Psychology, its branches: 1. Noology; 2. Aesthesiology; 3. Thelematology. Aesthesiology is psychological pathology. Thelematology is psychological dynamics.

783. Of aestheiology and thelematology, the speculative part is *expository* and may be designated by those appellations, respectively. The practical part is *deontology,* the knowledge of what is proper to be done on all occasions.

784. Speculative and | | together, thelematology has commonly been called Ethics or Moral Philosophy.

785. Sole *actual* and ultimate end of each man's conduct: the maximum of his own happiness.

786. Sole *proper* end of the conduct of the legislator in any community: the maximum of the happiness of the community.

787. Sole ingredients of happiness: pleasure and exemption from pain.

788. Sole *means* of operating on mankind by the legislator: creation and application of pleasures, exemptions, pains and losses, viz. through the medium of their causes.

789. Correspondent to pleasures and pains are *interests, desires* and *motives.*

790. By the legislator, nothing can a man be made to do any further than he has been made to have *an interest* in doing it.

791. Nor by the moralist, any further than he has been *persuaded* that it *is* his interest to do it.

792. The legislator *creates,* of himself, new interests. To the deontologist it belongs, of himself, to bring to view existing interests, and even, in proportion to the influence of his authority, to apply the force of the moral or popular sanction to the creation of new interests.

Psychological Dynamics

793. In psychological dynamics, the matter of felicity and infelicity are considered as *means,* whatever be the *end.*

794. To the extent of his *power,* the *ruler* has these means at his disposal. He creates and applies them.

795. The moralist does but indicate the application *capable of being* made by a man himself and ditto likely to be made by other agents: viz. physical or moral, i.e. human. Thence, the natural pathological consequences of a man's actions.

796. *Ruler's* rule: what you would have done, make it a man's *interest* to do it.

797. Moralist's rule: what you would have done, shew that it is a man's interest to do it.

798. Ruler's corresponding problem: so to order matters that what you would have done, it shall be a man's interest to do it.

799. Moralist's corresponding problem: so to order *discourse* that what you would have done, it shall be seen to be man's interest to do it.

800. That which the ruler has endeavoured to make it the subject-citizen's *interest* to do, he calls his *duty.*

801. In so far as this endeavour has been successful, *duty* and *interest* have been made to coincide.

802. Of the success of this endeavour, the extent of that coincidence is the measure.

803. Relation of subject's duty to ruler's interest will be as the form of government.

804. In ruler's, as in every situation, it will be a man's *endeavour* to render other men's conduct, thence their political duty, as conducive as possible to his interest. *Facility* will be as the form of government.

805. Case 1. Pure Monarchy. Facility at its maximum. Political duty accordant, as above.

806. Case 2. Aristocracy or Mixt Monarchy. In the instance of each co-ruler, facility of self-serving, as above, less. The mass of services obtained *in toto* by the absolute monarch must here be shared among the co-rulers. Mode and proportions, as Constitution.

807. Case 3. Democracy. Desire of self-serving, the same in all: facility, less in each. The purer the democracy, the greater the number of co-sharers will each man have. Mode of sharing, leaving in the hands of each the maximum proportion of his possessions or earnings.

808. Though every where ruler's own happiness will be his own sole object, yet the ingredients of it (viz. pleasures and exemptions) will differ in different states of society.

809. In so far as society is civilized, pleasures etc. of the popular and religious sanctions and of sympathy will be strong.

810. In Mahometan countries, particularly in Morocco, popular and religious sanction pleasures, almost unknown: ditto of that sympathy which has for its object the public welfare, completely so.

Psychological dynamics continued

811. *Anglicé,* liberty of the press not compleatly destroyed, the shifts employed by the ruling few to share among themselves in so large a proportion, as matter of *reward,* the matter of *good* (i.e. the mass of services) have necessarily been disguised.

812. Disguises. 1. Sinecures, needless places and overpaid ditto;
2. To create apparent demand for the needless places, nation kept perpetually at war; 3. To keep war alive and dispositions by which all other nations are kept in avowed humiliation and necessary enmity—the adverse parties concurring in this sinister interest.

813. To conceal the waste and corruption, the mantle of religion spread over it. Establishment composed *in toto* of sinecures, etc. To opulence added, in defiance of Jesus, power and dignity: protesters against these reprobated as enemies of religion, government, society and mankind.

814. Were subserviency to general interest regarded by the ruling few as their duty, then, in proportion as the coincidence between that interest and this duty, would the interest of the subject many be in the highest degree served: because by pursuing duty a man would pursue general interest.

815. But by such pursuit of general interest, their particular interest would often be disserved. Thence it is that the above rule of psychological dynamics is so little applied. Good (they say) in theory, bad in practice.

INTRODUCTION[1]

Names of *real* entities—names of *fictitious* entities: in one or other of those two characters will every work, which in any language presents itself in the form of the part of speech called a noun *substantive,* be found to serve. By every name of a real entity, in so far as the import of the word is understood, is held up to view an object really existing, an object in relation to which assertions, grammatical propositions having more or less in them not only of meaning but of truth, are capable of being advanced.

Taken by itself and apart from any relation which it may be understood to bear to some proposition which has for its subject a real entity, a proposition which has for its subject no other than a fictitious entity has neither truth nor meaning: it is no better than a heap of nonsense.

If the above observations be found to be true—and the more thoroughly they are examined, the stronger and clearer it is believed will be the persuasion entertained of their truth—the following two propositions will be found presenting an incontestable claim to be received as axioms.

1. To be understood, every term—to use the language of the Logicians, every noun substantive; to speak in the language [of] Grammarians, every word—which is not the name of a real entity requires to be explained by the indication given of the relation which its import bears to the import of some word which is the name of a real entity.

2. For the manifestation of this relation, there is but this one course by which the purpose can be effected, and that is—to the term in question, employed in the character of the name of the subject of a proposition, add the complement of words necessary to the formation of a proposition (in the logical sense of the word 'proposition'), which proposition must, moreover, be such as shall upon examination be found to have for its exact equivalent a proposition having for its subject the name of a real entity; viz. the name of that particular real entity which alone, when it has received its complement of words in other forms expressed by so many definite parts of speech, is suited to the purpose.

Shortly, thus: any name of a fictitious entity can no otherwise be made clearly intelligible than by means of some relation which the import of it bears to some word which is the name of a real entity.

Any proposition having for its subject a fictitious entity can no otherwise be made clearly intelligible than by means of some relation

[1] The manuscript for this section is UC xiv. 22-34, and was written in Bentl^im's hand on 8 July 1815.

which the import of it can be shewn to have to a correspondent proposition having for its subject the name of some real entity.

A proposition having for its subject the name of a fictitious entity is not clearly understood any further than as it can be translated into a correspondent proposition having for its subject the name of some real entity. Falsehood, then, or nonsense, is the only import, of which, abstractedly from all relations to any proposition having for its subject the name of some real entity, a proposition having for its subject the name of a fictitious entity is susceptible.

By this aphorism, incontestable as it is, no imputation, it will presently be seen, can possibly be found to attach upon any person on the ground of the use which, in the terms of his discourse, he makes of terms significative of, and propositions constructed out of, names of fictitious entities. To the carrying on of any discourse having for its tenor any matter considerably different from the matter of the sort of discourse which the inferior animals hold with one another, names of *fictitious* are not less necessary than names of *real* entities.

By one short howsoever comprehensive observation, the necessity of the language of fictitious entities to every purpose of rational discourse will be rendered sufficiently apparent. As to the greatest part of it, to all discourse having for its subject the state of the human mind, the operations which it is in the habit of performing, the distinguishable parts into which it is capable of being represented as divisible, and the modifications of which it is susceptible, names of fictitious entities and propositions having for their subjects names of fictitious entities—in a word, fictitious entity language—are essentially and indispensably necessary.

Of the above propositions, the contents of the following Table will at the same time afford an exemplification, and a demonstration of their truth.

In it will be exhibited, on the one hand, a number of names of fictitious entities, [and] on the other hand, two, and but two, names of real entities. The relation, which by the import of those names of fictitious entities is borne to the import of those names of real entities, the import of the names of fictitious entities, [and] the import of the corresponding portion of the fictitious part of human language, will be placed in a light which, it is believed, will be found to be as strong and clear as it will be acknowledged to be new.

The whole mass of language will, thus, be seen to be divisible into two parts, the real and the fictitious. And throughout the whole mass, it is in the real part that the fictitious will be found to have its necessary root.

The names of fictitious entities in question, [or] the semantic symbolic appellations as they may be termed, are: 1. ‘Desires’ and

'Aversions' with their synonyms; 2. 'Wants' with their synonyms; 3. 'Hopes' and 'Fears' with their synonyms; 4. 'Motives' with their synonyms; and 5. 'Interests' with their synonyms.

The names of the real entities, in which these fictitious entities have their root, are 'Pleasure' and 'Pain', with their synonyms and the specific names contained within and under them, of which the significations respectively are subordinate to theirs.

That Pleasure and Pain (understand always individual pleasures and individual pains) are real entities—[and] that consequently the words 'Pleasure' and 'Pain' are respectively names of real entities—no man, it is believed, will feel disposed to doubt. Of their existence the evidence which we have is still more immediate than any that we have of the existence either of the body or of the mind in which they have respectively their seats.

Pain and pleasure, together with all sensations of the neutral or uninteresting classes (for by these names may be designated and distinguished all sensations or perceptions other than those of pain and pleasure), are to us the only immediately perceptible entities. In comparison of these, not only the mind itself but our own bodies respectively, with the addition of all other bodies, may be referred to a class distinguished by the appellation of *inferential* entities. For sensations alone are the immediate subjects or objects of experience. It is from them that we infer the existence of this or that other real entity in the character of a productive instrument or cause.

Happily, on this ground. Tyranny and Intolerance—let them wrap themselves up ever so close in the cloak of Religion—have no tolerable pretence for attempting to set foot. True it is that by *Non-Religionists,* not only the mind of man in a state of separation from the body, but unembodied spirits of all sorts and even the Deity Himself, have in synonymous language been ranked in the category of *fictitious entities.* But, as if in retaliation, and to turn the tables upon those audacious speculatists, the ingenuity of a celebrated divine, as well as illustrious philanthropist, has with no inconsiderable force of argument penetrated into the enemy's quarters and attacked the existence of all bodies.[1]

Nor is it to any such abstruse portion of the field of action and thought, or in particular of the field of art and science, as Ontology and Theology, that the question, 'Is this the name of a real or the name of a fictitious entity?' has confined itself. Light and heat, as everybody knows, have successively been taken for the subjects of it; and as divinity has had its atheists, so have Natural Philosophy and

[1] Bentham is referring to George Berkeley (1685-1753), Bishop of Cloyne, who argued that all physical or material objects are reducible to mental phenomena.

Chemistry had their aphotists and athermists.[1] But the ruling few have not hitherto regarded themselves as having in either of these cases an interest in taking a part in the question whether *light* and *heat* are, respectively, *alethosemantic* or*plastosemantic* appellatives.[2] Yet, notwithstanding the wit which might so easily be displayed by employing light and heat to join in affording proof of their existence and reducing incredulity to silence, neither fire, nor sword, nor halter, nor starvation, nor exclusion, nor so much as simple insult or execration, have ever yet been employed on this ground in settling opinion on the right side. Nor is it exactly in this sense that, by letting this light shine forth before man, it has, of late years at least, been contended that their father which is in heaven will be most aptly glorified.

After the observations which have just been above brought to view, whatsoever may be said of the distinction between real and fictitious entities, an imputation to which, at any rate, it seems not to be exposed is that of being devoid of either theoretical or some practical importance.

In further exemplification and proof of this importance, two observations and, on the present occasion, no more than two will be added: one of these applying more immediately to the field of Ethics including Politics; the other to the still more extensive field of Logic.

The one that applies to the field of Logic is this. Definition being universally acknowledged in the character of the great instrument of pneumatic clarification, when, either for the purposes of instruction or controversy, a man is determined to be clear, he takes in hand some word or words in which the essence of his subject seems to him to be lodged and tacks to it something that presents itself to him in the character of a *definition.* Unfortunately not so most commonly, after taxing his wits to the utmost, what he finds—or if he does not, others find for him—is that, after the pains thus bestowed upon the subject, it is if any thing less clear than before.

The only mode of exposition commonly understood by the word 'Definition' is that which by the Aristotelians was called definition *per genus et differential*^ an exposition which is performed by naming a class or genus of objects within which that which is designated by the term thus undertaken to be defined is included, and thereupon, some circumstance or other by which the contents of this lesser class are considered as being distinguished from all the other contents of the greater and containing class.[3]

' Aphotists and athermists: those who deny the real existence of light and heat.

[2] Alethosemantic appellative: the name of a real entity. Plastosemantic appellative: the name of a fictitious entity.

[3] See, for instance, Aristotle, *Topica,* I. 2, 101b-102a, and IV. 2, 122b.

This being the case, if so it happens, as it most commonly does, that the word thus undertaken to be defined is the name not of a class of real but of a class of fictitious entities,[1] what commonly happens is that, the word not having belonging to it that sort of relation which is the principal object of research, namely, a word significant of a superior, i.e. more extensive and containing genus, the thing thus undertaken to be done belongs to the category of impossibles. What he gives for the name of a superior genus, coupled with words designative of some differential character, is at best no more than a synonym by which no ulterior information is given, and which itself stands in as much need of exposition as the word for the exposition of which it is employed.

With the exception of one case, and that a case not very frequently exemplified, this untoward circumstance is sure to have place as often as the word thus undertaken to be defined is the name of a fictitious entity. Instances, if is true, are not altogether wanting in which, for this or that name of a species of fictitious entities, the name of a superior genus in which that species is included may be found: thus, taken in a certain sense, 'privilege' and 'exemption' have, both of them, for their superior genus 'right', the word 'right'.

But in comparison of those which stand, all of them, on the same level at the top of the Porphyrian tree,[2] those names of fictitious entities which have other names standing above them are extremely rare. And even when the good fortune of the Logician leads him to one of this rare sort, it is only one step taken by him before his arrival at the degree of utter darkness. Nor is any useful light gained. An exemption is a *right*[3]—Good! But a right—a right itself—what is it? Of what is it a species? 'Of nothing at all,' says the answer, if it be a true one.

This then is an example of the case, and that a most extensive one, in which, in the ordinary and almost exclusively and universally received signification of the word 'definition', a definition is not possible.

The word is it then unsusceptible of all explanation—is it unsusceptible of *exposition* in any shape? The state of things would be a sad one if it were a true one. For these are exactly the sort of words in the instance of which the demand for explanation is most urgent and most important.

What then is the species of exposition adapted to this case? It is that to which may be given the name of 'paraphrasis': The finding

[1] MS 'entity', the original reading being 'not of a real but a fictitious entity'.

[5] The 'Porphyrian tree', a device for classifying by dichotomy used by Porphyry (c.232-304), one of the founders of Neo-Platonism, in his book *Isagoge.* Bentham believed that the correct position of the Porphyrian tree was upside down: see his *Essay on Logic,* Bowring, viii. 266-7.

[3] Cf. *An Introduction (CW),* p. 241.

among propositions having respectively for their subject the name of a real entity, some *alethosemantic* appellative, some one that will be of the same import with a proposition having for its subject the name of a fictitious entity, some *plastosemantic* appellative.

Thus in the case of the word 'right'. To give an exposition of the word 'right', the only sort of exposition which the nature of the case admits of, it would be necessary to commence in some such way as this: 'A man is said to have a right or a right is said to belong to a man when . ..'.

Let it not, however, be expected that the exposition thus commenced shall in this place be completed. Ere it could be completed, it would be necessary to have travelled step by step over no inconsiderable portion of the speculative department of the field of Ethics, Politics included. For of rights there are many species: and for each species a very different exposition, though in each case of that sort for the designation of which the word 'paraphrasis' will be found sufficiently expressive, would require to be employed.

TABLE
OF
THE SPRINGS OF ACTION

No. I. PLEASURES AND PAINS,
—*of the* TASTE—*the* PALATE—*the Alimentary Canal—of* INTOXICATION.

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the PALATE—Interest of the* BOTTLE.

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES.

---- 1, NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	-----111. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
1. Hunger.	*Proper, none.*	1. Gluttony.	cramming, stuffing, devouring, gormandizing, guttling, &c.
2. Need of food.	*Improper.*	2. Gulosity.	10. Drunkenness.
3. Want of food.	1. Love of the pleasures of the social board—of the social bowl, or glass of good cheer—of good living----------of the good goddess—of the jolly god, &c.	3. Voracity.	11. Ebriety.
4. Desire of food.		4. Voraciousness.	12. Intoxication.
5. Fear of hunger,		5. Greediness.	13.Sottishness.
6. Thirst.		6. Ravenousness.	Love, &c. *(as per Col.* 3) of &c. drink, liquor—drinking, tippling, toping, boosing, guzzling, swilling, soaking, sotting, carousing—junketting, revelling, &c.
7. Drought.		7. Liquorishness.	
8. Need, want, desire —of the means of quenching, relieving, abating, &c. thirst.		8. Daintiness.	
9. Inanition.		9. Love, appetite, craving, hankering, propensity. eagerness, passion, rage---------- of, for, to, and after—	

No. II. PLEASURES AND PAINS,
—of the Sexual Appetite, or of the Sixth Sense.

Corresponding Interest, *SEXUAL INTEREST.*

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

-----1. NEUTRAL: viz	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	—III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
Single-worded, none.			
———	None.	1. Venery.	6. Libidinousness.
Many-worded,		2. Lust.	7. Lecherousness.
Sexual desire.		3. Lechery.	8. Salacity.
		4. Lewdness.	9. Salaciousness.
		5. Lustfulness.	———
			10. Venereal desire.

No. III. PLEASURES AND PAINS,
—O/SENSE, *or of the* SENSES: *viz. generically or collectively considered.*

Corresponding Interest,
Interest of SENSE—of the Senses:—SENSUAL INTEREST.

Corresponding A/O77V7SS—with NAMES,

—I. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	— III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
Single-worded, none.			
———	None.	1. Sensuality.	8. Love, appetite, craving, &c. (as *per No. I. Col.* 3) of, for, to, and after—sensual pleasure, enjoyment, gratification, indulgence, &c.
Many-worded,		2. Luxury.	
Physical want, need.		3. Carnality.	
exigency, necessity		4. Debauchery.	
—desire, appetite.		5. Intemperance.	
		6. Luxuriousness.	
		7. Voluptuousness.	See note (6), *Synonyms to pleasure.*

No. IV. PLEASURES AND PAINS,

Derived from the matter of WEALTH.—PLEASURES *of Possession—Fruition—Acquisition—Affluence-—Opulence.* PAINS *of Privation—Loss—Poverty—Indigence*

Corresponding Interest,
PECUNIARY INTEREST. Interest of the Purse.

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

---- 1. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	---- III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
Single-worded, none		1. Parsimony.	1. Covetousness.
Many-worded,	1. Economy.	2. Parsimoniousness.	2. Cupidity.
1. Desire, want, need, hope, prospect, expectation—of the means of subsistence, of competence, plenty, abundance, riches, opulence;—of profit, acquisition, &c.	2. Frugality.	3. Penuriousness.	3. Avarice.
2. Fear, apprehension—of loss, pecuniary damage, want, penury, poverty, impoverishment, indigence,	3. Thrift.	4. Closeness.	4. Rapacity.
3. Desire, &c.----------of maintaining, preserving, improving, mending, bettering, meliorating, advancing—a man's condition, situation, station, position—in life, in society, in the world, &c.	4. Thriftiness.	5. Stinginess.	5. Rapaciousness.
	5. Desire, hope, prospect, expectation—of thriving.	6. Niggardliness.	6. Corruption.
	6. Prudential regard, care, attention, for and to a man's pecuniary concerns, property, income, estate, livelihood, subsistence.	7. Miserliness	7. Corruptness.
		8. Nearness.	8. Venality.
		9. Dirtiness.	9. Love, appetite, &c. (as *per No. I. Col.* 3) lust, greediness—of, for, to and after----- money, gain, lucre, pelf—hoarding, flint-skinning, scraping, &c.

No. V. PLEASURES AND PAINS,

—of POWER, *Influence, Authority, Dominion, Governance, Government, Command, Rule, Sway, &c.;—of Governing, Commanding, Ruling, &c.*

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the SCEPTRE.*

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—■*'with* N AMES,

---- 1. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	---- III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
1. Ambition.	*Single-worded, none.*	1. Ambition.	4. *Self-regarding or dis-social* moral qualities, liable to be *manifested* in the *exercise of* power, and *productive* of the *abuse* of it;—and wont to be spoken of in the character of MOTIVES.
2. Aspiringness.	*Many-worded,*	2. Love, appetite, craving, hankering, eagerness, greediness, thirst, lust, rage, passion—for *power,* &c. (as per Col 1.)	1. Tyranny.
3. Desire. &c. as per No. IV. Col. 1. of *power,* &c. as above: of promotion, preferment, advancement; of exaltation, aggrandisement, ascendancy, preponderancy, superiority; of risingin the world, &c.	1. Honest, becoming, praiseworthy, laudable, honourable, generous, noble, virtuous------ ambition.	3. Spirit of faction, turbulence, intrigue.	2. Tyrannicalness.
			3. Despotism.
			4. Despoticalness.
			5. Arbitrariness.
			6. Imperiousness.
			7. Dictatorialness.
			8. Domineeringness.
			9. Magisterialness.
			And see No. VIII. Col. 4.

No. VI. PLEASURES AND PAINS,

-----O^CURIOSITY.

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the SPYING-GLASS.*

Corresponding MOTIVES—with NAMES,

—-I. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	---- III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
	Single-worded, none.		
1. Curiosity.	—	1. Inquisitiveness.	5. Idle, vain, busy. prying, impertinent—curiosity. inquisitiveness.
2. Inquisitiveness.	*Many-worded,*	2. Pryingness.	
—	1. Love, desire, appetite, thirst. rage, passion—for knowledge, learning, Instruction, literature, science; useful information; the arts, &c.	3. Impertinence.	
3. Love of novelty.		4, Meddlesomeness.	
4. Love of experiment.			
5. Desire of information.	2. Laudable curiosity.		

No. VII. PLEASURES AND PAINS,

—of AMITY: U/Z. PLEASURES *derivable from the* Good-will, *thence from the* Free Services, *of this or that individual.*—PAINS *derivable from the* Loss *or* Non acquisition *of ditto.*

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the CLOSET.*

Corresponding MOTIVES—with NAMES,

—NEUTRAL: viz.	---- EULOGISTIC: viz.	---- III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
Single-worded, none.	*Single-worded, none.*		
Many-worded,	*Many-worded,*	1. Servility.	9. Propensity, readiness—to fawn, cringe, truckle to, humour, flatter--------- this or that individual.
1. Desire, wish, want, need, hope, prospect, expectation—of obtaining, gaining, acquiring, procuring—partaking of, sharing in---------- enjoying, retaining, securing—the good opinion, favourable opinion, good-will; good offices, services; help, aid, assistance, support, co-operation; vote; interest; favour, patronage, protection, countenance, recommendation—of this or that *individual.*	Honest, &c. *(as per No. V. Col.* 2). desire, &c. *(asper No. VII. Col.* 1.)	2. Slavishnqss.	10. Desire, hope, &c. of insinuating, worming a man's self, creeping into the good graces of the individual in question; of currying favour with him.
2. Fear, apprehension, dread —of losing, forfeiting, foregoing—the favour, good opinion, &c. as above.		3. Obsequiousness.	
3. Desire, &c. of ingratiating a man's self with him, of recommending a man's self to him, to his favour, &c. as above;--------- of obtaining, &c. a place in his favour.		4. Cringingness.	
		5. Abjectness.	
		6. Meanness.	
		7. Sycophantism	
		8. Toad-eating.	

No. VIII. PLEASURES AND PAINS, —*of the* MORAL *or* POPULAR *Sanction: viz.* PLEASURES *of* REPUTATION, *or Good-repute:* PAINS O/BAD REPUTATION, *or Ill-repute.*

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the TRUMPET.*

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

—I. NEUTRAL: viz.	I. NEUTRAL *continued.*	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz. ----------	III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.
Single-worded, none.	ignominy, infamy. odium, unpopularity", of ill, evil, bad •—repute, report, or fame; of an ill, &c. name; of bad reputation, bad character: of being disgraced, dishonoured. &c.	1. Honour.	1. Vanity.
—		—	2. Vainness.
Many-worded.	4. Sense of propriety. decorum, honour. dignity; moral rectitude, moral duty.	2. Conscience.	3. Ostentation.
1. Desire, &c. (os *per No. VII.y—of* obtaining, &e. the goodwill, &c., thence the eventual services,&c. of *the public at large.* or a more or less considerable, though not liquidated, portion of it.		3. Principle.	4. Fastidiousness.
		—	5. Vainglory.
2. Fear, &c. *(as per No. VII. Col.* 2.) of losing, &c. the good opinion, &c.of ditto.		4. Probity.	—
		5. Integrity.	6. False glory.
3. Fear, or sense----------of shame, disrepute, opprobrium, reproach, dishonour, disgrace,		6. Uprightness.	7. False honour.
		7. Rectitude.	—
		8. Honesty.	8. Pride.
		—	9. False pride.
		9. Heroicalness.	10. Self-sufficiency.
		10. Honest, becoming. laudable, virtuous. pride: a proper degree of pride. Conscience *and* Principle *belong also to Nos. IX. and X.: so likewise* Probity, &c.: *and these last belong to No. XIV. in so far as depends upon the* LEGAL SANCTION.	11. Loftiness. 12. Haughtiness. 13. Assumingness. 14. Arrogance. 15. Overbearingness. 16. Insolence. And *see No.* V. *Col.* 4.

No. IX. PLEASURES AND PAINS, —*of the* RELIGIOUS SANCTION.

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the ALTAR.*

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

—I. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz. ----------	III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.
1. Religion.	1. Piety.	1. Superstition.
2. Religiousness.	2. Devotion.	2. Bigotry.
—	3. Devoutness.	—
3. Sense of religious duty.	4. Godliness.	3. Enthusiasm.
4. Religious zeal, fervour. ardour.	5. Holiness.	4. Fanaticism.
—	6. Sanctity.	—
5. Fear of God.	7. Righteousness.	5. Sanctimoniousness.
6. Hope from God.	—	6. Hypocrisy.
7. Love of God.	8. Pious, godly, holy, sacred------ &c. zeal, fervour, ardour, *Sec.*	7. Affectation of, pretension to—religion, &c.—Piety, &c.— *as above, Col.* 2.
		8. Religious prejudice.
		9. Religious frenzy
		10. Religious intolerance.

No. X. PLEASURES AND PAINS, —*of* SYMPATHY.

Corresponding Interest,

Interest of the HEART: viz. more or less expanded, expansive, comprehensive— in proportion to the Number *of the* Persons *whose Welfare is the object of the* Desire.

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

---- 1. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	II. EULOGISTIC *continued:*	---- DYSLOGISTIC: viz.
I.—*Towards this or that determinate INDIVIDUAL—*	*(Mostly names of permanent moral Qualities—)*	III.—*Towards the POLITICAL Community, or Nation, at large------*	I.—*Towards this or that INDIVIDUAL* ——
1. Sympathy.	I.-----*Towards this or that INDIVIDUAL* —	1. Patriotism.	1. Partiality.
2. Fellow-feeling.	1. Kindness.	2. Public spirit.	2. Favouritism.
3. Good-will.	2. Good-nature.	3. Public zeal.	3. Partial attachment. &c.----- *(see Cols.* 1. *and* 2.)
4. Friendship.	3. Amicableness.	4. Love of country.	
—	4. Complacency.		II.—*Towards this or that comparatively PRIVATE Circle—*
5. Personal attachment, affection,regard, kindness, tenderness, fondness.	5. Benignity.	IV.----- *Towards MANKIND at large---------*	1. Family partiality.
	6. Tenderness.	1. Philanthropy.	—
II.-----*Towards this or that DOMESTIC, or other comparatively PRIVATE Circle—*	7. Loving-kindness.	2. General, universal. all-embracing, all-comprehensive— benevolence, beneficence, kindness, &c. *(See Cols.* 1 & 2.)	2. Party attachment. favour. affection. prejudice, prepossession, zeal, spirit. rage, madness.
1. Family, domestic, parental, social attachment, &c.--------*as above.*	—		3. Spirit of faction.
	8. Affability.		4. Corporation spirit.
III.-----*Towards the POLITICAL Community at large—*	9. Courteousness.		III.-----*Towards the POLITICAL Community at large*
	10. Urbanity.		
1. National attachment.	—		1. Nationality.
2. National zeal.	11. Pity.		—
	12. Compassion.		2. National partiality, prejudice, prepossession.
IV.—*Towards MANKIND at large---------*	13. Commiseration.		
	14. Charity.		IV.----- *Towards MANKIND at large---------*
1. Sympathy,fellow-feeling, good-will, regard, kindness-------for or towards------mankind, the human species, the race of men, &c.—in general.	———		None.
	15. Mercy.		
	16. Clemency.		
	17. Long-suffering.		
	18. Forbearance,		
	19. Humanity.		
	———		
	20. Kindheartedness.		
	21. Tenderheartedness.		
	22. Goodness of heart.		
	—		
	23. Gratitude.		
	II.—*Towards this or that comparatively PRIVATE Circle---------- no otherwise than as above.*		

No. XI. PLEASURES AND PAINS, —*of* ANTIPATHY—*of Ill-will—of the* IRASCIBLE APPETITE: *including the* PLEASURES of Revenge,and *the* PAINS *of* Unsatisfied Vindictiveness.

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the GALL-BLADDER.*

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

---- 1. NEUTRAL: viz.	-----II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	—III. DYSLOGISTIC:viz.	
		I.—*Specially derived and directed affections*—	II.—*Abstract Moral Qualities*-------
1. Antipathy.	*Single-worded, none.*	1. IU-wilL	19. Spleen.
2. Dislike.	—	2. Ill-humour.	20. Ill-nature.
3. Aversion.	*Many-worded,*	3. Animosity.	21.Washpishness.
4. Displeasure.	1. Just, proper, legitimate, justifiable. warranted, well-grounded, due, becoming, laudable, praiseworthy, commendabie, noble. dignified-------- displeasure, indignation, resentment.	4. Spite.	—
—		5. Malice.	22. Maliciousness.
5. Anger.		6. Hatred.	23. Malignity.
6. Wrath.		7. Hate.	24. Malignancy.
7. Exasperation.		—	25. Venomousness.
—		8. Abhorrence.	—
8. Resentment.		9. Abomination.	26. Cruelty.
9. Indignation.		10. Detestation.	27. Barbarity.
lO.Incensement.		11. Execration.	28.Savageness.
		———	29. Brutality.
		12. Rage.	30. Ferocity.
		13. Fury.	———
		14. Rancour.	31. Vindictiveness.
		———	32. Vengefulness.
		15. Revenge.	———
		16. Vengeance.	33. Obduracy.
		———	34. Obdurateness.
		17. Envy.	3 5. Implacability.
		18. Jeaousy.	36. Callousness.
			—— —
			37, Unjust, improper, & c.—asperity, harshness, rigour, severity, antipathy, &c.
			(See *Cols.* 2. *and* 3.)

No. XII. PAINS, —*of* LABOUR —*Toil—Fatigue.*

Corresponding Interest, *Interest of the PILLOW.*

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

---- 1. NEUTRAL: viz.	---------- II. EULOGISTIC:	---- III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
Single'Worded, none.	*None.*	1. Indolence.	11. Torpidity.
———		2. Laziness.	12.Seguity.
Many-worded,		3. Sloth.	———
1. Love of ease.		4. Slothfulness.	13. Tardiness.
2. Aversion to labour.		5. Sluggardliness.	14. DUatoriness.
3. Fear, apprehension, dread—of toil, fatigue, over-exertion, over-working, over-straining.		6. Sluggishness.	15. Procrastination.
		7. Self-indulgence.	———
		8. Idleness.	16. Slowness.
		9. Listlessness.	17. Lenitude.
		10. Torpidness.	18. Drawlingness.

No. XIII. PAINS,
—*of* DEATH, *and* BODILY *Pains in general.*

Corresponding Interest,
Interest of EXISTENCE—of Bodily, Corporal, Personal, SELF-PRESER VA TION—Safety—Security.

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

—I. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	---- III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
		I. *Transient EMOTIONS.*	II. *Permanent QUALITIES.*
1. Self-preservation.	*Properly belonging to this head, none.*	1. Dread.	1. Timidity.
2. Self-defence.		2. Terror.	2. Timorousness.
3. Self-protection.	*Borrowed from the Habitudes of the INTELLECTUAL Faculty—*	3. Appalment.	3. Pusillanimity.
4. Desire of, regard to. or for----- personal safety, security.	1. Prudence.	4. Consternation.	4. Faint-heartedness.
5. Fear, apprehension —of pain, suffering, &c.	2. Circumspection.	5. Dismay.	5. Chicken-heartedness
6. Fear of death.	3. Forecast.	6. Tremor.	6. Cowardice.
7. Love of life.	4. Foresight.	7. Trepidation.	7. Poltroonery.
	5. Cautiousness.		
	6. Vigilance.		
	7. Prudential care.		

No. XIV. PLEASURES AND PAINS,
—*if the* SELF-REGARDING *Class, generically or collectively considered: i.e.* of all the above sorts, except Nos. X. and XI.

Corresponding Interest, *SELF-REGARDING Interest.*

Corresponding *MOTIVES*—with NAMES,

---- 1. NEUTRAL: viz.	---- II. EULOGISTIC: viz.	—III. DYSLOGISTIC: viz.	
Single-worded, none: except in so far as those in No. XII. may here be applicable.	*None: except in so far as those in No, XIII. may here be applicable.*	1. Self-interest.	3. Interestedness.
1, Personal interest.		2. Selfishness.	4. Self-interestedness.
2. Self-regarding interest.			

EXPLANATIONS

(a) *(Springs of action)* 1. Under this denomination, those objects and considerations alone are included in this Table, which, in their operation on the *will,* act as it were in the way of immediate contact. Concerning those which act on the will no otherwise than through the understanding, see Note (m) on the word 'Motives'.

2. The words here employed as leading terms, are names of so many *psychological entities,* mostly *fictitious,* framed by necessity for the purpose of *discourse.* Add, and even of *thought:* for, without corresponding words to clothe them in, ideas could no more be *fixed,* or so much as *fashioned,* than *communicated.*

3. By habit, wherever a man sees a *name,* he is led to figure to himself a corresponding object, of the reality of which the *name* is accepted by him, as it were of course, in the character of a *certificate.* From this delusion, endless is the confusion, the error, the dissension, the hostility, that has been derived.

4. Of all these groups or classes of intimately connected psychological entities, to *motives* alone is the appellation 'Springs of action' immediately applicable: to the others, no otherwise than in virtue of the relation they respectively bear to *Motives.*

5. 'Psychological dynamics' (by this name may be called the science, which has for its *subject* these same *springs of action,* considered as such) has for its basis psychological *pathology. Pleasure* and *exemption from pain* fall to be considered *every where* in the character of *ends:* pleasure and pain *here* in the character of *means.*

(b) *(Pleasures.)* Synonyms to the word 'pleasure': including those by which are designated the correspondent *states of mind,* and their respective causes. 1. Gratification. 2. Enjoyment. 3. Fruition. 4. Indulgence. 5. Joy. 6. Delight. 6*. Delectation. 7. Hilarity. 8. Merriment. 9. Mirth. 10. Gaiety. 11. Airiness. 12. Comfort. 13. Solace. 14. Content. 15. Satisfaction. 16. Rapture. 17. Transport. 18. Ecstasy. 19. Bliss. 20. Joyfulness. 21. Gladness. 22. Gladfulness. 23. Gladsomeness. 24. Cheerfulness. 25. Comfortableness. 26. Contentedness. 27. Happiness. 28. Blissfulness. 29. Felicity. 30. Well-being. 31. Prosperity. 32. Success. 33. Exultation. 34. Triumph. 35. Amusement. 36. Entertainment. 37. Diversion. 38. Festivity. 39. Pastime. 40. Sport. 41. Play. 42. Frolic. 43. Recreation. 44. Refreshment. 45. Ease. 46. Repose. 47. Rest. 48. Tranquillity. 49. Quiet. 50. Peace. 51. Relief. 52. Relaxation. 53. Alleviation. 54. Mitigation.

(c) *(Pains.)* Synonyms to the word 'pain': including those by which are designated the correspondent states of mind and their respective causes. 1. Vexation. 2. Suffering. 3. Mortification. 4. Humiliation.

5. Sorrow. 6. Grief. 7. Mourning. 8. Concern. 9. Distress. 10. Discomfort. 11. Discontent. 12. Dissatisfaction. 13. Regret. 14. Anguish. 15. Agony. 16. Torture. 17. Torment. 18. Pang. 19. Throe. 20. Excruciation. 21. Distraction. 22. Trouble. 23. Embarrassment. 24. Anxiety. 25. Solicitude. 26. Perplexity. 27. Disquiet. 28. Disquietude. 29. Inquietude. 30. Unquietness. 31. Discomposure. 32. Disturbance. 33. Commotion. 34. Agitation. 35. Perturbation. 36. Disorder. 37. Harrassment. 38. Restlessness. 39. Uneasiness. 40. Discontentedness. 41. Anxiousness. 42. Sorrowfulness. 43. Sadness. 44. Weariness. 45. Mournfulness. 46. Bitterness. 47. Unhappiness. 48. Wretchedness. 49. Misery. 50. Infelicity. 51. Melancholy. 52. Gloom. 53. Depression. 54. Dejection. 55. Despondence. 56. Despondency. 57. Despair. 58. Desperation. 59. Hopelessness. 60. Affliction. 61. Calamity. 62. Plague. 63. Grievance. 64. Misfortune. 65. Mishap. 66. Misadventure. 67. Mischance.

2. Note that in many instances the *transient* sensation, the *permanent* state of mind, and the *cause* of one or both, are designated by the same word.

3. In the plural *number,* in some instances, the word is scarcely in use.

4. In some instances, different modifications of the principal idea, as above, are designated by the two *numbers.* See for example under *Pleasure* Nos. 11,12,13,14,15.

5. Fully to delineate and illustrate these and other observable modes of difference would require a volume.

6. *Use of these synonyms.* It is only by means of its *relation* to objects designated by other *names,* that the nature of any object can be made known. Proportioned to the number of the *names* brought to view is the number of the *relations* here exhibited. *Sy no ny mation* is *denomination.* By denomination, to an extent proportioned to that of the *denominatives* employed, the work of *classification* is performed. In *physics,* right *denomination* and right *conception,*—and, so far as depends upon right conception, right *practice,*—are acknowledged to be inseparable. By identity of *denomination,* identity of *nature,* i.e. of *properties-,* by diversity, diversity is declared.

7. Constructed in different *languages,* a Table of this sort would afford an interesting specimen of their comparative copiousness and expressiveness.

8. Of the *value* of a *pleasure* the *elements* or *ingredients* are: 1. its *intensity;* 2. its *duration* (of these two its *magnitude* is composed);
3. its *certainty* (say rather its *probability);* 4. its *propinquity* or *nearness* (measurable no otherwise than by the opposite quality, its *remoteness);* in both which cases, by the supposition, it is not *present;*

5. its *purity,* which is inversely as the value of any *pain* or pains, *loss* or losses (viz. of *pleasure),* in such sort associated with it as that, in case of his experiencing the pleasure, a man will experience them, otherwise not; 6. its *fecundity,* which is directly as the value of any pleasure or pleasures, *exemption* or exemptions, (viz. from pain) which, in case of his experiencing the pleasure, he will experience, otherwise not; 7. its *extent,* which is as the *number* of the persons, by whom a pleasure of the *sort* in question, produced by the *individual* event or state of things in question which is the cause of the pleasure, is experienced.

9. Apply this to *reward,* to *punishment,* to *compensation',* to the matter of *good* and the matter of *evil* employed to those respective purposes. In so far as this application is neglected, the business of *law* and *government* is carried on blindfold.

10. *Positive good* (understand *pathological* good) is either pleasure itself, or a cause of pleasure; *negative* good, either *exemption from pain,* or a cause of such exemption.

11. In like manner, positive evil is either pain itself or a cause of pain; negative evil, either loss of pleasure, or a cause of such loss.

12. In the character of an interest, a desire, a motive, equivalent to, and thence equipollent with a given pleasure, may be *exemption from a given pain:*—say for simplicity's sake an *exemption;* equivalent to a given pain, *loss of a given pleasure:*—say for simplicity's sake a *loss.*

13. *Moral good* is, as above, *pathological* good, in so far as *human will* is considered as instrumental in the production of it: in so far as any thing else is made of it, either the *word* is without meaning or the thing is without *value.* And so in regard to *evil.*

14. For *pathological* might here have been put the more ordinary adjunct 'physical', were it not that, in that case, those pleasures and pains, the seat of which is not in the *body,* but only in the *mind,* might be regarded as excluded.

15. Take away *pleasures* and *pains,* not only *happiness,* but *justice,* and *duty,* and *obligation,* and *virtue*—all which have been so elaborately held up to view as independent of them—are so many empty sounds.

16. As *a spring of action,* a *pleasure* cannot operate, but in so far as, in the particular direction in question, action is regarded as a means of *obtaining* it; a *pain,* in so far as action is regarded as a means of *avoiding* it.

17. In so far as it happens not to operate as a spring of action, a *pleasure* may be termed 'inert'. Pleasures which in their very nature are inert are: 1. All pleasures of mere recollection; 2. All pleasures of

mere imagination; 3. Even pleasures of expectation, when the expected pleasure is regarded as certain, and not capable of being by action either brought nearer or increased. And so it is with *pains.*

18. In a remote way, indeed, it may happen to any such pleasure, howsoever in itself *inert,* to give birth to action: but then it is only by means of some different pleasure, which it happens to bring to view.

19. In itself, the pleasure derived, for example, from a recollected landscape, is an *inert* one. An effect of it may indeed be the sending a man again to the place to take another view. But, in that case, the operating pleasure—the actuating motive—is a different one: viz. the pleasurable idea of the pleasurable sensation *expected* from that *other* view.

(d) *(original)* 1. viz. as opposed to *derivative.* By the adjunct 'original' may be distinguished such *pleasures* as are the immediate and simultaneous accompaniments of *perception:* viz. *physical,* i.e. *corporeal,* or merely *psychological,* i.e. *mental.* And so of *pains.*

2. By the adjunct 'derivative', such as are not accompaniments of perception, viz. of *present* perception, but are derived from *past* perception. And so of *pains.*

3. Derived from *past perception,* they are the fruit of *memory,* (i.e. of recollection) or of *imagination:* of *memory,* in so far as they are copies of an *entire* picture; of *imagination,* in so far as they are copies, taken in the way of abstraction, from detached parts of any such picture—those parts being taken either, each by itself, or mixed up together, in any order, along with parts taken in like manner from other pictures.

4. Derived from *imagination,* if the conception formed of them be accompanied with a *judgement* more or less *decided*—a *persuasion* more or less *intense*—of the future realization of the pictures so composed, the *imagination* is styled 'expectation'. And the pleasure, if any there be, which is the immediate accompaniment of such persuasion, is styled 'a pleasure of expectation', or a 'pleasure of hope'; if not so accompanied, a 'pleasure of imagination', and nothing more. And so of pains: except that pains of *expectation* have for their synonyms not pains of *hope,* but pains of *apprehension.*

5. Thus, it is no otherwise than through the medium of the *imagination,* that any pleasure, or pain, is capable of operating in the character of a *motive.* It is only through the medium of these *derivative* representations that the past *original* can, in any shape, or in any part, be brought to view.

6. Note, that in the way of *imagination,* from original *pleasures* may be derived not *pleasures* only but likewise *pains. Pain,* for example,

is a natural accompaniment of the recollected idea of the past pleasure, when the expectation is that it *will not be*—as *pleasure* is, when the expectation is that it *will be*—again realized. And so in the case of *pains.*

(e) *(simple)* 1. The pleasures and pains here brought to view are, every one of them, *simple* and *elementary.* Out of these, others in any number may be compounded; and for the compound so made, appropriate denominations may be, and in an indefinite number have been, framed; giving, each of them, to the *compound* object, especially in so far as the denomination employed is *single-worded,* the aspect of a *simple* one. For example, in Note (r), 'Pleasures of the bottle'; 2. 'Love' (the sexual) considered as a motive; 3. 'Love of justice'; 4. 'Love of liberty'.

2. *Objection.* The pleasures and pains styled, as above, simple, are not so in every instance: for, under the import of the word 'physical pleasure' (No. 3) physical pleasures *of all sorts,* with the several *motives,* are included.

Answer. The pleasure which, on any individual occasion, is here considered as being in question, is not the less *simple:* for, on the occasion here supposed, no more than *one* such pleasure is considered as being in prospect, though that one may be of any one of the species comprised under the *class* designated by the word in question, viz. 'physical'. Whether of this same class, or of any other class, or of any two classes, suppose *two* pleasures operating on the same occasion in the character of *motives,* then and then only is it that, to the pleasure and to the correspondent motive, the epithet 'compound', in the sense in which it is here employed, is applicable.

(f) *(Interest)* 1. A man is said *to have an interest in any subject* in so far as that *subject* is considered as more or less likely to be to him a source of pleasure or exemption: subject, viz. *thing* or *person*[1]*, thing,* in virtue of this or that *use,* which it may happen to him to derive from that thing;person, in virtue of this or that *service,* which it may happen to him to receive at the hands of that person.

2. A man is said *to have an interest in the performance* of this or that *act,* by himself or any other—or in *the taking place* of this or that *event* or *state of things,*—in so far as, upon and in consequence of its having place, this or that *good* (i.e. *pleasure* or *exemption)* is considered as being more or less likely to be possessed by him.

3. It is said *to be a man's interest that* the act, the event, or the state of things in question should have place, in so far as it is supposed to be that—upon, and in consequence of, its having place—*good,* to a greater *value,* will be possessed by him than in the contrary case. In the former case, *interest* corresponds to a *single item*

in the account of *good and evil*: in the latter case it corresponds to *a balance* on the side of *good.*

4. For the word 'interest' no *synonyms* have been found.

(g) *(Desires)* Synonyms to the word 'desire': 1. Wish (to, or for). 2. Appetite (for). 3. Craving (for). 4. Longing (for, or after). 5. Coveting (of, or for). 6. Liking (to, or for). 7. Inclination (to, or for). 8. Regard (for). 9. Affection (for). 10. Attachment (to). 11. Love (of, or for). 12. Hankering (after). 13. Propensity (to, or towards). 14. Zeal (for, or in behalf of). 15. Eagerness (for). 16. Anxiety (for).

(h) *(Aversions)* Synonyms to the word 'aversion': 1. Dislike (of, to or for). 2. Distaste (of, or for). 3. Disgust (at). 4. Antipathy (against, or towards). 5. Loathing (of). 6. Abhorrence (of). 7. Detestation (of). 8. Execration. 9. Hatred (of, or towards).

(i) *(Wants)* Synonyms to the word 'want' are: 1. Need (of). 2. Demand (for). 3. Exigency. 4. Necessity.

(k) *(Hopes)* Synonyms to the word 'hope': 1. Expectation (of, or from). 2. Prospect (of, or from).

(l) *(Fears)* 1. Synonyms to the word 'fear': 1. Apprehension (of, for, or about). 2. Dread (of). 3. Terror. 4. Horror (of). 5. Solicitude (for, or about, or concerning). 6. Anxiety (for, or about). 7. Suspicion (of, or about).

2. As *desire* is to *pleasure* (and its expected causes), so is *aversion* to *pain* and its expected causes. So, as to *hope* and *fear.*

3. *Want* bears a common reference to pleasure and to pain; satisfied, it produces pleasure; unsatisfied, pain; though capable of being overbalanced by the pleasure of *hope,* i.e. of *expectation.*

4. *Need, demand, exigency, necessity* may exist without any corresponding *desire.* So likewise 'want', in so far as it is synonymous to these four appellatives, without being so to 'desire'. Exposed to danger, a man has *need* of, and so far is in *want* of, all necessary means of safety, but, so long as he is ignorant of the danger, he has no *desire* of or for any of them.

5. As *hope* is to *pleasure* and *exemption,* so is *fear* to *pain* and *loss.*

6. *Expectation and prospect are,* without self-contradiction, applicable to *pain,* to *loss,* and to their supposed causes; *hope,* not.

(m) *(Motives)* 1. Synonyms to the word 'motive': 1. Inducement. 2. Incitement. 3. Incentive. 4. Spur. 5. Invitation. 6. Solicitation. 7. Allurement. 8. Enticement. 9. Temptation.

2. Motives to the *will*—motives to the *understanding.* Note well the difference: motive to the *will,* a *desire*—the corresponding desire —operating in the character of a motive; motive to the *understanding,* any consideration, the apparent tendency of which is to give

increase to the efficiency of the desire, in the character of a motive to the *will.*

Of the modifications of *good* and *evil,* capable of operating in the character of motives to the *will,* this Table presents a view. Of the corresponding considerations capable of operating in subservience to these several motives to the will, in the character of motives to the *understanding,* no book could comprise the catalogue.

3. To the head of *motives* to *the understanding* belong *means.*

4. The desire existing, whatsoever, in the character of a *means* promises to be contributory to the attainment of the *end* (i.e. to the possession of the *pleasure* or the *exemption* which is the main object of the *desire),* operates in the character of an *incentive,* i.e. a *motive:* viz. by giving increase to the apparent *value* of the good in respect of *certainty.*

5. As by *judgement desire* is influenced, so by *desire, judgement:* witness *interest-begotten prejudice,* the tendency of the influence being, in the first case regular and salutary, *rightly* instructive and *directive-,* in the other case irregular, and naturally *sinister,* deceptions, and *seductive.*

6. Motives to the *understanding* operate as such in every case on the *will,* else they would not be *motives.* The converse does not hold good. Antecedently to action (the actions termed 'involuntary' excepted) the *will* is, in every case, perceptibly in exercise: not so the *understanding.*

7. In so far as the effect or tendency of the desire is to *restrain* action, not to *produce* it, the term 'motive' cannot be employed without a contradiction in terms. Unfortunately, the word 'restrictive', though in the form of an *adjective* it *is,* in the form of a *substantive* is *not,* as yet, in the language.

8. Of the sorts of psychological *powers* brought to view in this Table under the appellation of 'motives', *three* at least, viz. No. 8. (regard for reputation etc.), No. 9. (piety), and No. 10. (sympathy), will be found to be more frequently and extensively, as well as more usefully, employed to the purpose of *restraint,* than to that of *incitement*—as *restrictives* than as *motives.* In comparison of the degree of efficiency, with which man's power of producing *unhappiness,* small indeed is that with which his power of producing *happiness,* is capable of being employed. By the power of the *political sanction,* almost all the *pleasures* and *pains* of which man's nature is susceptible, thence almost all the *motives* to the action of which he is sensible, are capable of being applied to the purpose of *restraint.* But, except in so far as they are so employed by that power, *incitement* alone is the purpose, to which, in the character of *springs of*

action (as the term 'springs of action' imports) the motives, under the governance of which man is placed, are mostly employed. All perform alike the office of a *spur:* upon these few rests principally the charge of performing the office of a *bridle.*

9. 'Pleasure', 'Pain', etc.—connection between the respective imports of these several appellatives.

When to a man's enjoying a certain *good,* i.e. a certain *pleasure* or *exemption* from a certain *pain,* it has appeared to him to be necessary that a certain *event* or *state of things* should have had place, and, for the purpose of causing it to have place he has performed a certain act, then so it is that among the psychological phenomena which, on the occasion in question, have had place and operation in his mind, are the following, viz.: 1. He has felt himself to have *an interest* in the possession of that same good. 2. He has felt *a desire* to possess it. 3. He has felt *an aversion* to the idea of his not possessing it. 4. He has felt *the want* of it. 5. He has entertained *a hope* of possessing it. 6. He has had before his eyes the *fear* of not possessing it.

7. And the *desire* he has felt of possessing it has operated on his will in the character of a *motive* by the sole operation, or by the help, of which, the act exercised by him, as above, has been produced.

10. Such has been the state of the case of whatsoever nature the *pleasure* or the pain in question has been, whether of the *self-regarding* or of the *extra-regarding* class: if of the *extra-regarding* class, whether of the *social,* or of the *dissocial* order or *genus.*

11. Thus it is that these intimately *connected,* but not otherwise *commensurable,* appellatives serve for the *exposition* of each other: no one of these having any superior genus, nor consequently being susceptible of the only species of *exposition* as yet in common use, viz. that which is called 'a definition', and is performed by the assignment of some word expressive of a *superior genus* of which the word in question denotes a *species.*

12. To the *will* it is that the idea of a pleasure or an exemption applies itself in the *first* instance; in *that* stage its effect, if not conclusive, is *velleity.* By velleity, reference is made to the *understanding,* viz.: 1. for striking a *balance* between the *value* of *this good,* and that of the *pain* or *loss,* if any, which present themselves as eventually about to stand associated with it; 2. then, if the balance appear to be in its favour, for the choice of *means:* thereupon, if *action* be the result, *velleity* is perfected into *volition,* of which the correspondent *action* is the immediate consequence. For the process that has place, this description may serve alike in *all* cases: *time* occupied by it may be of any length; from a minute fraction of *a second* as in ordinary cases, to any number of years.

(n) *(eulogistic)* (o) *(dyslogistic)* (p) *(neutral)* 1. 'Eulogistic' or 'dyslogistic', any such appellative may in either case be termed 'censorial'.

2. Thus it is that, in addition to the import which, in the character of a *simple tern,* properly belongs to it, will be found involved in every such censorial appellation the import of at least one entire *proposition:* viz. a proposition expressive of a *judgement* of *approbation* or *disapprobation,* as above.

3. Various, and as yet seldom altogether determinate, are the *grounds* on which this judgement seems to have been framed: 1. a supposed excess of *intensity* on the part of the desire; (See Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14.) 2. a supposed impropriety in the choice of the *subject* on which the *act,* from which the pleasure is expected to be derived, is exercised; (See No. 2.) 3. a supposed impropriety in *the nature of the act,* i.e., in so far as the imputed impropriety has any intelligible grounds, as supposed *mischievousness*—a balance on the side of evil *(pathological* evil)—on the part of its *consequences.* See the above, and the several other instances.

4. On this occasion, to take the case of a *dyslogistic* appellative, the error, in so far as there is any, consists in this: viz. that, on account of some *accidental* effect, which, on this or that occasion, has been observed to be produced by the *desire,* the whole corresponding group of *psychological* entities—*pleasure, interest, desire, motive*—are, on all occasions, by the undistinguishing and uneludible force of this condemnatory appellative, involved in one common and undistinguishing censure: and, *vice versa,* when the censorial appellative is of the *eulogistic* cast, whatsoever *mischievous* effects are liable, and apt, to be produced by the desire, are covered and kept out of sight. Whereas, to a truly enlightened as well as sincerely benevolent mind, it will appear, that, on each individual occasion, it is by the probable *balance* in the account of *utility,* whether of *pleasure* or of *pain,* that the judgement, whether it be of *approbation* or of *disapprobation,* ought to be determined.

(q) *(impassioned)* 1. Between such as are simply *censorial* and such as are moreover *impassioned,* the line will almost every where be necessarily and irremediably indeterminate: on the question to which of the two classes the appellative belongs, the decision therefore cannot but be in a proportionable degree arbitrary.

2. Passion being among the causes of wrong judgement and consequent *misconduct,* any intimation of the existence of any such feeling, in the breast of him by whom the appellative is applied, may on that score have its *practical* use.

3. Having, without the *form,* the *force* of an assumption—and having for its object, and but too commonly for its effect, a like

assumption on the part of the hearer or reader—the sort of allegation in question, how ill-grounded soever, is, when thus masked, apt to be more persuasive than when expressed simply and in its own proper form: especially where, to the character of a *censorial* adding the quality and tendency of an *impassioned* allegation, it tends to propagate, as it were by contagion, the passion by which it was suggested. On this occasion, it seeks and finds support in that *general* opinion, of the existence of which the eulogistic or dyslogistic sense which thus, as it were by adhesion, has connected itself with the import of the appellative, operates as proof.

4. Applied to the several *springs of action* and in particular to *pleasures* and to *motives,* these censorial and impassioned appellatives form no inconsiderable part of the *ammunition* employed in the *war of words.*

5. Under the direction of *sinister interest* and *interest-begotten prejudice,* they have been employed in the character of *fallacies,* or instruments of deception, by polemics of all classes: by politicians, lawyers, writers on controversial divinity, satirists and literary censors.

6. *Causes of the comparative numbers of censorial and neutral names of motives. Eulogistic* appellatives: in some instance abdundant, in others rare or wanting; so likewise, *dyslogistic:* in some instances *both* abundant; *neutral* appellatives: in most instances either rare or wanting. Such are among the observations which the contents of this Table may be apt to suggest. Of so remarkable a diversity, where (it may be asked) are we to look for the cause? *Answer.* In the *interest* which, on the several occasions, in their character of makers and employers of language, men have understood themselves to have, in propagating the persuasion which, by the appellatives respectively in question has been endeavoured to be impressed. Of this proposition, the proof will, it is supposed, be seen in the following paper, entitled ‘OBSERVATIONS’.

N B. Where on this occasion appellatives are said to be *wanting,* understand *single-worded* ones. By *combinations* of words, no assignable object for which appellatives may not be found.

(r) *(Compound Pleasures exemplified)*

Example I. *Pleasures of the bottle.* (No. 1) COMPONENT ELEMENTS, commonly conjoined in this aggregate, are: 1. *Pleasure of the palate-,* viz. from the taste of liquor. 2. *Pleasure of exhilaration-,* viz. of what may be termed *physical* or *pharmaceutic* exhilaration—*seat* of it, the nervous system in general (No. 1). 3. *Pleasure of sympathy or good will* (No. 10); viz. as towards co-partakers, the compotators.

Example II. *Love,* (the passion).—COMPONENT ELEMENTS:

1. *Sexual desire* (No. 2). 2. Ditto enhanced by particular beauty. 3. *Desire of goodwill* (No. 7); viz. the goodwill of the person beloved, including the indefinite train of *services,* of which it may be the imagined and expected source. 4. *Goodwill* itself; viz. towards that same person (No. 10) or say *sympathy,* viz. in contemplation of the qualities, intellectual or moral, ascribed to that same person, etc. etc.

Example III. *Love of justice.* COMPONENT ELEMENTS; 1. In so far as it is to the individual *in question,* that, in the instance in question, the benefit of justice accrues, *Desire of self-preservation* (No. 13). 2. *Sympathy* (No. 10) for this or that *other individual,* considered as being, on the occasion in question, or on other similar ones, liable to become a sufferer by the opposite *injustice.* 3. *Sympathy* (No. 10) for *the community* at large, in respect of the interest, which it has in the maintenance of *justice,* i.e. as being liable, in an indefinite extent, to become a sufferer by *injustice.* 4. *Antipathy* (No. 9) towards any other person or persons, considered as profiting, or being in a way to *profit,* by the opposite *injustice.* 5. *Antipathy* (No. 9) towards any other person, who, in the character of *a Judge,* is considered as concerned, or about to be concerned, in giving *existence* or *effect* to the injustice.

Example IV. *Love of liberty;* viz. *constitutional liberty,* or rather, (to speak more distinctly) *security.* COMPONENT ELEMENTS: 1. *Desire of self-preservation* (No. 13); viz. against *misrule* and its *effects.* 2. *Sympathy* (No. 10); viz. that which has for its object *the community* at large, considered as liable to be made to suffer from the misrule. 3. *Sympathy* (No. 10) towards this or that *individual,* considered as being, or having been, or about to be, or liable to be, on the occasion in question, or other similar one, a particular *sufferer* from the *misrule.* 4. *Antipathy* (No. 9) towards individuals; viz. in the character of lovers and supporters, creators or preservers, of misrule; and partakers, actual or expected, in the *fruits* of it. 5. *Love of power* (No. 5) ex. gr. in respect of the influence exercised—immediately or through the medium of the *understanding*—on the *wills* of persons on the *same* side or, in the way of *intimidation,* on the *wills* or *sensibilities* of persons on the *opposite* side.

In the same manner may be analysed and resolved into the *simple* and *elementary* pleasures of which they are composed, other *complex* pleasures agreeing with and differing from one another in endless variety, according to the nature of the *sources* from whence they are respectively derived: ex. gr.: 1. Pleasures of the *ball-room;* 2. Pleasures of the *theatre;3.* Pleasures of the *fine arts,* whether severally produced, or conjunctively, in *modes, proportion,* and *groupes* indefinitely diversifiable.

Note that, according to the nature of the *instrument,* by means of which or of the *channel* through which any such complex pleasure is considered as being capable of being experienced, the *desire* may be resolvable into the *desire,* corresponding to this or that one in the catalogue of the more *simple* pleasures. For instance into (No. 4) desire of *the matter of wealth',* (No. 7) desire of *amity,* (No. 8) desire of *reputation.*

OBSERVATIONS

§1. *Pleasures and pains the basis of all the other entities: these the only real ones; those, fictitious*

Among all the several species of psychological entities, the names of which are to be found either in the *Table of the Springs of Action,* or in the *Explanations* above subjoined to it, the two which are as it were the *roots,* the main pillars or *foundations* of all the rest, the *matter* of which all the rest are composed—or the *receptacles* of that matter, which soever may be the *physical image,* employed to give *aid,* if not *existence* to conception, will be, it is believed, if they have not been already, seen to be, PLEASURES and PAINS. Of *these,* the existence is matter of universal and constant experience. Without any of the rest, *these* are susceptible of,—and as often as they come *unlooked* for, do actually come into, *existence:* without these, no one of all those others ever had, or ever could have had, existence.

True it is that, when the question is, 'What, in the case in question, are the *springs of action,* by which, on the occasion in question, the mind in question has been operated upon, or to the operation of which it has been exposed?', the species of *psychological entity* to be looked out for in the first place is the *motive.* But, of the sort of *motive* which has thus been in operation, no clear idea can be entertained otherwise than by reference to the sort of *pleasure* or *pain* which such *motive* has for its *basis:* viz. the pleasure or pain, the idea, and eventual expectation of which is considered as having been operating in the character of *a motive.*

This being understood, the corresponding *interest* is at the same time understood: and, if it be to the *pleasurable* class that the operating cause in question belongs, then so it is that, in its way to become *a motive,* the interest has become productive of *a desire;* if to the *painful* class, of a correspondent *aversion*: and thus it is that, on the occasion in question, the operation of a motive of the kind in question, whatever it be, (meaning a motive *to the will)* having had

existence, it can not but be that a corresponding *desire* or *aversion,* —and the *idea,* and *eventual expectation* at least, of a corresponding *pleasure* or *pain,*—and the idea and belief of the existence of a corresponding *interest,*—must also have had existence.

On this basis must also be erected, and to this standard must be referred whatsoever clear explanations are capable of being suggested by the other more anomalous appellatives above spoken of; such as 'emotion', 'affection', 'passion', 'disposition', 'inclination', 'propensity', 'quality', (viz. 'moral quality') 'vice', 'virtue', 'moral good', 'moral evil'.

Destitute of reference to the ideas of *pain* and *pleasure,* whatever ideas are annexed to the words 'virtue' and 'vice' amount to nothing more than that of groundless *approbation* or *disapprobation.* All language in which these appellatives are employed is no better than empty declamation. A *virtuous disposition* is the disposition to give birth *to good*—understand always *pathological* good,—or to prevent or abstain from giving birth to, *evil,*—understand always *pathological* evil,—in so far as the production of the effect requires *exertion* in the way of *self-denial',* i.e. sacrifice of supposed lesser good to supposed greater good. In so far as the greater good, to which the less is sacrificed, is considered as being the good of *others,* the virtue belongs to the head of *probity* or *beneficence',* in so far as it is considered as being the good of *self,* to that of *self-regarding prudence.* (No. 13.) *Means selecting* is the name by which the other branch of prudence may be designated: viz. that which, being *subservient* in its nature, and being so with reference to some *interest,* is equally capable of being understood to be so, whether that interest be of the *self-regarding* class, (No. 14) or of the *extra-regarding-,* viz. of the *social* (No. 10) or of the *dissocial* class (No. 9).

§11. *No act, properly speaking, disinterested*

If so it be that, of the view here given of the causes of human action, the general tenor is conformable to the truth of things, then so it is that, by means of it, divers psychological phenomena—divers phenomena of the human mind which till now have been either not at all or but indistinctly perceived—phenomena of the most unquestionable importance with reference to practice—will, now for the first time, have become distinctly visible.

I. 1. In regard to *interest,* in the most extended, which is the original and only strictly proper sense of the word 'disinterested', no human act ever has been or ever can be *disinterested.* For there exists not ever any voluntary action, which is not the result of the operation

of some *motive* or *motives,* nor any motive, which has not for its accompaniment a corresponding *interest,* real or imagined.

2. In the only sense in which *disinterestedness* can with truth be predicated of human action, it is employed in a sense more confined than the only one which the etymology of the word suggests, and can with propriety admit of: what, in this sense, it must be understood to denote, being not the absence of *all* interest, a state of things which, consistently with voluntary action, is not possible, but only the absence of all interest of the *self-regarding* class. Not but that it is very frequently predicated of human action, in cases in which divers interests, to no one of which the appellation of *self-regarding* can with propriety be denied, have been exercising their influence and in particular (No. 9) *fear of God* or *hope from God,* and (No. 8) fear of *ill-repute* or hope of *good repute.*

3. If what is above be correct, the most *disinterested* of men is not less under the dominion of *interest* than the most *interested.* The only cause of his being styled 'disinterested' is its not having been observed that the sort of *motive* (suppose it *sympathy* for an individual or a class of individuals) has as truly a corresponding *interest* belonging to it, as any other species of motive has. Of this contradiction, between the truth of the case and the language employed in speaking of it, the cause is that in the one case, men have not been in the habit of making—as in point of consistency they ought to have made—of the word 'interest', that use which, in the other case, they have been in the habit of making of it.

4. At the same time, by its having been as properly, and completely, and indisputably, the product of *interest,* as any other action ever is or can be, whatsoever *merit* may happen to belong to any action to which, in the loose and ordinary way of speaking, the epithet 'disinterested' would be applied, is not in any the slightest degree lessened.

Not that, in the case where *sympathy* is the motive, there is less *need* of nor even less actual *demand* for such a word as 'interest' than, in the case, where the motive and interest are of the *self-regarding* class. Not but that, even in the case of *sympathy, conjugates* of the word 'interest' are employed, and even the word itself. Witness these expressions among so many: There stands a man, in whose behalf I feel myself strongly interested; a man, in whose fate, in whose sorrows, I take a lively interest', etc. etc.

§ III. *Appellatives eulogistic, dyslogistic and neutral—cause of their comparative penury and abundance, as applied to springs of action*

Of the declared opinions, of such of the several members of the community, by whom respectively in relation to the subject in question,

an opinion or judgement of *approbation* or *disapprobation* is expressed, is that quantity of *the force of public opinion,* otherwise termed 'the force of the popular or moral sanction', which is thus brought to bear upon that subject, composed and constituted. In and by any act by which intimation is given of such his judgement, in quality of member of the tribunal by which that judgement is considered as pronounced, a man may be considered as delivering his *vote.* On the present occasion, the subject matter of this judgement will be seen to be the several *springs of action,* by which, on the several occasions in question, human *conduct*—human *action*—is liable to be influenced and determined: these several *springs of action,* considered as being in operation, and as giving birth to whatsoever *acts* or modes of *conduct,* may respectively be the result.

On and by the delivery of this vote, in so far as it is with himself that it originates, he makes as it were a *motion* which, by the concurrence of as many as join with him in the sentiment so expressed, is formed into a *judgement:* a judgement, pronounced by that portion, be it what it may, of the tribunal of public opinion, which the persons so concurring compose.

I. In this, as in every other instance, in which any thing is either done or said, whatsoever is done or said is the result of *interest:* of *interest* in this or that one of its shapes, as above explained *(benevolence—sympathy* not excluded) operating upon him by whom it is done or said, in the character of a *motive.* In this interest will be seen the cause of the several diversities above spoken of, and which will now be in a more particular manner brought to view.

I. Case 1. *Eulogistic appellatives, none:* for the numbers see the Table.

Instances. (No. 1) Desire of food and drink. (No. 2) Sexual desire. (No. 3) Physical desires in general. (No. 5) Desire of power. (No. 6) Curiosity. (No. 12) Love of ease. (No. 13) Desire of self-preservation. (No. 14) Personal interest in general.

Cause or *Reason* of this deficiency.—Men in general do not derive any advantage, one man from what is done by another, for the satisfaction of those several desires.

Objection, in the case of No. 2. In this case, it is on what is done by some other person for the gratification of this desire, that, on the part of each person, the correspondent gratification depends. *Answer.* But on the occasion of those more or less elaborated discourses, of which language as it stands expressed in and by means of its permanent signs, is composed, it does not answer a man's purpose, to bring it to view in any state other than that in which, being as above mentioned (p. 98) combined with other desires, it enters into the

composition of that *complex* desire which admits of the *neutral,* or rather *eulogistic* appellative—'love'.

II. Case 2. *Eulogistic abundant.—Instances.* (No. 4) Love of the matter of wealth. (No. 8) Regard for reputation. (No. 9) Fear of God. (No. 10) Good will towards men. *Cause or Reason.* Of all these several desires there is not one which it is not common for one man to behold an advantage to himself, in the creating and increasing, in the breasts of other men. But, as to *Love of the matter of wealth,* see below Case 7.

III. Case 3. *Dyslogistic wanting.—Instances,* none. *Cause or Reason.* There exists not any species of desire such, that by the pursuit of it, i.e. of the object of it, it does not frequently happen, that one man's *interest* is opposed and his *desires* frustrated, by the *interests* and corresponding desires and pursuits of other men.

IV. Case 4. *Dyslogistic abundant.—Instances,* generally speaking, all fourteen, with little distinction worth noticing. *Cause or Reason,* the same as just mentioned.

For *sexual desire,* when taken by itself, *dyslogistic* appellatives may be observed to be in a more particular degree abundant. *Cause or Reason.* This may be seen in 1. The intensity of the desire; 2. its aptitude to enter into *combination* with others, as above; 3. the importance of the *consequences,* with which the gratification of it is liable to be attended; 4. the variety of ways, in which the *interests* of different persons are liable to be put in opposition to each other, by the force of it. 1. Of two *rivals,* each is thus, by the *interest* correspondent to this *desire,* prompted to vent his antipathy against his opponent by whatsoever names of reproach he can find applicable.
2. *Husbands* find themselves annoyed by it in the persons of *Gallants:* and so, in a corresponding manner, *Wives.* 3. *Parents* and other *Guardians,* in the persons of their *wards.* 4. *Legislators, Moralists,* and *Divines,* finding it operating, to so great an extent, and with so efficient a force, in opposition to their views and endeavours, make unceasing war upon it. The corresponding *compound* or *mixt* desire *(love)* being protected by its necessity to the preservation of the species, and thence by public opinion, the form of invective is by this means directed exclusively against the *simple* desire, which however is not the basis, but the indispensably necessary basis, of the whole compound.

V. Case 5. *Neutral abundant.—Instances,* none. *Cause or Reason.* Seldom, comparatively speaking, has a man occasion to speak of a *motive* as operating, or of a *desire* etc. as having place in any human breast—whether his own or any other—without feeling an interest in presenting it either to the approbation or to the disapprobation of those for whose ear or eye his discourse is intended.

VI. Case 6. *Neutral wanting.—Instances* many: understand *single-worded* appellatives, which are the only ones here in question: viz. (No. 2) Sexual desire; (No. 3) Physical desire in general; (No. 4) Love of money, or rather the matter of wealth; (No. 5) Love of power, unless 'Ambition', as well as 'Aspiringness' be regarded as purely neutral; (No. 6) Desire of Amity; (No. 7) Regard for reputation; (No. 12) Love of Ease;(No. 14) The desire corresponding to 'Personal interest' at large.

VII. Case 7. *Eulogistic and Dyslogistic, both abundant. Instance,* (No. 4) *Love of the matter of wealth. Cause* or *Reason.* Under the two respective heads, indication has, in some measure, been already given of it. What remains to be given is an indication of the different *circumstances* in which judgements thus opposite-—the judgement having moreover in each case *emotion* for its not unfrequent accompaniment—take their rise.

1. As to *disbursement* and *non-disbursement,* in so far as *acquisition* has already taken place. Some persons there will commonly be, connected with the person in question by this or that circumstance, the effect of which has been to render it their *interest,* that in this or that particular *way,* on this or that particular *occasion,* he should *disburse.* In speaking of *disbursement,* by these it is that appellatives of the *eulogistic* cast will naturally have been employed; so, on the other hand, in speaking of *non-disbursement,* appellatives of the *dyslogistic* cast. Others there will have been, by whose connection with that same person it will have been rendered their interest, that, in the *way* in question, or the *occasion* in question, he should *not disburse.* In speaking of *non-disbursement,* by these it is that appellatives of the *eulogistic* cast will naturally have been employed; in speaking of *disbursement,* appellatives of the *dyslogistic* cast.

2. As to *acquisition* and *non-acquisition.* Rivality and competition of interests apart, generally speaking, of those who by any tie, whether of *self-regarding* interest or *sympathy,* are more or less intimately connected, or disposed to be connected, with the party in question, it is the interest that the quantity of the matter of wealth *possessed* by him *(of wealth,* of which an inseparable accompaniment is *power)* and thence that the quantity of it *acquired* by him, should at all times be as great as possible. But, so far as concerns *acquisition,* finding *that* operation, necessary as it is to human existence, loaded notwithstanding, to wit, by the influence of the above-mentioned causes, with the sort of reproach involved in the import of the several articles, in the long list of *dyslogistic* appellatives exhibited in the Table—and at the same time not provided with *eulogistic,* nor so much as with *neutral* appellatives—thence, in

their endeavours to obtain for it the approbation of their hearers or readers—and for that purpose to elude the force of the dyslogistic appellatives, which in a manner lie in wait for it, unable to find for the desire in question any appellative which, by its *eulogistic* quality would be rendered applicable to their purpose—men put aside *that* species of desire, and look out for some other, which, being furnished with *eulogistic* appellatives, shall, at the same time be nearly enough resembling to it, or connected with it, to be made to pass instead of it. Under these circumstances, *labour* being necessary to the preservation of *existence,* thus it is that, disguised under the name of 'desire of labour', the *desire of wealth* has been in some measure preserved from the reproach which, with so much profusion, has been wont to be cast upon it when viewed in a direct point of view and under its own name.

Meantime, as to *labour,* although the desire of it, of labour *simply* —desire of labour *for the sake of labour*—of labour considered in the character of an *end,* without any view to any thing else, is a sort of desire that seems scarcely to have place in the human breast; yet, if considered in the character of a *means,* scarce a desire can be found, to the gratification of which *labour,* and therein *the desire of labour,* is not continually rendered subservient. Hence again it is, that when abstraction is made of the consideration of the *end,* there scarcely exists a desire, the name of which has been so apt to be employed for *eulogistic purposes,* and thence to contract an *eulogistic signification,* as the appellative that has been employed in bringing to view this *desire of labour.* 'Industry' is this appellative, and thus it is that, under *another* name, the *desire of wealth* has been furnished with a sort of *letter of recommendation,* which under its *own* name, could not have been given to it.

Aversion—not *desire*—is the emotion, the only emotion which *labour,* taken by itself, is qualified to produce. Of any such emotion as *love* or *desire, ease,* which is the *negative* or *absence* of labour, *ease,* not *labour,* is the object. In so far as *labour* is taken in its proper sense, *love of labour* is a contradiction in terms.

'Frugality', 'economy', these, it is true, are *eulogistic* terms: but by these, *preservation* of the quantity of wealth acquired—*preservation* only not *acquisition*—is the thing indicated. Add to the above the terms 'thrift' and 'thriftiness', for if in the import of these two latter terms, *acquisition* be in any way included, it is only in a confined way, and, as in the before-mentioned cases, as it were by *stealth. Insinuated* it is; declared it can scarce be said to be. To *thrive* is the property—the *physical* property—of a plant or an inferior species of animal. Applied to a human being—employed in a

psychological sense—it is indicative of *prosperity in general—of happiness in general*—and not in the shape of any particular pleasure, reaped in and from the gratification of the correspondent particular desire.

VIII. Case 8. *Eulogistic appellatives how supplied.* In some instance, in default of a *single-worded* one, *many-worded* appellatives of the eulogistic cast may be formed, by adding, to a neutral, or but faintly dyslogistic appellative, an eulogistic adjunct. *Examples:*

I. (No. 3) *Dyslogistic* appellative, 'sensuality'; *eulogistic* adjunct, 'refined'. 2. *Neutral,* though but faintly *dyslogistic* appellative, 'luxury'; *eulogistic* adjunct, 'elegant': and note in this view the phrase 'luxury of beneficence'. 3. (No. 5) *Neutral* or but *faintly dyslogistic* appellative, 'ambition'; *eulogistic* adjunct, 'honest', 'generous', 'noble', 'laudable', 'virtuous', etc. 4. (No. 7) *Dyslogistic* appellative, 'pride'; *eulogistic* adjunct, 'honest, 'generous', etc. as above.

N.B. Some instances there are, in which the quantity of odium heaped upon the desire by this or that dyslogistic appellative, is so great as not to be overbalanced or so much as counterbalanced by any eulogistic adjunct that can be set in the scale against it. By any such additament the expression would be made to wear the appearance of a self-contradictory one. *Examples:* (No. 1) *Dyslogistic* appellatives, 'gluttony', 'drunkenness'. (No. 2) *Dyslogistic* appellatives, 'lewdness', etc. (No. 7) *Dyslogistic* appellative, 'servility'. (No. 11) *Neutral* appellative, 'antipathy'; *dyslogistic* appellative, 'malignity'. In company with none of these would any such epithets as 'honest', 'generous', 'noble', 'virtuous', 'laudable', etc. be found endurable.

§IV. *'Good' and 'bad'—attributives, applied to species of motives: impropriety of the application—its causes and effects*

As there is not any sort of *pleasure,* the enjoyment of which, if taken by itself, is not a *good*—(taken by itself, that is, on the supposition that it is not *preventive* of a more than equivalent *pleasure,* or *productive* of more than equivalent *pain)* nor any *sort* of *pain,* from which, taken in like manner by itself, the *exemption* is not a good—in a word, as there is not any sort of *pleasure* that is not itself a good, nor any sort of *pain* the exemption from which is not a good, and as nothing but the expectation of the eventual enjoyment of pleasure in some shape, or of exemption from pain in some shape, can operate in the character of a *motive,*—a necessary consequence is, that if by *motive* be meant *sort* of motive, there is not any such thing as a *bad* motive, no, nor any such thing as a motive which, to the exclusion of

any other, can with propriety be termed a 'good'motive. Incontestable as the correctness of these positions will be found to be, perpetual are the occasions on which in discourses on *moral, political,* and even *legal* subjects, *motives* are distinguished from, and contrasted with, one another, under the respective names of 'good motives', and 'bad motives'.

From this speculative error, practical errors of the very first importance may be seen to have taken their rise. In the instance of any person, to assign, as the cause by which any act of his has been produced, any motive to which the adjunct 'bad' is wont to be prefixed, is among the number of acts which, under the description of 'criminal offences', men are held punishable. Punishable? Yes, and actually and habitually punished, when perhaps, in the very nature of the case, one of the sort of motives thus denominated, is the only one by which the act in question, the existence of which is unquestionable, could have been produced.

In the composition of this error, what there is of truth seems to be this: viz. that, as there are some motives, the force of which, they being either of the *self-regarding,* or of the *dissocial* class, is more liable than the force of those of the remaining class, viz. the *social* class, to operate in the breast of each particular individual to the prejudice of the general good-—of the interest of mankind at large; so, on the other hand, there are others, and more particularly among those which belong to the *social* class,—which, in a particular degree, are capable of being employed, and with success, in checking the operative force of the above *comparatively* dangerous motives, and restraining it from applying itself with effect to the production of acts of the tendency just mentioned.

But, if in any such observations a sufficient warrant were supposed to be found for attaching to a motive of the former description the appellative of a 'bad motive', or to a motive of the other description any such appellative as that of a 'good motive',—and for acting accordingly, viz. by *punishing* a man as often as his conduct was deemed to have for its cause one of these *bad* motives, or *rewarding* him as often as it was found to have for its cause any one of those *good* motives,—of any such error, supposing it universally embraced and permanently acted upon, the destruction of the whole human race would be the certain consequence. *'Regulators* are good things; *mainsprings* are bad things; therefore, to make a good watch, put into it *regulators,* two or as many more as you please, but not one *mainspring.'* Exactly as conducive as such notions would be to *good watchmaking,* would be to *good government* the notion that men's conduct ought not to be influenced by any motives but those of the

sort commonly called 'good motives'; that it ought not ever to be influenced by any motives of the sort commonly called 'bad motives'.

A measure of government is brought to view: by certain persons it is *opposed-,* the *motives* by which they are engaged in the opposition to it are, it is said, *bad* motives; *conclusion,* it ought to be *adopted.*

A measure of government is brought to view: by certain persons it is *supported-,* the *motives* by which they are engaged in the support of it are, it is said, *bad* motives; *conclusion,* it ought to be *rejected.* By the influence of arguments such as these how frequently has a bad measure been adopted, a good measure thrown out!

For an alleged wrong, a person is under prosecution. The *motives* by which the *prosecutor* is engaged in the prosecution are, it is said, *bad* motives: *lucre* for example, or *selfish ambition,* or *vengeance*[1] *, therefore the defendant ought to be acquitted, or the prosecution quashed. By the influence of arguments such as these, how frequently has a wrongdoer been exempted from the infliction due to his transgression!—exempted, more or less, either from *punishment,* or from the burthen of *satisfaction,* in a pecuniary, or in whatever other shape, it has been due! And note, that for the sort of imputation, of which this argument is composed, seldom can there be any difficulty in finding a plausible ground, or even a true one.

Note however, that from the nature of the *motive,* the *mischief* produced by an action of a *mischievous* species is really liable to receive very considerable increase. But it is not from the sort of motive which is most apt to be spoken of as a 'bad motive' that in this case the mischief will always receive the greatest increase. The *desire* of acquiring the *matter of wealth*—let this, as it so commonly is, be set down in the catalogue of *bad motives.* Yet, by those who bear hardest upon it, it will hardly be deemed so bad a motive as *revenge.* But there are offences, of which, when produced by the desire of the matter of wealth, the mischief is by far greater than that of an offence of the same denomination produced by revenge. Take for example *murder* committed in prosecution of a plan of *highway robbery,* and murder produced by a *private quarrel.* In the *first* case, in the *alarm* and *danger*—in which consists by far the greater part of the *mischief—all* are sharers, whose occasions happen to call them that way; in the *second* case, none but those to whom it might happen to offer to the murderer a *provocation,* equally irritating with that which gave occasion to his crime.[8]

[a] See *Introd, to Mor. and Legist.* Ch. *Motives.* Dum. *Traite de Legist,*[1]

[1] *An Introduction* (CW), ch. X; *Traites dė legislàtion civile et penale,* ed. Dumont, 3 vols., Paris, 1802, ii. 262-7.

Of all *motives,* actual or imaginable, the very *best,* if goodness were to be measured by necessity to human existence, would be the motives that correspond respectively to the desires of *food* and *drink* (No. 1) and to *sexual desire* (No. 2). Yet, to any such desire as that of *eating* or *drinking,* by those by whom so much is said of *good motives,* and so much stress is laid upon the degree of *goodness* of a man's *motives,* admittance would scarcely have been given into their list of *good motives:* and as to *sexual desire* taken by itself, so bad a thing is it commonly deemed in the character of a motive, or even in the character of a desire, that all the force which it is in the power of human exertion to muster has, to a great extent, been employed in the endeavour to extinguish it altogether.

Under the general name of 'self-regarding interest', (No. 14) are comprisable the several *particular* interests, corresponding to all the several *motives,* that do not belong either to the *social* class (No. 10) or the *dissocial* class (No. 11). Weed out of the heart of man this species of *interest,* with the corresponding *desires* and *motives,* the thread of life is cut, and the whole race perishes. *Self-regarding interest,* has it any where a place in the catalogue of *good motives?* Oh no, scarce any where as yet is it known by any such unimpassioned, any such neutral name. 'Self-interest', 'selfishness', 'interestedness', these are the only names it is known by, and to any of these to attach 'good'—any such epithet as 'good'—would be a contradiction in terms.

Fear of God (No. 9), *Sympathy* (No. 10), *Love of reputation* (No. 8), to these, if to any, would be assigned a place and, if not the only place, the highest place in the catalogue of *good* motives. Yet, in a savage state, (to look no higher) men have existed from the very first in countless multitudes, with scarce any perceptible traces in their conduct of the influence or existence of any such motives: at any rate in the character of motives, capable of operating with efficiency, as a *check* to excess, in the action of the *self-regarding* and *dissocial* motives.

Moreover, of all those *good* motives, the goodness or badness of the *effect* depends altogether upon the *direction* in which, on each occasion, they act,—upon the nature of the effects,—the consequences—*pleasurable* or *painful,* of which they become *efficient causes* or *preventives.* 1. *Fear of God.* The mischiefs of which this motive has been productive are altogether as incontestable as, and still more *distinctly* visible than, the good effects: witness the word 'persecution', with the miseries which it serves to bring to view. 2. *Sympathy.* Of the operation of sympathy, in so far as the object of it is but a single individual, the effects, supposing it to operate alone

and unchecked, may be neither better nor worse than those of *selfishness.* Of these effects, the *degree* of its efficiency being given, the *goodness* depends upon the *extent* to which they reach; and that extent—such is its amplitude—has at one end *unity,* at the other, the number of the whole of the human race,—or rather of the whole sensitive race, all species included,—present and future. 3. *Love of reputation. Infanticide,* when committed by the mother of an illegitimate offspring, has no other motive for its cause. *Murder* committed upon the body of any other individual in whose agency, in the way of testimony or any other, a man beholds a cause of life in respect of reputation, is equally capable of being produced by the same cause. 'Conquest' a short word for the aggregate of all the crimes and all the mischiefs that man is capable of committing or suffering by—in particular, for *murder, robbery,* and *violence* in every other imaginable shape, committed all of them upon the very largest scale—is even without any such aid as that of *love of power, love of the matter of wealth,* or *antipathy,* capable of being produced by this same motive. See more on this head in *Introd, to Prine, of Morals and Legislation:* London, 1789, Ch. *Motives.*

§V. *Proper subjects of the attributives 'good'and 'bad', are consequences, intentions, acts, habits, dispositions, inclinations, and propensities: so of the attributives 'virtuous' and 'vitious', except consequences: how as to interests and desires*

Consequences and *intentions,—intentions,* considered in respect of the *consequences,* to the production of which they are directed, or at any rate in respect of the consequences which at the time of the intention, a man actually *had,* or at least *ought* (it is supposed) to have had *in view,*—these, together with the *acts* which the *intentions* in question are considered as having been directed to the production of, or as having a *tendency* to produce, will (it is believed) be seen to be the only subjects to which, in the character of *attributives,* such adjuncts as 'good' and 'bad' can either with speculative propriety, or without danger of practical error, in so far as *acts,* and *springs of action* are concerned, be attached.

To *motives* they can not, without impropriety, be attached; viz. for the reasons already exhibited at large.

For the like reasons, neither can *bad* be attached to *pleasures,* or to *exemptions* (viz. from pain); nor *good,* to *pains,* or to *losses* (viz. of *pleasure).*

For the like reasons, neither can *vitious* be attached to *pleasures,* any more than *virtuous* to *pains.*

For the like reasons, neither can *bad* be attached to any species

of *interests,* nor therefore *good,* to any species of interest, to the exclusion of any other.

Of late years, though any such expression as 'good interest' has hardly ever been seen or heard, yet the expression 'best interests', chiefly in the *rhetorical* or other *impassioned style,* is become a common one.

According to analogy, for the same reasons, neither should *vitious* any more than *bad* or *good* be attached to *desires, aversions,* or *propensities.* But, when the word 'desire' is employed, it is commonly with reference to some *act* which, for the gratification of the *desire,* the person in question is considered as having it in contemplation to exercise. And, forasmuch as in respect of *consequences* and *intentions,* the adjuncts 'good' and 'bad' are, in strictness of speech, and without any danger of leading to error, properly as well as continually, attached to *acts,* thence it is, that in as far as any *act*—any sort of act, or any individual *act*—to which those epithets may with propriety be attached is in view, these same epithets may, without impropriety, as in practice they are continually, be applied to *desires.*

So likewise the epithets 'vitious' and 'virtuous', as, accordingly, the epithet 'vitious' frequently is; as also sometimes the epithet 'virtuous', though not with equal frequency.

To *dispositions, inclinations,* and *propensities, vitious* and *virtuous,* as well as *bad* and *good,* are, and with similar propriety, frequently applied in practice.

To *aversions,* the occasion for applying them has not, in the instance of any of those four attributives, been wont to present itself with any considerable degree of frequency.

In respect of the relation that has place between the import of the word 'act' and the import of the word 'habit', we hear of *good* and *bad, virtuous* and *vitious habits,* as properly, and at least as frequently as of *good* and *bad, virtuous* and *vitious acts.*

Applied to *interests,* in the character of a *dyslogistic* epithet, instead of 'bad' or 'vitious' we have 'sinister';—*eulogistic,* except, as above, 'best'—the superlative of 'good'—we have none. In *Ethics,* 'sinister' has not, as in *Anatomy,* and thence in *Heraldry,* 'dexter' for its accompaniment.

On this occasion, by 'sinister', if any thing determinate is meant, is meant: operating, or tending to operate, in a sinister *direction,* i.e. in such a direction as to give birth to a *bad, alias* a *vitious* act.

The sorts of bad or vitious acts, of which *sinister interest* is, in practice, commonly spoken of as the efficient cause, seem to be more frequently, if not exclusively, such as come under the denomination of acts of *improbity,* than such as come under the denomination of

acts of *imprudence:* such as are considered as injurious to the interests of other persons, than such as are considered as injurious to the interest of the agent himself. But it is in the accidental course of practice, and not in the nature of the case, that the restriction will (it is believed) be seen to have originated.

§ VI. *Causes of misjudgement and misconduct—intellectual weakness, indigenous and adoptive—sinister interest, and interest-begotten prejudice*

As between the two main departments of the human mind, viz. the *volitional* and the *intellectual,* according as it is the one or the other, the state of which is under consideration as being subjected or exposed to the operation of *interest,*—termed, in so far as the direction in which it is considered as operating is considered as *sinister, sinister interest,* as above,—the result of the operation will receive a different description. In so far as it is the *volitional* department—in so far as it is *the will—delinquency* is the result. In so far as it is the intellectual faculty, *misjudgement*—with or without *misconduct*—is the result. As to *error,* though mostly employed as synonymous to *misjudgement,* it is not unfrequently employed as synonymous to *misconduct,* and therefore not fit to be employed in contradistinction to it.

Indigenous intellectual weakness—*adoptive* intellectual weakness, or in one word *prejudice—sinister* interest, (understand self-conscious sinister interest)—lastly *interest-begotten* (though not self-conscious) *prejudice*: by one or other of these denominations, may be designated (it is believed) the cause of whatever is on any occasion amiss in the opinions or conduct of mankind.

Of these several distinguishable psychological causes of misjudgement and misconduct, the mutual relations may be stated as follows. Of the *intellectual department,* the condition—of the *intellectual faculties,* the operation—is, on every occasion, *exposed* to the action and influence of the *sensitive* and the *volitional: judgement—opinion* —is liable to be acted upon, influenced, and perverted, by *interest.* On the occasion in question, suppose *misjudgement* alone, or *misconduct* alone, or both together, to have had place; suppose a judgement more or less erroneous to have been pronounced, an opinion in some way or other erroneous to have been formed. In this case, in the production of the result, as above, *interest* may have had, or may not have had, a share. If no, the result has had for its cause mere *weakness*—intellectual weakness—whether it be *indigenous* or *adoptive,* i.e. *prejudice.* If yes, then whatsoever of *misconduct* may happen to be included in it, has had for its cause, either *sinister*

interest (i.e. *self-conscious* sinister interest), or *interest-begotten prejudice.*

§ VII. *Simultaneously operating motives—co-operating, conflicting, or both*

Seldom (it will readily be seen) does it happen, that a man's conduct stands exposed to the action of no more than one motive. Frequently indeed—not to say commonly—does it happen, that, on one and the same occasion, it is acted upon by a number of motives acting in opposite directions: in each of those two opposite directions respectively, sometimes by one, sometimes by more than one motive. And, on every such occasion, be it what it may, the action is, of course, the result of that one motive, or that groupe of simultaneously operating motives, of which, on that same occasion, the force and influence happen to be the strongest.

Be this as it may, on every occasion, *conduct*—the *course* taken by a man's conduct—is at the absolute command of—is the never-failing result of—the *motives,* and thence, in so far as the corresponding interests are perceived and understood, of the corresponding *interests,* to the action of which, his mind—his will—has, on that same occasion, stood exposed.

Employ the term 'free-will'—to the exclusion of the term 'free-will', employ the term 'necessity'—in respect of the truth of the above observations, the language so employed will not be found to be expressive of any real differences.

§ VIII. SUBSTITUTION OF MOTIVES. *Acts produced by one motive, commonly ascribed to another.—Causes of this misrepresentation*

The sort of motives to the influence of which a man would in general be best pleased that his breast should be regarded as most sensible—this, for the present purpose, may serve for the explanation of what is meant by *good* motives; the reverse may serve for *bad* motives. In his dealings with other men, it is seldom, however, that a man is not exposed to the *conjunct* action of motives, more than one. In so far as this sort of concurrence is observable, the sort of motive to which a man's conduct will be apt to be ascribed in preference, will vary with the relative position of him to whom, on the occasion in question, it happens to speak or think of it. The *best* motive, that will be recognised as capable of producing the effect in question, is the motive, to which the man himself,—and, in proportion as their dispositions towards him are amicable, other men in general—will be disposed to ascribe his conduct, and accordingly to exhibit it in the

character of the sole efficient cause, or at least as the most operative among the efficient causes, by which such his conduct was produced.

Things being in this state, if, among the causes by which the conduct in question was actually produced, a motive, of a complexion sufficiently respected to be found, this is the motive, to which—at least in the character of a predominant one—but most naturally because most simply, in the character of *the* exclusively operative one, the conduct will be ascribed. But, if no such sufficiently respected motive can be found, then, instead of the actual motive, some such other motive will be looked out for and employed as being sufficiently favourable, shall by the nearness of its connection with the actual one, have been rendered most difficultly distinguishable from it. To speak shortly, if the actual motive do not come up to the purpose, another will, in the account given of the matter, be *substituted* to it; or, more shortly still, the motive will be *changed.*

And so *vice versa* in the case of *enmity.*

Thus it is that, for example, in political contention, no line of conduct can be pursued by either of two parties, but what, by persons of the *same* party, is ascribed to *good* motives; by persons of the *opposite* party, to *bad* motives: and so in every case of *competition,* which (as most such cases have) has any thing in it of enmity.

On any such occasion, the motive which, though but one out of several actual and cooperating motives, or though it be but, as above, a *substituted* motive, is thus put forward, may be designated by the appellation of 'the covering motive': being employed to serve as a *covering,* to whatsoever actually operating motives would not have been so well adapted as itself to the purpose in view.

Follow a few examples:

I. (No. 1) *Desire* corresponding to the *pleasures of the palate: Eulogistic covering,* 'sympathy': viz. as implied in some such expression as 'love of good cheer', 'love of a social bowl' or 'glass'. N.B. For pleasure of this sort taken by itself—i.e. for solitary gratification in this shape—a *covering* of the eulogistic cast would scarcely be to be found.

II. (No. 2) *Sexual desire: Eulogistic covering,* 'love': viz. the *compound* affection of which the *component elements* are brought to view as above. To the single desire of having children is the sexual intercourse ascribed by Rome-bred lawyers in the case of marriage: a desire for which there is no place but in the breasts of the comparatively few who are in a state of relative affluence. *After* birth, in how high a degree soever, the child is an object of *love, before* birth, to indigent parents, the same child could scarcely have been an object of *desire.*

III. (No. 4) *Desire of the matter of wealth. Eulogistic covering,* 'industry': a desire, as above, which, if by it be meant the *desire of labour simply,* and for its own sake, has no existence.

(No. 5) *Love of power. Eulogistic coverings:* 1. 'Love of country'—a man's *own* country, i.e. sympathy for the feelings of its inhabitants, present or future or both—taken in the aggregate. 2. 'Love of mankind', 'philanthropy', i.e. sympathy for the human race taken in the aggregate: such being the effects, to the production of which the exercise of power will, whether it *be* or no, be *said* to be directed. 3. 'Love of duty': another impossible motive, in so far as *duty* is understood as synonymous to *obligation.* An act, the performance of which is seen or supposed to be amicable to mankind at large, or to his own countrymen in particular: any such act a man may *love* to do, either on that consideration or on any other. But, be it which it may, and let him find ever so much pleasure in the doing of it, what is not possible is that a man should derive any pleasure from any such thought as that of being *forced* to do it. 4. *Sense of duty.* By this, if by it be meant any thing but the *love of duty* as above, will be meant *fear* of the several pains, which, in the character of *evil consequences* to the individual in question, may (as it appears to him) befal him in case of a neglect on his part, in relation to that same duty: fear of *legal punishment*[1], fear of *loss of amity* at the hands of this or that individual; fear of *loss of reputation-, tear* of the wrath of God.

IV. (No. 7) *Desire of amity:* viz. of obtaining or preserving a share, more or less considerable, in the *good will,* and therein in the *eventual good offices,* of this or that particular individual. *Coverings:* 1. 'Sympathy' at large, as towards that same individual. 2. 'Gratitude', as towards that same individual, i.e. *sympathy* produced by reflection on such or such benefits *already* received at his hands.

6. (No. 11) *Antipathy, ill-will:* viz. towards this or that particular individual. In so far as prosecution, whether at the bar of a *legal* tribunal, or at the bar of *public opinion,* has been the instrument employed in the gratification of the desire, *Covering,* 'public spirit', (No. 10); or 'love of justice' (the compound affection) as above. So, if the object in which a gratification for the desire is sought, be an act of enmity at large, exercised without any such warrant, the action may perhaps, still, by the agent in question, or even, in his behalf, by a friend, be termed an act of 'justice', viz, of that justice, which is exercised by the infliction of suffering, on a person, to whom, with or without sufficient ground, misconduct in some shape or other has been imputed.

Of these six species of *desires* and *motives,* by the operation of

which so large a portion of the business of human life is carried on, it is not very often that any one will, either by the man himself, or even by any other person, in so far as such other person speaks in the character of his friend, be recognised in quality of so much as *a co-operating cause,* much less as *the sole cause* of the effect which, by the conjunct, or perhaps sole operation of it, has been produced. These *desires* and *motives* may accordingly be considered as *the unseemly parts of the human mind.* Of the sort of *fig-leaves* commonly employed for the covering of them, specimens have now been given, as above.

DEONTOLOGY

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Morality made easy :

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From the manuscripts of

Jeremy Bentham.

Now together with additions by

John Bowring.

Deontology:
or
Morality made easy:
Shewing how
Throughout the whole course of every person's life
Duty coincides with interest rightly understood
Felicity with Virtue
Prudence extra-regarding as well as self-regarding with
Effective benevolence.
From the Manuscripts of
Jeremy Bentham:
Put together with additions by
John Bowring

From 16 Apr. 1819 to 23 July 1829, Bentham recorded seven titles for the Deontology. The one reproduced in facsimile on the opposite page is taken from UC xv. 219[v] and is dated 23 July 1829. It is not known what the additions mentioned in the last phrase of the title were intended to be—whether they were to be minor embellishments or the considerable additions which Bowring seems to have included in his 1834 edition of the *Deontology.* See the discussion in the Editorial Introduction, p. 000 above.

From 16 Apr. 1819 to 18 Mar. 1828, Bentham recorded six other titles which for purposes of comparison are presented below.

> Man's Interests and Duties: or A System of Deontology or say Ethics applied to the circumstances of private life or Interests and Duties of Man or private life being etc.
>
> (16 Apr. 1819, UC xiv. 226.)

> Man's Interests and Duties: or Principles of Morality better termed Deontology, applied to private life: man's duties being all along deduced from his interests.
>
> (24 June 1819, UC xiv. 241.)

> Morality or Private Morality or Deontology Shewing The Connection between interest and duty throughout life in every rank of life, independently of the obligation of law.
>
> (26 Feb. 1821, UC xiv. 269.)

> Morality made easy: or The natural connection between Self-regarding Prudence and Effective Benevolence—between Interest and Duty shewn, and applied to the continually occurring occasions of life.
>
> (10 Sept. 1821, UC xiv. 241.)

> Leading Principles of Morality made easy: or say Private Deontology Shewing the connection between interest and duty between extra-regarding prudence and effective benevolence Exhibiting the Whole Duty of Man as flowing from his interest.
>
> (18 Mar. 1828, UC xiv. 289.)

DEONTOLOGY: THEORETICAL

1.1

OF DEONTOLOGY IN GENERAL[1]

This work has for its object the placing of man's interests and duties in every walk of private life in as clear and satisfactory a point of view as possible.

To this purpose it is necessary to bring to view the relation between interest and duty, the relation between both of them, on the one part, and Virtue and Vice, on the other, together with[2] the marked relation between several intermediate objects, the mention of which is continually occurring on every list which takes the field of morals for its subject.

One thing which there will be occasion[3] to stress is that it never is, to any practical purpose, a man's duty to do that which it is his interest not to do. And that, accordingly, all laws, in so far as they have for their object the happiness of those concerned, have for their endeavour to cause it to be for a man's interest to do that which they make it his duty to do, and thus to bring his interest and his duty into coincidence.[4]

That a man ought to sacrifice his interest to his duty is a very common position; that such and such a one has on such or such an occasion sacrificed his interest to his duty is a very common assertion. But when both interest and duty are considered in their broadest sense, it will be seen that in the general tenor of life the act of sacrifice is neither possible nor so much as desirable; that it can not have place, and that if it were to have place, the sum total of the happiness of mankind would not be augmented by it.

The strain taken and kept up by books of morality in general is that of one continuous call upon man for the most painful sacrifices: and as, taken by itself, all consequences apart, every such sacrifice is mischievous, it is in a mischievous light that morality itself is in this

[1] The MSS for this section are UC xiv. 232-6 (dated 11 June 1819) and xiv. 273 (20 Sept. 1821). The first four paragraphs of the text are taken from xiv. 232, the following four paragraphs from 273, and the remainder from 233-6. Sheet 232 is headed 'Man's Interests and Duties etc. Preface or Introduction'.

For further information about the sequence of MS sheets used, see Editorial Introduction, pp. xxvi-xxvii.

[2] MS alt. 'including'.

[3] MS alt. 'On this occasion what it will be necessary'.

[4] MS 'and thus to bring his interest and his duty and his interest into coincidence'.

way represented. Those who paint it in this light, little, as it should seem, are they aware to how great an extent morality may be carried into effect, without any painful sensation whatsoever, without any thing that would ordinarily be presented to view by any such appellation as that of sacrifice.

In the production of this propensity two causes seem to have concurred:

1. A gloomy system of theology.

2. On the part of the authors, a scheme of selfishness at the bottom of all this purity.[1]

One thing is certain, that the less the sacrifice made of happiness, the greater is the quantity remaining. Hence, the first object of remark should be in what cases, by what means, and in what quantity, happiness may be obtained gratis, and obtained without sacrifice: when these means are exhausted, then will come the inquiry how the greatest quantity of happiness may be obtained with the least quantity of sacrifice.

By this sort of economy, the stock of happiness encreases in two ways: 1. in a particular and immediate way, by the effect of each line of conduct recommended; 2. in a general and remote way, by giving to the whole texture of the art and science that light and pleasant hue which properly belongs to it.

In the course of this enquiry what will also be seen is the relation which Virtue and Vice, the Virtues and the Vices, bear to man's interests, his happiness, and his duties: that no act can with propriety to any good purpose be termed virtuous except in so far as in its tendency it is conducive to the augmentation of the sum of happiness, and so, contrariwise, in regard to Vice.

It will, moreover, be seen that all Virtues may, with propriety and in respect of clearness with great advantage, be considered as modifications of two all comprehensive ones, to wit: prudence and benevolence. For that, on this occasion, all that is ultimately and for its own sake worth regard is happiness. This happiness will on each occasion be the happiness either of a man's self or of other men, or of both together. In so far as it is to a man's own happiness that the act is conducive, it is, if such be the object as well as the effect of it, an act of prudence; in so far as it is to the happiness of others that it is conducive, if such has been the object as well as the effect of it, it is an act of benevolence.

For its ultimate and practical result, this work[2] has for its object

[1] Here Bentham wrote the following marginal note: 'Inference called for that in proportion to the sacrifices he calls for are those he is in the habit of making.'

[2] Bentham divided the *Deontology* into a theoretical and a practical part. The

the pointing out to each man on each occasion what course of conduct promises to be in the highest degree conducive to his happiness: to his own happiness, first and last; to the happiness of others, no farther than in so far as his happiness is promoted by promoting theirs, than his interest coincides with theirs. For that in the case of man in general regard should any further be had to the happiness of others will be shewn to be neither possible nor upon the whole desirable: though on the other hand, what will also be shewn is in how many different ways, more than is very generally understood, each man's happiness is ultimately promoted by an intermediate regard shewn in practice for the happiness of others.

By these two leading terms 'prudence' and 'benevolence' it will be seen how clear and, it is hoped, commodious a plan of division and distribution will be afforded for the whole of the matter of the practical part of this work: and to this purpose nothing more will require to be added, than a distinction of the matter ranged under the head of prudence, and thence a division of the virtue of prudence into two branches or species.

One class of cases will be seen in which the happiness of no other person is in any immediate way at stake otherwise than the person himself whose interest is in question. Considered as applied to this class of cases, prudence will be made to receive the name of 'purely self-regarding prudence': the interest of others is not on occasion an object to be considered, no other person being so circumstanced as that their interest is at stake upon what is done or not done.

'Dictates of purely self-regarding prudence' will therefore constitute the title of the matter contained in the first division of the practical part.

When the happiness of others as well as his own is at stake upon the conduct he is about to pursue, a man's own happiness it has already been observed will be the sole ultimate as well as immediate object of his solicitude; that of others, no further than in so far as his own happiness is affected in virtue of the way in which the happiness of others is affected by his conduct. But, wheresoever the happiness of others is affected by the conduct a man pursues, his own happiness it will be shewn will in some way or other be affected by the manner in which theirs is affected by it.

On every such occasion, in order to know in what way the act he is about to perform may be most conducive to his own happiness it thence becomes necessary for him to consider and, as far as may

practical part as a whole was not completed, or is partially missing, but the discussion in the remainder of this section provides an outline of the intended content of that part of the work.

be possible, know in what way their happiness is likely to be affected by it.

Thus it is that, in short, to know on each occasion what are the dictates of extra-regarding prudence, it is necessary to know what are the dictates of benevolence.

'Dictates of benevolence' will therefore constitute the title of the matter contained in the second division of this practical part.

There will thus remain for the subject and title of the third and only remaining division of this practical part 'Dictates of Extra-regarding prudence'.

This portion of the matter will have for its object the shewing how far on each occasion it will be conducive to a man's self-regarding interest to have regard for the interest of others and sacrifice to theirs a correspondent portion of his own interest, and moreover to shew after such care has been had as his own interest requires to such interests of others as are at stake, what course of conduct will thereupon be most conducive to his own particular and self-regarding interest: and so far as the regard for his own general and ultimate interest allows of his pursuing his particular and immediate interest at the expense of theirs, what course of conduct is most conducive to his purpose.

Though last in description, the practical part of this work has been brought to view and explained in the first place.

Let us now go back and speak of the theoretical part which though in intention but subservient will, in point of order, require to come first and stand prefixt to it.

I . 2

EXPOSITORY OR EXEGETICAL PART: DEFINITIONS, EXPLANATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS[1]

Deontology, or *Ethics* (taken in the largest sense of the word), is that branch of art and science which has for its object the learning and shewing for the information of each individual, by what means the net amount of his happiness may be made as large as possible; of each in so far as it is dependent on his own conduct: the happiness

[1] The MSS for this section are as follows: UC xiv. 215-18 (22 Feb. 1819), cii. 202 (30 July 1814), and xiv. 186-8 (13 May 1816). At the head of the first sheet Bentham wrote: 'Insert somewhere in a note a remark concerning *self-denial* or self-sacrifice, considered as an impediment to virtue.' In another note on the same sheet Bentham wrote: '11 June 1819. Superseded these 4 pages, but consultable. '

of each individual separately being considered, and thereby that of every individual among[1] those whose happiness is on this occasion an object of regard.[2]

As to the *end* or object of it, if by this be meant the most general end, for this most general end or object it has or ought to have the same end or object which not only every branch of art or science has, but every human thought as well as every human action has—and not only has but ought to have: [namely,] the giving encrease in some shape or other to man's well-being—say in one word the sum of human happiness.

As to subordinate ends—distinguishable subordinate ends it has as many as it has of distinguishable subjects—as many as there [are] of distinguishable operations performable by human beings on those subjects; of faculties, by means and in virtue of which those operations are performed.

All these however are but *means* in respect[3] of the several distinguishable modifications or branches of the highest and most general end, viz. *well-being,* viz. enjoyment of the several distinguishable pleasures and exemption from the several distinguishable pains. But of these elements of well-being, when taken separately, the consideration belongs to a particular branch of art and science, which, under the name of 'Ethics', there will be occasion to consider in its place.[4]

In so far as a man's conduct is regarded as conducive to this end, the term 'virtue' with its conjugate 'virtuous' may be employed in speaking of it: the character of his conduct may be said to be *virtuous:* the man may be said to be a man of virtue: virtue may be said to be [the] man's characteristic and be manifested in and by his conduct, his actions, his deportment.

In so far as his conduct is considered as operating in an opposite direction, the term 'vice' with its conjugates may be employed in

[1] MS alt. 'being of the number of'.

[2] After this paragraph, Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Add here the distinction between Deontology and the other branches of the art and science of Eudaemonics.' The ensuing three paragraphs are taken from cii. 202. Thereafter the text reverts to xiv. 215-18.

[3] MS alt. 'comparison'.

[4] *A* much more complete discussion of the distinction between deontology and the other branches of the 'art and science of eudaemonics' is to be found in ci. 456-70. However, this material was plainly not intended for the *Deontology.* It forms part of a general discussion of the classification of the sciences which was used, in part, by Southwood Smith in Appendix B to his edition of Bentham's *Essay on Logic* (Bowring, viii. 285 ff.). This discussion of deontology as a branch of eudaemonics is reproduced below in Appendix A, pp. 331 ff.

speaking of it. His conduct may be said to be vicious.* [1] The man may be said to be a man of vice. Vice may be said to characterize and to be manifested in his conduct, his actions, his deportment.[3]

On[2] the occasion of the act in question,[3] either the agent himself is considered as the only person whose happiness is affected by it, or it is considered as producing or tending to produce an effect more or less considerable upon the happiness of some other individual or individuals.

In the first case, virtue and vice are considered in a purely self regarding point of view: it is the virtue of the unconnected individual. In the other case, it is considered also in an extra-regarding point of view; it is the virtue of a member of society—of human society. And so in the case of vice.

In so far as virtue is considered in no other than a self-regarding point of view, as above, among the consequences liable to be produced by the act in question those alone are considered to the production of which no act on the part of any individual other than himself is necessary.

In so far as it is considered in an extra-regarding point of view, two sets of consequences, either or both, may be considered as being liable to become the results of it: viz. 1. consequences affecting the happiness of other individuals; and 2. consequences which, affecting his own happiness, are the results of this or that act on the part of some other individual or individuals, produced by that act of his which is in question.[4]

The word 'virtue' is employed sometimes as a generic, sometimes as a specific name: as a generic name employed in designating, in the character of an aggregate, all or any [of] the several fictitious entities, each of which is spoken of as a virtue; when in a generic sense, the word 'virtue' is employed to designate an aggregate composed of

[a] Virtue and Vice—two fictitious entities, imagined and spoken of as real for the purposes of discourse. Sometimes they are considered as spoken of as if they were personages. Fictions as they are, deception is not in the use made of them either an object or an effect. Without fictions of this nature, and those in considerable abundance, discourse on subjects such as this could not be carried on.

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[1] Here and in the next two sentences MS has 'virtuous' and 'virtue' instead of the clearly required 'vicious' and 'vice'.

[1] Before this sentence Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Here for accurate conception concerning happiness and its ingredients, pleasure and exemption from pain, make reference to *Springs of Action.*' Cf. pp. 87-97 above.

' Here Bentham wrote the following note to himself: Tn a note make the distinction between positive and negative acts.' No such note has been found.

" Following this paragraph Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Recast the phraseology.'

all the virtues. In this case it is sometimes denominated 'virtue in the abstract'. And so in regard to vice.

When 'virtue' is considered as the name of an aggregate, the several particular virtues, considered in so far as the individual agent in question is considered as the only person whose happiness is liable to be affected by his conduct, may be all comprehended under the general and concise denomination of 'prudence'[8] ('self regarding prudence').[1]

Considered as having application to and effect on the happiness of individuals other than the agent himself, they may all [be] comprehended under the general name of 'beneficence'. It is in the power of every man to be benevolent: not so to be *beneficent.*

'Benevolence' is a word employed to describe the desire of exercising the virtue of beneficence. Considered as exercised under particular circumstances, beneficence assumes the name of 'justice'.

Opposite to the virtue termed 'justice' is the vice termed 'injustice'.

'Justice' is the name given to beneficence, in so far as the exercise of it is regarded as matter of obligation.

This art with the science appertaining to it has for its object the shewing how on every imaginable occasion happiness may be promoted or encreased by the exercise of virtue in all its modes—by the avoidance of vice.

Such is the object of this work.

Considered with relation to happiness, every human act is either indifferent or important: indifferent when not considered as producing an effect of one or other of the two opposite sorts, to wit encrease or decrease (or a tendency to the one or the other). In so far as it is considered as productive of an encrease to happiness it is termed 'good' or 'beneficial' or 'salutary': in so far as it is considered as productive of decrease, [it is termed] 'evil', 'mischievous' or 'pernicious'.

[a] The word 'prudence' is also employed in another sense, in which it seems to have for its synonym the word 'wisdom'. The virtue thus denominated is a virtue of the head, purely a virtue of the head, and consists in an apt of choice of means with reference to the end in question—the effect meant to be produced: whether by that effect the happiness of the agent himself be or be not considered as affected.

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[1] Bentham wrote on 30 Aug. 1814 the following fragment on prudence (UC xiv. 80): 'Prudence: a man may be spoken of as *prudent* in so far as the views he is accustomed to take of his own interest are regarded as correct and compleat, and the canon of conduct, which on each occasion he pursues, is regarded as conformable to such his views; [and] in so far the particular ends he chooses and pursues are in their nature conducive to the aggregate of his well-being, and the means which in the pursuit of these ends he chooses and employs are in their nature conducive to the attainment of these ends.'

Of the various acts, whether individual or sorts of acts, by which happiness is considered as encreased, it is not every one that is commonly termed 'virtuous'. The acts most beneficial are those which are most necessary: the acts most necessary are those without which the individual can not be kept in existence, and those without which the species can not be kept in existence. By the exercise of neither of these acts is a man ever regarded as being in any sense or degree a man of virtue; by the exercise of neither of these is virtue considered as being encreased.)[1]

Deontological Ethics has for its indispensable foundations Exegetical Ethics. By no other means with any rational prospect of success can you endeavour to cause a man to do so and so, otherwise than by shewing him that it is, or making it to be, his interest so to do.[2]

Positions constituting the ground of Exegetical Ethics.

1.On every occasion, by interest in some shape or other is the conduct of every man determined; i.e. by the conception which on that occasion is formed by him in relation to such his interest.

2. To the word 'interest', no clear idea can be attached otherwise than by its relation to the import of the words 'pleasure' and 'pain': for which see *Table of Springs of Action.*[3] Corresponding to every species of pleasure and every species of pain is a species of interest.

3.· In the case of the most extensively beneficent, generous, and heroic action that ever was performed or can by possibility be conceived, this subjection[4] of conduct to interest will not be less incontestably true than in the case of the most mischievous or selfish. In the case of the suppose[d] beneficent action, the interest is of the social kind or class and acting on the most extensive scale: in the case of the supposed mischievous action, the interest is of the dissocial or anti-social class; in the shape of the selfish, of the self-regarding class.

4. In no shape can interest operate with effect upon the will, or indeed act upon it, otherwise than at the time when it is present to the mind, i.e. to the conceptive or imaginative faculty. *Actio,* say the old Logicians, *non datur nisi in praesenti.*[5] True in Somatics, this is not less true in Pneumatics.

5. If at the moment interest in no other shape be present to the mind, the determination taken by the will, and thence by the active

[1] MS torn.

[2] Before this paragraph at the top of the sheet (xiv. 186), Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Add to par. 1. *Principle of Utility,* its two correspondent senses.'

[3] See pp. 79-86 and 91-2 above.

[4] MS alt. 'dependence'.

[5] The source of this quotation has not been traced. The meaning would appear to be: 'Action is impossible except in the present.'

faculty, may be produced by interest in any the weakest shape, and in that shape in any the smallest quantity. In this sense, by the desire of obtaining some pleasure which if obtained is found to be of the slightest kind, or of avoiding some pain which when suffered is found to be of the slightest kind, a man may lose some pleasure of the most certain and durable kind that would have been enjoyed in the greatest quantity, or bring upon himself some pain of the most intense and durable kind which shall be experienced in the most intense degree and during the greatest length of time.

6. In either of these cases a man may in a certain sense be said to act against his own interest.

7. In no other sense with truth can a man be said ever to act against his own interest.

8. But in both senses never, probably has any man existed who has not acted against his own interest.[1]

Of universal benevolence, considered in an exegetical, and in a deontological point of view,[2] [it may be said that] in point of fact, [it] is to a certain degree a natural cause of action. In point of right, it may, with reason be affirmed to be altogether a proper cause of action.

Scarcely can that human being ever have existed to whom, unless when afflicted by the contemplation of some unfortunate state of circumstances or agitated by some tumultuous passion, the sight of a fellow creature though a stranger to him in a state of apparent comfort was more gratifying than the sight of a fellow creature equally a stranger to him in a state of apparent sufferance.

As this is the case in regard to any one such fellow creature, so will it be in regard to any two or more, and though the encrease of the gratification can not be in a proportion any thing near to equality with that of the numbers of the fellow creatures in question, yet still along with the numbers it will receive some encrease: each man's addition to the number will naturally bring with it its encrease.

[1] At this point Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Go on'—indicating an intended continuation of the numbered paragraphs constituting 'the ground of Exegetical Ethics'; but no such continuation has been found.

[2] The opening phrase of this paragraph is in fact a chapter-heading, followed by two section-headings which have been used for the completion of this sentence and for the next. At the head of the sheet (xiv. 188) Bentham wrote: 'Shew how universal benevolence is overborne by a narrow and more concentrated interest. How by mental culture the wider and remoter gains more and more upon the narrower and nearer interest. Motives by which men are led to speak slightingly or hostilely of universal benevolence: 1. Not to condemn their own selfishness. 2. To obtain power- of discernment in not suffering themselves to be dupes to false pretences of universal benevolence. 3. Envy of those whom they see gaining reputation by universal benevolence.'

1.3

OF WELL-BEING AND ILL-BEING IN GENERAL: HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS[1]

For clearness of discourse and conception, it is absolutely necessary to have some word by which the *difference* in *value* between the sum of the pleasures of all sorts and the sum of the pains of all sorts, which down to the point of time (suppose the end of his life) a man has experienced, may be designated.

This difference may, if it be on the pleasure side of the account, be termed the net[2] amount of his well-being—or, more shortly, his clear well-being—or simply his well-being; if on the side of pain, the net amount of his ill-being—or his net ill-being—or simply his ill-being.

Instead of *well-being* the word 'happiness' will not be equally suitable to the purpose. It seems not only to lay pain in all its shapes altogether out of the account, but to give it to be understood that whatsoever have been the pleasures that have been experienced, it is in a high and as it were superlative degree that they have been experienced.

Comparatively speaking few men it is believed would be found who down to any given period, the whole length of their lives taken together, have not been in the enjoyment of a measure more or less considerable of well-being. Much fewer, or rather none at all, who during an equal period have been in the possession and enjoyment of *happiness,* as above described.

In regard to well-being,[3] quality as well as quantity requires to be taken into account.

Quantity depends upon *general* sensibility, sensibility to pleasure and pain in general; quality upon *particular* sensibility: upon a man's being more sensible to pleasure or pain from this or that source, than to ditto from this or that other.

To every man, by competent attention and observation the quality of his own sensibility may be made known: it may be known by the most impressive and infallible of all direct evidence, the evidence of a man's own senses.

[1] The MSS for this section are UC xiv. 35-41 (30 Aug. 1814). Following the heading, there is a subheading for the first four paragraphs, ' § 1. Well-being what —Happiness not exactly synonymous to it'.

[2] MS here and below, 'neat'.

[3] This and the following four paragraphs have the subheading '§ 2. Well-being --- its dependence on particular Sensibility'.

To no man, can the quality of sensibility in the breast of any other man be made known by any thing like equally probative and unfallacious evidence. Countenance, gesture, deportment, contemporary conduct at the time, subsequent conduct at other subsequent times —from each of these articles of circumstance, separately or collectively taken—indications much surer and [more] unambiguous may be deduced than from any such direct evidence as is or can be constituted and delivered by any verbal account given by him of his own feelings.[1]

Proportioned to the differences between the particular sensibilities of the several persons in question will be the absurdity of him who, in a case in which the agent himself were the only person whose well-being were in question, should in the character of a Moralist or say a Deontologist, prescribe exactly the same line of conduct to be observed by every man.

With a benefit of a certain degree of experience it may be delivered in the character of a general proposition [that] every man is a better judge of what is conducive to his own well-being than any other man can be.

Taking the whole of mankind together,[2] on which side of the account does the balance lie, on the well-being, or on the ill-being side?

If religion were out of the question, the answer would require scarce a moment's thought: on the side of well-being beyond dispute; of well-being, existence is of itself a conclusive proof. So small is the quantity of pain necessarily accompanying the termination of existence.

But under the guidance of religion[3] men have made to themselves an almighty being, whose delight is in human misery, and who, to prevent a man's escaping from whatsoever misery he may be threatened with in the present life, has without having denounced it formed a determination, in the event of any such escape, to plunge him into infinitely greater misery in a life to come.

Even taking the Christian religion for true, this notion is a most vain and groundless conceit. For the Christian Scripture lies open to every eye and in no one part of it is any intimation given of any such doom.

By no precept has Jesus been represented as forbidding suicide.

[1] At this point, at the bottom of the sheet (xiv. 36), Bentham wrote a note to himself: 'Go on.'

[2] This paragraph is preceded by the subheading * § 3. Quantity of well-being in human life---- its preponderance over that of ill-being'.

[3] Bentham inserted square brackets in pencil round the words 'under the guidance of religion'.

By his own example he is represented as approving of it. Possessed even of superhuman power, having power, though it were forever, to exempt himself from death, Jesus purposely and spontaneously subjected himself to it. What he then did, it was for all men, i.e. to promote the well-being of all men that he did it. Will this be said? What he thought right that by one person it should be done [for][1] all men, how could he think otherwise than right, that by each[2] person, it should upon occasion, be done for himself?

A manufacturer of human misery is every man who joins in the declamation against suicide. In what proportion?—in the exact proportion of the extent of his influence.

If Maupertuis is to be believed, it is to a great amount clearly on the side of ill-being that the balance lies.[3]

The precise lines or even purpose of his argument I do not now remember. The book is not at hand, nor is it worth looking for. Horace's *Qui fit Maecenas,*[4] if I misrecollect not, or something in that strain.

To better his condition, to acquire for the future some means of enjoyment more than at present he is in possession of, is the aim of every man. Not perhaps in the character of a universal proposition, true: but for argument sake, be it so. What then does it prove?—that in other particulars be the balance on the side of well-being or of ill-being, an element of well-being is in the possession of every man—a pleasure of expectation—a pleasure of hope.

No (will it be said)—it is not for the encrease of a balance on the side of pleasure that a man looks forward and labours for a change in his condition, but for the diminution of a balance on the side of pain? Among any of those whom Horace could have had in view, this, at any rate, could not have been the case. Why? Because among them, so far from being an object of horror, suicide was an object of praise and admiration. 'Dum moritur', asks Martial, 'numquid major Othone fuit?'[5]

[1] MS 'by'; but 'for' is evidently required if the sentence is to make sense.

[2] MS orig. 'every'.

[3] Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) was celebrated mainly as a mathematician; but Bentham is here referring to his *Essai de philosophie morale,* Berlin, 1749, ch. II.

[4] These are the opening words of the first of Horace's *Satires.* The first three lines read as follows: 'Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo quam sibi sortem / Seu ratio dederit, seu fors obiecerit, ilia *I* Contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentes.' (How is it, Maecenas, that no one lives content with the lot that he has chosen or that chance has brought him, keeping his praise for those who pursue other goals?)

[5] Marcus Salvius Otho was Roman Emperor for three months at the beginning of AD 69: he committed suicide, in his thirty-seventh year, following a defeat in battle. Bentham's quotation--------'Surely no one was greater than Otho in his dying?'----is from Martial, *Epigrammata,* 6. 32. 6.

To be consistent, the admirers of Jesus should likewise be admirers of this Otho. Otho was Jesus, though upon an inferior scale. What Jesus did to save men from misery after death, Otho did to save men from the miseries of civil war—from misery and death.

As to motives, in the case of Otho, it is true what we believe concerning them, if we believe them to be as above, it is from his own account that we must take them. But so must we in the case of Jesus: his account—that is the account given by others of that account of his.

By an ill considered expression, Locke, a man worth a hundred Maupertuises, has given countenance to a notion at once so false, so uncomfortable, and so pernicious. According to him, *uneasiness* is what every action has for its source.[1] If this be true, a proposition not easily found deniable is that uneasiness is the state in which every man is who acts: viz, as often as he acts, and for as long as he acts.

But, in so far as it exists, this uneasiness what is it? Incidentally, it will indeed be this or that according to the situation, in which on each occasion the man in question is. Necessarily, however, it is no more than this: viz., a sense of a capacity of enjoying at some future time a pleasure not enjoyed at the time in question, at the time at which this uneasiness is considered as being felt.

What by Locke was not sufficiently considered—and what by the expression in question seems to be negatived, is—that for as much as pleasure as well as pain may be issuing at the same time[2] from a thousand sources, hence it is that from any number of sources he may at a given point of[3] time be in the receipt of present pleasure, while at that same point of time he is looking forward to and acting in pursuit of future pleasure: reaping at the same time from the prospect of that pleasure the pleasure of hope.

If Johnson be to be believed, that which, in the thoughts of every man, occupies till dinner comes the highest place in his thoughts is—his dinner. According to the (improper) phraseology of Locke—this is as much as to say, every man who is not at dinner is uneasy for want of his dinner: or simply and absolutely, at every point of time other than those which are occupied by the act of eating his dinner, in a state of uneasiness. No, not even of Johnson himself was this true. Beyond every thing else what Johnson loved was his dinner: perhaps so. But thinking thus amorously of his dinner, what should

[1] John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding,* ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975, p. 249.

[2] MS has at this point the interlinear insertion ‘and taking in’; but it is not clear how this can be incorporated into the text as it stands.

[3] MS orig. ‘the same’.

have hindered him from sitting with his Tetsey[1] on his knee, with a nosegay under his nose, another Tetsey at the Harpsichord entertaining him with a Song, and with the work of a favourite author in his hand?[2]

1.4

SUMMUM BONUM: CONSUMMATE NONSENSE[3]

The *summum bonum,* wherein does it consist? Such was the question debated by multitudes, debated from generation to generation by men calling themselves lovers of wisdom, and by others, wise.

The *summum bonum,* wherein does it consist? In this nonsensical question is implied an opinion of the existence of a something correspondent to and designated by this name.

The *summum bonum*—the sovereign good wherein does it consist? The philosopher's stone, the thing that turns all metals into gold, the thing that cures disease in all its shapes, in what quarry is it to be found? Upon the same level in the scale of rationality stand both these questions.

It consists in virtue, it consists in this and that and t'other: it consists in any thing rather than in pleasure. It is the Irishman's apple which was to be made of nothing but quinces.

This *bonum,* what would it be if it were any thing? What would it be if it had any thing in it of or belonging to pleasure? Would it be pleasure in the character of an *effect* or would it be a something, an unknown something, considered as the cause of pleasure?

This supreme or sovereign good—one supposition is that, whatever it is, it is the degree in which it is, that is, [in] the highest degree:

[1] Johnson's pet-name for his wife, Elizabeth.

[2] The next MS sheet (xiv. 42) is headed '§4. Well-being—its preponderance perpetually on the encrease'; and this is followed by the sentence: 'In civilized nations, and therefore in the whole of mankind, the sum of well-being is perpetually on the encrease.' Unfortunately Bentham seems not to have developed the theme further. The next sheet (xiv. 43) was evidently intended for yet another subsection of the discussion of well-being and ill-being, with the heading '§5. *Summum bonum'.* the notion of its existence absurd and mischievous'. Bentham subsequently decided, however, to devote a separate section or chapter to the subject of the *summum bonum.*

[3] The MSS for this section are UC xiv. 43 (30 Aug. 1814) and 57-79 (9-10 Sept. 1814). Sheet 43 provides the first six paragraphs of the section. The word 'CONSUMMATE' on the title replaces MS orig. 'SOLEMN', The sheet is headed as follows: 'Eyes shut against all experience. / Summum bonum no more exists than Canon Law. *I* Summum bonum--------- the notion of its existence absurd and mischievous.'

whatever it is, it is to be in the instance of every man who is in possession of it one and the same thing at all times and in all places. This unintelligible thing, in what one individual man, in what one individual place, in what one individual time, was it ever to be found? What fool ever has there been so foolish as not to know that in no man, by no man, at no place, at no time, has it ever been found?

What well-being is has been seen:[1] in the instance of the individual in question, for and during the portion of time in question, what balance there has been, if any, on the side of pleasure.

What happiness is has also been seen: any pleasure or combination of contemporary pleasures, considered as existing at an elevated point, though without the possibility of marking it in the scale of intensity.

From observations such as these, nothing that comes under the name of information can be derived: nothing that comes under that name is pretended to be given; no human being so ignorant as not to be informed of it, informed of it by the best master, his own experience.

In almost every walk of discipline, error is a sort of labyrinth through which men are condemned to pass in the way to truth.

While Xenophon was writing History, and Euclid teaching Geometry, Socrates and Plato were talking nonsense, on pretence of teaching morality and wisdom.[2] This morality of theirs consisted in words. This wisdom of theirs, in so far as it had a meaning, consisted in denying the existence of matters made known to every body by experience [and] in asserting the existence of a variety of matters the non-existence of which was made known to every body by experience. Exactly in proportion as they and their notions thus differed from the general mass of mankind, exactly in that same proportion were they below the level of it.

The people who took no pleasure in the talking of any such nonsense (the people who were content with reaping pleasures under the guidance of common sense) and on that account were considered as ignorant and as composing the vulgar herd, were beheld by them enjoying each of them throughout the compass of their lives a portion more or less considerable of well-being—most of them, every now and then, a portion of happiness. Well-being for their ordinary fare, happiness, now and then a slight taste of it, as if at a feast. Good

[1] Above this paragraph, MS has (at the top of xiv. 57) the subheading 'Summum bonum: one of the doctrines of the philosophers of antiquity'.

[2] Bentham's chronology is somewhat loose in respect of Euclid, who was at work around 300 BC. Xenophon (c.430-355 BC) wrote his *Hellenica* as a continuation of Thucydides, covering Greek history from 411 to 362.

enough this for the ignorant vulgar. Not so for those learned sages: men who by whatsoever name they call themselves or were called—wisest of men (ao^tarat), wise men (oo0oi), or lovers of wisdom (</>iXooo0ot)—held their heads equally high, carrying on with the same rapidity and pretension the manufactory of nonsense.

To the vulgar they left the enjoyment of this or that pleasure in whatsoever shape it might fall in the way of each man to lay hold of. For their own disciples they reserved a thing they called the *summum bonum.* This *summum bonum,* what was it? Was it pleasure? Oh no! pleasure was not good enough for them: their *summum bonum* was something that was better than pleasure: and better it could not be without being different from it.

Had their practice been of a piece with their doctrine, it would have been that of the dog who, to hunt the shadow of a beef stake, let drop the stake.[1] But theirs was no such folly. Pleasure was for one use, *summum bonum* for another: pleasure to be enjoyed, *summum bonum* to be talked of.

While they were all of them chattering about the *summum bonum,* each was amusing himself with his respective *iratbiKas.*[2] Socrates had his Alcibiades, Plato his Aster, Aristotle his [Harphyllis],[3] each of them his favourite of either sex, without number, whom no history has canonized.[3]

Two things there were about which the alchemists, a set of physical philosophers of later times, were agreed: that there existed a universal medicine somewhere, and that it was findable. About one thing their agreement was not quite so perfect: that was, whereabouts it was to be found.

Two things, in like manner, the moral philosophers in question were agreed about: that a *summum bonum* exists somewhere, and

[a] Dependent on public opinion for that reputation which to the head of a party or a sect is always money's worth, and upon occasion money, they knew better than to suffer themselves to be governed by their minions, as James the first of England was by his. Socrates, the most prudent of them all, such, as he himself declared, was the bent of his constitution and such the turn of his desires, upon his coming in company with a person of his own sex, durst not, if the person were young and handsome, accost him with the sort of salutation which was customary, for fear of forfeiting his independence.

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[1] This fable is related by, among others, La Fontaine (6. 17), following Aesop.

[2] 'darlings'.

[3] At this point Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'See Diogenes Laertius'; but he failed to supply from that source *(The Lives and Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers)* the name of Harphyllis, who was Aristotle's concubine and the mother of several children by him. The same work names Aster as one of the young men whom Plato loved.

that, existing, it is somewhere findable. But as to the *where,* in this case too, there was the matter and the source of difference.

'The idea of good': this, according to one set, was the *summum bonum* or, what comes to much the same thing, that is to much the same nonsense, in this idea it was that the *summum bonum* was to be found.[1] This being true, you then, whoever you are, no sooner have you got the idea of good than you have the *summum bonum*: and having it you are happier—happier by it is not easy to say how much than the happiest of all men who has not got it. But, as to what you are to do with it when you have got it, *that* it is time enough for you to know.

In this view of the matter, two sets of Philosophers were agreed, viz. the Platonists and the Academics:[2] the Platonists include, of course, the master manufacturer of nonsense, from whom they took their nonsense and their name.

Nonsense in general, or at least this nonsense in particular, is like an eel: when you think you have it fast, it slips through your fingers, and in comes another lot of nonsense in the stead of it.

After giving you for the *summum bonum* of these philosophers (the Platonists and the Academics) the *idea of good,* as if this were not unintelligible enough, in the same breath, in the same sentence, and in the very next words, in comes the Instructor with a *sive*—'sive *visione et fruitione Dei':* that is to say, 'in the vision and fruition —the seeing and enjoying of God'.

Here, if there were any thing, there would be two things: vision or seeing of God, one thing, enjoying of God, another thing. And this same idea of good, what has either of them to do with it?

Enjoying a person of the same species and the opposite sex—this is sufficiently intelligible. But this is of the number of those things in which, as every body who ever talked about the *summum bonum* is altogether clear, the *summum bonum* is not to be found: and so as to the instance of a mess of turtle or a pineapple. But God—

[1] At this point Bentham wrote the marginal note 'Eth. Compend. Oxon. p. 9'. This refers to *Ethices Compendium in usum juventutis academicae,* Oxford, 1745, the elementary textbook on moral philosophy used by undergraduates at Oxford. Bentham himself used it as an undergraduate in 1762: see *Correspondence* (CW), i. 59-60 and n. 3. Chapter 3 of the work (pp. 8-10) is entitled 'De summo Bono, sive de eo in quo consistit felicitas'; and the relevant paragraph on p. 9 begins: 'Neque [collocandum est summum hoc Bonum] in Idea Boni, sive Visione et fruitione Dei, ut Platonici et Academici [existimant].'

[2] Bentham is referring to the sceptics of the Middle and New Academy. These are to be distinguished from the members of the Old Academy, who were Platonists.

enjoyment of God? What sort of an enjoyment is that? By whom was it ever experienced? As to the God—the God here spoken of—though here we are given to understand there is but one God, he is neither the God of the Jews, nor the God of the Christians, who each of them had but one—and he, as they say, as the Christians at least say, the same—but the God of the Platonists and the Academics, all of them heathens, all of them having Gods by thousands.

The habit of Virtue—according to another set this was the *summum bonum,*[1] or in this was the summuzn *bonum* to be found: in this we have either the jewel itself, or the casket in which it will be found. Lie all your life long in your bed, with the rheumatism in your loins, the stone in your bladder, and the gout in both your feet, so long as you are in the habit of virtue, so long the *summum bonum,* be it what it may, is in your hands, and much good may it do you. As to the condition, in so far at least as negative virtue is virtue, in the fulfilment of it no great difficulty presents itself: in any such situation to engage in the practice of vice—of vice in any shape—in that rather than in its opposite, seems the greater difficulty. Of a *summum bonum* of this sort, the seat, if it be any where, it is in the head surely that it must be. But, to *have summum bonums* in his head, be they what they may, and the numbers of them ever so great, exists there any man in his senses who would be content to have his head, his bladder and his loins thus occupied?

Lest the sense of this nonsense should be mistaken, in comes the compiler with a remark of kindred sagacity in his mouth: 'For', says he, 'Reason shows that a naked habit is not of any the least value, unless it be referred to operation, and brought forward into act and exercise.' A habit without an act! a habit in existence and not so much as a single act in it! a habit formed, and of the acts of which that habit is composed, not so much as a single act ever done! and so, lest you should fall into any such error, and in consequence any such misconduct, as that of persevering in the habit of virtue, without ever having performed so much as a single act of virtue, it is for this cause that the information and warning thus given to you is bestowed.

Of little indeed would be the use of knowing where this *summum bonum*—if it meant any thing and were good for any thing—little, indeed, would be the use of a man's knowing where it *is not,* unless he knows where it *is* to be found. This accordingly is what, inspired by all these Oracles, the Academical instructor, with his philosophers in his head, has been generous enough to inform us of.

Virtue—virtue itself—there it is that the *summum bonum,* the

[1] The relevant paragraph on pp. 9-10 of *Ethices Compendium* begins: 'Nec denique in solo Virtutis habitu, ut Stoici.'

true and only true *summum bonum,* is to be found. *'Ponendum est igitur summum hominis bonum in ipsa virtute.'*[1] What? in the habit of virtue? Oh no, not in any such thing: a supposition to any such effect is the very error against which you have just been cautioned. Have virtue, and you have the *summum bonum:* have virtue, you need not trouble yourself about the habit of it. As to the habit of virtue, this too you may have if you please, but no *summum bonum* will you get by it.

Nothing can be more positive, nothing more decided: whereupon, immediately upon the back of this concise nonsense comes a torrent of diffuse nonsense by which every thing that was decided is washed away.

'And therefore', continues the Instructor, 'and therefore in acting according to the best and most perfect virtue consists the essence of human felicity.[2] Yet to the entirety and perfection of felicity are required, in moderate quantity at least, good things of the body and of fortune: and moreover is added that more sincere pleasure of the mind which of its own accord is produced'—though it should seem in a sort of sly way, *subnascitur*—'from the conscience of things well done.'

'This felicity', he goes on to assure us; 'is a steady kind of good, and not easily can it be lost.' Are you in doubt? Look once more, and at the back of the assurance you may see the ground and reason of it. 'For', says he, 'virtue in which its foundation is laid'—virtue in which this *summum bonum* which is itself virtue is laid—'neither can be snatched out of the hands that are unwilling to part with it, nor when the good things of fortune and the body are gone does it immediately take itself off. In a word, by the loss of external good things the essence of felicity is not taken away: all that happens to it is to be diminished and to have its integrity mutilated.'[3]

Not to speak of the Platonics and the Academics with their vision and their fruition and their divinity or divinities, if the Stoics with their habits of Virtue were still short of the mark, and being so short of the mark were still wrong, how must it have been with those sensualists, with those hogs, the Epicureans? The *summum bonum* being the thing sought, guess where it was that they looked for it:

[1] 'Therefore the sovereign good for men is to be located in virtue itself': Bentham's marginal note gives the reference to p. 10 of the *Compendium.*

[2] Marginal note, 'p. 10', referring to p. 10 of the *Compendium,* from which this whole paragraph is taken.

[3] Bentham wrote at the end of this paragraph, *'Haec felicitas* etc. to *integritatem',* referring to the paragraph on p. 10 of the *Compendium* which is given here in translation.

could any body have thought of such a thing? Hogs as they were, it was actually in pleasure that they looked for it: where to look for it they could not imagine, unless it were in pleasure. Such is the account here given of them: that they as well as those others joined in the hunt for the *summum bonum,* and that it was in pleasure—yea and that too though it were bodily pleasure—that they looked for it.[1] Upon the face of it this account presents itself as not altogether a correct one. That to those men as well as others *pleasure* was *pleasure,* in that there seems nothing improbable: another thing that seems likewise not altogether improbable is, that if they had been obliged to look for this *summum bonum,* it is in pleasure they would have looked for it. On the other hand three things seem not alike probable: that they should have expected to have found it any where; that among these people the existence of it should have found believers; and that in their account of pleasure, pleasure in every shape that was not bodily should have been omitted.

In some of its shapes it is in the body that pleasure has its seat, in others it is in the mind: where is the man to whom either part of this is unknown? Where is the man to whom experience of any part of it has been wanting? That which is known to every man can it have been unknown to these philosophers?

Too reasonable to look for any such moonshine any where, they could no more have looked for it in pleasure, whether of the mind or of the body, than any where else.

Be this as it may, having thus started the subject of bodily pleasure, he, the Instructor, takes this occasion to assure us that no such thing as the *summum bonum* is to be found in it. Why not to be found there? Because it exists not anywhere? Oh no: but for quite different reasons.

1. In the first place, the part of the human frame to which they minister—one should rather have said, 'which are subservient to them'—is the less noble, literally the more ignoble.

2. In the next place they are short.

3. In the third place, here and there, when they are over, the recollection of them is (it seems) unsavoury, and, thereupon come, or ought to come, certain blushes.

Harum praeterea sensus est brevis, praeteritarumque in suavis saepe recordatio, et erubescenda.[2]

The life of A is filled up with pleasures, all of them ignoble, all of

[1] The relevant paragraph on p. 9 of the *Compendium* begins: 'Neque in Voluptate corporea, ut Epicurei: nam illae voluptates, quae sensibus externis oblectationem afferunt, ignobiliori tantum hominis parti subserviunt.'

[2] In margin 'p. 9'. This sentence follows the one quoted in n. 1 above.

them in the highest degree intense, none of them alloyed by any thing in the shape of pain. In the life of B, what pleasures there are, are all of them of the noble kind, but all of them are alloyed with and outweighed by pains. Whose lot, of A or B, would a man choose, he being in his senses?

The part *ignoble*—well, and if so it be, what follows? Ignoble as it is, is it less necessary than any other part? Ignoble as it is, the Compend-writer, not to speak of his master, would he have liked to have been without it?

Not that, as thus applied, 'ignoble' means any thing but 'ignoble': the sound of the word—'ignoble'—the sound of the word is all there is in it.

But let it mean what the modern philosopher pleases. Taken two men, Felix and Miser. The life of Felix is filled up with pleasures, all of them altogether ignoble, but on the other hand all of them intense and all of them unalloyed by pain, and in that only intelligible sense, all of them pure. In the life of Miser, what pleasures there are [are] all of them of the noble kind, whatsoever is the noble kind, but every one of them faint in itself, every one of them alloyed and outweighed by pains. Felix or Miser, philosopher as you are, which would you rather be?

Alas! alas! all this is a mistake. Not the particular organ, but the whole body is the ignoble thing here meant, and if the pleasure be one thing to which the organ is subservient, the body is the thing to which the pleasure is subservient. Well, but suppose 'ignoble', though it means nothing, mean any thing, and let the body be as ignoble as heart can wish:[1] what follows? The seat of the pleasure, be the pleasure what it will, is it not all this while in the mind? Did ever any body see a body that felt pleasure when the mind was out of it?

Duration, short. Well, and what if it be? Taken by itself, there is little of it. Well, and what of that? Take a guinea out of your pocket, and get the change for it: which is worth most, the guinea or the change? Which of the two is the heavier, a pound of gold or a pound of feathers? When an answer has been given to these questions, there and then it is that this observation about shortness will be found to have any thing in it besides words.

Recollection unsavoury, and the demand for a blush the consequence. When enjoyed in an improper manner, whatever be an improper manner, let the recollection of them be ever so unsavoury, those which are enjoyed in a proper manner, how much are they the worse for it? So in regard also to blushes, if any thing be meant by blushes.

[1] MS alt. 'as the purpose can require'.

But besides all these sets of *summum bonumists* who have each of them their *proper* names, three others the Compendialist has found who have no names but common ones. If he is in the right, the *denominated* ones are all in the wrong, and so are the undenominated ones.

True: in the wrong they are if, having what they prize, they pretend or fancy themselves to have a *summum bonum:* but not at all in the wrong, hard as he labours to have them thought so, if, having what they prize, they value it at what it is worth.

First come the *vulgus—Anglice* the mob.[1] These place their *summum bonum* in riches or, to speak more precisely, in the matter of wealth; meaning, we cannot but suppose, what is regarded as a large quantity of it.

All in the wrong box, notwithstanding there are so many of them. Good reason why: this matter of wealth, which the vulgar are so fond of, small is the value of it, let there be ever so much of it.

In the first place, the thing is slippery and unsteady. In the next place, it is not on its own account, but on account of other things, that these vulgar people are so fond of it. In the third place, to whom does it belong? Not to the owner, but to Fortune.[2]

Objection the first[3]—slipperiness or unsteadiness: or in plain English (when the rhetorical varnish is stripped off), it is liable to be lost. But the question is, what is it worth, not to him who has it not, but to him who has it? And, as is well observed by Adam Smith, in England at least, being the country in which this Tutor wrote, and in the 18th century, being the century in the middle of which this Compend was published, for one man who has lost what he had, you have a good thousand who have not only kept it but added to it.[4]

Travelling on with closed eyes on the track of common place, whatsoever on the subject in question was the language of the earliest times, men continue to employ it, heedless of the changes that have

[1] The relevant paragraph on p. 8 of the *Compendium* reads: 'Non collocandum est summum hoc Bonum in Divitiis, ut vulgus hominum fere existimat: turn quia hae sunt fluxae, et instabiles; turn quia non propter se, sed aliorum gratia expetuntur: turn denique quia non in nostra potestate, sed in fortunae temeritate, ponuntur.'

[2] In margin 'p. 8'. Bentham has also written in the margin: *eipt* 8' dXoX OUfiefOQ aXXa Tuyt)?. ('I belong to no one at all but to Fortune.') The quotation is from the *Greek Anthology,* 9. *74.* 4.

[3] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 71), Bentham wrote: 'Put at the commencement. One use of this exposure, to give a sample of the spirit of false and weak reasoning with which the Oxford youth continue to be drenched.'

[4] Adam Smith, *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd, 2 vols., Oxford, 1976, i. 342.

taken place in the state of things which it was then employed to represent. In the heart of Greece, in Athens, when Aristotle wrote, land was at two years' purchase:[1] in England it is now at thirty years.

In Judaea, at the time when the biographers of Jesus wrote, moth and rust were in the character of corruptors general, and assuredly not without reason: not without reason then, no nor yet at present.[2] But neither moth nor rust corrupt gold, no nor yet the paper which represents it. From the moth no one at this time of day has any serious loss to fear unless it be a woollen draper, nor from rust unless it be a hardware man whose goods lie upon his hands.

Objection the second. Not for its own sake does a man want it, but to get this and that and t'other in exchange for it.—Well, but if he gets for it what he wants, whatsoever it is that he happens to want, in what respect is it the less valuable? When you know a man to have what he wants, what more would he have? And if he has not the *summum bonum* itself, has he not a something else which is as good as ever that can be?

Objection the third. The person it belongs to is not the owner, but Fortune. Literally, 'the thing is placed not in our power but in the temerity of Fortune'. *[l]Non in nostra potestate, sed in Fortunae temeritate'.* In the union of rhetoric with poetry, in Dame Fortune and the two *tates,* lies the great strength of this argument: decanted out of Latin into English, no small part of it flies off. In truth what is it that remains? That the matter of wealth is a slippery sort of thing—that it is liable to slip out of a man's hands—was the matter of the first of these objections: and for such news, surely, once might have been sufficient.

If in this place that be not all, what more is there in it? That Fortune is a woman, and that this woman is a rash one? Good perhaps in rhetoric, but this is a book on Ethics. Good in rhetoric? No: not even there. For where design is not, neither can rashness be.

Next comes, in one set, the class of Politicians and your Votaries of Ambition.[3]

In Honour and in Power—in the one or the other or in both—do these men place their *summum bonum.*

[1] Marginal note 'Hume from Xenophon'. No such reference has been traced; but Bentham may have had a vague recollection of the following sentence from Hume's essay 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations': 'Antidorus, says Demosthenes, paid three talents and a half for a house which he let at a talent a year' (David Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary,* ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols., London, 1882, i. 410).

[2] Matt. 6: 19.

[3] The relevant paragraph on p. 8 of the *Compendium* begins: 'Neque in Honore, aut Potentia, ut Politici et Ambitiosi.'

Reason, or what is meant for reason, means, so far as any such thing can be found, much the same in this case as in the foregoing one. Of language, that something new might appear to be said[1]—of this, of the sort of rayment thus made for nothingness, a new change. Riches were slippery and unstable. Honour and power are uncertain and deciduous: depending for the most part on popular breath or pretended favour: *'admodum incerta et caduca . . . ; utpote quae ex arbitrio popularis aurae,*[2] *aut simulato hominum favore plerumque pendent'.*

Riches, when it was of these that our Moralist had to speak, it was not for their own sake, they were sought after. Neither in Honour, no, nor yet in Power, whatsoever the man of politics or the man of ambition may think, is there any intrinsic dignity: or, if any of this intrinsic dignity there be, none is there in either of them of any such sort of intrinsic dignity as can cause them, or either of them, to be either desired, or praised.[3]

As to the objection about caducity, in so far as it means any thing, it has received an answer in the answer about unsteadiness.

But as to meaning, has it any? and if any, what? If from any person this latter question is capable of receiving an answer, it must be from some person other than him by whom the objection thus worded was brought to view.

Honore? What means Honore? Honour or honours? Natural good reputation, or political and factitious dignity: for in English thus wide is the distinction between the singular and the plural.

Good repute [or] reputation, is it that? By accident, no doubt, may good repute attach upon ill behaviour, ill repute upon good. But this ill-constituted state of things, if it be a possible one, and now and then a visible one, happily for any length of time at least it is not an ordinary one. Were there even more truth in it than there is, in the mouth of a moralist, at any rate, it seems not a very consistent one: to under-rate the power of the moral sanction has no more of consistency than it has of truth in the mouth of a professed moralist, whatsoever it may have in other mouths. These rival sanctions—in some sort on rare occasions rivals—the popular, the political, and the religious: by the politician and by the religionist (more particularly the religionist) the power, and in particular power as applied to tutelary purposes, is but too apt to be undervalued. But the professed

[1] MS alt. 'done'.

[1] Marginal note 'here Horace speaks'. Cf. *Carmina,* 3. 2. 20.

[3] The sentence on p. 9 of the *Compendium* which Bentham is paraphrasing here is as follows: 'Nullam porro intrinsecam habent dignitatem, ob quam expeti, aut laudari possint.'

Moralist, is it for him to undervalue it? To undervalue it is to undervalue his own occupation: it is as if a tradesman were to undervalue the very ware he deals in.

Is it factitious reputation? Is it Honours in the plural?[1] Here as before in the case of riches, the worse it is to cease having them, the better it is to continue having them. Keeping them alive and even encreasing them, is the ordinary course, losing them only the accidental one: and it is in the keeping them, and not in the losing them, that the Politician and the Ambitious man would, if he dreamt of having a *summum bonum* in his hand, he disposed to place it; and so, in regard to *power.*

But, be it honours, be it power, what means 'pretended'? What means *'simulate"!* In so far as it is by 'favour' that a man has been placed[2] either in honour or in dignity, what room is there for a denial of the sincerity of it?

Lastly comes a set of people who, supposing them to exist, are here called *Theoretics.* It is to contemplation, and that alone, that these men look for their *summum bonum,* such as it is.[3]

Contemplation? To obtain the summit of felicity, has a man nothing to do but contemplate? If this were the case, if the *summum bonum* were any thing like what has been said of it, who is there that would not be a Theoretic? *Crede quod habes et habes*[4]—if there be really a case in which the truth of this maxim is exemplified, surely it must be this: for between being in any given degree happy, and in that same degree fancying one's self happy, so long as the fancy lasts, where (let any body say) is the difference?

Of these men surely may be said, and with no less propriety, what by Cicero was said of another set of men: *Istos viros sine contumelia dimittamus: sunt enim boni viri, et quandoquidem ita sibi ipsis videtur beati.*[5] "These are a good set of men, and forasmuch as such they are in their own opinion, a blessed one.'

[1] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 75), Bentham wrote: 'The Compendialist forgets he is writing in England where honours are not deciduous.'

[2] MS orig. 'raised'.

[3] The relevant paragraph on p. 9 of the *Compendium* reads: 'Neque in Contemplatione sola, ut Theoretici: testatur enim nostrae naturae fabrica, nos ad agendum esse natos; ideoque summa in artibus aut scientiis cognitio manca quodammodo est, et humano generi parum profutura, si nulla Officiorum actio consequatur. '

[4] 'Believe that you have, and you have.'

[5] Bentham's translation in the next sentence omits the opening phrase, 'Let us dismiss these men without reproach'. The quotation is from Cicero, *De Oratore,* 3. 17. 64.

Not so this our modern philosopher. Whatsoever they may think themselves, let them fancy themselves ever so happy, he proves to them that it is no such thing.

'We are born for action,' he says, 'for action': and to prove it he calls The Fabric of our Nature: whereupon he goes on to observe that therefore if in such acting no action, no action of *offices* (or, for offices, say *Duties)*—whatsoever he meant to say by action of offices or action of duties—takes place, the highest knowledge in arts or sciences is, in a certain sort, defective, and such as will be of little service to mankind.[1]

Thus far this our compendialist. All this while, how conclusive so ever that evidence of his may appear to him, a still nearer proof of our being born to act is that which he himself was giving, all the while he was thus scribbling, if there be any truth in the adage *Scribere est agere.*[2]

To all this, in good truth, there are but two objections: one of them that it means nothing; the other one that it is nothing to the purpose.

For once more, one of these Theoretics, who ever they are, suppose him wrapt up in contemplation, thinking about any thing else or nothing else but fancying himself happy, and so happy as to be in possession of the *summum bonum*: what is it that he will believe? His own feelings, which tell him that he has got the *summum bonum,* or this Fabric of our Nature which, if the compendialist is to be believed, is telling him that he has not got it?

To plain sense it should seem that whatever it is that a man does, that it is that he was born to do, for how else happens it that he does it? These good people by the supposition contrive to occupy themselves somehow or other in contemplation; they are therefore as clearly born to contemplate as they or any body can be to act, and if so, what becomes of the compendialist and this his argument?[3]

As for the manufacturers of nonsense, call them Platonists, call them Academics, call them Stoics, they shall be as much in the wrong as he pleases. But of the others who, according to him, are all in the wrong, let any one now judge, whether there be a single one amongst them that is so compleatly in the wrong as he is.

By no one of them, taking his account of them, is the sovereign good found but where there is some good; while not an atom of good is there to be seen where he has found it.

Be they, all of them, every so much in the wrong, no one of them is to such a degree in the wrong as to contradict himself. But he, no

[1] MS note *'Testatur enim* etc. p. 9'. Cf. p. 145, n. 3 above.
[2] 'To write is to act.'
[3] This paragraph is preceded by an MS note in pencil, 'Omitt?'

sooner has he come out with one sentence, than he comes out with another that runs counter to it.

Nothing after all does this *summum bonum* of his amount to, without a dose of those other things which he has been turning up his nose at and dragging through the kennel. A dose—and what dose? This is more than he so much as pretends to know: a moderate one it must be, and this is all he can find to say about it, all the description he can give of it.

Have the least valuable of all the other *summum bonums,* you have always something. Have his *summum bonum,* you have nothing but moonshine, and that, according to him, you can not have, unless at the same time you have more or less of those others.

But, whatsoever may have been their logic, their ethics, it may be said, were good. Whatsoever they were in speculation, they were good in practice: the effect was good, howsoever it may have been with the cause, and so long as the effect is good, no matter what the cause. Suppose two men, one who always reasons well with you, all the while doing ill by you: another who always reasons ill with you, but always does well by you: for a friend, or for a companion, which of them would you choose?

To a question[1] thus put, about the answer there will not be a difference.

But the truth is—of these antique sages, all that we can have any sufficient assurance of is their logic: delivering this sort of logic, a man's moral conduct might have been good or bad just as it happened. In morals as in religion nothing is more common: one thing for shew, another thing for use. Of these men all that we know for certain is their logic: and especially when morals is the field in which it exercises itself, all bad logic is mischievous. By no man can any such moral doctrine have been embraced but at the expence of his understanding: deep indeed must have been its prostration of strength, ere trash such as this can have been swallowed by it.

1.5

UNIVERSAL END OF ACTION[2]

Well-being, composed as hath been seen, of the maximum of pleasure minus the minimum of pain—the pleasure it will be seen is man's

' MS alt. 'set of questions'.

[2] The MSS for this section, UC xiv. 44-8 (6 Sept. 1814), are headed 'Ch. I 1 Ends of Action, or sole and constant object of man's pursuit, well-being'. This is followed in the heading by 'His own Well-being is actually properly and necessarily

own pleasure, the pain is man's own pain—will upon a strict and close enquiry be seen to be actually the intrinsic and the ultimate object of pursuit to every man at all times.

1. Can it ever cease or fail so to be?

2. Exists there that occasion in which it ought to cease or fail so to be?

3. If to no man this can ever cease or fail to be the ultimate object of his pursuit, then what, it may be asked, can ever be the use or effect of this or any other discourse on the subject of Ethics?

For all these several questions, answers will be endeavoured to be found.

In the instance of any man,[1] well being—his own well being—can it ever cease or fail to be the object—and in one shape or other the sole ultimate object—of his pursuit?

'Nay!', cries an Objector, 'But if this be so then where is sympathy? Where is benevolence?' Whereupon comes a volley of sentiment decked out by the hands of rhetoric in all its gayest and most tender colours.[2]

Answer: exactly where they were.

To deny the existence of this social affection would be to talk in the teeth of all experience. Scarce in the most brutal savage would they be found altogether wanting.

But the pleasure I feel at the prospect of bestowing pleasure on my friend, whose pleasure is it but mine? The pain which I feel at the sight or under the apprehension of seeing my friend oppressed with pain, whose pain is it but mine?

If from that external source neither any such pleasure nor any such pain were felt by me, beneficence indeed I might have, since there is not a self-regarding motive by which a course of action followed by that effect is not capable of being produced: but should I have any sympathy?

Ought it ever to cease so to be?[3] The answer, will be liable to be different, according to [whether] the party whose interest, i.e. whose well being, is considered as the preferable object of regard, is

the sole object of every man's pursuit'; and, presumably as an alternative, 'Universal object of pursuit to man------- what the actual—what the proper'. There follows the subheading ' § 1. Topics belonging to this head'.

[1] This and the next five paragraphs have the subheading '§2. Well-being can never cease or fail to be man's object'.

* This sentence bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

[3] This and the four following paragraphs have the subheading '§3. His own well-being, ought it ever to cease to be the object of any man's pursuit? *Ought* and *ought not,* what?'

the individual alone, or the society of which he is considered as a member.

But in the first place this word 'ought'—what on this occasion is meant by it?

Answer. What by myself is meant by it is altogether clear to me. If to the preceding question my answer is, his own well-being ought on every occasion to be the sole object of pursuit to every man, what I mean by it is that the conduct of him who on every occasion takes his own well-being for the object of his pursuit is approved by me: approved by me in so much that, if it depended upon me, his pursuit should not on any occasion have any other object.

As often as, speaking of any man, I say he ought to do so and so or he ought not to do so and so, what accordingly I know and acknowledge myself to be doing is neither more nor less than endeavouring] to bring to view the state of my own mind, of my own opinion, of my own affections in relation to the line of conduct which on the occasion in question is stated as pursued by him—this much and nothing more.

That which I am very sure I do not mean forms no part of my meaning—no part of my intention is that on this or any other occasion that or any other opinion of mine should, independently of any particular political power with which it may happen to me to be invested, be considered as having the force of law, [or] should in the character of a law or otherwise be regarded by him as constituting of itself a *reason* why the line of conduct, to which my approbation as above is declared to be attached, should be by him or any one pursued, or that, on the ground of such my opinion, he should believe or be disposed to believe that a law to any such effect is any where in existence.

If it can not ever cease to be, then what can ever be the use of this or that or any other discourse on any part of the field of ethics?[1]

Answer: use the 1st.

To shew him that, however conducive to his well being according to his then present view of it the conduct which otherwise he might be disposed to pursue might present itself to him as being, it will not, on a cool and comprehensive view, be seen to be so at the upshot, inasmuch as the present or other nearer good, by the prospect of which he could be determined so to do, would be outweighed by a mass of evil preponderant in value.

Answer: use the 2d.

If so it be that by the line of conduct in question the effect is more

[1] This sentence is in fact a subheading to the next three paragraphs, and its insertion is required to provide a context for the three 'answers' they embody. It is numbered * § 3', but this should presumably be * § 4': cf. p. 148 n. 3 above,

or less likely to prove prejudicial to the interests of this or that portion of the society in which he lives—that while they sustain evil in this shape, the source from whence and the person from whom it comes will be visible to their eyes—and that accordingly, were it only by the principle of self-preservation, they will stand engaged in some shape or other to wreak their vengeance upon the author for the injury which they regard themselves as having sustained.

Answer: [use] the 3d.

If so it be that with or without reason, the species of conduct in question is in the breasts of a portion more or less considerable of the community productive of displeasure, and thus of damage in some shape or other determinate or indeterminate to the man himself, to bring before his view by way of warning the tendency of this practice to become productive of this effect.

1.6

PLEASURE AND PAIN: THEIR RELATION TO GOOD AND EVIL. APHORISMS[1]

1. *Prima facie,* and *pro tanto,* consequences apart, every species of pleasure, every individual pleasure to whatsoever species it belongs, is good and fit to be pursued.

2. After experience had of it by the person in question, the very fact of his pursuing it is, subject to the limitations abovementioned, conclusive proof of its goodness—of its relative goodness, relation being had to the person himself and his particular well-being.

3. Prima facie and *pro tanto,* all consequences apart over and above the pleasure reaped by it, every act whereby pleasure in any shape is reaped is good and fit or proper to be exercised: and the converse is true in regard to pain.

4. Every act by which pleasure is reaped is good, if either no pain at all is the result of it, or if, pain being among its consequences, the magnitude of the sum of pain is less than that of the sum of pleasure: and the converse is true in regard to pain.

5. Every person is not only the most proper judge, but the only proper judge of what with reference to himself is pleasure: and so in regard to pain.

6. To say of any act, from this act no pleasure, or no preponderant mass of pleasure, were the act exercised by me, or by this or that other person or number of persons, would be reaped by me or by

[1] The MSS for this section, UC xiv. 49-53 (6-7 Sept. 1814), are headed thus on the first sheet.

them respectively, therefore from the like act if exercised by you no pleasure would be reaped by you, is folly.

7. To say of any act, from this [act] no pleasure, or no preponderant mass of pleasure—were the act exercised by me or by this or that other person or number of persons—would be reaped by me or by them respectively, therefore, although from the like act, if exercised by you, *pure* or preponderant pleasure would be reaped by you, the act is not fit or not proper to be exercised by you, is folly: and, if followed up by acts having for their object the applying evil in any shape to you, injustice and, in so far as public power or influence is employed to that end, tyranny.

8. Abstraction made of future contingent consequences, viz. of consequences which, with reference to the point of time in question, are as yet but contingent, the bare fact of a person's having down to that time continued in his *free* as well as habitual exercise of any act *{free,* viz. without or independently of any disposition thereunto produced by the influence of either pain or pleasure in the shape of punishment or reward expected from any foreign source) is of itself conclusive proof, that the act is with relation to him productive either of pure or of preponderant good, and as such fit and proper to be exercised by him.

9. In relation to any act which, abstraction made of future contingent consequences, is then (as per paragraph 8) fit and proper to be exercised by a person, to warrant any other person in pronouncing it to be in any way an evil one, it is incumbent on such censor to show and render it preponderantly probable—not only that in this or that determinate shape evil will be the result of it, but that the sum of that evil at the end of the account will be preponderant over the sum of the good produced by the same cause.[1]

[1] The following discussion (for which the MS is xv. 179[v], dated 19 Sept. [?] 1814), although it is not part of the sequence of numbered paragraphs which forms this section, serves as a relevant addition to the text: *In respect to future contingent pleasures and pains, so far is the situation of the individual himself [from being] more favourable to the business of forming a just estimate of [their] value than that of an observant bystander, that it is apt to be much less favourable. Why? Because to the eye of the mind, as well as to that of the body, more remote objects are apt to be eclipsed by less remote and, more especially, by present ones.

'When, for example, in the character of an incentive to action, pleasure in any shape is in view, observe what in this respect is the natural consequence. If it be of such a nature that the enjoyment of it is likely to be followed by a more than equivalent mass of pain, nothing is more ordinary than for the elements of which that mass is composed to be undervalued or to be kept out of sight.

'Suppose, for example, the case of a pleasure, to the enjoyment of which are attached, in the character of a more or less probable consequence, the pains

10. On every man who, whether by misrepresentation of the natural consequences, or by erroneous argumentation in any other shape, or[1] by fear of punishment at the hands of any one or more of the tutelary sanctions, viz. physical, popular or moral, political, or religious,[2] is dissuaded from the reaping of any pleasure, an injury is inflicted, an injury as great as would be done to him by the causing him to suffer pain in any shape to an equivalent amount.

11. Such injury will be susceptible of all those degrees of delinquency which, being dependent on the state of the delinquent's mind with reference to the consequences of the act, are constituted and expressed by the concomitants *bona fides* or absence of evil consciousness, *bona fides* accompanied with temerity, and *mala fides* or presence of evil consciousness. At any rate it is not of its nature to be productive of evil of the second order in any shape.[3] But still it is not the less an injury: an injury the gravity of which, in so far as depends upon its mischievousness, is exactly as[4] the magnitude of the pleasure from which by the means in question the person in question has been debarred.

12. The means employed, and the material circumstances in which they are employed, being in both cases the same, the injury done to a person by the causing him to fail of reaping this or that pleasure which he would otherwise have reaped is exactly equal to the injury that would be done to him by the causing him to suffer this or that *pain* which he would otherwise not have suffered.

13. The matter of wealth is not of any value, nor can the subtraction of it from any person be productive of injury, nor for the punishing of him who without right obtains it for himself can there be any sufficient reason, otherwise than in so far as the general effect of it is to serve for the attainment of pleasure or for the avoidance of pain.

respectively belonging to the five sanctions, any one or more, or all of them------- viz. the physical; the sympathetic; the popular or moral; the political, including the legal; and the religious. Here, for its incentive or incitative force, the act requisite to the production of the pleasure has the prospect of that same pleasure; while, for its restrictive, it has the sum of all those probably or certainly consequent pains. Of these the actual value may, to any amount, be greater than that of the pleasure. But while to the eyes of other persons they are sufficiently present, to the eyes of the individual himself they are, one or more of them, either not present at all or present in a degree of value inferior to that which properly belongs to them.'

[1] MS insertion 'much more if'.

[2] It is noteworthy that Bentham here, as in *An Introduction (CW),* p. 34, refers to four sanctions only, whereas in the passage cited above at p. 151 n. 1, he added the sympathetic sanction. Cf. Editorial Introduction, p. xxi above. For a description of the sympathetic sanction, see pp. 176-7 below.

[3] Here Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Add, why?'

[4] MS alt. 'equal [to]'.

14. In respect of any erroneous reasoning, having for its effect or tendency the causing a person to debar himself from innoxious pleasure, as above, in any shape and to any amount, there can not be any sufficient reason for annexing punishment to the act of giving utterance to such erroneous reason. Why? Because if any reasoning be erroneous, it is only by correct reasoning, and not by punishment, or fear of punishment, that the erroneousness of it can be proved and exposed. It is only in proportion as an opinion is erroneous, that he by whom it is expressed or pretended to be expressed can have any need of employing punishment for the support of it. Nor, for proving that the opinion in question not only is erroneous, but by the person in question is believed to be so, can there be any more conclusive presumptive evidence, than the act of his employing, or contributing or seeking to employ, punishment in support of it.

15. For the purpose of obtaining money, reputation, or the matter of good in any shape, giving, without due consideration, allowance to discourses having for their object or their tendency the causing men to debar themselves from the enjoyment of pleasure in a shape not preponderantly noxious, is a species of act analogous to the act of him who, for the saving of an equal quantity of the matter of wealth or of the matter of good in any other shape, should, instead of causing such filth as in any shape has been produced in his house to be conveyed away by some unnoisome mode of conveyance such as is supplied by the established practice of the place, cast it out of the window upon the heads of passengers, and in the instance of each respective sufferer, the magnitude of the injury thus inflicted will be as the magnitude of the *uneasiness* sustained in the one case, compared with the magnitude of the loss of pleasure sustained in the other case.

16. He who, in a discourse having for its subject any part of the field of morals, deals out at random, and without any specific grounds produced or referred to, his ‘ought’ and his ‘ought not’—his injunction or declared approbation attributed to this or that act—his prohibition or declared disapprobation to that other—may be compared to the careless housemaid who, without regard to the heads upon which it might chance to fall, should cast the contents of her receiving pail into a crowded street out of an upper window.[1]

' This paragraph bracketed in MS for possible omission.

1.7

VIRTUE WHAT: ACCORDING TO PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY[1]

Of Virtue the effects, such effects as it is productive of, may be considered either in respect of their influence on the well-being of other persons, or in respect of their influence on the well-being of the man himself. In the first case it may be said to be considered in an extra-regarding point of view, and to be of the extra-regarding kind—in the other case to be considered in a self-regarding point of view, and[2] to be of the self-regarding kind.

Considered in an extra-regarding point of view, the maintenance of the conduct which it is considered as requiring at a man's hands, and which, in so far as he is properly termed virtuous, he is considered as being, or as not being, under any obligation[a] of maintaining: in the former of these two cases 'probity' is the appellation by which the virtue is wont to be designated; in the other case, 'beneficence'.

Extra-regarding or self-regarding virtue is considered as[3] having place in so far as, against the current of the individual party's own inclination or at least against the general inclination of mankind, a preference is given to a greater good on its coming in competition with a less: viz. in the case of extra-regarding virtue, in so far as for the sake of producing a more extensive and thence upon the whole a greater mass of good receivable by another person or assemblage of persons, a man forbears possession of, or does what depends upon him for sacrificing, a lesser mass of good receivable by himself.

As to the good thus forborne, it may be either of the positive or of the negative stamp. In so far as it is of the positive stamp, the virtue consists in the forbearance to possess or enjoy some lot or lots of positive pleasure. In so far as it is of the negative stamp, the virtue consists in a man's subjecting himself to some lot or lots of positive pain.

[a] viz. placed under obligation by the power of one or other of the four sanctions, viz. physical, popular or moral, political including legal, and religious.

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[1] The MSS for this section, UC xiv. 84, 86-93, 85 (10 Sept. 1814), are enclosed in a small brown folder with the deleted general heading 'Logic or Ethics', replaced by 'Deontology—Theoretical'. The chapter-heading, originally 'Ch. 1. Virtue what---- its various divisions', has the last three words deleted and replaced by 'according to principle of utility'. The MSS themselves open with the following summary: 'Virtue what (its various divisions). Virtue, Self-regarding and Extra-regarding; Prudence, its relation to Self-regarding Probity; Benevolence and Beneficence, their relation to Extra-regarding; Virtue and Vice unmeaning but for their relation to Pain and Pleasure.'

[2] MS alt. 'or'.

[3] MS orig. 'consists in'.

On any occasion of the above description 'sacrifice'and 'self-denial' are wont to present themselves as proper to be employed. In so far as the good in question is of the positive kind, viz. of the nature of pleasure, and it is by that abstinence (that virtue is exercised) that the exercise of virtue is performed, the use made of them is strictly and obviously proper. In so far as the good sacrificed is of the negative kind, consisting in exemption from positive pain, and it is accordingly by the self-subjection to positive pain that the sacrifice of the good is made, the use thus made of the terms 'sacrifice' and 'self-denial' is less obvious and seems less natural and less strictly proper.

If to the import of these words this extension be given, in this case, but in this alone, can it be said with propriety that in the idea of virtue is included that of sacrifice and that of self-denial: and by this means, and by this means only, the exposition given of it may be reduced to the comparatively concise expression above exhibited.

That in the more ordinary and less extensive application of the words 'sacrifice' and 'self-denial' the ideas respectively expressed by these words are not, either of them, necessarily included in the idea of virtue, will be sufficiently apparent to be incontestable. To the appellation of virtue, in cases to a large extent at least, the quality of courage or courageousness is indisputable. But in so far as it consists in a man's exposing himself to pain—to bodily pain, for example, and suppose it to be unaccompanied with danger to life—in this case no sacrifice is made, the operation thus designated not having any assignable object. And so again in regard to 'self-denial': no self-denial has place, the case not affording any thing the possession of which being capable of being obtained by a man for himself is accordingly capable of being denied by a man to himself.

On the subject of *inclination,* in addition to the particular inclination of the individual in question, it became necessary to subjoin the mention of the general inclination of mankind. Otherwise, in and by the account given of *virtue,* virtue in the most perfect degree of perfection might have appeared to have stood excluded.

In proportion as, over the desire in question, a man has acquired a command, resistance to its impulse becomes less and less difficult, till at length, in some constitutions, things may have come to such a pass that all difficulty is at an end. At an early part of his life, for instance, a man had a taste for wine in general, or for a particular species of food. Finding it disagree with his constitution, little by little the uneasiness attendant on the gratification of the desire has become so frequent in experience, and so continually present in idea, that the idea of the future but near and certain pain has gained such strength as to overpower the impression of the present pleasure—or,

what comes to the same thing, the idea of it at the moment preceding that at which, but for the idea of the attendant pain, it would have been reaped. In fine, the idea of the consequent and greater though more distant pain has operated as an extinguisher upon the idea of the lesser though immediate pleasure. In this way it is that by the power of association, things which originally had been objects of desire have at length been rendered objects of aversion, and on the other hand things which originally had been objects of aversion, such as medicines for instance, have been rendered objects of desire. In this state of things, the good, viz. the pleasure, which had been being no longer in existence, there is no good in the case, no pleasure capable of being sacrificed. And in like manner in regard to *self-denial:* the *desire* which had originally been *calling for* its *gratification* being no longer in existence, there exists no *call* to which any denial can be opposed.

When things are arrived at this pitch, the virtue, so far from being extinguished, has reached the pinnacle of perfection; and defective indeed would be that definition of virtue the effect of which would be to exclude from its pale the very perfection of virtue.

What is curious enough is,[1] that by the exclusion thus put upon virtue in this its most perfect degree, the whole would be comprized of that to which, and to which alone, the Aristotelians will allow the appellation of virtue: for where for the exercise of the virtue any thing of present inclination remains and requires to be subdued, there, be the subjugation ever so perfect, the title of virtue is still refused, and to this superior title the inferior title of semi-virtue or half-virtue is substituted.

Semivirtutes, says the Oxford Compend, *sunt virtutum quasi rudimenta et bonae dispositiones ad virtutis habitum, sed tamen integram virtutis formam non habent. . .*

Semivirtus igitur est (continues the author) *quae mediocritatem*[a] *seruat, sed cum aliqua difficultate, affectibus Rationis imperio reluctantibus et aegre parentibus.*

Atque in hoc a virtute perfecta distinguitur; quam tunc se sciat aliquis assequutum esse, cum Ratio praescribit quod rectum est, et Affectus sine ulla reluctantia Rationis dictamina sequuntur.[2]

[a] The allusion here is to another tenet of the Aristotelians, viz. that in every case virtue consists, in other words every species of virtue consists, in *mediocrity.*

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[1] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 89), Bentham wrote: 'From analogy for every virtue there should be a nonvirtue.'

[2] Opposite the beginning of the quotation Bentham has written in the margin 'Eth. Comp. p. 69'. For the *Ethices Compendium* see p. 137 n. 1 above. The passage may be translated as follows: 'The half-virtues are, as it were, the rudiments

According to this account, forasmuch as virtue consists in doing, without any expence in the articles of self-sacrifice or self-denial, whatsoever requires to be done, the consequence is that for every whole virtue there should be a half-virtue. Accordingly, though with a limitation for which it seems not very easy to find any assignable ground, intimation is actually given of this correspondency.[1] *Harum tot fere genera statui possunt quot sunt virtutes perfectae.*[2] *Fere?* Why *fere?* Why not *penitus?* But to no such question is any answer to be found.

Be this as it may, continuing to speak of these half-virtues, they may be commodiously reduced (he says) to two denominations,[3] *Continentia et Tolerantia*—continence and tolerance.

Of this division he goes on to observe that it corresponds with that of appetite into the concupiscible and the irascible: continence being the virtue by which the concupiscible, tolerance that by which the irascible, is taken in hand and governed.

But forasmuch as between whole virtues and half-virtues there exists not, according to him, any other difference than that which consists in the difference between the absence and the presence of reluctance, this same division into continence and tolerance, thus brought forward for the purpose of being applied to half-virtues, should have been with equal propriety applicable, and should accordingly have been applied, to the whole virtues: but neither to his whole virtues all together nor to any one of them by itself is any such appellation made.

Unfortunately, the further he travels, the thicker is the dust in which by his footsteps the subject has been involved. Given for exhaustive, his division of appetite into 'concupiscible and irascible', as the phrase is ('concupiscitive and irative' it should have been) is no such thing, and at this stage the imperfection of it stares a reader in the face. Subjection [of] one's self to pain—to bodily pain, for

of the virtues and good dispositions towards the habit of virtue, but they have not the complete form of virtues.

'A half-virtue, therefore, is one which preserves moderation, but with some difficulty, the affections struggling against the command of reason and unwillingly submitting.

'And in this respect it is distinguished from perfect virtue, which a person knows himself to have attained when both reason prescribes what is right and the affections follow the dictates of reason without any reluctance.'

[1] MS orig. 'intimation of this correspondency is given in the book'.

[2] In margin 'p. 69'. 'Of these [half-virtues] almost as many kinds may be posited as there are perfect virtues.' Bentham goes on to contrast *fere* (almost) with *penitus* (wholly).

[3] MS orig. 'classes', alt. 'heads'.

example—is not that what he means, or among those things which he means, by *tolerantia,* by tolerance? Yes, if he himself is to be believed, that it is—*Semivirtutes versantur primo circa Voluptates, ut Continentia, secundo circa dolores, ut Tolerantia.*[1]

Tolerantia (thereupon continues he a little further on) *est virtus imperfecta, qua res adversas et laboriosas cum quodam dolore conjunctas honestatis gratia magno animo perferre conamur.*

Objectum ejus sunt Res adversae sive Dolores, non vero quivis, sed iipraesertim, quibus plerique succumbunt ex imbecillitate Animi.[2]

The irascible appetite is that appetite which in consequence of anger or ill will in any other shape takes for its object the suffering of some person who in another sense is the object of it: insomuch that, if not in so far as, in the breast of that person evil at large is produced, at any rate in so far as to the production of it in that same breast the person in question, the angry person, is instrumental, the appetite receives its gratification.

But in the case here in question, the breast which is the seat of the *pain* in question is not the breast of any person with whom he, the man of tolerance, is angry, but his own breast; and in short, as for anger, it forms not any part of the case.

In a practical point of view, if this Oxford academical teacher of morality is to be believed, no light matter is the subject which has thus been left involved, and to this hour continues to be involved, in such thick confusion. On it depends, if any thing depends, the difference between salvation and damnation. These very qualities, this Continence and this Tolerance, which in Aristotle's account and language are but half-virtues, in Theology, if the Compend-writer is to be believed, are reckoned not only among the most perfect but amongst the most arduous virtues.[3] According to Aristotle's morality, half is but no more than half: half-virtue but half-virtue. According to Oxford Theology, half is at least equal to, if not greater than, the

[a] *Observandum esse uelim Continentiam et Tolerantiam quae hie ab Aristotele semivirtutes dicuntur, in Theologia annumerari inter perfectas et maxitne arduas virtutes. Nec immerito.*[3]

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[1] In margin 'p. 70'. 'The half-virtues are concerned firstly with pleasures, as in continence, secondly with pains, as in tolerance.'

[2] 'Tolerance is an imperfect virtue, whereby for honour's sake we strive to bear courageously adverse and irksome circumstances associated with some degree of suffering. For its object it has adverse circumstances or pains, not indeed any you please, but those especially to which many people succumb from weakness of mind.'

[3] In margin 'p. 71'.

whole. For in the Oxford theology, mystery is made on every occasion out of any thing or nothing: the more mystery the more merit.

At Oxford to the two Aristotelian appetites, the concupiscible and the irascible, should have been added at least one other, the appetite for mystery: which being interpreted is that appetite which in the field of religion keeps itself in the hunt for absurdity and nonsense, devouring such aliment with a relish proportioned to its grossness.

From what is above, if to the word 'virtue' any intelligible meaning be annexed, the following observations[1] may, in the way of corollaries, be deduced.[2]

The existence of virtue depends upon the existence of pain and pleasure.[3]

It is only in proportion as it is productive of pleasure or preventive of pain that it is promotive of well-being, possessed of any positive value, or entitled to any regard.

Its dependence on pleasure is altogether as close and necessary as any dependence it has on pain.

In respect of whatever tendency it has to promote pleasure in any shape and to any extent it is of exactly the same value and entitled to the same regard in respect of whatsoever equally strong and efficient tendency it has to avert pain in any shape to an amount corresponding and equal in value to such pleasure.[4]

As to vice, this too is, and in the same proportion as Virtue, dependent for its very existence upon pain and pleasure.

It is only in proportion as it is productive of pain or preventive of pleasure that it is promotive of ill-being, or a fit object of aversion.

Of vice too the dependence on pleasure is altogether as necessary as any dependence it has on pain.

In respect of whatever tendency it may have to prevent pleasure, it is of exactly the same value and is entitled to exactly the same regard as it is in respect of whatsoever equally strong and efficient tendency it has to promote pain in any shape to an amount corresponding and equal in value to such pleasure.

[1] MS orig. 'positions', 2nd alt. 'corollaries'.

[2] In the ensuing 'observations' or 'corollaries' Bentham at first wrote 'That' at the beginning of each item. He subsequently bracketed this word for possible deletion in the first two cases: in the text here it has been deleted throughout.

[3] MS continues with what seems to be the repetitive statement, 'Virtue for its very existence depends upon pain and pleasure'.

[4] Following this paragraph Bentham originally wrote: 'Whatsoever may as above be predicated of Virtue, the reverse of it may with equal truth be predicated of vice.' He then bracketed and queried the sentence and evidently decided instead to repeat the various 'observations' with reference to vice.

Thus if the effect of virtue were to prevent more pleasure in any shape than it produced and at the same time to promote more pain than it prevented, the practice of it would, according to the persons affected by it, be either wickedness or folly: wickedness in so far as others were so affected; folly in so far as the man himself was so affected.

If the effect of vice were to produce more pleasure than it prevented[1] [and at the same time to prevent more pain than it produced, the practice of it would, according to the persons affected by it, be either goodness or wisdom: goodness, in so far as others were so affected; wisdom, in so far as the man himself was so affected].

1.8

VIRTUE WHAT: ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE AND OXFORD[2]

According to the view here taken of the subject, the essence of virtue consists in its being in its general nature conducive in some shape or other to well-being: viz. to the very man himself[3] or to some other person or persons.

According to Aristotle or his Oxford disciple, it consists in 'mediocrity', so in Latin at least:[4] but of the Latin *mediocritas,* 'moderation' would perhaps be thought the more congruous interpretation. If at Oxford morality had been regarded as a thing for use, a living language and not a dead one would have been the language in which it would have been taught: the language of the many, not the language of the few.

Of any exposition which in the shape of an ordinary definition or in any other shape is given of a thing, be it a real entity, be it a fictitious entity, what is the use? What is the end in view? That to what purpose so ever such knowledge may be necessary or useful, we may know it when we meet with [it]: we may on each occasion, in relation to any individual object that can come to be proposed, know whether it does or does not come under that name.

[1] At this point Bentham left the sentence unfinished, but wrote in the margin the note 'Compleat this'. The completion has accordingly been supplied here.

[2] The MSS for this section are UC xiv. 108-12 (13 Sept. 1814). These sheets are in a small brown folder bearing the deleted general title 'Logic or Ethics', the substituted title 'Deontology I. Theoretical', and the chapter-heading 'Ch. 2. Virtue what-----according to Aristotle and Oxford*. The MSS are headed 'Logic or Ethics. Ch. I I Aristotle's Virtues. Virtue in genera)'.

[3] MS orig. 'the agent in question'.

[4] *Ethices Compendium,* p. 39. Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea,* II. 6-9.

To so desirable an end how it is in the nature of the reference thus made—the reference to mediocrity—to be conducive, seems not altogether easy to discover: there lies the difficulty.

By name, the virtue itself, by name or description, the quality which, in respect of that virtue, is deficient, by name or description the quality which in respect of that same virtue is excessive—this is the sort of explanation which is carried on through the whole list of virtues.

But of this quality, to know the exact quantity of it—to know on each occasion whether the quantity which has been, or, if that which is proposed were done, would be, exhibited, be the proper one, lest by exhibiting none of it, or too little of it, vice or weakness in other shape, should be exhibited—this on every occasion is the one thing needful. This is the purpose to which the words which are bestowed upon it will,* if they be good for any thing, be conducive.

In the instance of the words here in question, difficult indeed it should be to show how to this useful, to this exclusively useful purpose, in any the slightest degree it is in the nature of them to be conducive.

In one or more words, for the quality which in each instance is in question, in the several doses of which it is considered as capable of existing, viz. the proper dose, the deficient dose, and the excessive dose, this is what you have not. This is what you may look for long enough ere you find it.[2]

In every instance, in the instance of every word which has been commonly regarded as being the name of a virtue, what you have is a certain species of action which, according to the circumstances in which it is performed or abstained from, is conducive to the well-being or to the ill-being of the party in question upon the whole—is an act of prudence or imprudence, of probity or improbity, of beneficence or maleficence.

What in each instance are these circumstances? In each instance, what is that line of conduct which, if maintained, will be in the highest degree subservient to the welfare of society—of the individual or community in question upon the whole? Of that which in each instance is the proper object of enquiry, this, it should seem, may be given as the description.

Follows the application[3] carried through the whole list of names

' MS orig. ‘must’.

[2] At this point Bentham wrote the following note: ‘Compare this mode of exposition with that of the Nosologist who without giving the symptoms of the disease in any of them, should content himself with giving their names.’

[3] MS orig. ‘exemplification’.

which, by Aristotle and through him by the moralists of modern times, have been considered and employed in the character of virtues.[1]

So much for the notion to be attached to the word 'virtue'. Reader, does the account above given of it fail of being satisfactory to you? Turn to the Oxford Compend and there you will see no want of others in considerable number and variety—pick and choose.[2]

1. Virtue, moral virtue in general, is an elective habit, consisting in mediocrity (or in a medium) in regard to ourselves, and as a prudent man would describe it.

2. Virtue consists in the conformity of our actions to the divine will.

3. Virtue consists in the conformity of our actions to right reason.

4. Virtue, forasmuch as those conformities consist both of them in a certain mean or middle, doth itself consist in mediocrity.[3]

Of these four definitions—the first, make sense of it who can: if it meant any thing it would be that there are exactly two virtues, viz. mediocrity and prudence, and these two are one.

The three others, not to speak of truth and reason, reconcile them to one another who can.

1. 'The divine will'—yes. But to know on each occasion, to be assured what the divine will is—there lies the difficulty. Is it in the two Testaments, Old and New—or either of them—that we are to look for it? Unhappily, the Old has in some points (but what points?)

[1] Bentham did not follow this paragraph with an analysis of the virtues as discussed by Aristotle and others. However, evidence of what he had in mind is provided in the following sources. UC xiv. 17, which was written in September 1795, contains a catalogue of the virtues according to the Oxford *Ethices Compendium.* This catalogue cites the four cardinal virtues of Aristotle: Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice, and continues the list with Liberality, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Modesty, Moderation in Anger, Veracity, Comitas, and Urbanity. In xiv. 18, which was written in 1804, there is a record of the marginals for a set of twenty-eight or more missing manuscript sheets. Heading this group of marginals are the same twelve virtues cited above. It may be that Bentham intended to add these missing manuscripts or some version of them to the discussion at this point. In xiv. 220, which was written in February 1819 (see p. 187), Bentham referred to several of these virtues and added Continence. In xiv. 227, which was written in April 1819 (see p. 180), Bentham refers to Aristotle's cardinal virtues. In xiv. 228, which was also written in April 1819, Bentham refers to Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice as modifications of Prudence and Beneficence.

[1] A marginal note at this point refers to p. 39 of the *Ethices Compendium,* from which the following four definitions are taken.

[3] Bentham wrote at the bottom of this sheet (xiv. 112): 'Go on with Med. Arithm. and Geom. p. 40.' This refers to a passage on p. 40 of the *Compendium* which considers whether the mean, or middle, in which virtue is to be sought should be understood in an arithmetic or in a geometric sense.

been superseded by the New—and both of them to a degree pregnant with continual doubts, difficulties and disputes, deal in generals.

2. 'It consists in conformity to the divine will and to right reason.' But Reason, according to those who occupy themselves with most zeal and assiduity in the discovery of the divine will, Reason and the divine will, or at least the inferences deduced from it, are everlastingly at variance.

But, besides consisting in conformity to the divine will and to right reason, it consists in mediocrity. Unhappily, by reference to this third standard, it seems not easy to say how the above-mentioned doubts and difficulties should be removed or so much as lessened.

1.9

OF PROPRIETY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH UTILITY[1]

Even under the dominion of the principle of Utility, taken in the sense so often explained, the word 'utility' with its conjugates 'useful' and 'usefulness', 'useless' and 'uselessness' or 'inutility', has not been found conveniently adapted to every one of the occasions on which application of the principle of utility io practice may come to be made.

In some instances the expression will be apt to appear too weak: not sufficiently expressive of the force of the obligation which in those cases appears to have place.

It is useless to commit murder, it would be useful to prevent it: and so in regard to rape, incendiarism and other acts which, in respect of the magnitude of the mischief to which they are apt to give birth, are wont to be denominated and dealt with in the footing of heinous crimes. To every such application of the word 'utility' or its conjugates, the mind of most readers would be apt to recalcitrate.

Another obstacle to the all-comprehensive employment of the word 'utility' on all occasions is the decision which it will be seen to involve in relation to the question concerning the different principles in regard to morals, the different sources of morality. Upon the two rival principles to that of utility, viz. asceticism and sentimentalism,

[1] The MSS for this section, UC xiv. 135-8 (17-18 Sept. 1814), are in a small brown folder with the deleted general heading 'Logic or Ethics' replaced by 'Deontology I. Theoretical' and the chapter heading 'Ch.] I Of Propriety and its connection with Utility'. The first page has the heading 'Ch. | I Of Propriety and its connection with the principle of utility', the words 'the principle of' being bracketed for possible deletion.

a negative[1] on every occasion on which it is employed being manifestly put, a consequence is that to any person by whom in any instance the dominion of either of these principles is recognized, every proposition in which it is employed will be apt to present itself as inadmissible.

Such are the observations of which the effect was the suggesting the expediency—not to say the necessity—of looking out for some other word which, being capable of expressing on other occasions the ideas for the expression of which but for the above objections the word 'utility' would have been employed, should at the same time be free from those same objections.

In the word 'propriety', with its several conjugates 'proper', 'improper' and 'impropriety', this desirable quality seemed to be found.

In respect of intensity of import, no crime, how heinous so ever, but will readily be admitted to be improper. In relation to no crime, how heinous so ever, will it be denied that the prevention of it—understand, in so far as it can be effected without the introduction of preponderant evil in some other shape is a proper object to be aimed at. True it is that to the rhetorician an expression thus cool may, in respect of its coolness, be apt to present itself as not well suited to the occasion—or, in a word, as being itself improper. His object being to put others into a passion, his practice is to be so or to appear to be so in his own instance: and, by so cool a term, not passion but the absence of passion is expressed.

But to the eye of the logician an objection of this sort will not present a very formidable aspect: and it is in a logical and not a rhetorical point of view that the field of morals is throughout meant to be presented in this work.

In respect of impartiality, the usefulness of this term presented itself as not less manifest. Of itself it decides not between any two or more of the three systems: with equal propriety it may be employed in the exposition, development and application of any one of them. Unless it be in respect of the coolness of it, a property which has just been spoken to, neither the ascetic nor the sentimentalist[2] will, it is supposed, be apt to take objection to it [or] will be apt to regard [it] as inapplicable to his purpose. Of whatsoever he disapproves of he will be ready enough to recognize the impropriety: of whatsoever he approves of, the propriety. By these words, the simple and absolute fact, viz. that the sorts of act to which they are respectively applied are respectively the objects of his approbation [or

[1] MS orig. preferred to alt. 'plan', which does not seem to fit the context.

[1] MS orig. preferred to alt. 'sentimental ipsedixitist', to preserve uniformity with Bentham's terminology above.

disapprobation], may, in a manner not likely to be unsatisfactory, stand expressed: and this done, whatsoever degree of intensity he may feel himself disposed to give to the expression of his affections, the language is not wanting in words usually employed in the expression of it.

On all these occasions, the judgment to which expression is meant to be given is accordingly expressed—expressed simply[1] and purely, without intimation given of either of two collateral matters: viz. the affections with which that judgment is accompanied, or the ground on which it has been formed.

Another consideration by which no inconsiderable addition to the convenience and propriety of the use made of the set of words in question will, it is believed, be seen to be made, is that under the dominion of the principle of utility, taken as the general and all-comprehensive rule of action, it will with equal convenience serve for giving expression to any judgment of approbation or disapprobation meant to be brought to view, on which so ever of the two grounds in the field of interest, viz. self-regarding or extra-regarding interest, and on which soever of the three grounds in the field of virtue, viz. of the three more particular though still very general grounds, corresponding to the three primary virtues, it may happen to that judgment to be built. By the three primary virtues, understanding here as elsewhere the virtues respectively designated by the names of Prudence, Probity and Beneficence.

1.10

OF THE CAUSES OF IMMORALITY: RELIGION MISAPPLIED[2]

Next to the use and application of the false principles of morality, viz. asceticism and sentimentalism, comes the misapplication of religious principles.

[1] MS ‘simple’.

[2] Bentham evidently planned a comprehensive discussion of the general topic of the causes of immorality, under the following headings (from UC xiv. 125, dated 16 Sept. 1814):

‘1. Prevalence of self-regarding to social interest: cause, fault of governments, in non-identification.

‘2. Preference of lesser present to greater distant: cause, defects in education, intellectual and moral.

‘3. False principles in morals: vis. asceticism and sentimentalism. Requiring to be given up pleasures which neither ought to be nor even ever ought to be given up, they disprove the practical utility of books of morality, and confirm men in

Religion is misapplied—how can it be otherwise?—in proportion as it is applied to any part of the field of morals.

Applied in conformity to the principle of utility it is needless and useless; applied in opposition to that sole guardian of temporal felicity it is pernicious.

Take any religion,[1] meaning by any religion the notion or notions of any human person or persons on the subject of religion—if in any of its precepts it be irreconcilable to the principle of utility, what is the consequence? That the religion is false. For of the falsity of any religion there can not be plainer nor more conclusive evidence than the fact, supposing it proved, that in any point it is repugnant to that principle which for the test of propriety in every act takes its conduciveness or repugnancy to the greatest known happiness of the greatest number of mankind.[2]

To understand religion is to understand the will of God. God is a being one of whose attributes is benevolence: and that not ordinary, such as human, but infinite benevolence. But, be he God or man, how can any person be benevolent but in proportion to the quantity of happiness which it is his wish to see enjoyed by those who are subject to his power? And if it be any other than an empty name, of what is it that happiness can be composed but of pleasures? Be the pleasure what it may, to speak of any being as desirous that it should be given up for any other cause than that of its not being receivable

the notion that bad morals are all that are fit for practice, good ones only for discourse and parade—hence hypocrisy. False morality can never be cultivated but at the expense of true.

'4. Misapplication of religion.'

Material for only the last of these heads has been identified among extant MSS, and the chapter heading—'Of the Causes of Immorality, viz. in the degree in which it is at present prevalent'------- has been modified accordingly. The MSS in question, UC xiv. 126-34, are enclosed in a folder with the alternative general headings 'Logic or Ethics' and 'Deontology'. Though the MSS bear the same date as the outline in xiv. 125, they do not entirely correspond to that scheme, being numbered as § 3 of the projected chapter and headed 'Second cause of the prevalence of immorality: misapplication of religion to morals'.

[1] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 127), Bentham wrote: 'What is conducive to happiness is more certain than that morals are true. Conduciveness to happiness is conformable to any man's experience—morals, unconformable.'

[2] Bentham's use, here and below, of the phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' in MSS written in 1814 is of interest in view of the virtual disappearance of that formulation from his published writings between 1776 and 1820: cf. Robert Shackleton, 'The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: the History of Bentham's Phrase', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century,* xc (1972), 1461-87, esp. 1476-7.

without being accompanied or followed by a more than equivalent pain—thus to speak, and at the same time to speak of such being in the character of a benevolent one, is a contradiction in terms. By a mere change of terms, in the use made of the sounds and characters of which discourse is composed, can actions or can agents be made to change their nature? By calling it a kiss, can that which used to be termed a stab be rendered an act of kindness?

To make on this occasion a distinction between the attributes of God and the attributes of man, and in particular to say that God's benevolence, though different from man's benevolence, is not the less benevolence, is mere mockery. Unless in its application to human-kind—on the one hand to human conduct, on the other to human feelings—whence did the word 'benevolence' acquire its meaning? Be it what it may, an effect is still the same—it is still itself whatsoever be its author or its cause. If he who asserts this is a trifler, what shall we say of him who denies it?

To ascribe to God under the name of benevolence that which if ascribed to another being would not be benevolence, is, on the part of every one whom terror or prejudice has not blinded to the impropriety,[1] a mere act of fraud: under the name of a fish, it is to sell a serpent.[2] By being called a fish,[3] would an adder[4] be made harmless?

True of any one attribute, this can not be otherwise than true of any other. Any otherwise than as man is just, how can any other being be just?—and so of powerfulness and knowledge and veracity. From what but from the observation of the effect of human conduct or human feelings can the idea of justice—the idea, for the designation of which the word 'justice' and those others which in different languages correspond to it, have been employed among human beings—have been derived?

'Oh yes' (say some) 'happiness, even as you say—-and that human happiness—it is *that,* that affords the one and only true standard of moral conduct: that which is in the highest degree conducive to human happiness—that is, to the greatest happiness of the greatest number—that is the course of conduct which on every occasion is the most fit to be pursued. But on each particular occasion, for knowing what course of conduct will be conducive to human happiness, there is but one way, and that is, to consult the will of God: meaning the will of God as declared in the sacred scriptures by Jesus and his followers.'

[1] MS orig. 'absurdity'.
[2] Cf. Matt. 7: 10: 'Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent?'
[3] MS alt. 'tomtit'.
[4] MS alt. 'tarantula'.

Yes,[1] if in those books the happiness of the present life were all along the declared object.

Yes, if in those books, for men's guidance in the pursuit of it, the principle of utility, as so often explained, were all along appealed to, and the application of it to the details of human life made all along with the correctness and compleatness which the nature of the case admitts of.

But in those books the happiness of the present life is not all along the declared object; in those books the principle of utility, as above, is not any where appealed to, nor, even of such principles and rules as are there laid down, is the application made all along with the correctness and compleatness which the nature of the case admitts of.

In the language therein ascribed to Jesus and his followers, the utmost attainable happiness of the present life, in comparison of the happiness or misery about to be experienced in a future life, is there comparatively or even absolutely, over and over again, spoken of as being of no value.

The utmost happiness attainable in the present life being represented as of no value, strange indeed would it have been—and with reference to all such representations, inconsistent—if that principle by which the influence of an act on the happiness, i.e. the pleasures as well as the pains, capable of being experienced in the present life is pointed to as the standard of its propriety and impropriety, were in these same writings on any occasion referred to in any such character as that of the all-governing principle.

On the occasion of any proposed act, to make application of the principle of utility is to take one account of the feelings of the two opposite kinds[2]—of the pleasures of all sorts on the one side, of the pains of all sorts on the other side—which, in all breasts that seem likely to be in any way affected by it, seem liable and likely, in the two opposite cases of the act's being done and of its being left undone, to take place.

But in no part of the works in question is any such account to be found, or so much as the slightest trace of one.

In the nature of things—in the nature of language itself, or in the nature of the particular language in use at the times and in the places in which the discourses in question are represented to have been delivered—exists there any bar, or so much as an impediment, to the taking of such account?

No, verily. Where is the language, in particular the written language,

[1] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 130), Bentham wrote: 'If *this* be not *false, that* is *defective.'*

[1] MS orig. 'of both sorts'.

which is incapable of serving for the designation of any of the pleasures or any of the pains to which those who speak it are susceptible, or of any of the acts from which those pleasures and those pains may respectively be seen to flow?

But, it has been said, so clear and conclusive is the evidence by which it is proved that, concerning whatsoever relation to human happiness in this life, whatsoever will is expressed in the Christian scriptures is the will of God—so clear and conclusive is this evidence, that in order to know on each occasion what on that occasion is most conducive to human happiness even in this life, the only safe and proper course is to study those sacred writings and, on each occasion, observe and if necessary discover what in respect of command, prohibition, or allowance is the will of God.

Unfortunately, by no examination made into these sacred writings can the correctness of any one of these propositions be established.

Pleasures and pains are all of them matters of experience. The acts —understand, the human acts—by which they are respectively produced are all of them alike matters of experience. The connection between those acts in the character of causes, and those pains and pleasures respectively in the character of effects, is (on the part of every man that breathes) matter of continual experience.

In no sense, at any rate with reference to the inhabitants of present time, can the verity of those discourses which on this occasion are referred to as expressive of the declared will of God, be stated with so much as the colour of truth as being matter of experience. The conclusion from which the authenticity and verity of those discourses is affirmed has been drawn from a prodigious mass of probative and disprobative evidence: and this where as yet no tolerably correct, compleat or consistent system of rules in relation to evidence, considered in its application even to the events of present time, much less when considered in its application to times so long past and states of things so widely dissimilar to the present, hath ever as yet made its appearance.

Instead of an account such as the above, of what sort, considered in the character of a discourse having for its object the production of the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the present life, are the discourses contained in that sacred volume?

Discourses couched always in the most general terms, most commonly in very obscure or ambiguous terms, and which, to be saved from the reproach of having taken for their object, instead of the beatification, the destruction and in the mean time the torment of all who paid any regard to them,[1] who took them for the standard of

[1] This clause (from 'who paid') bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

right and wrong and for the model of human conduct, require, unless restrained in their import by words of limitation no where to be found, in a great measure either to be explained away and so reduced to nothing, or to be explained in a sense quite different from, if not opposite to, the obvious import of the terms and phrases.

How long would any society continue to subsist if, among the members of it, no such thing as property had place—against injury in any shape, no security in any shape: if in every shape, instead of being repelled, injury were, and by the injured party himself, courted and encouraged?[1]

Oh, but discourses of this sort ought not to be understood according to the letter.

Well then, if they were not fit to be understood according to the letter wherefore is it that they were pronounced? Why not, on every occasion, employ such discourses, and such discourses alone, as without danger of error, of being productive of misconception, and thus productive of misconduct, might on every occasion have been employed.

But whether they could or could not have been otherwise (which is here a thing in question), such as they are, such unfortunately they are: such is the character of a rule of moral action are they in comparison with those rules which, according to the principle of utility and an account taken in conformity and pursuant to it, might now at leng(th) be established.

But if, to the purpose here in question, viz. that of ascertaining what manner of conduct is most conducive to the happiness of the present life, religion, i.e. the rules of conduct as laid down in the sacred volumes, is in its very nature incapable of being applied with propriety and ådvantage, what other application, it may be asked, are they capable of?

Answer. To provide an answer to this question belongs not to the present purpose. Ethics not Religion is the subject of the present work. The field of Ethics, not the field of Religion, is the field here undertaken to be surveyed.

To any such question an answer, if given in this work, would with reference to the proper object and purpose and plan of this work be irrelevant.

Irrelevancy apart, and were reference had to the satisfaction of the enquirer, it would be superfluous and therefore needless, at least to a large proportion of the aggregate mass of those who call themselves Christians.

[1] Opposite this passage Bentham wrote the marginal note ‘Quote the Mount Sermon’. Cf. Matt. 5: 39: ‘But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.’

Not the happiness of the present, but that of a future life is the happiness which the religion of Jesus has for its object. Compared with the happiness which by means of that religion is attainable in a future life, the utmost conceivable happiness capable of being enjoyed in the present life is nothing worth. The multitude of the accessible discourses in which this position has been insisted upon, urged, repeated, and enforced, who shall take upon him to enumerate? On the head here in question, whoso requires satisfaction, let him look to any of these books.

1.11

DEFINITIONS: RIGHT, OBLIGATION, PRINCIPLE[1]

Obligations is a species of fictitious entity that belongs to the field of law and the field of deontology. *Right* belongs almost exclusively to law: with deontology it has but little to do: in deontology it is comparatively but seldom that the occasion for making mention of it presents itself.

Of deontology the business consists chiefly in the distribution of obligations: in marking in the field of action the spots upon which it is proper that obligation in one shape or another should consider itself as attaching; and, in case of a conflict between obligations issuing from different sources, in determining which should obtain and which should yield the preference.

Of the obligations which attach upon them men have need to be informed.

To be informed of their rights, from deontology at least, they have, comparatively speaking, little need.

Rights corresponding to and derived from correspondent obligations of the perfect kind are not derivable from any other source than law.

[1] This is another section for which Bentham's intended programme is very imperfectly carried out in the extant MSS. The inscription on the small brown folder for the section seems to indicate a systematic discussion of right, principle, and conscience; but only the second of these is treated at any length in the available MSS, UC xiv. 180-5. These sheets are dated 5-6 Sept. 1815 and headed 'Deontology'. At the top of sheet 180 Bentham wrote, above the chapter-heading 'Right and Rights', the words 'Add Justice and Injustice'. There then follows a note: 'After the exposition of right and the different sorts of rights as performed in the old papers by means of the relation which these objects bear to obligation and obligations.' It is not clear what this refers to: the rather unusual phrase 'the old papers' may indicate that Bentham had in mind some of his very early MSS, e.g. those for *Of Laws in General (CW,* as index s.v. *rights).* Justice is the subject of section I. 19 below (pp. 219-22).

Of these legal rights shall they, and in what manner, on the several occasions in question, make exercise? Such are the questions for which it belongs to deontology to find the solution. But to give the solution is in each instance to point out, of the several conflicting obligations of the imperfect kind which attach upon the spot in question, which it is that presents the best title to be considered as the strongest.[1]

Principle: what is meant by principle? What is the ground of the estimation in which a man is so generally held by those by whom he is regarded as acting upon principle, even by those by whom that principle is regarded as erroneous?

Answer. A man is considered as habitually acting upon principle, and is accordingly stiled 'a man of principle', in so far as, having laid down to himself in relation to any part of the field of human conduct a rule of action, he is considered as acting constantly and steadily in pursuance of that rule.

Objection. All this it may be said is good in so far as that rule is in conformity, which is as much as to say in subordination, to the principle of utility, and in that sense a good rule. But suppose it is a rule of which the direction is in opposition to that of utility, and in that sense a bad one: in this sense, judging according to the principle of utility, what ground can any one find for taking this man and his habit of conducting himself for objects of approbation?

Answer. In so far as a man is said to act habitually upon principle —to be a man of principle—he is considered as pursuing the course pointed out by the corresponding rule or system of action notwithstanding all solicitations to the contrary. But these solicitations, these temptations to the contrary—what are they? They are the solicitations practised, the temptations administered, by the prospect of eventually approaching pain or eventually approaching pleasure. Such

[1] The discussion breaks off at this point. At the top of the next MS sheet (xiv. 181) Bentham has written: 'Add a Chapter on Conscience. Relation of principle (moral principle) to Obligation, Sanctions, etc.' However, the only material for this proposed discussion that can be found consists of the following, from xiv. 185: 'Words through which the word "conscience" will most aptly be explained: "Obligation", "Sanction". Of the physical sanction, it is only by the penal branch that conscience can be acted upon, if by either: not by the pleasurable.

'Conscience, what—conscientious person—good conscience—evil or bad conscience.

'Conscience: what is meant by conscience?

'Conscience is a fictitious entity conceived as having a lodgment in the mind.'

The main text of xiv. 181 begins under a separate heading or summary, as follows: *'Principle,* what—a *man of principle*—a man of *no principle*—a man of *bad principles.'*

solicitations in proportion as a man has shewn himself able to withstand, he has proved himself able to forego pleasure or exemption, though in respect of proximity and intensity the more considerable, for the avoidance of the more than equivalent, though less nearly situated and commonly, were it only on that account, less certain, pain or loss of pleasure.

This system—the object of that adherence from the pertinacity of which the agent is said to shew himself a man of principle—if it be not in all points conformable to the principle of utility, what scarce ever does or can happen is that it shall not include in it some of the rules which are framed under and operate in conformity to that all benefiting principle, and it is only in so far as [such rules are included][1] in the system by the adherence to which the prevalence of principle is demonstrated, that the character in question is regarded [as] an object or subject of approbation, as above.

If a man of bad principles is not regarded as worse than [a] man of no principle, [it] is on the supposition that with the bad are mixed some good.

Accordingly, it is scarcely otherwise than when contrasted with a man of no principle that his being regarded as coming under the denomination of 'a man of principle' is considered as a just ground for regarding him with approbation.

A man to whom the appellation of 'a man of no principle' is applied is accordingly a man who, without due regard to consequences more or less remote, and to himself or others connected with him of a nature more or less pernicious, is in the habit of giving way to whatever solicitation happens to be administered by present or merely approaching pleasure or exemption, regardless of the distant future —heedless of the future pain or loss of which such pleasure or exemption may become productive.

By 'a man of bad principles' seems to be understood a man who for the general direction of his conduct is regarded as having laid down to himself some general rule or set of general rules, by the observance which the well-being[2] of those persons whose welfare lies within the field of his action is regarded as being in a way to be diminished. Thus a man who for his own observance has laid down in his own mind for a rule that he will on every opportunity do mischief in a certain way, or in every imaginable way,[3] to every man whose opinions differ from his in this or that particular subject, will, in so

[1] The insertion of some such phrase seems to be necessary to complete the sense.

[1] MS orig. 'welfare', which Bentham retains in the next clause.

[3] MS orig. preferred to alt. 'shape'.

far, be acknowledged by every person who does not join with him in the observance of that same rule as one to whom the appellation of 'a man of bad principles' may with truth and propriety be applied.

A case may be conceived in which a man of no principle shall be more mischievous to society than a man of bad principles. A man of no principle will not do mischief to any other man or class of men when, by his so doing, there is no appetite or passion of his that will receive gratification: but wherever from any act by which mischief to society will, in the event of its being performed, be produced [. . .][1]

In the instance [of] a man to whom in respect of the number of bad principles by which his conduct is in use to be influenced and directed, the appellation of 'a man of bad principles' may seem justly applicable, it may happen that besides these bad principles, there are other good ones by the influence of which his conduct is, in some instances, wont to be directed. Instance—persecutor of some may be benevolent to others.

For want of principle the man of *no* principle may do much mischief, while by reason of want of opportunity or excitement the man of bad principles may do little mischief or none.

1.12

INTERESTS AND DUTIES: GENERAL EXPLANATIONS[2]

In the works extant on this subject, the practice generally at least, if not universally, has been to state from first to last what, according to the authors, is the *duty* of the individual in relation to each subject or occasion: what is his duty, and this without any explicit and direct, if any, reference to what may be his interest. Whereas if it can not be said with truth that what is not a man's interest is not his duty, it may at any rate be said that unless in his eyes, at the moment for

[1] This sentence appears to have been left unfinished.

[2] On the textual problems of this and the two following sections, see Introduction above, pp. xxvii-xxviii. The MSS for this section are dated 28 Apr. 1817 (UC xiv. 190), 29 Apr. 1819 (xiv. 191), and 11 Sept. 1823 (xiv. 277-9). Since xiv. 191 is a continuation of 190, however, and 190 bears the watermark-date 1818, it seems likely that both these sheets were written in April 1819.

At the top of xiv. 190 there is the following barely legible note: 'Interests by which Moralists are led into this talk about duty: exercise of power, reputation of virtue, piety etc. Thus false duties imposed, duties not coinciding with interests.' There then follow, in bold handwriting, these headings: 'Man's Interests and Duties / *or* / Principles of Moral otherwise termed Ethical and more appositely Deontological Art and Science-------placed in a new point of view. / Ch. 1 / § 1. Relation between interest and duty.'

action, it is not his interest, in vain will it be said to be his duty or endeavoured to be rendered his duty.[1]

Idle as it is, of this sort has been, hitherto, the general complexion of the talk delivered in this part of the field of art and science. 'It is your duty to do so and so, it is your duty to abstain from doing so and so.' In this strain the author goes on, travelling all the while very much at his ease. 'How comes it to be my duty to do so and so?' Put to the author this question, his answer will be, if he answers truly and explicitly, 'Because I bid you do so and so; because such is my opinion—and such, accordingly, is my will.' 'Well, but suppose my conduct does not conform itself to this will of yours—what then?' 'Oh, you will do very wrong', says he. 'You will do very wrong': i.e. 'I declare my disapprobation of your conduct, and in this disapprobation I expect to be joined by other men.'

Regarding as an uncontrovertible fact, that no man ever has done or ever can do any act which at the moment of action is not (in the largest sense, though that not an improper one, that can be given to the word 'interest') in his own eyes at least, his interest to do, every thing which in the course of this work I shall say, will be bottomed on this ground.

By one man, the conduct of another man may be influenced in either of two ways: 1. by causing him to believe that without any thing done by the party influencing, it is already the man's interest so to do; or 2. by doing some act in consequence of which it becomes his interest so to do, though it would not have been otherwise: in a word, either by simply indicating inducements, or by creating inducements.

Considered[2] in respect of its effects or tendency a sanction may be termed an inducement, a motive, when the tendency is to give birth to positive action, i.e. to motion in some direction; a restriction when the tendency is to produce the negation of action—not through forbearance—in opposition to whatsoever inducement may be in operation on the other side in the character of motives.

Considered in respect of the nature of the sensation by which they are constituted, sanctions are of two sorts: painful and pleasurable —considered as in an applied state, punitive and remunerative—-the painful first mentioned as being the most effectual and universally applicable and applying.

Considered in respect of their source they exhibit the distinctions following:

[1] MS continues with what appears to be an alternative reading, 'to say that it is his duty is but idle talk'. The latter part of the sentence, from 'whereas', has been bracketed for possible omission.

[2] This sheet (xiv. 277) is headed in pencil 'Sanctions. Analytic View'.

1. The pain or pleasure in question may be considered as resulting or eventually expected to have place either without or with the intervention of a sensitive and intelligent agent. In the first case, the sanction may be stiled ‘purely physical’, or for shortness ‘physical’; in the other case, ‘voluntary’ or ‘volitional’.

2. The pain or the pleasure where the sanction is volitional may be considered as eventually[1] to be applied by a voluntary agent of a known and continually seen species, or by a voluntary agent of an unknown and never seen species. In the first case, the sanction may be termed ‘voluntary and natural’, or in one word ‘human’; in the other case, ‘hyperphysical’, ‘supernatural’, ‘super-human’, or ‘religious’.

3. Where the sanction is human, the pain or the pleasure may be considered as resulting from the will of some functionary or functionaries armed with some appropriate share in the power of government, and acting as such, or from the will of an individual at large. In the first case, the sanction may be termed ‘political’; in the other case, ‘non-political’.

4. In the case where the sanction is political, the pain or pleasure may be considered as resulting from the will of a functionary invested with judicial power and acting as such, or from the will of a functionary invested with political power, not in that shape but in some other. In the first place, the political may be termed the ‘legal’ or ‘judicial sanction’; in the other case, the ‘administrative’.

5. Where the sanction is non-political, the pain or the pleasure may be considered as resulting or apprehended from the action of the human being in question considered as a member of a community of human beings having mutual intercourse and judging and acting, though without political power, with community of opinion and action; or as separately from, and without intercourse on the subject with, any other. In the first case, the sanction may be termed the collectively operating ‘popular’ or ‘moral sanction’; in the other case the individually operating ‘non-political sanction’.

6. Where the sanction is the individually operating ‘non-political sanction’, the pain or the pleasure may be considered as resulting or eventually expected at the hands of the individual in question either in consideration of some pain or some pleasure antecedently received or supposed to have been received by him at the hands of the individual in whose mind the sanction is considered as operating, or independently of any such consideration. In the first case, the sanction may be termed the ‘retributive sanction’; in the other case, the

[1] MS alt. ‘resulting or eventually expected’.

'antipathetic' or the 'sympathetic sanction': antipathetic, if it be pain that is expected; sympathetic, if it be pleasure.[1]

For illustration of the tendency, effects and modes of operating of these several sanctions, the positive vice of drunkenness and the opposite and negative virtue of sobriety may serve: and for the exemplification of the tendency and effects of the several sanctions, punitive and remunerative, flowing from those several sources and applying themselves to the promotion of the virtue and the repression of the vice, reference may be made to Hogarth's scenes of the respective progresses of the drunken and the sober apprentice.[2]

Timothy Thoughtless and Walter Wise were fellow prentices. Thoughtless gave into the sin of drunkenness: Wise abstained from it. Mark the consequences.

1. Physical sanction. For each debauch, Thoughtless was rewarded by the physical sanction with sickness and head ache: to recruit,[3] he used to lie in bed the next morning; he thus by degrees relaxed and enervated his whole frame.

2. Supernatural and Super-human sanction. While thus lying in a state of bodily sufferance, his mind was alarmed and affected by the imagination of an angry and avenging deity, to whom the practice of this sin could not fail to be an object of displeasure.

3. Political sanction—judicial branch. In the course of one of his drinking bouts, he sallied forth with some associates into the streets, broke windows, insulted passengers, was apprehended, prosecuted, convicted and punished.

4. Had his manner of life been unexceptionable, a connection of his would have provided for him a respectable Clerkship in one of the Offices, but by his habits, the marks of which were conspicuous upon his countenance, he was too unquestionably and notoriously unfit for it.

[1] As with the sympathetic or retributive sanction, the subdivision of the political sanction into a judicial and an administrative branch is introduced after *An Introduction* and *Of Laws in General.* Cf. p. xxi n. 4 above, and the letter of Bentham to Dumont, 29 Nov. 1821, cited therein.

[1] This refers to Hogarth's series of engravings entitled 'Industry and Idleness' (1747).

[3] These two words bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

1.13

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY VIRTUES[1]

To be virtuous, every action must be either in effect or in tendency beneficial as above.[2] But of actions that are beneficial to the community, it is not every one that is virtuous. For a beneficial action to be virtuous, some effort must accompany the performance of it. The actions that are most beneficial to [the] community are those by which the individual is preserved and those by which the species is preserved: to neither of these two species of acts as such is any such epithet as that of 'virtuous' ever attributed. For a species of action to be regarded as having a claim to the appellation of virtuous, it seems necessary that some effort should in some degree have accompanied it. Of this effort, the nature would be different according to the mode in which the action is virtuous, of which presently. To be beneficial, an action must be so either to the agent himself or to another person or other persons or to both. In so far as being thus beneficial to the agent himself it is virtuous, a virtue is considered as being exercised by the performance of it: and this virtue is termed 'prudence', viz. in particular, 'self-regarding prudence'. In so far as being beneficial to others, it is also virtuous, virtue in another shape is considered as exercised by the performance of it. This virtue is termed 'beneficence'.

In so far as the effect which it is the intention or disposition to produce is regarded as being in the opinion of the agent beneficial to others, the action is termed 'benevolent' and the virtue 'benevolence':

[1] The MSS for the first part of this section (down to p. 180 n. 2 below) are UC xiv. 266, 265, 267. They are, apart from the last few lines and some of the headings (which are in Bentham's hand), in a copyist's hand throughout, and were written on 27 and 28 Nov. and 3 Dec. 1819. The MSS have the general heading 'Deontology Theoretical', while the more specific heading is 'Actions virtuous and vicious. Virtues------Vices'. The first sheet opens with the following summary: 'Actions virtuous and vicious—virtues and vices—vices—the ideas whence and how deduced-------every virtuous action is in effect or in tendency beneficial to the community: every vicious action, pernicious.' In Bentham's plan, followed here, the function of this section is to pursue, in the context of the discussion of interest and duty, the distinction between principal or primary and subservient or secondary virtues. Cf. the heading on the small brown folder now found with xiv. 225: 'Ch. 2. General Explanations continued. Primary Virtues—Secondary Virtues.' (MS orig. 'Principal Virtues---------- Subservient Virtues'.)

[2] Bentham is here referring to the last part of the summary of xiv. 266, 265, 267, as quoted in n. 1 above.

and this whether any benefit to any other person be or be not among the effects of it.[1]

Be the usefulness what it may, in neither case, it has been said, can there be virtue without effort. Of this effort, the seat is different according to the nature of the virtue. In the case of prudence, the seat is principally the understanding. In the case of benevolence and beneficence, it is principally in the will and the affections.

An adversary, suppose,[2] aims a stroke at me with a club. I spring aside and escape the stroke. Here is usefulness,[3] but here is no room for prudence.

Hearing that an adversary is lying in wait for me at a certain place in a certain road, I avoid that road and repair to the place where I have business by a longer and more expensive road. Here usefulness may be exactly the same as in the other case. But whether the choice so made was prudent or imprudent, here has been an effort made by the understanding—here has been room at least for prudence.

So in the case where the principal seat and the effort is in the will. At the shop of the Baker, I purchase a loaf for my own dinner. Here is usefulness—double usefulness: usefulness to myself by the preservation of life, usefulness to the baker by his profit upon the loaf.

Suppose, when I have got the loaf, observing a man who, being in a famished state, has more need of it, I give him the loaf and so go without my dinner: here too is usefulness. But besides usefulness, here is virtue: for to subject a man's self to pain in any shape, as I by the supposition have subjected myself to it in the shape of hunger, requires an effort, and this effort I have made.

In regard to efforts, however, thus much is to be understood. Though effort is necessary, what is not necessary is that the time of the effort should be the very time when the exercise in question is given to the virtue. All that is necessary is that the act in question should be of the sort of some of those to the exercise of which an effort in most men is necessary. By habit, that which in the first instance required effort, comes by degrees to be done without effort. Take, for instance, the confining anger within the limits[4] prescribed by prudence and benevolence. If, in this instance, there could be no virtue without effort exerted by the individual in question at the

[1] At this point (the foot of xiv. 266) MS has, in pencil in the copyist's hand, the following note, presumably as a reminder of how the discussion was to be continued: 'Next as to the effect of the understanding in one case---------- of the will in the other.'

[2] MS orig. 'A man, suppose, meeting me on the road'.

[3] MS orig. 'self-preservation'.

[4] The remainder of this paragraph is in Bentham's handwriting.

very time in question, on that supposition virtue when arrived in[1] its most consummate state, would cease to be virtue.[2]

If then conduciveness to happiness is the test of virtue, if all happiness is either the happiness of the agent himself or the happiness of others, if in man's disposition conduciveness to a man's own happiness is prudence, to the happiness of others benevolence, and, in so far as effective, beneficence, all other virtues, howsoever denominated, are but so many modifications of prudence or benevolence or both together. Here then is the test of virtue divided, the whole of it, into two branches, forming together a test by which every thing else that has ever borne the name of virtue may be tried: those which are without value, condemned and discarded: and of those which have value, the value proved and the quantum of it measured.

Since Aristotle's time, four virtues have been known under the name of cardinal virtues—*cardo* being Latin for a hinge—virtues on which, as doors on hinges, all other virtues were said to turn.[3] On the two above-mentioned ones, to wit prudence and benevolence, yes: on the four in question, no. This will in its order be shewn at large.[4] Note mean time that among Aristotle's virtues, no such virtue as benevolence or beneficence is to be found: nothing nearer to it than justice, which is but a portion of benevolence in disguise.

In this way and this way alone—namely by indication of the relation borne to happiness, that is to pleasures and pains—can any clear conception be attached to the words 'virtue' and 'virtues', 'vice' and 'vices'. Were it not for this principle of order, not one of these names, familiar as they are, [has a] meaning which[5] is not confused, unsettled and indeterminate.[6]

The actions which lie within the dominion of [the] rules [of purely self-regarding prudence][7] are either such as, being in their nature

[1] MS alt. 'when arrived [at]'.

[2] The next three paragraphs are from xiv. 227. This MS sheet, in Bentham's hand, was written on 26 Apr. 1819 and has the following heading: 'Ch. or § | | Prudence and Benevolence (or Beneficence) the virtues to which all others are reducible—of which all others are but modifications. Prudence and Benevolence the two all-comprehensive Virtues.'

[3] At this point Bentham made a marginal note listing the four classical 'cardinal virtues': 'Prudence, fortitude, temperance, justice.'

[4] Bentham did not provide this analysis; but for what he had in mind see p. 162 n. 1 above.

[5] MS orig. 'the meaning of what'.

[6] The text from this point down to p. 182 at n. 2 below comes from xiv. 230-1. These sheets, in Bentham's hand throughout, were written on 30 Apr. 1819 under the following heading and subheading: 'Acts falling within the rules of purely self-regarding prudence. 1. Character of the acts belonging to this class.'

[7] MS 'The actions which lie within the dominion of these rules—of the rules of this class'. The reference is to the heading and subheading quoted in n. 6.

performable, are accordingly performed out of view of witness—say uncognoscible acts—or such as are performed within view of witness —say cognoscible acts.

Those which are performable out of view of witness are either 1. actions purely internal, namely thoughts in so far as they are voluntary; or 2. external actions, namely all such external actions as possess, as above, this quality in common, namely that they are performed or performable out of view of witness.

An act may be performable and performed within knowledge[1] of witness, without belonging to the class of acts coming under the dominion either of benevolence or of extra-regarding prudence. This is the case in so far as, to the feelings of such other persons as are witnesses of it—percipient or recipient witnesses—the act in question is matter of indifference.

In so far as an act belongs to the first class here in question, no human sanction[2] has application to it other than the pathological.

In so far as an act belongs to the second class, the sanctions that have application to it may be 1. the retributive; 2. the popular or moral; 3. the political, including the legal.

Note that acts not cognoscible or at any rate not known, in themselves, may be cognoscible, and accordingly become in some sort known, by their consequences.

Uncognoscible acts may be distinguished into 1. those which have no material consequences; 2. those which have material consequences.

In so far as an act is uncognoscible, and unattended by any material consequences, it lies within the province of taste alone, and not within that of deontology or morality. Take any one such act, a man is on each occasion perfectly free whether to perform it or not: whichever part he takes, he can not do amiss. An apple of his own being before him, and no danger of indigestion having place, he may eat it or not eat it; an apple and a pear being before him, he may eat the apple first or the pear.

In so far as an act is attended with material consequences, it lies within the dominion of deontology or morality. Here may be two conflicting interests, the interest of the moment, and the interest of the rest of life. Here accordingly come in and have place the temptation and the call for sacrifice; the sacrifice of the present to the contingent future, or of the contingent future to the present.

Thus in the case of the apple, as between the two sacrifices concerned, which is the greatest in value, the immediate gratification that could be obtained by the eating of the apple, or the future

[1] MS orig. ‘view’.

[2] MS orig. ‘among human sanctions no other’.

uneasiness produced by indigestion? Suppose no danger of indigestion to have place, no demand for sacrifice can have place; suppose danger of indigestion to have place, then comes the demand for comparative estimate of value, and, according to the reported balance, the demand for self-sacrifice.[1]

In the case of beneficence and benevolence,[2] the language being so unhappily constituted as that for giving expression by one and the same word to the intention and the act and thence the effect—the effect including the act-—no word is afforded, as it is in the opposite and corresponding case of prudence, the result seems to be that, after this warning, we must content ourselves with using sometimes the one and sometimes the other of these two so intimately related words for bringing to view one and the same virtue [and] one and the same sort of disposition: using moreover both, when for preventing misconception both present themselves as indispensable.

Beneficence is subservient to prudence, self-regarding prudence, in two cases: 1. when it can be exercised without any sacrifice of self-regarding interest; 2. when it can be exercised without any sacrifice but what is outweighed by superior advantage.

In both cases, the motives by which beneficence is recommended may be as follows:

First, motives belonging to the retributive sanction: chance of reward at the hands of the person benefitted—of this chance the value will be the greater according as, in respect of the power of rewarding, the relation of the party benefitted to the party benefitting is that of inferior, equal, or superior.

In this respect, no human being is to such a degree inferior as that the chance of receiving at his hands remunerative retribution should be equal to nought.

Illustrative of this position is the well-known fable of the lion and the mouse.[3]

Secondly, motives belonging to the moral or popular sanction. This supposes the fact and circumstances of the benefit [are] known. The value of the reward will, in this case, be in the ratio of: 1. the

[1] At this point Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Here, for familiarization, in the way of compleat statement or only in the way of allusion, bring in the story of Eve's apple.' Cf. p. 258 below.

[2] This paragraph is found on xv. 84, in Bentham's hand, and was written on 29 Apr. 1829. Thereafter, down to p. 183 at n. 3 below, the text comes from xv. 87, 86. These two sheets are both in the hand of a copyist, apart from the dates and headings which are in Bentham's hand. They are dated March and April 1819, and carry the chapter-heading 'Connection of Beneficence and Benevolence with Prudence'.

[3] One of the fables traditionally ascribed to Aesop.

degree of supposed meritoriousness belonging to the essence of the virtue in the case in question; 2. the number and influentiality of the persons to whom, in the character of judges of the judicatory of the popular sanction, the knowledge of the fact has come.

For illustration may be employed the story of the preconization of the miraculous power of Jesus by the sick and infirm who had been healed by him.[1]

Thirdly, motives belonging to the sympathetic sanction. In some instances this motive alone is sufficient to produce the effect without the aid of either of the other motives.

But over and above any such pleasure of sympathy as may happen to be derived from the exercise of this virtue in the individual instance considered by itself, every act by which it is exercised contributes to the formation of a correspondent habit; and the greater the number of acts of this sort performed within a given time, the stronger the habit; and the stronger the habit the more intense the feeling of self-complacency which it tends to diffuse on the whole mortal frame; as also the greater the chance of its becoming continually productive of similar acts of which the rewards belonging to the popular or moral sanction may be the fruits.[2]

Benevolence and beneficence are either positive or negative. Positive beneficence is doing good; negative beneficence is abstaining from doing evil.

Vast, it is evident, in the case of men in general, is the range of negative in comparison of that of positive beneficence. Not so of benevolence, if by this term nothing be understood beyond the wish, or even if nothing be understood by it beyond the endeavour.

Maleficence may have place without intention or with intention: without intention through heedlessness.

With intention it may have place: 1. through self-regard; 2. through pure ill-will; 3. through social regard; 4. through mere wantonness or say wanton curiosity.

Whether the result of self-regard, of pure ill-will, or of social regard, maleficence may be the result either of sudden anger, or of deliberate revenge.[3]

' Cf. Mark 7: 36-7.

[1] The five short paragraphs which follow are from xv. 551[v]. The material, written on 29 Apr. 1819, is in Bentham's hand and has the heading 'Deontology Private. Benevolence'.

[3] At this point Bentham wrote the following, apparently as notes to himself rather than as a footnote to the text: 'Note the several considerations which self-regarding prudence opposes to it [sell, maleficence] in these several cases.

'Bring to view the several modes in which maleficence with or without malevolence may exercise itself in cases in which it has not the legal sanction to oppose it.

Beneficence consists in contributing to the comforts of our fellow-creatures. Benevolence is the desire to do so. Beneficence is not a virtue except in so far as accompanied with benevolence. The food we eat contributes to the comfort of those by whom it is eaten. But the comfort of the eater does not render the food virtuous.

Benevolence may be virtue without being accompanied by beneficence, for the desire may exist without any power of carrying it into effect. But benevolence is not a virtue any further than, as occasion serves, it is accompanied with beneficence: if when occasion serves correspondent beneficence is not exercised, it is a proof that the desire was not in reality present, or that, if present, it was so faint as to be of no use.

Over and above any pleasure with which the act may happen to be accompanied, the inducement which a man has for the exercise of benevolence is of the same sort as that which the husbandman has for the sowing of his seed, or that which the frugal man has for the laying up money. Seed sown is no otherwise of any value than for the crops of which it is productive. Money is of no value but for the services of all sorts which it procures at the hands of other men: at the hands of the labourer, the services rendered by the performance of his labour; at the hands of the baker, the service performed by the delivery of his bread to the customer who gives the money for it.

By every act of virtuous beneficence which a man exercises, he contributes to a sort of fund—a sort of Saving Bank—a sort of fund of general Good-will, out of which services of all sorts may be looked for as about to flow on occasion out of other hands into his: if not positive services, at any rate negative services, services consisting in the forbearance to vex him by annoyances with which he might otherwise have been vexed.

Negative beneficence is exercised in so far as mischief is *not* done to others. Negative beneficence amounts to nothing, unless in so far as accompanied either with correspondent benevolence or with self-regarding prudence. The most mischievous of all beings exercises negative beneficence in respect of all imaginable mischief except that which he does.

'One case will consist in the violation of the rules of good-breeding: for which see Chesterfield's Letters.'

The *Letters* written by Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield (1694-1773), to his natural son were published in 1774.

The text of the remainder of the section is at xv. 544-50. These MSS, written on 4 Mar. 1821, are headed on the first sheet 'Beneficence and Benevolence, what. Ditto positive and negative'. The MS bears some alterations made (in ink of a distinctive colour) by Bowring, but these have been excluded from the text as here presented.

Negative beneficence is a virtue in so far as any mischief which without consideration might have been produced is by consideration forborne to be produced. In so far as it is by the consideration of the effect which the mischievous action might have upon a man's own comfort, the virtue is prudence, self-regarding prudence. In so far as it is by the consideration of the effect which the mischievous action might have upon the comfort of any other person, the virtue is benevolence.

A main distinction here is between beneficence which can not be exercised without self-sacrifice and beneficence which can be exercised without self-sacrifice. To that which can not be exercised without self-sacrifice, there are necessarily limits and these comparatively very narrow ones. Indeed, beneficence which is accompanied with any degree of self-sacrifice is not exercised without being to a certain amount exercised at the expense of self-regarding prudence: although it may be no otherwise at the expense of self-regarding prudence than as the seed sown by the husbandman is sown at the expense of self-regarding prudence. In no case in which money is disbursed without adequate return can beneficence, it is plain, be exercised without correspondent self-sacrifice.

To the exercise of beneficence in the case in which it is exercised without self-sacrifice, it is plain there can be no limits: and by every exercise thus made of it, a contribution is made to a man's General Good-will Fund, and made without expense. In a certain sense, indeed, beneficence that has any virtue in it—beneficence though negative if it has any virtue in it—can not be exercised without self-sacrifice, for it can not be exercised without forbearance. And forbearance, in so far as there is any the smallest desire to perform the act forborne from, requires consideration, requires effort, and to undergo any uneasiness with which the effort may happen to be accompanied is, by the amount of that uneasiness, self-sacrifice. There are cases in which this self-sacrifice is accompanied with uneasiness to a great amount, an amount beyond the endurance of the generality of men, in the present state of society at least. Such is that which consists in forbearance to gratify the appetite of revenge when excited by severe injury. But to self-sacrifice in this shape, whatsoever limits may be set by the dictates of beneficence and self-regarding prudence, there are none set by the nature of the case, none set such as those which are set in the case where the act of beneficence consists in the gift of money and the rendering of service by labour performed.

Negative beneficence is exercised in so far as annoyance is forborne to be inflicted on others: negative beneficence is forbearance

of annoyance. By acts of this description no direct contribution, it is true, can be said to be made to the Good-will Fund above-mentioned. On the other hand, correspondent to that same Good-will Fund, there is an Ill-will Fund: and by every exercise of negative beneficence, the Ill-will Fund is kept from receiving contributions, contributions to the amount of which it would otherwise have received. In an indirect way, the withdrawing contributions from the Ill-will Fund may be productive of an effect equivalent to that produced by a contribution to the Good-will Fund. For if, while Malevolus keeps filling his Ill-will Fund, Benevolus keeps it empty, it is manifest what the advantage will be which, in a case where there are rival candidates for a certain service which may be rendered to either and must be rendered to either of them, Benevolus will have on his side.

Described in general terms, the inducement to positive beneficence in all its shapes is the contribution it makes to a man's General Good-will Fund: to the General Good-will Fund from which draughts in his favour may come to be paid. The inducement to negative beneficence is the contribution it keeps back from his General Ill-will Fund —the General Ill-will Fund hanging over his head: and besides its own particular use, any exertion made to keep the Ill-will Fund empty may be productive of advantage in the same shape as that produced by contributions made to a man's General Good-will Fund.

He who is in possession of a fund of that sort and understands the value of it, will understand himself to be the richer by every act of benevolent beneficence he is known to have exercised. He is the richer and feels that he is so by every act of kindness he has ever done. Will it be believed?—believed or not, it is strictly true. I knew a man once, on whose mind the very contrary impression had taken place. He had a phrase of his own by which he gave expression to it. Even without self-sacrifice in any shape, to be the source of advantage or gratification to any one else without receiving an advantage equal at least in value, he called 'being made a property of'. Often have I heard him declare; he did not like to be made a property of—or he would not be made a property of. He would have regarded himself as being so much the poorer for it; he would have been ashamed of it as of a weakness.

A disposition of this stamp was in this same instance productive of its natural effects. It had for its accompaniment an ardent ambition, and to that appetite it contributed to secure continually repeated rebuffs and disappointments.[1]

[1] See Appendix B for an additional but unconnected treatment of the virtues.

1.14

HUMAN INSTRUMENTS OF GOOD AND EVIL[1]

Prudence purely self-regarding regards either actions or thoughts: actions, to wit, bodily or external actions, for mental or internal actions are thoughts; actions, i.e. the choice of actions—thoughts, i.e. the choice of thoughts.

In so far as actions are in question, that which prudence can do and all that it can do (that prudence which consists in the choice of means being out of the question) consists in the sacrifice of the present to the future: in this sacrifice, i.e. in so far as, and no further than, the aggregate of happiness is thus increased, to wit by the sacrifice of the lesser present [happiness][2] to the greater future. Of two portions of happiness equal in magnitude, one present, the other not present, that which is present will always be greater in value than that which is but future: of that which is but future the value being lessened by and in proportion to, in the first place, remoteness, and, in case of uncertainty, by the uncertainty. In so far as no portion of time is considered but the present, or if as between pleasure and pleasure, pain and pain, or pleasure and pain, the future is regarded as continuing on the same footing in respect of magnitude and certainty as the present and in the same degree of propinquity and certainty in all the several cases, virtue is out of the question: the case comes under the dominion not of virtue but of taste.

Under this general head, to wit, the head of purely self-regarding prudence, come several of the particular virtues put by Aristotle and thence by other Moralists, to this day, on a line with prudence.

These are 1. Temperance; 2. Continence; 3. Fortitude; 4. Magnanimity; 5. Veracity: to wit, in so far as by the effects of actions considered as regulated by those virtues the happiness of no being other than the agent in question is considered as being affected.[3]

In so far as the interests[4] of others are connected with and dependent on that of the person in question, beneficence, to wit, as towards those others, belongs to the head of prudence, even self-regarding

[1] The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 219-24) were written between 28 Feb. and 5 Mar. 1819, under the heading ‘Deontology. Prudence self-regarding’, and are all in the hand of a copyist.

[2] MS has the word ‘sacrifice’ bracketed in pencil.

[3] The MS (xiv. 220) breaks off at this point and the following note appears: ‘Go on to shew how in these several cases prudence consists in the sacrifice of the present to the future.’ But this continuation of the discussion seems not to be extant.

[4] MS ‘interest’.

prudence. But in this case the sort of prudence in question is not purely self-regarding but extra-regarding prudence. In so far as neither the greater future happiness of the agent in question is considered as being promoted or endeavoured to be promoted, nor the happiness of others, a sacrifice of happiness, whether present or future, is asceticism—the offspring of delusion: the very opposite of prudence.

To give up any the least particle of pleasure for any other purpose than that of obtaining for a man's self or some other person a greater quantity of pleasure, or of saving oneself or some other person from a more than equivalent quantity of pain, is not virtue but folly.

To cause or endeavour to cause any other person to give up any particle of pleasure for any other purpose than that of obtaining for a man's self or some other person a greater quantity of pleasure, or of saving oneself or some other person from a more than equivalent quantity of pain, is not virtue but vice—is not beneficence or benevolence, but maleficence or malevolence.

Speme voluptates (says Horace), *nocet empta dolore voluptas.* 'Be pleasures spurned. Hurtful is the pleasure which is bought by pain.'[1] Silly is this precept, sadly silly, taken according to the words, but no such silly notion had the poet in his head. No such silly notion was it ever his meaning to inculcate. But to have rendered it otherwise than silly would have spoiled the verse; and when the option is between truth and verse, between serving and pleasing, extraordinary indeed must that poet be who makes any other choice than that which we see made by Horace. What was it that he really meant to inculcate? What but that which has just been brought to view? *Utilitas,* says he in another place, *Utilitas justi prope mater et aequi*—'Utility, as it were, the mother of that which is right and equitable.'[2] Here we see the principle of utility set up as the standard of right and wrong in express terms: terms the import of which is plain enough, though here too, for this too is poetry, the expression wants more or less of being correct and compleat. And what is utility? What but the property of producing pleasure or preventing pain, as above?

Thoughts which considered with reference to the ultimate object are purely of the self-regarding class—considered with reference to their consequences and the causes of those consequences, have regard either to those consequences which have for their causes events purely physical, or such as have for their causes human actions.

These actions are either a man's own or those of other persons. Thoughts which have for their objects consequences considered as future are stiled 'expectations'. No small part of a man's happiness or unhappiness depends upon the state of his expectations.

[1] Horace, *Epistulae,* 1. 2. 166. [2] Horace, *Satirae,* 1. 3. 98.

In so far as a pleasure which has been the object of expectation fails of being experienced, a pain of the positive cast is experienced in consequence of the failure. For the designation of this pain, the French language furnishes no other than a compound appellative, *peine d'attente trompeé*—'pain of frustrated expectation'; in English, in one word, 'pain of disappointment'.

Of such importance is the pain thus denominated, such its influence on the aggregate of happiness, that it constitutes a principal object of regard in that branch of the field of law which is called the civil branch, and the arrangements employed for the exclusion of it form the principal part of the arrangements in the making of which the labours employed in that field are occupied. Why give to the proprietor that which is his own, rather than to any other person? Because by giving it to any other person other than the proprietor you would produce the pain of disappointment: a pain which in the opposite case has no place.

Of the importance of this pain, and thence of all such measures as promise to contribute to the exclusion of it, take this testimony by Dean Swift in the form of an addition to the beatitudes: 'Blessed is he which expecteth not, for he shall not be disappointed.'[1]

On this ground rests the importance of the task of presenting a just view of the expectations proper to be entertained in relation to the conduct of other men at large—to wit, in respect of such of their actions by which a man's own happiness may be affected.

'If we would love mankind', says Helvetius, 'you should expect little of them.'[2] He might have added, 'or if we love ourselves'.

At any rate, so far as concerns any sacrifices to be made of their own happiness to ours, the less sanguine our expectations are the better: so far as disappointment has place, so far as any such sacrifices fail of being made, the less exposed we are to the pain of disappointment, and the less severe it is in so far as it comes upon us. In so far as any such sacrifices are really made, the more exquisite is the pleasure. Whatsoever pleasure the services thus rendered, the services considered in themselves, might otherwise produce will be heightened by the pleasure of surprise: instead of pain of disappointment comes a pleasure beyond expectation. Against pain considered as liable to

' What Bentham probably had in mind was a ninth beatitude proposed by Pope in a letter to John Gay, 16 Oct. 1727 *(Letters of Mr. Pope and Several Eminent Persons,* 2 vols., London, 1735, i. 146): 'Blessed is he who expects nothing, for he shall never be disappointed.'

[2] 'Pour aimer les hommes il faut en attendre peu': Claude Adrien Helvétius, *De Pesprit,* Paris, 1758, p. 37. Bentham said in his old age to Bowring, 'This sentence of Helvetius has been a real treasure to me' (Bowring, x. 587).

flow from this source, no preservative can be so effectual as that which is applied by any correct and compleat view of the necessity of that preponderance which the force of self-regarding affection is, by the unalterable constitution of human nature, destined to maintain over sympathetic or social affection.[1]

1.15

OF PROPRIETY AS BETWEEN PRUDENCE, PROBITY AND BENEFICENCE[2]

Prudence, probity, beneficence: under one or other of these denominations are comprized, it may be seen, every known quality conducive to human happiness, every thing that bears—or at least every thing which taking for the standard of this genuine virtue conduciveness to well-being ought to bear—the name of virtue.[3]

On this view of the matter by these three virtues, taken together, the whole field of ethics is covered: and whatsoever is capable of being to any use observed on the subject of Ethics will consist in instructions concerning the application to be made of these virtues.

Meantime these are not—far indeed are they from being—all the items that are commonly spoken of in the character of virtues.[4] Under the name of virtues, not inconsiderable is the number of those other qualities which under the same general appellation are wont to be placed level with these three.

This being the case, it follows that, if by these three virtues in the character of all-comprehensive ones the whole field of morals is compleatly covered,[5] to one or more of these three those others are, all of them, in some way or other resolvable.

[1] At this point, at the bottom of the sheet (xiv, 224), there is the following note: 'Here insert what is contained in the papers on this subject.' But it has not been possible to identify the 'papers' referred to and thus to supply the continuation Bentham intended.

[2] The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 81-3; xv. 310^{v}, 150^{v}; xiv. 139-41; cii. 211; xv. 278^{v}, 276^{v}, 275^{v}; xiv. 197-214) were written in 1814 and 1817. See editorial notes below for particular groups of MSS. The first group (xiv. 81-3), providing the text down to p. 192 at n. 1, is dated 12 Sept. 1814 and has the chapter-heading 'Field of Ethics------its divisions'.

[3] Following this paragraph Bentham wrote the following, which he subsequently crossed out: 'Prudence, probity and beneficence---------- the Trinity of the Moral World. To these and these alone should belong the superior title of *cardinal* ones.'

[4] The whole of this sentence, apart from the first word, is bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

[5] MS continues 'what follows is that'; but this phrase seems redundant.

Such accordingly, it is believed, will be found to be the case.

From any number of sources of division, the whole or aggregate in question, be it what it may, may, according to the various enquiries of which human affairs are susceptible, need to be divided: divided, at the same time in each such instance, on such a plan of division as shall in each instance be found exhaustive.

I. First source of division. 1. Person whose interest is to be pursued, i.e. the agent himself; 2. another party, another person or set of persons more or less numerous and extensive. From this source of division the whole field of virtue is divided into two portions: 1. the field of self-regarding; 2. the field of extra-regarding virtue.

II. Second source of division, applying exclusively to the extra-regarding branch of virtue: presence or absence of obligation to pursue the path of conduct by the pursuit of which the virtue is exercised. From this source of division the field of extra-regarding virtue is again divided into two portions, viz. the field of probity and the field of beneficence.

III. Third source of division, applicable successively to the respective fields of those three most extensive and all-embracing virtues. Natures of the several subordinate virtues which are respectively subservient and reducible to one or more of those three. From this source the field of virtue[1] is divisible into as many ulterior portions as there are of these secondary virtues.

IV. [Fourth][2] source of division. Nature of the pleasures, positive and negative,[3] on the choice or rejection of which the absence or presence of the virtue in question depends. From this source the field of virtue is divisible into as many portions as there are pleasures and pains.

V. [Fifth][4] source of division. Permanence or transitoriness and thence accidentality[5] of the situation or state of things by which the occasion for the exercise or non-exercise of the virtue in question depends.

VI. [Sixth source of division.] In the case of permanence more particularly,[6] amplitude of the situation by which the occasion for the exercise or non-exercise of the Virtue in question is afforded.

From this source the field of extra-regarding virtue is divisible into the private and the public compartments: private into the domestic and the miscellaneous non-domestic; public into the international and the national; the national into the field of legislation and the

[1] MS alt. ‘Morals’.
[2] MS ‘Third’.
[3] MS orig. 'and exemptions (exemptions from pain)’.
[4] MS ‘Fourth’.
[5] MS orig. ‘causality’.
[6] This opening phrase of the sentence is bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

field of executive management;' the field of executive management into the field of administration and the field of judicature.[2]

At the outset an objection presents itself, and that an objection applying to every thing that follows or can follow. It shall be allowed to present itself in its full force.

According to you, the principle which in the case of every action establishes as the ground and measure of its propriety its conduciveness or repugnance to the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the sure and only true principle.

But on the other hand, according to you, it is by a regard for his own happiness, and by that alone, that on every occasion a man's conduct will actually be guided.

In like manner also, according to you, each man, being of ripe years and an ordinarily sound constitution of mind, is at all times a better [judge than others][3] on the question what pleasures there are the enjoyment of which, and what pains there are the exemption from which will, at any rate at the moment in question, be most conducive to his well-being.

This being the case, of what use according to you can this work of yours, or any other work that can be written on the subject ever come to be?

Be he who he may, according to you, it is by his own particular interest, his own self-regarding interest, that[4] on every occasion, be it what it may, a man's conduct will be governed. This being the case, to what use speak to him of his extra-regarding interest, of the interest constituted by the pleasures or exemptions [from][5] pains of others?

Again, in the field of self-regarding interest, as to the competition and conflict between the present and the contingent future, each man being, according to you, the sole competent judge as to what is most conducive to his aggregate and ultimate interest, to what use

[1] MS orig. 'government'.

[2] From this point to p. 193 at n. 1 below the text comes from xv. 310[v] and 150[v]. These MSS, dated 18 Sept. 1814, have the following heading: 'Ch. 2. Of propriety, as between self-regarding Prudence on the one hand, and Probity and Beneficence taken together, on the other.' Above this Bentham has written the note, 'See another sheet (Sept. 1814) in which this topic is begun to be handled'; he may be referring to the material in xiv. 81-3 which is used in the text to begin this section.

[3] Bentham inadvertently crossed out the words 'a better' without supplying an alternative or completing the phrase as above.

[4] MS alt. 'it is his own particular interest, his own self-regarding interest, by consideration of which in so far as concerns choice of pleasures and exemptions [from pains) in the character of ends'.

[5] MS 'of'.

speak to him on the subject of the preference to be given on any occasion to the one in comparison of the other?[1]

In respect to the competition as referred to between self-regarding and extra-regarding interest, true it is that between the two interests thus denominated a strong and almost continual competition does really exist.[2]

But on the other hand what is no less true is that into the composition of a man's self-regarding interest enters, on every occasion, a quantity of extra-regarding interest, and that in a variety of shapes.[3] In other words, on most not to say on all occasions a man has an interest—a self-regarding interest—in promoting and accommodating his conduct to the interest, the self-regarding interest, of others: and in so far as a self-regarding interest of this description has place, it acts in alliance with his extra-regarding interest and as a check upon the force of that self-regarding interest which operates in other shapes.[4]

What then is the business of the Deontologist? In every instance to bring out of their obscurity, out of the neglect in which they have hitherto in so large a proportion been buried, the points of coincidence to the extent of which extra-regarding interest is connected and has by the hands of nature been identified with self-regarding interest: and this in such sort and with such effect that by the alliance thus formed, by this conjunct kind of interest, the force of self-regarding interest in those shapes in which it is purely self-regarding is commonly already in use, and by apt means may be rendered more and more in use, to be outweighed and overpowered. In this way it will, it is believed, be found that for this species of artist there is no want of work. Nature has provided no inconsiderable quantity of useful work which as yet remains unattempted, and thus it will be his own fault if his office be a sinecure.

I.[5] In the first place comes the interest corresponding to, and

' From this point to p. 194 at n. 4 below the text comes from xiv. 139-41, dated 18 Sept. 1814; the first sheet is headed 'Answer'. Bentham also wrote at the top of this sheet: 'Quote the Poet---------- "Self and social interests are the same".' (The reference is to Pope, *Essay on Man,* iv. 396: 'That true Self-love and Social are the same.')

[2] MS orig. 'has been planted by the hands of nature'.

[3] MS orig. 'on more accounts than one'.

[4] At this point in the MS (xiv. 139) Bentham wrote the following notes: 'Here and lower down shew that what the deontologist has to do is to shew how extra-regarding becomes self-regarding interest'; 'Shall the following order be employed, or the reverse?'

[5] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 140), Bentham wrote the following note: 'Subjoin to this sheet a stricture on sentimentalism, which ascribes to the Utilitarians the opinion that *selfishness* is the cause of every thing that is done—-selfishness being dyslogistic.'

produced by, the affection of sympathy or benevolence.[1] This it is true is an extra-regarding interest, but it is not the less a self-regarding one. Egenus is in distress. This distress is observed by Liberalis.[2] By the force of sympathy, the pain felt by Egenus becomes, by means of the manifestation made of it, productive of correspondent pain in the bosom of Liberalis. To relieve himself from this pain and to obtain, at the same time, by means of the same act, a portion of the opposite and correspondent pleasure, he applies relief to this distress. If for the purpose of applying to Egenus this relief or exemption from pain, the correspondent relief heightened by the correspondent pleasure, Liberalis puts himself to any expence, in this case as in other cases of expenditure, a competition has place between the interest served by the expenditure and the interest (in this case the pecuniary interest) disserved by it. But by the supposition the relief is applied: therefore the interest served by the expenditure, the interest of sympathy, has been the preponderant one.[3]

2. In the next place comes the interest correspondent to and produced by the love of reputation: in other words, the interest created by the power of the popular or moral sanction. Proportioned in general to the regard which, by his deportment, a man appears to have for the well-being of other men, is the regard which by the like tokens they are disposed to manifest for him. Here again is another extra-regarding interest, but it is not the less a self-regarding one.[4]

3. In the third and last place comes the interest corresponding to and produced by, the desire of amity: the desire of becoming, or continuing to be, with relation to this or that particular individual or small assortment of determinate individuals, an object of sympathetic affection, or a recipient of any such good thing as by that affection a man is prompted to bestow upon a person who is the object of it.

Of these three interests, the two former are capable of operating and are wont to operate upon all sorts of men, upon all sorts of occasions, and in all sorts of situations.

[1] Bentham at this point has the note 'See Springs Table': cf. p. 84 above.

[2] Bentham has personalized the Latin words *egenus,* meaning 'a poor man', and *liberalis,* meaning 'a generous man'.

[3] At this point Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Add a stricture on the absurdity and injustice of the Sentimentalist'; but no such addition has been found.

[4] The next three paragraphs are from cii. 211, dated 18 Sept. 1814. Bentham wrote the following note at the top of the sheet: 'Conflict between self- and extra-regarding—but not more than between one branch and another of self-regarding. Say or do what one will, every case will in every instance be determined by the predominant interest. As intercourse and intellectuality encrease, the force of social interest encreases.'

Of the third, the operation in the instance of each man is confined to particular and comparatively casual situations. It may be termed the interest of the popular or moral sanction in miniature. Between the two, although they are capable of operating in opposition and competition with relation to each other, there is evidently no precise boundary line. In proportion as the field of a man's particular connection enlarges itself, it approaches to a coincidence with that of the public at large.[1]

By his own interest, and even by his own self-regarding interest,
i.e. by that which in that character presents itself to his view, will, on every occasion, the conduct of every man be determined. But by what branch of his own interest? It has just been seen that in every man's self-regarding interest there are two branches: one, indeed, in a state of competition with and opposition to the body of extra-regarding interest, but another in alliance with and acting in support of it.

In proportion[2] to the degree in which extra-regarding interest, i.e. that part of his self-regarding which acts in alliance with extra-regarding interest, predominates in his breast, will he be inclined to preserve his conduct in a state of subserviency to the well-being of those to whose lot it happens to be within the range of his activity.

But it is only in so far as it is present to his mind, that by the action of any interest whatsoever a man's conduct is determined; and by a variety of circumstances, the elements of that branch of a man's self-regarding interests which are in alliance with interests of other men, and thence with his extra-regarding interests, are kept from being so manifest and in general from acting so efficiently as those of which the *purely* self-regarding branch of his self-regarding interest is composed.

To bring to view these comparatively latent ties—this, in so far as concerns the competition between purely self-regarding and social or say extra-regarding interest; this, in so far as concerns the competition between probity and the self-regarding branch of prudence—this is what belongs to the field of deontology, in this part of that

[1] At this point Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Continue to shew the relation between the self-regarding interest of the future and ditto of the present, and to shew how they are servable by deontology. Each man best judge of present pleasure or pain but not every man of future ditto. Like a third person his future contingent individual pleasure and pain can not be judged of by him otherwise than from the species it belongs to.'

The next four paragraphs are from xv. 278^{v} and 27 6^{V}. The latter sheet is dated 18 Sept. 1814; the former is an incomplete sheet of which the upper part has been cut away.

[2] MS alt. 'proportioned'.

field the labour of the human kind seems capable of being expended not altogether without fruit.[1]

Remains within the field of self-regarding interest teleclectic[2] prudence.

Of the value of the matter of present good in both its shapes, viz. pleasure and exemption from pain, every man is in his own instance the best at least, not to say the only, tolerably competent judge.

But when, in either of those its shapes, the portion in question of that pretious matter becomes more or less remote, the more remote it is, the less, *caeteris paribus,* is the advantage which in this respect a man himself has in comparison of another man who, with the same natural talent and appropriate mental acquirements, has taken the connection between causes and effects in that portion of the field of action for the subject of a more attentive scrutiny. Of the value of each particle of good, of the value of each pleasure and each pain when once it becomes present to the feelings of the individual in question, by no other individual can any equally correct or compleat conception be formed. But, not infrequently, a pleasure or pain which to the mind of another person shall be present, and its value with relation to the individual by whom it is about to be experienced as correctly and compleatly comprehended as any feelings which are not a man's own are capable of being, shall to the mind of that individual be altogether out of sight: and that which at any point of time is not so much as thought of is not capable of being, at that point of time, appreciated.[3]

The office and use of the extra-regarding branch of deontology—meaning private deontology—is to engage men in the practice of probity and beneficence by shewing, as far as this is the case, the

[1] The three following paragraphs are from xv. 275[v], which is dated 19 Sept. 1814.

[2] MS orig. 'self-regarding'. The word 'teleclectic' appears to have been coined by Bentham to mean 'in regard to long-term choices'.

[3] The remainder of the section comes from xiv. 197-214. This substantial group of sequential MSS carries several dates between 16 and 26 Dec. 1817, though the last four sheets are dated 1818. The material is headed 'Deontology —Foundation of' and has the subheading 'Office and use of extra-regarding deontology'. At a number of points from xiv. 204 onwards Bentham has written notes to himself in the form 'Proceed to state...' etc. Where the ensuing material corresponds to these notes it has not seemed necessary to record their occurrence systematically below. The MSS are throughout in the hand of an amanuensis, and it is clear from p. 207 n. 4 below that Bentham in fact dictated the material, the notes just mentioned being intended to remind him where to resume the task after an interruption. A number of slips in the text (noted in their places below) seem to have been caused either by mishearing or by miscopying from a rougher version of the dictated material.

coincidence of the dictates of probity and beneficence with those of self-regarding prudence.

To point out this coincidence where it exists, and so far as it exists, is (it may seem) all that can be done by any individual teacher acting as such. To give any encreased extent to that coincidence belongs only to him who for that purpose has been furnished with the powers of government: in which case any instruction that comes to be given belongs to the head, not of private, but of political deontology.

But of the means by which the coincidence in question is capable of being promoted, one—and that indeed the principal—is the power or influence of the popular or moral sanction: of the board or tribunal of public opinion, and of this board every individual who pleases being a member, and almost every individual [being] more or less in the habit of acting as a member, and every man who takes upon himself to write upon the subject [being] a leading member, or at least one who is thereby endeavouring to act uprightly] in that character—hence it is that, with a degree of influence proportioned to the approbation he experiences at the hands of his readers, the strength of the impression he makes on their minds, and the number and influence of these same readers, it lies open to every such instructor not only to give indication of this coincidence, but by means of those exertions to give additional extent to it.

Whatsoever is, or can be, done towards the extension of this coincidence can by no other means be done than by the operation of those groups or classes of interests and corresponding motives which have been already designated by the appellation of *sanctions.*

Under the self-regarding branch of deontology, occasion was found for bringing to view the several sanctions: viz. 1. the physical; 2. the political, including the legal; 3. the popular or moral; 4. the social or sympathetic; 5. the religious.[1]

Under the self-regarding branch, the physical sanction [is] considered as occupying itself in preventing the pursuit of pleasure from being productive of preponderant, i.e. more than equivalent, evil, viz. more than equivalent pain, or loss of more than equivalent pleasure consistent in such evil consequences as for example in case of excess were liable to be produced by the act of self-gratification: for example, from the drinking of intoxicating liquors to excess, sickness and headache from the act, general prostration of strength and disease in various shapes from the habit.

Under the present branch of deontology, viz. the extra-regarding, to the head of the physical sanction may be referred all such evil

[1] Cf. pp. 176-7 above.

consequences as in any shape, upon and after any act by which evil is produced or considered as produced to a third person, are apt or liable to be produced by the enmity of such third person or of those who on the occasion in question sympathise with him. Thus, suppose a man prompted by ill will to aim a blow at another with whom he has a quarrel, in this case, in so far as he is restrained by fear of a return of the blow, whether from the man himself or from a friend and companion of his, it is to the physical sanction that the restraining cause may be referable: and so in case of injury or supposed injury in any other shape, viz. to person, reputation, property or condition in life.

In so far as the evil which a man might otherwise have done to another party is adequately prevented, either by the physical sanction, as above explained, or by the political, including the legal, sanction—there is no room for the application of private deontology. The effect is produced by the power of political deontology alone.

In the field of extra-regarding deontology, the principally operating tutelary forces, i.e. evil-restraining and good-promoting forces, are the popular or moral sanction and the social or sympathetic. It is by one or other or both of these (the religious sanction for the present being out of the question) that any deficiencies in the action of the physical and political sanctions are supplied.[1]

Of deontology considered as an art, of deontology in both its branches, the object is the promotion of human welfare: of self-regarding deontology, the welfare of the individual agent in question; of extra-regarding deontology, the welfare of all persons concerned other than the individual agent. On all occasions his immediate object will naturally be the pursuit of immediate pleasure or the avoidance of immediate pain. To the engaging him or fixing him in this pursuit, nothing in the shape of art is necessary: it is what man's nature—artless and untutored nature—is constantly prone to. Of art, the one business on this occasion is in the pursuit of the immediate pleasure or in the avoidance of immediate pain to forbear the subjecting himself to remote pain or the forgoing remote pleasure to a greater value. So far as concerns self-regarding deontology, the remote pleasure or pain is the pleasure or pain of the agent himself: so far as concerns extra-regarding deontology, it is the pleasure or pain of others.

[1] At this point (foot of xiv. 198) there are two notes. First, 'Proceed to shew 1. the natural alliance between these two sanctions; 2. their weakness in the original state of man and their strength in the present state'—a programme more or less, though not immediately, fulfilled in what follows. Second, 'Quere whether as in the self-regarding so in the extra-regarding branch the physical sanction may not be considered as one of the powers belonging to private deontology.'

In the field of self-regarding deontology, with little exception, what is capable of being done towards the attainment of the end (and it is by the art here in question, viz. private deontology, that it is to be done) [viz.] the means are indication of the effects the contemplation of which constitutes the physical sanction, and of those the contemplation of which constitutes the popular or moral sanction. If we suppose in the breast of the party in question a sensibility to the effect producible, in the breast of this or that other individual with whom he is connected by the ties of mutual sympathy, by the contemplation of his conduct—on this supposition, the contemplation of the effects produced by such his conduct on the state of the affections in such a friendly breast, constitues another sanction, viz. the sympathetic sanction, the force of which may by the [indication][1] given of it be rendered a means applicable to the same end. Thus suppose a man wedded to the pleasure of intoxication to an injurious degree, Deontology applying itself to this case shews him how to draw up the account of pleasure and pain considered as the probable consequences of this practice. First, the intensity and duration of the gratification reaped on [ebriation]:[2] here he will see the whole of what stands on the profit side of the account. Per contra:

1. Sickness and other immediate effects prejudici al to health.

2. Future [contingent][3] pains by debility, and disease in various shapes at future periods.

3. Loss of time, if needed to be employed providing for self-maintenance; expence, in so far as the instruments of his gratifications are purchased at his expence: here we have a specimen at least of the loss belonging to the physical sanction—the loss by the indication or contemplation of which the force of the physical sanction is applied.

4. Disrepute attached to the practice: this propensity having among its known effects that of lowering in the estimation of persons in general a person to whom it is imputed. Of this disrepute the cause will be found in the circumstances already above mentioned.

5. Effect produced by the sympathetic sanction: in the mind of the person in question, the idea of the pain which in the minds of persons dear to him—for example, a parent, a wife, a husband, a child—may be produced by the contemplation of the disrepute etc., viz. the evils correspondent to the four above mentioned sanctions.

6. Suppose punishment in any shape be attached by law to the gratification of this propensity in any case—for example, in the case of a man's appearing in public exhibiting the symptoms of that

[1] MS 'education'. [2] MS 'education'. [3] MS 'transingent'.

temporary mental disorder of which it is liable to be productive: here will be an instance of the application of the force of the political, including the legal, sanction in a direction tending to restrain the gratification of this same propensity. To this head may be considered as belonging the punishments respectively attached to the several offences into the commission of which a man is liable to be led by the gratification of this same propensity.

Let us now consider what the sanctions are which have application to the case, where the welfare of individuals other than the agents is affected by the action—where the action is of such a nature that the welfare of individuals other than the agent is in one way or other affected by it.

Take, for example, a case of corporal injury, where the effect of the action is to produce immediate physical pain in another individual by application made to some part or other of his bodily frame—say, for example, by a blow with the fist or a cut with a sharp instrument.

Now, in the first place, what in this case the agent has commonly to apprehend, whether it be in defence—i.e. in the hope of warding it off, if there be time—or in the way of retribution—i.e. for revenge—or in both, is the receiving at the hands of the patient the same, or some other, personal injury.

The restraint or check produced by this fear is the restraint or check which it is in the nature of the physical sanction to apply. In this case the physical sanction is the sanction by the force of which whatever restraint or check, by this fear applied to the mischievous action, is applied.

Political, including the legal, sanction. Special cases of justification excepted—the list of which is capable of being made out on the ground of the principle of utility, and with more or less conformity to that principle, is actually made out in the legal system of every political state—the force of the political, including the legal, sanction can not fail to apply itself to this case and with more or less efficiency operate towards the prevention of mischief in this shape.

Not less extensively manifested will be the application of the restraining force of the popular or moral sanction to this same case. As to the exceptions, in the main they will naturally be the same as those which have place in the application of the restraining force of the political, including the legal, sanction: for in the considerations by which the force of the popular or moral sanction had already been made to apply itself to the subject in question, the application made of the restraining force of the political, including the legal, sanction will have had its cause. By the experience had, or the observations

made, of the suffering produced by acts of the afflictive description in question, men in general will, upon observation made of any fresh act of this description, be led to view the act and the author with disapprobation: with a degree of disapprobation more or less intense according to the apparent magnitude of the suffering thus produced, and in this disapprobation, the application made of the penal and restraining force of the political, including the legal, sanction will have had its proximate cause.

Sympathetic sanction: the force of sympathy, acting in the character of a tutelary sanction, tending to the prevention of meditated mischief. In no state of society, which with the view of giving direction to the human conduct [by] a work such as this I have in contemplation, can that social affection be wholly without place or wholly without the power of exercising in the direction here in question its influence on human conduct. In some states of society it is indeed in the whole extremely weak, and in every state the strength of it is susceptible of great variation as between individual and individual: in both which particulars it agrees in a considerable degree with the popular or moral sanction.

Few men can contemplate altogether without uneasiness—at any rate, if brought home in a close and particular manner to their perception or imagination—pain suffered or supposed to be suffered by a fellow creature: of such uneasiness the nominal seat is in the sympathetic affections, and the name of it, 'pain of sympathy'. In the idea of this pain is composed the force with which the sympathetic sanction tends on every occasion to restrain the person in question from engaging in any act the tendency of which appears to him to be the giving birth to the sense of pain in the breast of a fellow creature. If, as is by supposition the case, where he has actually been the intended author of such pain, the act by which it has been produced has been performed, the force of this principle of restraint must have been overcome by the superior force of some motive or motives acting in an opposite direction. But supposing no such counter-motive in operation, the restraint produced by the sanction here in question will always be an effective one.

Different degrees of the influence with which the several sanctions operate in different stages in the career of civilization.

As to the physical sanction, the degree of influence with which to the person in question, in so far as they are present to the mind, the pains belonging to the sanction operate, will in all stages be of course pretty much the same. But it is only in so far as at the very moment of action any idea is actually present to the mind, that in the character of a motive it can be productive of any effect. And as the strength

and steadiness of the mind and the command which it has over its several faculties are continually encreasing [with] the aggregate body of recorded observation and experience and with the correspondent length of recorded practice, so, the earlier the period, the less likely upon each occasion is the greater and more durable and extensive series of future contingent pains and pleasures to be upon each occasion present in such sort as to be set in the balance against any immediate pleasure by which, in the character of a motive, a man may be prompted to act in such sort as to produce preponderant evil, whether to himself, or to any other person or persons. And thus it is that, at a more advanced state of society, in the character of a mischief-restraining force even the physical sanction is apt to act with greater efficiency than at a stage less advanced.

As it is with the individual, so is it with the species. For a considerable length of time, the self-regarding affections occupy exclusively or almost exclusively the whole field of the mind. During this period, the physical sanction, as above explained, is the only one that can operate in restraint of the propensity produced by the view and desire of immediate pleasure or exemption from present or immediate pain. Next to the self-regarding affections come the dissocial: to use a phrase employed by Aristotle, but not now much in use, 'Next to the concupiscible appetite comes the irascible'.[1] Though the feelings correspond[ing] to the two appetites are so different, yet in respect of the sanction resulting from them, i.e. the nature of the restraint they tend to impose, they operate towards the same end. The concupiscible appetite of each individual experiences a check from the prospect of the evil effects producible to his detriment by the operation of the irascible appetite in the breast of any such other individuals by whom pain or loss of pleasure to themselves may be viewed as producible by the acts performed by him in gratification of his concupiscible appetite. It is thus that injury to others finds its first restraint in the fear of eventual retaliation and retribution—the natural consequences of resentment.

It has already been observed that, as in the individual, so in society at large, in infancy, i.e. in the earliest stages of its existence, the affection of sympathy is in its weakest state: viz. the affection itself, considered in and by itself, and the force of that same affection considered as tending to give birth to action. As in the individual, so in society, as age and experience advance, this affection and its force and efficiency receive encrease. As to the affection itself, it is only in

[1] No sentence corresponding exactly to this one has been found; but cf. *Ethica Nicomachea,* VIII. 6, 1149a 23-4, and *Ethica Eudemia,* II. 8, 1223b 18-19. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* Part I, Q. 81, Art. 2.

respect of force that it can receive encrease. But considered as a principle and source of action, it is capable of receiving, and does accordingly receive, encrease in two distinguishable ways: viz. first, in respect of its efficiency with reference to any individual in whose favour it may be considered as operating, i.e. in respect of the magnitude of the services which it has the effect of rendering or causing endeavours to be used to render to him, and thence the sacrifices which it causes to be made for the purpose of rendering those services; secondly, in respect of extent, i.e. in respect of the number of the persons in whose favour it operates, as above. At first the circle within which are contained the individuals in whose favour it operates—in other words, the field of its operation—is confined to, or even within, that in which are included the individuals most closely attached to the individual agent in question, for example by consanguinity, by affinity, by domestic contract, by habitual and at the same time friendly intercourse. As experience encreasesand mental culture advances, the field of operation and influence of this principle of action enlarges itself more and more. It extends itself successively, or at the same time, to other such individuals respectively connected with the individual in question by the ties of profession, class, town, province, political state.

In so far as the sympathetic affection operates, its tendency can not but be to minister, in the first instance at least, to the well-being of some individual or individuals other than the individual whose breast is the seat of it. In so far as it becomes productive of the desired effect, and that effect not followed by an equal or greater effect of the opposite cast, the ultimate result is a clear accession to the aggregate stock of happiness in the community. By continually recurrent experience or observation, the attention of each individual being incidentally pointed to this effect, hence it is that in each breast, even by the self-regarding affection itself, the value and usefulness of the sympathetic affection, considered as existing and operating in other breasts in the character of a source of happiness to himself, is brought to each man's notice: each man's sympathy finds itself excited and brought into action, as it were, by contagion, by the observation or supposition of the operation of the sympathetic affection in the breast of others. From the example of the services thus rendered by his next neighbour to his next neighbour but one, a man, by a process more prompt than that of reflection, contracts and catches, as it were, a propensity to requite upon occasion the author of those benefits with similar benefits. But the cheapest mode of requital—and that considering the extreme facility of it, not the least efficacious—is the giving expression, external expression, to the benevolent affection which the man feels within him. But to give expression to

this affection, as pointed towards or operating in favour of this or that individual, in consideration of this or that act performed by him, or supposed to be performed by him, is to direct and apply in the shape of a reward the force of the popular or moral sanction to the production of similar acts. And thus it is that out of the self-regarding affection rose by degrees the sympathetic affection; out of that, the power of the popular or moral affection—and both of them, in their main tendency, operating in conjunction to the encrease of the aggregate of happiness.

That, in respect of any action or mode of being, the sympathy excited in favour of a man should be strong in proportion to its conduciveness to the happiness of the whole community, this is what, of course, is always to be desired; this, however, is not always the state of things that has place. Sympathy in favour of a man has been in too many instances excited not by acts conducive, but by acts detrimental—and that in the highest degree—to human happiness: for example, by victory and conquest, i.e. by slaughter, devastation and depredation, each committed [on] the largest scale. So likewise by the acquisition or possession of power in the most unbounded quantity, however exercised and employed.

Even where, of the act by which the sympathy is excited, the consequences have been in some respects beneficial to the community, in other respects they may have been of the opposite cast, the good produced being neither pure nor preponderant. Of sympathy, by whatsoever act or mode of being excited, the natural tendency is to give birth to acts of a similar description in the breast in which it is excited, and in those by which the expression given to it has been observed. An idea can not operate in the character of a motive in the mind any otherwise than in so far as in the very time of the operation it is present to the mind. If in any act the consequences of which are partly beneficial, partly pernicious, but in a preponderant degree pernicious, those which are pernicious happen to be exclusively present to the mind, the effect or tendency of the sympathy, in this case, will be to give birth to [acts] in a preponderant degree pernicious to the community.

An act which, in its earliest or its most obvious effects, is beneficial may, when the whole of its effects are taken together, be upon the balance pernicious. An act which in its earliest or most obvious effects is pernicious may upon the balance be beneficial. In either of these cases, an act or a judgment produced by a sympathy excited by the contemplation of the earliest or most obvious effects of the act first mentioned may be purely pernicious: and so in the case of an act or Judgment produced by an antipathy excited by an act of the sort

mentioned in the second place. In so far as, by an assemblage of sympathies or antipathies or both, which, as above, had become pernicious, a judgment or dictate of the popular or moral sanction has been produced, that judgment or dictate will be pernicious, and will accordingly be thereby at variance with the principle of general utility.[1]

The Deontologist not having, as such, any coercive power, the utmost he can do will—so to a hasty glance it may be apt to appear—amount to little more [than] the putting together so many strings of sentences.

Three different ways, however, have been, or will be, brought to view in which literary labour employed in this field has been, and may accordingly not without reason be expected to be, not altogether unproductive of effect. One is, among the several consequences, good or evil or both, with which human action or forbearance in the several situations in question is apt to be attended, the bringing to view, in a greater or lesser proportion, some which, if not thus brought to view, might have failed to present themselves to the mind: in this way, no new motives are created. Another is the giving birth, as it were, to an ordinance of the popular or moral sanction bearing upon the point in question, the Deontologist as such being, as it were, the member on whose motion the ordinance to the effect in question is established. Third and last is the operating in [such a][2] way upon the minds of those in the country in question in whose hands reside the powers of legislation and other powers of government as to engage them to add to the force of the popular or moral sanction the [force][3] of the political including the legal sanction: the political sanction displaying its force on this occasion by giving birth and expression to such ordinances as afford a promise of giving practical effect to the ordinance supposed to be established by the popular or moral sanction as above.

Though in respect of the faculty of initiating a law of the popular or moral sanction all men are, antecedently to the exercise of it, upon a par, yet by any one who, by means of a public work, has taken upon him to exercise it, a distinction of no small moment has thus been conferred upon himself. As in a deliberative assembly, the distinction between the few who take upon themselves to make motions and the many to whom it belongs to form the decisions consequent upon those motions is great, so in the republic of letters [is

[1] At this point (foot of xiv. 209) there appears the following note: 'Quere—whether to proceed to give examples of sympathy and antipathy and thence of the popular sanction from the standard of utility; then proceed to shew howall that can be done by deontology is to bring to view the latent dictates of the several springs of action as above.'

[2] MS 'this'.

[3] MS 'course'.

that] between the few who write and publish works and the many to whom it may happen by reading or report from others to give birth and expression to opinions and thence incidentally to actions and conduct in consequence of them.

In the case of a real assembly actually met together in one place, in case of a motion made to any effect he by whom it is made beholds in so many members as are present so many persons who, any one of them, in case of any impropriety contained in it, may upon the spot and in his presence do and say whatsoever may be necessary for the bringing of that impropriety to light. Not so in the case of the fictitious and never assembled body of which the tribunal of public opinion is composed. On this occasion, expressing himself in this way, what he says is said under full assurance that, be it what it may, it will not experience any immediate contradiction: and under little less than a full assurance in the eyes of a great part—perhaps by far the greater part—of his readers, it will not experience contradiction in any particulars at any future point of time. Of this security of contradiction, a proportional degree of presumption is a natural, not to say a necessary, consequence. As to reasons, to give to the doctrines and precepts he lays down all along the support of reasons, would be productive of [two][1] obligations, from both of which he finds it much to his advantage, viz. in respect of power and ease, to be free. In respect of power, because if to the attempt to exercise it the giving of reasons were necessary, the consequence is that, were no such reasons found, no such attempt could be made. In respect of ease, because to give expression to a simple desire or act of the will in relation to any subject requires much less labour than the giving expression not to that alone, but also to whatever considerations happened to have been employed in giving birth to the desire, with the addition of all considerations in the character of reasons as present themselves as being habitually necessary or conducive to the purpose of securing, in the minds of his readers, a sentiment of approbation towards such his doctrines.

Being thus in so great a degree free from contradiction and opposition, more so than it frequently happens to the legislator to be when armed with all his powers, he proceeds with the most perfect composure—this self-constituted legislator of the popular or moral sanction—to lay down or, in a word, to enact his laws. Among the words of form employed on this occasion and for this purpose are the words ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ [and] ‘obligation’. ‘Obligation’ on the one part, ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ on the other, may on this occasion be

[1] MS ‘few’.

considered as quasi-conjugates. Obligation is either positive or negative. When positive, it has for its quasi-conjugate 'ought', when negative 'ought not'. When it is his will and pleasure that you should do the act in question, he tells you that you ought to do it, you are under an obligation to do it, and the obligation you are under is a positive one. When it is his will and pleasure [that] you shall not do it, he informs you that you ought not to do it, and then the obligation you are under is a negative one.

In this way it is that the fictitious entity having for its visible sign the word 'obligation' has been formed. 'Obligation' from the Latin word *'obligo',* to bind—a term to the use of which so much importance has been attached and about which such a cloud of obscurity has been thrown that an entire work composing an octavo volume has been employed, and employed in vain, in the endeavour to dispel it.[1] Whoever wishes to see it dispelled must call in the principle of utility, and from the system prescribed by that [principle][2] borrow the word 'motive'. Where, among the motives [to which] on the occasion in question the man's conduct is exposed, there are one or more the prevalence of which is regarded by the writer with an eye of approbation, he speaks of the man in question as being under an obligation: an obligation correspondent to the sanction to which the motive in question belongs: if to the political or legal sanction, a political or legal obligation; if the popular or moral sanction, a moral obligation; if the religious sanction, a religious obligation. As to the case where the obligation of the legal sort applies, it is only by accident that in a work on deontology it can come in question. [There] remain therefore as adequate for the purpose of creating an obligation applicable to the purpose here in question, the moral sanction and the religious. As to the dictates of prudence, viz. self-regarding prudence, derived from and created by the physical sanction, scarcely is the fictitious entity in question, obligation, derived from this source. Repeating such phrases as a man's 'duty to himself', a man's 'owing it to himself' [and] the like: but phrases such as these are considered as belonging to the language of rhetorical oranament, [not to][3] simple language.[4]

[1] Bentham is almost certainly referring here to *a* work he mentioned in a letter to John Lind on 5 Oct. 1774 as 'the short treatise on Obligation' published (like Bentham's own early works) by Thomas Payne: see *Correspondence (CW),* i. 206. The book has not been identified.

[2] MS 'system'.

[3] MS 'into'. The syntax of the sentence is unclear, and this emendation is conjectural.

[4] MS continues: 'Here for the present ends what has been preached on the subject of the foundations of deontology.' By 'preached' Bentham meant 'dictated to an amanuensis'.

1.16

THE VIRTUES OR MODIFICATIONS OF VIRTUE CLASSED[1]

Virtue is an appellative by which a fictitious entity is wont to be designated. The entity signified by it having no superior genus, the term is not susceptible of what is commonly meant by a definition: viz. indication given of a generic appellative, within the import of which that of the term defined is comprehended, together with an indication of some property, by which the object so indicated is distinguished from all other things designated by the same generic appellative.

Thus it is, that in a direct way, it is by itself incapable of being defined or so much as in any other way expounded.

But in [an indirect][2] way through the medium of this or that conjugate belonging to the same root, it is capable of being expounded.

A virtuous act, a virtuous habit, a virtuous disposition—in these several ways, by means of these several locutions, its conjugate 'virtuous' is susceptible of being expounded, and by means of [them] a tolerably determinate and correct conception of it may be indicated.[3]

'Virtue' in the common acceptation of the word[4] is not only the name of a fictitious entity, but that fictitious entity is a fictitious personage. It is a member of a sort of fictitious family. For those who speak of virtue in the singular, speak also of the virtues in the plural: of an indefinitely extensive family, of which the several virtues are the members. In a word, the scene presented to the imagination is that of a parent with a family of children. The Latin language being the parent soil of this appellative, and the gender of the appellative, the feminine, the image presented is that of a mother surrounded by a family of daughters. Virtue in the abstract sense and singular number, the mother: the virtues in the plural number, her daughters. Many a person, by whom the unavoidable and almost incurable imperfections of the instrument called language has not been sufficiently considered, will here be apt to be shocked by the proposition that virtue is a fictitious entity. 'What', will he say, 'deny the existence of virtue? Virtue an empty name? No such thing as virtue? Oh, horrible!

* The MSS for this section are in two groups: UC xiv. 281-5 and xiv. 94-9. The former group is in the hand of a copyist and dated 7 Mar. 1827; the latter group is in Bentham's hand and dated 12 Sept. 1814.

[3] MS 'a direct'.

[3] MS 'and by means of it a tolerably determinate and correct conception of it may be indicated by it'.

[4] Bentham here wrote the following note to himself: 'Add the propensity to infer existence from appellatives.'

What an opinion must this man have of human nature! What good, what useful information can be expected from him? What of any other sort but the most pernicious conceivable? But if virtue is a mere imaginary thing, so will be its correspondent and opposite vice. Thus will virtue and vice be on a level. Both alike creatures of the imagination, alike objects of indifference.' Peace, good sir—no such horrible consequences will follow.

Of virtuous acts, habits, dispositions, propensities, the existence, in so far as such entities are in any case susceptible of existence, is admitted, and for all practical purposes, namely for the purpose of discourse, assumed. Thus, whatsoever may be the phraseology employed by us respectively, nothing is there in it that will of necessity prevent our opinions from being the same.

When, speaking of an act, a habit, a disposition, or a propensity, a man speaks of it at the same time as being virtuous, what he means by it, if it is his own opinion alone that it is his intention to express, and not the opinion of any other person is that in his mind a sentiment of approbation is associated with the idea of it. And at the same time that, to the act, habit, disposition or propensity in question, a degree of importance not altogether inconsiderable belongs. So far, so good. But, thereupon comes the question; of the sentiment of approbation thus connected with the idea of the object in question, what is the efficient cause, or, in one word, what is the ground?

My answer is: in different states of society, in different individuals belonging to the same society, the ground has every where, as yet, been very considerably different. Therefore, to this question no single answer can be given and be at the same time a true one. To be all true, or even in any considerable number true, different answers will require to be given: and for the collection of them, intricate and all comprehensive would require to be the researches made into the several fields of geography and history.

Therefore it is that when to the question above mentioned an answer is required, all the satisfaction that a man who is duly solicitous for the correctness of the propositions which on so important a subject he delivers, will be to give what, according to his own opinion, is that same desired efficient cause or ground. In the present instance, this exclusively true answer will be given without difficulty. The efficient cause, or say ground, for whatever sentiment of approbation stands in any mind associated with the idea of any act, habit, disposition, or propensity, is its tendency to give a net increase to the aggregate quantity of happiness in all its shapes taken together, about to have place in the community, whatsoever it be, that is in question. Thence, if it be of the human species, of the whole human species,

this effect is produced, if any particle, however small, of happiness is produced on the part of any one individual, without the production of an equal quantity of unhappiness in any other. Thus much accords with truth as far as it goes. But when this exposition is applied to the explanation of the import of the word 'virtue' and its conjugate 'virtuous', as above, an indication of one circumstance must be superadded. When an act, a habit, a disposition, a propensity is spoken of as virtuous, the idea of something of difficulty in the task, and of consequent exertion and effort employed in the surmounting of that difficulty, seems to be in every case implied.

For example, that by those acts, habits, dispositions and propensities, which have for their effect the preservation of the existence of the individual, by the introsusception of nourishment, very considerable addition to the quantity of happiness is produced, and this on the part of every individual without exception during at the worst the greatest part of his life, is what no one assuredly can entertain a doubt of. Yet to no such acts, or at any rate to no such habits or dispositions or propensities, will he attach the name of virtuous. These things being premised, and to the word 'virtue' a tolerably clear as well as correct and comprehensive idea endeavoured to be attached, we will next proceed to the consideration of the different virtues, or, changing a little the phrase and the image, we will consider virtue as an aggregate of all the virtues, and the individual objects contained in it as divisible into different groups.[1]

Intrinsically useful virtues, subservient or ancillary virtues—under one or other of these heads will every thing which is entitled to the appellation of virtue, and with few if any exceptions every thing that has ever worn the name of virtue, be found. Every act which, being possessed of those other properties which have been above spoken of as essential to virtue, as essential ingredients in the composition of an act of virtue, can, upon the principle of utility, be regarded as capable of being with propriety designated by that appellative: every thing which, taking for the standard and test of virtue subservience to well-being, can with propriety and consistency be regarded as entitled to the name of virtue.

'Prudence' (in respect of the greater part of its application), 'probity' and 'beneficence'—by one or other of these appellatives will all virtues that are intrinsically useful, it is believed, be found comprizible: 'prudence', in so far as the person to whose well-being the virtue and accordingly the act which is regarded as being virtuous is regarded as conducive is that person himself—in which respect the virtue may

[1] The first group of MSS used for this section ends here. The first sheet of the second group (xiv. 94) has the heading 'Virtue: its divisions or modifications'.

be said to be of the self-regarding kind; 'probity' and 'beneficence', in so far as the party or parties to whose well-being it is regarded as conducive are any party or parties other than the person himself whose act is in question; 'probity', in so far as the act in question, the act regarded as an act of probity, is an act of the number of those acts which are considered as obligatory, i.e. as being rendered so by the force of one or more of the above mentioned four sanctions;[1] free beneficence'—say, for shortness, 'beneficence'—in so far as it is considered as not comprized within the field of any of those obligations.

Subservient, and in certain respects reducible, to one or more of the above three, with few or no exceptions, will, it is believed, be found every other moral quality the name of which has ever been considered as the name of a species included under the genus designated by the terms 'virtuous' and 'virtue'.

'Primary virtues', 'principal virtues', 'virtues of the first rank', 'virtues of the first order'—by all these several denominations may the virtues here designated by the name of 'intrinsically useful virtues' be occasionally designated.

'Secondary virtues', or 'virtues of the second order', or 'ancillary virtues'—by these several denominations may the whole tribe of virtues, the value of which depends upon their subserviency to these primarily and intrinsically useful virtues, be designated.

Of this class of secondary virtues, the following properties (deduced from the relation they have in common to those of the primary class) may be stated as the characters.

1. If those of the primary class were not useful, neither would those of the secondary class be so.

2. Their utility consists in their subserviency to those ends which are the same ends as those of the primary class.

3. With reference to some person or other, whether useful or not to human society upon the whole, the tendency of the virtues of the primary class is in all cases a useful tendency.

4. Of those of the secondary class, in so far as the tendency is useful, it is so no otherwise than in so far as it is their tendency to be productive of some one or more of the effects of which it is the tendency of those of the first class to be productive.

5. Their utility has for its measure the degree in which they contribute or tend to contribute to the advancement of one or more of those ends which are the ends of the primary virtues.[2]

[1] Cf. p. 152 n. 2 above.

* Bentham here wrote the following note: 'After examining the several secondary virtues in detail look back to this statement, to see whether it does not require correction.'

Positive and negative[1]—into these two branches the field of beneficence requires, it will be seen, to be divided.

Positive beneficence is the quality which a man is considered as endowed with in a degree proportioned to the importance of the beneficial effects produced [by] acts of a positively serviceable nature exercised by him in relation to the persons towards whom the virtue is considered as exercising itself.

Negative beneficence is the quality which a man is considered as possessing in respect of all or any such acts as, without being repugnant to the virtue of probity, i.e. manifestations of the vice of improbity, would be productive of annoyance, i.e. of pain or uneasiness, to other men.

By the word 'benevolence' seems to be designated the disposition to exercise all those same acts in the actual exercise of which beneficence consists.

Of this virtue the field coincides therefore exactly with the field of beneficence.

Not that either of them is necessarily accompanied by the other.

That benevolence may have place without beneficence is but too certain, and sufficiently obvious. Be the action if performed beneficial or pernicious, the endeavour is liable to fail of becoming productive of the intended effect, much more the bare desire or wish.

On the other hand, so may beneficence without benevolence. In truth, in the whole mass of human affairs, the good which has for its spring the benevolent, the sympathetic, affection would upon examination be found to bear a very small proportion to that which has its source in the influence exercised by the self-regarding class of virtues. The quantity of the matter of wealth, of subsistence and abundance, which is transferred without equivalent (even if the donation made in favour of children by their parents be reckoned into the account) bears but a small proportion to that which is not obtained but for an equivalent, viz. in the way of trade. The quantity which is voluntarily offered up to government to be employed for the benefit of the public at large bears but a small proportion to the quantity paid in obedience to compulsory requisitions.

In the account of the sentimentalist,[2] as between benevolence and

[1] The remainder of the section (xiv. 97-9) has the heading 'Of Beneficence and Benevolence'.

[2] MS alt. 'sentimentality'. Before this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 99), Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Go on to shew that the favour shewn to benevolence is not altogether without reasonable cause. The will better regarded than the deed. Why?-------because the will is regarded as a perennial source of beneficence.'

beneficence, benevolence, whether accompanied or not by beneficence, is apt to experience the larger portion of popular favour. Only, however, in proportion as it is accompanied or followed by beneficence is benevolence of use.

1.17

OF TEMPERANCE[1]

Temperance has for its objects the pleasures of sense. Of these there is not one the abstinence from which may not as well as the abstinence from any be without impropriety referred to this head. But forasmuch as, subject to the restriction above mentioned, self-denial—i.e. sacrifice of pleasure—is of the essence of virtue, hence it is that in the instance of some of the pleasures of sense may be found abstinence which would scarcely be deemed to afford matter enough for so imposing a name.

Opposite to the virtue, such as it is, of temperance, is the vice of intemperance. Productive of a preponderance on the side of mischief to a man himself, intemperance is a breach of prudence: productive of mischief to others, it is a breach of probity.

Productive of mischief in neither of these shapes, to whom can it be a mischief? How can it to any person be a mischief?

But if it be not, then if the principle of utility—if the greatest happiness of the greatest number—be the true and only standard, and conduciveness or opposition to that end the only test of right and wrong, then in any other case, except where in one or other of these two shapes or both together enjoyment is productive of preponderant mischief, neither can abstinence have any claim to the name and praise of virtue, nor enjoyment be with justice considered as subject to the reproach of vice.

Difficult as it may be found to object to this, impossible consistently with consistency, few, it is believed, are those who, at the existing stage in the career of civilisation, in the existing state of the public mind, will bring themselves to accede to it. Few perhaps[2] will be found sturdy enough to maintain that all physical good is moral, or not to admitt that pleasure is of itself a good thing, or at least is capable of being made so, or to take upon themselves to find for happiness any other materials than such as, without impropriety, are susceptible of the name of pleasure.

[1] The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 123-4) are dated 15 Sept. 1814 and headed ‘Temperance’.

[2] MS orig. ‘indeed’.

But on this occasion a condition that generally speaking most men insist upon is that of choosing for every other man what would be his pleasures, or at any rate that no man shall have the choosing of his own pleasures, but shall leave that task to other people. The object of his desire is not a pleasure; being a pleasure, it is an unlawful, an improper one. Either of these phrases, bestowed by any man upon what any other man regards and would wish to enjoy in the character of a pleasure, is considered as sufficient to cover the supposed pleasure with merited odium and operate as conclusive evidence of depravity on the part of any one to whom, under the notion of its being a pleasure, it is the object of desire.

1.18

OF FORTITUDE[1]

On what sort of occasion, in what case, is a man considered as entitling himself to the praise of fortitude, to the denomination of a man of courage? Answer: on the occasion of his placing himself voluntarily in a situation in which he would stand exposed to evil in some shape or other, and in particular to death, to considerable bodily pain, or to both in one.[2]

In so far as he voluntarily and knowingly places himself in any such situation, in proportion to the magnitude of the danger—i.e. what to him appears the magnitude of the pain or the probability of the death—in that same proportion is the quality of fortitude considered as belonging to him.

This exposure, for the ultimate good of human society, is it desirable that it should be made? On these circumstances will the answer, it is believed, be found to depend. By such exposure will his own well-being—his own ultimate interest—with that of such other persons whose interests are in any respect at stake upon it, be upon the whole more likely to be served than disserved? Suppose these two interests to be incompatible, to which of them is it desirable that the

[1] The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 113-21) were written between 13 and 15 Sept. 1814 under the heading ‘Logic or Ethics’. On the small brown folder that heading has been deleted and replaced by the following: ‘Deontology. Subordinate Virtues. Ch. | | Of Fortitude. §1. Its relation to the primary virtues according to the principle of utility. § 2. Account given of it by the Aristotelians.’ The heading and subheadings on the MSS themselves are similar though not identical.

[2] At this point Bentham wrote a note to himself, ‘Add---------- to actual pain or danger’.

preference should be given,[1] the other being, to the amount necessary for the purpose, sacrificed?

Difficult—in many instances but too difficult—to know. But at any rate here is something to be known, and that something not ill worth knowing.

The benefit, whether to a man's self or to some other man or set of men, is the article to be purchased. By exposing him to the dangers to which it is proposed that he should expose himself, he would pay the price necessary to be paid for the chance of obtaining that benefit. Whether the article is worth the price that must be paid, this is the question, and the only question worth considering; whether, in the case of his exposing himself to the danger, the act which he exercises in so exposing himself be entitled to the appellation of an act of *fortitude,* this is a mere question of words, a question not worth the words necessary to be expended in the proposing of it.

A question of this sort is not merely useless. By throwing a man's ideas into confusion, and thus eventually leading him to pursue a line of conduct adverse to the interest in question,[2] the tendency of it is positively pernicious.

The act least conducive to that interest, suppose it understood to merit the appellation of an act of fortitude. What is the practical consequence? That, fortitude being a virtue, the pernicious line of conduct in question is that which ought to be pursued.

The line of conduct most conducive, suppose it not to merit that appellation of fortitude. What is the practical consequence? That, not being conformable to the idea of virtue, it belongs to the category of folly or of vice.[3]

Of absurdity, of blindness, of self-contradiction would you wish for a curious pattern, turn to Chapter 16, titled 'Fortitude' in this *Oxford Compend.*[4] The title of an act to the denomination of an act of fortitude: what according to that institute does it depend upon? Upon the magnitude of the suffering which a man continues to endure? No such thing. Upon the magnitude or in other respects upon the value of the danger, i.e. the eventual suffering to which he voluntarily exposes himself? No, nor that either. Upon what then? Upon the nature of the occasion, on which the suffering is endured or the danger of it incurred: upon the nature of the occasion, viz. in respect

[1] MS orig. 'which of them is it desirable that it should give way'.

[2] MS orig. 'to that of his interest or that of his duty'.

[3] The next MS sheet (xiv. 115) has the subheading '§2. Account given of it by the Aristotelians'.

[4] At this point Bentham gives the reference 'p. 47' in the margin. For the *Ethices Compendium,* see p. 137 n. 1 above.

of the good or ill fortune which that occasion has to be approved or not approved of as a fit occasion for the purpose,[1] and the circumstance of its suiting or not suiting the convenience of the instructor to rank it among the number of the occasions on which the exposure in question is approved of.

In battle or on any other occasion, a man runs the risk of being deprived of life or makes an actual sacrifice of it: the act thus exercised by him, is it an act of fortitude? Ask the Compendialist. 'Oh', says he, 'before I give you an answer, you must tell me the occasion: if it has my approbation, then it is an act of fortitude, but if not, not.'

Self-slayers, for example, duellists, robbers, and men who subject or expose themselves to death, or instant danger of death, in defence of their personal liberty, let them endure or expose themselves to what they will, never can they by any such sufferance or any such exposure give to their doings the character and praise of acts of fortitude.

These absurdities would make a perfect riddle. To account for the cause of [them],[2] it is necessary to advert to the hands through which, in their way to the eyes and ears of Oxford Students, the doctrines of Aristotle had to pass.

The morality of the heathen being taken for the main text, to fit it for all such orthodox eyes, many amendments required to be made in it: an embroidery of amendments—nor that a scanty one—required to be applied to it.

The word 'virtue', notwithstanding the sparing mention made of it in the Christian scriptures, still maintained itself in the possession of general not to say universal homage. Be the act what it might, supposing it generally understood that the quality of virtue could without impropriety be applied to it, neither judgment nor therefore language of a condemnatory nature could consistently, nor therefore would willingly, be applied to it.

What was to be done? The dilemma was a distressing one. Here were two Masters, Aristotle and Jesus, at variance. No man can serve two masters.[3] To serve two masters—and these masters issuing opposite commands—was not in human power.[4] One was to be cloven to, the other to be [despised].[5] The choice was not difficult. Aristotle was indeed a hero, but Jesus was a God. Aristotle had founded neither

[1] This clause (from the word 'viz.') is bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

[2] MS 'these absurdities', the first sentence of the paragraph, incorporating that phrase, having been a subsequent insertion.

[3] This sentence bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

[4] Marginal note in MS 'Luke 16. 13*.

[5] Word left blank in MS.

enthroned[1] Bishoprics nor so much as fellowships. Jesus—little as, for aught appears, he thought of such a thing—had become a founder of both, clothing his Bishops in the robes of Dives and seating them on thrones.

What was to be done? To the points here in question the judgment of Aristotle was to be superseded. At the same time, as far as possible, his credit was to be saved. Here was a knot to be untied. To untie it was not possible. To cut it was found necessary, and this was the course taken for cutting it. Self-contradictory propositions[2] were necessary: self-contradictory propositions were accordingly employed —employed and given to the academic youth to swallow. For this operation every academic pharisee [?] was or was supposed to be, not without reason, sufficiently prepared. To those in whose arithmetic three persons of any kind are but one, what should hinder self-defence against slavery from being an act of cowardice?

After all, it was not the religion of Jesus, it was what is a very different thing, the religion of modern orthodoxy, that was to be served. Between Aristotle and modern orthodoxy, not between Aristotle and Jesus, was the real difference. Jesus had said nothing against suicide. He had said as little against duelling. In favour of suicide, what could be done by example he had done: and as to any distinctions, whatsoever may have been made by any other persons, by himself none, or at least none that have been handed down to us.

Neither in favour of duelling had he said any thing: for neither by name nor by any discriminatory description, nor in short by any description that could comprehend it, had he said any thing that could be applied to it.

Suppose death to be on both sides the intended consequence, duelling, compleat consent on both sides being supposed, would be but the combination of two acts of suicide. Smitten on one cheek, says Jesus, turn the other to be smitten by the same hand likewise. In a duel—always understood as a compleatly and reciprocally voluntary duel-—each combatant turns not his cheek merely but his vitals to be smitten by the other. To the letter no man, not even among the people called Quakers, ever professed to receive and practise the sermon from which the precepts here attended to were taken. Practising it to the letter, every Christian would be a slave having for his master every other man who was not of the same faith.

When reason has not only been sacrificed, but sacrificed upon principle, the absurdity of a position, so far from a disproof rendering a man ashamed of it, operates as a recommendation of it.

[1] Word bracketed in MS for possible deletion.
[2] MS orig. ‘contradictions in terms’.

The man who puts an end to his own life can never have been a man of fortitude. Would you know why? It is because suicide is unlawful.

According to these Oxford Ethics, in case of a war, before you can know whether any of the combatants fought bravely or no—or rather, since on this occasion words are every thing, whether he did or did not act the part of a man of fortitude—it will be necessary for you in the first place to know on which side it was that he fought, and in the next place whether Justice was on that side.

Not inconsiderable are the difficulties which, if in orthodox or fashionable ethics consistency were ever looked for, would be found to attend the application of this principle to practice. Look over the whole tribe of conquerors, scarce would you find a single man of fortitude. Your Alexanders, your Caesars, your Gengis Khans, your Bonapartes—what were they all? Any thing but men of fortitude.

When the protection afforded to an absurdity is such that no mouth dares open against it, the more flagrant and manifest it is, the greater the triumph with which it is uttered. To those who in battle expose themselves to no more than a chance of death, grant or deny as you will the praise of fortitude—to those who plunge into death itself, no such praise can be allowed. A self-murderer a man of fortitude? Call him rather the prince of cowards.

How often has not this discovery been made; made with the most perfect good faith, without any the least spice of self-conscious piracy. How happy the thought! The charms of wit embellishing the substantial ground of orthodoxy.

Continue in misery, lest you be ranked not only among unbelievers but among cowards. How often has not this comfort[1] been delivered to the diseased and destitute, to the incurably diseased and hopelessly destitute, from the seat of orthodox affluence, of rosy and well-fed orthodoxy?

Controversy, self-contradiction, confusion cover every inch of the field of ethics. Such must every where be the case where the precept of utility fails of being recognised.

At this same time, men are to be found to whom it is ‘quite certain’ and ‘altogether clear’ that every thing that relates to ethics has been settled for these two thousand years, and that every man is either a quack or a visionary who, on this ground, can fancy or pretend himself to have produced any thing that can be called new.

[1] MS orig. ‘admonition’.

1.19

JUSTICE: ITS RELATION TO THE THREE PRIMARY VIRTUES[1]

Virtues, intrinsically useful virtues, three: viz. prudence, probity, and beneficence.

The other virtues, no other than subservient; their utility being derived from and dependent on that of the three intrinsically useful ones. Such, it will here be observed, was the division made of the aggregate mass of virtues.

Of justice, then (it may naturally be asked) what shall be said? Is this too but a subordinate virtue? If so, to what one or more of the above three intrinsically useful ones is it thus subordinate?

Answer. Before the art of logic came into the world, and in particular before the business of arrangement was brought into a state approaching to that of correctness and compleatness, ideas respecting virtue, and names designative of those ideas, were made up. The relations between virtue and virtue were vague and obscure, the descriptions of them complex, the points of coincidence and difference indeterminate. Logically speaking they are disparate, mathematically speaking they are incommensurable.

To the Aristotelians it is that weare indebted for such definitions or expositions as have been given of the several virtues. Of those virtues several there are that have been divided into species. Examine them, and in several instances you will find that under one and the same generic name species are exhibited which have no assignable relation to one another: species, in terms of which the character of the genus is not to be found. The modifications ranked under the name of one virtue agree not with the definition given of that virtue, but with the definition given of some other. The Linnaeus of Natural History the world has had for some time past. The Linnaeus of Ethics is yet to come.[2]

[1] The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 103-7) fall into two groups. The first (xiv. 103-5), in Bentham's hand, was written on 14 Sept. 1814 under the heading 'Logic or Ethics'. This heading is replaced by 'Deontology' on xiv. 103 and on the small brown folder, which also has the heading 'Justice—its relation to the three primary Virtues'. The second group (xiv. 106-7), in a copyist's hand, was written on 23 June 1819 under the heading 'Deontology Private' with the subheading 'Benevolence and Justice'.

[2] Carolus Linnaeus (Carl von Linnê) (1707-78), the Swedish botanist, published *Philosophia botaniea in qua explicantur fundamenta botanica* in 1751. For Bentham's early enthusiasm for botany and for the Linnaean system which 'occasioned so great a revolution in the Botanical world', see *Correspondence (CW),* i. 105.

As to probity and justice, scarcely perhaps will it be altogether correct to speak of probity as subservient to justice. What at the same time may be said without impropriety, is that when there is no want of probity, there can not, so far as depends on intention, be any want of justice; while on the other hand it can not be said that there can not be any want of probity so long as there is no want of justice.

The truth is that, in the field of morals, the place occupied by probity and the place occupied by justice—viz. in so far as justice is considered as a species of virtue—are nearly if not entirely the same. Between the import of the one of these words and that of the other the difference is not logical or ethical but grammatical. The occasions on which they are capable of being employed, the actions of which they are capable of being predicated, are the same. But for their being respectively made up into sentences, the sets of concomitant and concordant words required by them are here and there different.

Every body says, 'I will do you justice.' Nobody says, 'I will do you probity.'

But every act of injustice, at any rate, if by the agent himself understood to be such, is an act of improbity: and conversely, every act of improbity is an act of injustice, if by the agent understood so to be.

Under these circumstances, for giving expression to the primary virtue, with its opposite vice, the term 'probity' will, it is supposed, be found much more apt and convenient than the terms 'justice' and 'injustice'.

Why? Because the word 'justice' is clogged with other significations which bear no relation—no such relation as that here in question—to the import of the word 'probity'. The word 'justice', for example, may be employed as a substitute for the word 'judicature'. Not that, even in this sense, it can be said to be synonymous to the word 'judicature', but that, provided the proper complement of adjectitious words be made up, the same import may be expressed in a sentence in which the one, as in a sentence in which the other, is the leading term.[1]

Of him by whom judicature is exercised, it is commonly said that he administers justice. In the exercise of his office let the conduct maintained by him be ever so truly and manifestly chargeable with

[1] The next paragraph in the MS is as follows: 'He by whom judicature, i.e. the power of judication, is exercised is said to administer justice. But on this occasion it is not ever said that probity is administered, scarcely that it is exercised.' But this paragraph appears to have been superseded by the following one.

improbity, not only by himself and those who speak well of him will it be said that which he administers is justice, but even those who speak worst of him will not without some difficulty and perplexity be able to bring themselves to deny it. But by no one will he, in any case, be said to administer probity, scarcely by any one to exercise probity. To exercise an act of probity: this phrase may perhaps be found endurable. But this and the preceding one are not the same.[1]

Under the system of utility, justice, as has been already explained, is but a modification of benevolence: benevolence considered, in so far as it belongs to the field of the present work, as applying to those cases in which no provision, or no adequate provision, has been made by the power of the law: in which case the dictates of justice belong to the subject of political deontology.

In the field of private deontology, the dictates of justice may have place in respect of any act in so far as it is considered as being the subject of obligation: of obligation from any one of the sources of obligation, that is to say, from any one of the several sanctions.

As in other cases the force and dictates of the several sanctions are liable to vary and become opposite to each other in respect of the direction in which they act, so in the present case.

The two sanctions as between which variance and opposition is most apt to take place, and in which the importance of such variance is the most considerable, are the legal and the popular or moral.

The provision made by those dictates to which the legal sanction applies is in a high degree liable to be imperfect and inadequate: in so far as that provision is not condemned by the principle of utility, it belongs to the popular or moral sanction, and for the most part the popular or moral sanction is not ill-disposed to supply the deficiencies of the legal.

In relation to the point in question the dictates of utility being supposed to be ascertained, the following seem to be the points in which the provision made by the legal sanction is liable to be inadequate.

1. By the legal sanction, no provision at all made; the legal sanction silent.

2. A provision made by the legal sanction, but that provision contrary to the dictates of utility.

3. By the legal sanction a provision supposed to be made, and that provision supposed to be not contrary to the dictates of utility, but the import of it uncertain.

4. A provision made and the import of it not regarded as uncertain.

[1] The first group of MSS described above (p. 219 n. 1) ends here.

but the carrying it into effect rendered impracticable or more or less difficult by imperfections in the system of procedure, that part which contains the rules of evidence included.

5. The existence of doubts or difficulties respecting the existence, procurability or import of evidence on the one side or the other, produced by causes other than the imperfections of the law.

1.20

PROPRIETY WITH REFERENCE TO THE PLEASURES AND PAINS OF AMITY[1]

The desire of amity is the species of desire that corresponds to the pleasures and pains derivable from this source.

The pleasures and pains of amity have already [been] stated as being the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction in miniature:[2] the person whose goodwill is the source of the present pleasure being in the case of the pleasures and pains of amity a determinate individual, in the case of the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction an indeterminate multitude.

To proceed in this case as in the case of all the several antecedently mentioned modifications of pleasure and pain.[3]

On what occasions is it proper and desirable that the pleasures of this description should be reaped? On all such occasions on which they may be reaped without preponderant evil in any shape, without violation of the laws of self-regarding prudence.

To what length may the pursuit of these be carried? To exactly such length, and no greater, at which that pursuit will be consistent with the laws of the above-mentioned three cardinal virtues—self-regarding prudence, probity—including veracity—and beneficence.[4]

[1] The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 154-6, xv. 273^{v}, xiv. 157-65) were written between 19 Sept, and 5 Oct. 1814, under the heading 'Logic or Ethics', with the secondary heading 'Deontology' and the subheading 'Ch. | | Of propriety with reference to the pleasures and pains of Amity'. The same headings appear on the two small brown folders in which the MSS were originally placed, corresponding to two subsections: the first of these is numbered but not headed, while the second has the heading 'Opposition made by an error of the popular sanction to the pursuit of these pleasures'.

[2] See p. 195 above.

[3] MS 'pleasures and pains', the words 'modifications of' having been a subsequent insertion.

[4] At the top of xiv. 155 Bentham made the following barely legible note: 'Note—may not abstinence from offensive *practice* [?] be ranged under this head. Pain the pain of disgust: disgust, by what cause produced—generally malpractice. Consult for disgusts *The Miseries of Human Life.* Sensibility here

In regard to the primary virtues, the occasions are comparatively rare in which for the direction to be given to this pursuit there exists between them any considerable competition.

Be this person who he may, what—in order to gain his favour, his amity—what is the natural, the obvious course? Within the sphere of power, to continue in the habit of rendering to him all sorts of services. To the value of the services thus to be rendered, what are the considerations that set the limit? Answer: those considerations suggested by probity and those suggested by prudence.

The limits applied by probity to the pursuit of the object of this desire are the same as those applied by that same primary virtue to the pursuit of the matter of wealth. If, as is to a considerable extent apt to be the case, the value of the good expected at the hands of the person whose amity is courted (say for shortness the person courted) consists in the tendency they have to confer on the person courting portions more or less considerable of the matter of wealth—if the desired amity is sought for as a source of enrichment—the pursuit of amity is in reality the pursuit of the matter of wealth: whereupon just as the pursuit of the matter of wealth, with the pleasures and exemptions deducible from it, is repugnant to probity, so is the pursuit of amity.

The pleasures derivable from this source have this almost peculiar property belonging to them: in so far as the pursuit of them is recommended by teleclectic[1] prudence, so is it by beneficence.

Let the desire by which the pursuit is produced, let it be purely of the self-regarding kind, without the least tincture of the social: let it be purely selfish, without the least tincture of benevolence. Still, the effects of it are not the less purely beneficial to all the parties concerned. In the ultimate result, the interest of the person *courting* may be served or not served, as it may happen. But in the mean time, with a degree of certainty scarcely inferior to that with which they could have been served by the pursuit of the well-being of the person courted himself carried on by his own labours, his interest is served, his well-being is promoted.

encreased by lofty education and habits. No flattery a just object of aversion or contempt, except what is rendered at the expence of probity. Prudence only suggests the propriety of not being known to render to the Patron services, the rendering of which when known renders the renderer an object of hatred and contempt. Thus by the fear of the imputation of flattery men are led into imprudent demonstrations of pride, injurious to beneficence as well as to prudence.' The work referred to in the note is [Rev. James Beresford,] *The Miseries of Human Life, or the Groans of Samuel Sensitive and Timothy Testy, with a few supplementary Sighs from Mrs. Testy,* London, 1806.

[1] MS orig. 'self-regarding'. Cf. p. 196 n. 2 above.

By this supposition, it is not by sympathy—:it is not by the purely social principle—it is not by benevolence that the services have been produced, the well-being of the party in question, in so far as these services have been effectual, promoted. But setting aside effects of the second order, the good produced is just the same, is just as valuable, as if it had for its final and efficient cause the purely social principle. Benevolence, to what does it owe its value? To this and this alone, viz. its tendency and aptitude to produce the effects of beneficence. [1]

This, it may be seen, is of the number of the cases in which, so it be not carried to any such length as to act in opposition to self-regarding interest [or] to the rules of probity, no care[2] need be attached to the case of preventing the affection from running into excess.

Proportioned to the value of the services,[3] in all shapes, which a man is regarded as qualified by ability and inclination to render to all such as happen to be within the field of his activity, will naturally be the number of those who, each of them having in any shape a demand for those his services, will enter into a sort of competition with one another for the benefit of those services. In this case, as in every other case of competition, each known competitor without exception will be to every other an object of jealousy: each competitor, in proportion as the share he is thought to have obtained is regarded as greater than the share which another has obtained, will be to that other an object of envy. Pain in every shape having for its natural concomitant an affection more or less intense of ill-will towards every person who is regarded as instrumental in the production of it, especially if he be knowingly and willingly instrumental—and ill-will having for its natural accompaniment the desire of inflicting or seeing inflicted, producing or seeing produced, pain in some shape or other upon every person who is the object of it—and one mode of inflicting pain on any person being the lowering him in the estimate of those with whom it may happen to him to have dealings, to diminish the quantity of respect paid to him—hence it is that upon the

[1] The following paragraph is from xv. 273[v].

[2] MS orig. 'anxiety*.

[3] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 157), Bentham wrote the following note: '2. Pride 3. General Selfishness. Why for his own sake should not a man render to a patron those services at least which he would render out of sympathy to one from whom he could not expect any return. How men assuage and satisfy themselves *a inferiors*' for the coercion self-imposed for ingratiation with superiors. Superiors sometimes know their gre for this.' The sheet also has the heading '2. Opposition made by an error of the popular or moral sanction to the pursuit of the pleasures of amity*.

whole tenor of his general deportment, and in particular that part which bears relation to the person whose expected good offices form the object contended for | |?

Meantime, there exists a prize[1] [2] for which this man, as well as every other, is a competitor. This prize is general esteem or good repute. There exists at the same time a tribunal, a judicatory, before which the contention for this benefit is perpetually carried on. This judicatory is the tribunal of the popular or moral sanction: the judicatory of which every man who chooses to take part in the business is a member. Under this judicatory, every one whose endeavour it is by alleged facts or inferences from those facts to detract from the quantity of public esteem bestowed upon the obnoxious person, acts as informer: by him the deportment[3] and character of every person whom he takes for the object of his hostility [are][4] represented in an unfavourable light. In particular, the motives to the operation of which his conduct is attributed are the least reputable, the least honourable, the least popular of all those by which such his deportment is regarded as capable of having been produced; and if in the motive considered in itself there is nothing disreputable, nothing objectionable, the name by which it is mentioned and brought to view is one of those dyslogistic appellations which for every sort of motive the authors of language have in the language of every nation provided in such abundance.

Servility: in this single term, though no inconsiderable number of synonyms and quasi-synonyms might be found for it, may be comprised the substance of the accusations which on this occasion are in use to be preferred.

To the imputation which this word is employed to convey no precise idea being attached, it is therefore but so much the more impressive: and great and constant are the privations and inconveniences to which, by the fear of it, many a man has been made to subject himself.

When examined into, it will be found to mean neither more nor less than the habit of rendering to the superior in question this or

[1] This extremely long and complex sentence is evidently incomplete. It may be noted that, when this group of MSS was ‘marginalised’ by one of Bentham’s amanuenses, the attempt to summarize this paragraph was followed by the note ‘Not understood’; and Bentham himself wrote in the margin below that note, ‘Abridge this?’ (A transcript of the marginals for this section, written on 5 Oct. 1814, and headed ‘Deontology. Ch. I I Pleasures of Amity’ is on xv. 272^{v}.)

[2] MS orig. preferred to alt. ‘benefit’.

[3] MS orig. ‘conduct’: it is possible that Bentham intended ‘deportment’ as an alternative to the entire phrase ‘conduct and character’.

[4] MS ‘is’.

that service which to a person in his situation according to the received notions of propriety, *ought not,* by a person in the situation in which the inferior is, to be rendered.

To form an apt ground for the decision called for by the question, 'What are the services which, in the case in question, may be rendered, what are those which, in that same case, ought not to be rendered?', the same course of enquiry which has been applied to the pleasures and pains derived from the several preceding sources will serve with equal effect for this.

In the instance of every person without exception, to render to him whatsoever services it may be in a man's power to render, without violation of the dictates of probity or those of prudence, is the obvious and indisputable dictate of that virtue of beneficence in which benevolence is comprized.

For constituting in this case not merely a sufficient warrant, but a sort of quasi-obligatory* mandate, the force of benevolence is, even by itself, sufficient: even supposing no weight to be added, can it be that any should be defalcated by the concurrent force of the virtue of prudence?

On this occasion as on so many others may be seen two opposite sets of antagonizing forces: the one set, that of the impelling; the other that of the restraining motives or considerations.

To the proper influence of the impelling forces there can be no other limits than those which are set by the cohibitive forces.

The field which by its actual exercise the virtue of beneficence is capable of occupying and filling with efficient services rendered to the whole of humankind taken together is, even when taken at its simplest, extremely narrow: much more narrow must be that part of it which can apply and confine itself to the demands of any single individual or particular assemblage of individuals.

It has been already shewn, that if it were possible that every man should on all occasions, or even with very few exceptions on any occasion, sacrifice to the interest of all mankind in general, or any portion large or small of mankind, his own personal interest, far from being benefited by any such disposition, the whole community—were it possible such a disposition should be carried into act—would speedily be destroyed by it.

Self-regarding prudence concurs, therefore, with probity and indeed suffices of itself, within the field of its dominion, to set limits, and those comparatively very narrow ones, to the exercise of the virtue of beneficence.

' MS orig. 'an obligatory mandate'. Above 'quasi-' Bentham has written the word 'morally'---- whether as an addition or as a third variant is not clear.

But in the case here in question, by the very supposition, in favour of the particular individual in question, viz. the supposed superior, to a very considerable extent self-regarding prudence, so far from prohibiting, prescribes and enjoins the profiting of every proper occasion to render him service.

To render him service—but in what quantity? Answer: to the amount of the utmost quantity that can be rendered under a sufficient assurance that the value of the service received in return will not be less than the value of the suffering which, in the shape of self-denial and self-sacrifice, is incurred in the course of the exertions necessary to the endeavours to render those same services.

In the case of this inexplicit as in the case of the most explicit commerce the rule of prudence that applies to the quantum of expenditure is the same. No expense is detrimental that brings with it or draws after it an equivalent: no expense fails of being beneficial,
i.e. of being productive of net[1] profit, that draws after it an equivalent with a balance.

Here then, as in every part of the field of commerce, prudence—self-regarding prudence—according to circumstances acts in opposite directions: prescribing expenditure in so far as it promises to be attended with more than equivalent profit; inhibiting on all occasions its advance beyond that line.

That propriety, in this case as in every other, inhibits the exercise of an act of beneficence, as of self-regarding prudence, wherever that exercise cannot be performed without a breach in the virtue of probity, has in every instance been observed, and in the present instance the bare mention of it is sufficient.

Of the restraining forces capable of applying to this case, remains that of self-regarding prudence?

But the dictates of self-regarding prudence, on this as on every other occasion, where are they? By what are they determined? By the balance of an account which has in it as many separate heads as there are species of pleasures and species of pains. With few or no exceptions, prudence supposes and requires the sacrifice of pleasure and exemption on the one hand to pleasure and exemption on the other. On every occasion pleasure and security in one shape are liable to find their rival in pleasure and security in some other shape or shapes.

In the present instance, the pleasures of amity find a constant rival in the pains of the popular or moral sanction.

Rendered in certain forms, service is disreputable [and] exposes

[1] MS 'neat'.

to general contempt the individual by whom it is rendered. Render those which would be warranted by virtue, by probity, by beneficence—by self-regarding prudence at large[1]—Fashion applies to pursuit of pleasure, security, *advantage* in a word from this source, variety of exceptions: exceptions in no small degree multitudinous and various.

In different stages of civilization the description of these has experienced corresponding variations. In general, the larger the scale of rank, i.e. the greater the distance between the highest and the lowest station, the less extensive has been the mass of restraint opposed by Fashion to the pursuit of advantage from this source—in other words, the greater the latitude that has been left to this pursuit; the less the distance between the highest and the lowest of these stations, the less extensive is the latitude allowed to this same pursuit, the more numerous and extensive the restrictions.

Go back in the field of *time.* In the reign of Elizabeth, in conduct, in deportment, and particularly in language, among the manifestations of obsequiousness many could universally be placed to the account of propriety, of prudence, and even of good breeding, which now would be placed to the account of undue obsequiousness, of servility, of meanness, of baseness, and in consequence draw upon the individual in question a full measure of general[2] contempt.

Go back in the field of *place.* Turn to any of the Mahometan, to any of those called Oriental nations. In those countries—under their governments—degrees not numerous, but the distance between degree and degree enormous.[3] There, unless in so far as inhibited by probity, no obsequiousness is undue. To how low soever a pitch carried, self-abasement is self-preservation. Carried to whatsoever excess, servility is but conformity to the laws of prudence.

[Bending][4] or, as the phrase is, cringing and fawning to his superiors, the same man is stiff and even insolent to his inferiors. Nothing is more frequently observed: nothing more natural. For the suffering to which he subjects himself in the one case, he makes amends by the enjoyment of the same kind which he gives himself in the other.

At the same time, by and [in] proportion to the gratification he thus affords to the sentiment of pride, he provokes enmity, and through enmity ill offices, and through ill offices, the suffering of which in all imaginable shapes, they are capable of being the cause.

[1] MS orig.'in other shapes'. [2] MS orig.'popular'.

[3] MS has, after the word 'governments', the clause 'though between the highest and the lowest station the distance is infinite'; but this clause appears to have been superseded by the last eight words of the sentence.

[4] MS 'Unbending', which in the context of the sentence is incorrect.

By self-indulgence in this shape is he upon the whole of his account a loser or a gainer? On which side the balance is will depend partly upon idiosyncratic taste, partly upon accidents.

1.21

FICTITIOUS ENTITIES DERIVING THEIR IMPORT FROM THE PLEASURES AND PAINS OF THE POPULAR OR MORAL SANCTION[1]

Of the names of fictitious entities the import[2] of which is derived from the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction, the following may serve for a list:

1. Reputation
2. Honour
3. Renown
4. Fame
5. Glory
6. Dignity.[3]

They have all of them one thing in common, viz. that they are so many fictitious objects of possession—or (as it is said for shortness) so many possessions.

One particular circumstance there is by which, while they agree with one another, they are distinguished from most if not all other possessions or objects of possession, viz. that the love and desire of them is scarcely[4] capable of being carried to excess. Whatsoever portion of them in this particular,[5] so far as words and sentimentality can go, the value of them, or at any rate the propriety of the attachment of which they are the object, is placed even above that of money. The attachment to money is universally acknowledged to be capable of being carried to excess: the attachment to these is commonly regarded, or at least spoken of, as *not* being capable of being carried to excess.

In the opinion which, by means of the eulogistic character acquired

' The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 166-73) were written on 9 Oct. 1814 under the following heading: 'Logic or Ethics. Ch. or Sec. | | Fictitious Entities deriving their import from the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction—their import—their pernicious *[orig.* corruptive] influence.'

[1] MS orig. preferred to alt. 'essence' in conformity with the title of the section.

[3] At this point Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Examine whether this list be compleat: if not compleat it---------see *Springs Table.'* Cf. *A Table of the Springs of Action,* p. 83 above. The word 'Reputation' in the list is bracketed for possible omission.

[4] MS orig. 'not'.

[5] MS orig. preferred to alt. 'by this ground'.

by the names of these several possessions, is expressed and disseminated as often as these names are employed, may be seen one of the most fruitful sources of improbity and consequent mischief that are any where to be found.

Whatsoever means a man has in his power, those means it is proper —it is much more than proper—he should employ in the endeavour not only to preserve at any rate whatsoever stock it may happen to him to be already in possession of, but to be perpetually making to that stock the most copious additions possible.

Hence the mischief of which they are apt to be productive is great in proportion to the magnitude of the field of action over which the influence of the person by whom these notions are imbibed extends, and to the magnitude of that influence.

Confined to' the field of virtue belonging to an individual, to a private person the mischief is at its *mininum.* Operating upon a national or international scale, it is at its *maximum.*

Confined[2] to *private* concerns,[3] the only mischief of which the use of these appellations is liable to be productive is the danger to life by the practice called duelling: and in this instance, though the good (viz. the repression of offensive deportment) is no more than what is capable of being produced by other and less expensive means, yet some good there is to set in the balance against the mischief.

Applied to *national* and *international* concerns, they operate as incentives to misrule in the shape of usurpation of power, or to war—i.e. to murder, rape, depredation and destruction upon the largest scale.

One element upon which the magnitude of the mischief depends is consequently the quantity of power belonging to the situation of him by whom the notions thus disseminated are imbibed. For abuse of power, or to speak still more largely, abuse of influence, is the immediate source of the mischief which it is their tendency to produce.

First, suppose the situation that of the Sovereign. The field of his action will be either *national* or *international.* In so far as his own subjects are the persons in his dealings with whom, and at whose expence, these possessions—this honour, glory, fame, renown, encrease of dignity—are to be acquired, the mischief to the production of which the language in question leads is invasion of popular rights and, in case of non-resistance, oppression and misrule, in case of resistance, civil war.

In so far as the rulers and subjects of any foreign state are the persons in his dealings with whom, and at the expence of whom, these

[1] MS orig. 'Operating upon'. [2] MS orig. 'Applied'. [3] MS orig. 'life'.

same possessions are to be acquired, the mischief is that of war at large, alias foreign war: which being interpreted is murder, robbery, rape, depredation and destruction carried on upon the largest scale, at the expence as well of his own subjects as of the ruler and subjects of the foreign state.

Of this all-comprehensive mass of wretchedness and profligacy, of these all-comprehensive enormities, it is only the sovereign alone that can be the actual and principal perpetrator. But the function of instigator, of would-be accessory before the fact, is a part which in the situation of subject it is open to every man to operate: in the situation for example of official Cabinet counsellor, or member of a popular assembly, member of a free and unofficial association, or, to speak of that which though last mentioned is not least, that of conductor of a public[1] newspaper.

That the quantity of these ideal possessions which, in the situation of sovereign, it will be in a man's power to possess will be in proportion to the quantity of power in the *international* and in the *national* sense which he possesses—the power which he and his subjects possess with reference to the rulers and subjects of other nations, and the power which he possesses with reference to and at the expence of his own subjects—is manifest enough. But according to the notions respectively attached to these names, the desire of national honour, national glory, national fame, national renown, national dignity, can not be carried to excess. Therefore neither can the desire of the sole and necessary means by which a man can acquire these same invaluable possessions be carried to excess: the respective means viz. foreign conquest, usurpation foreign and domestic, murder, rape, depredation and destruction committed abroad, committed at home, committed every where; the desire and endeavour to committ or cause to be committed all those acts which, when committed by unofficial hands, are spoken of and punished in the character of crimes. Therefore neither can criminality in any shape be carried to excess.

That instances may here and there be found in which, by exertions other than those which as above consist in abuse of power, the class of possessions here in question are now and then spoken of as having been obtained is not to be denied: for instance by the enactment of new laws, by the manifestation of the virtue of justice in transactions with foreign nations.

But it is only by a long continued series of operations carried on in these directions respectively, or by some one operation carried on upon a scale of extraordinary magnitude, that by any such innoxious

[1] MS orig. 'political'.

means any the least particle of these brilliant possessions is commonly spoken of as having been acquired: and when any portion of them is spoken of as having by any such means been acquired, the magnitude ascribed to it is so small, that in comparison of that which is continually spoken of as acquirable and acquired by those pernicious and flagitious means, it shrinks into insignificance.

If these observations are well-grounded, the consequence seems to be that, in so far as, without confining the recommendation to the particular cases in which of these same brilliant possessions some small stock is considered as acquirable by innoxious means, a man speaks of them in terms of which the tendency is to engage men in the indiscriminate endeavour to acquire them by any means, and thence—by these same flagitious means, the part he acts is that of a species of malefactor, in comparison of whom a common incendiary is as much inferior in the scale of mischievousness as the greatest quantity of mischief in all shapes capable of being perpetrated by a single act of incendiarism is inferior to the greatest quantity of mischief capable of being perpetrated by a foreign or domestic war.

One supposition[1] there is—and but one—in which, taken as above according to the import commonly attached to them, these exciting sounds[2] might be innoxious. This is where, instead of covering in its application a whole nation or its rulers, it is not only confined to the class of military men, but, in its application to them, confined to the time of actual warfare.[3]

The mischief would be no worse, nor any other than that of an inapposite and incongruous expression, if by the acquisition of these tinsel possessions nothing else were either meant or supposed to be meant than the advancement of the public and general *interest* of mankind, or even of the political state to the use of which all this stock of honour, glory, fame, renown, and dignity was to be purchased.

But no: when these radiant possessions are in view, of no such sordid object as that which is designated by the term ‘interest’ is any account to be taken, any provision made. To them, or though it be but to the hope of them, on every occasion is that coarse and vulgar possession to be sacrificed: to *that,* on no occasion is the sacrifice of any the least particle of any of them ever to be made.[4]

[1] MS orig. ‘case’.

[2] MS orig. ‘words’. Bentham also wrote above the line, presumably as a further alternative to ‘exciting words/sounds’, the single word ‘stimuli’.

[3] At this point in the MS (xiv. 171) Bentham wrote the following note to himself: ‘Go on to say that it is not thus confined. The poison conveyed by it is inhaled by the whole people, as well as by its rulers.’

[4] At this point in the MS (xiv. 172) Bentham wrote the following note to himself: ‘Add yet national interest may be more undeviatingly and unexcep-

After exception made of the comparatively narrow field of action above indicated, power being the net by the employment [of] which the brilliant possessions here in question are fished for,[1] the pursuit of the pleasures of the popular or moral sanction by this track coincides with the pursuit of the pleasures of power: and, as above, it is not by the use of that instrument but by the abuse of it that in this case these pleasures are endeavoured to be attained.

Striking is the contrast here exhibited by the composure with which the application of these stimuli with the effect, if not for the purpose, of engaging men in the pursuit of these most pernicious of all pleasures to excess is commonly contemplated, and the jealousy with which the pursuit of the pleasures of sense, and in particular those of the sexual appetite, are[2] regarded. Yet how vast the superiority of the least mischief produced by the excessive pursuit of the pleasures of the moral or popular sanction—of the pleasures derivable from power so employed—[to][3] the greatest mischief producible by the pursuit of any of the pleasures of sense![4]

tionably pursued—pursued without danger to probity or prudence—than private interest. By acquisition of territory by conquest, private interest may be advanced: not so public, neither by conquest nor by colonisation: the interest of the *ruling few,* yes; but not that of the subject many.' It may also be worth recording some notes Bentham wrote at the top of this sheet, evidently as a sketch (not fully worked out in the text) of what he intended to say: 'Rudiments—The sacrifice of even national interest to these *summum bonums* is prescribed as a duty. But in international concerns interest should be the only word interposed. Improbity is frequently the interest of an individual, never that of a *nation.'*

[1] Bentham originally wrote 'the instrument by which the brilliant possessions here in question are sought after'. He then inserted the words 'the employment', omitting the consequential 'of', and the alternative readings 'net' and 'fished for'. This version has been preferred in the text to what seems to have been a third variant-----'the instrument. . . are endeavoured to be acquired'.

' MS 'is'.

[3] MS 'and'. Bentham first used the inappropriate construction 'superiority between . . . and', then replaced 'between' with 'of', but omitted the consequential change at this point.

* At this point in the MS (xiv. 173) Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Go on to state the certain good of pleasures] of sense allayed only by uncertain evil, and *per contra* the absence of all good derivable from the pursuit of power *so* pursued.' Such a continuation, however, is not to be found in extant MSS.

1.22

OF PRIDE AND VANITY[1]

Pride and vanity, if they be both of them explained, must, to be clearly explained, be explained together. For the explanation of them, the same medium of explanation will be seen to be necessary. This is the popular or moral sanction: including the pleasures and the pains, and consequently the interests, desires, and motives which belong to it: the desires and consequently esteem—the ideal possession which is the object of those desires.

Esteem—the esteem of that portion of the human race upon which his well-being is regarded by him as in any way depending—is, to the proud man and the vain man, the common object of their thoughts.

With regard to each of them, two questions are continually presenting themselves: two questions having, both of them, a manifest influence on practice. Pride: 1. Is it of the nature of virtue or of the nature of vice? 2. If of the nature of virtue, of what virtue? If of the nature of vice, of what vice? And so in regard to vanity.

To the proud man as such, and to the vain man as such, esteem is an object of love and relish: consequently more or less so of desire.

But in the proud man as such, this desire of esteem is accompanied with a contempt, that is disesteem, for the persons whose esteem is the object of his desire: which, on the part of the vain man as such, is not the case.

Bulk for bulk, the value of the object being so much less in the eyes of the proud man than in those of the vain man, to obtain a given degree of gratification, the proud man must regard himself [as]

[1] The MSS for this section, UC xiv. 242-54, are in Bentham's hand, apart from the greater part of 242 together with 243 and 251-2. They were written on 11-13 Aug. 1819, under the heading 'Deontology. I. Theoretical. Ch. I I Of Pride and Vanity'. An earlier, inchoate discussion of the topic on what would apparently have been broadly similar lines is found in xiv. 100-2. The latter MSS, in Bentham's hand throughout, were written on 12 Sept. 1814 under the heading 'Logic or Ethics', subsequently deleted and replaced by 'Deontology', and the chapter-heading'Vanity andPride'. The inscription on the small brown folder enclosing xiv. 100-2 indicates that the theme 'Of Vanity and Pride' was at that stage conceived as part of a general discussion of 'Propriety with reference to the Pleasures and Pains of the Popular or Moral Sanction'. Even in 1819 Bentham had not fully made up his mind how best to treat this part of the subject. At the top of xiv. 242 he wrote the following note, dated 22 Dec. 1819: 'Quere notwithstanding the intimacy of the relation whether for simplicity of conception, in rewriting, it might not be better to consider one of them at a time: explaining that first, and then the othei- with reference to it.'

in possession of a quantity of it greater than what would suffice to afford the same degree of gratification to the vain man.

This being the case, the state of the proud man's mind is commonly a state of dissatisfaction: a dissatisfaction which very commonly makes itself manifest in and by his countenance.

Melancholy, and malevolence, one or both, in more or less proportion may accordingly be stated as constant concomitants or accompaniments of pride. Whether in the character of causes or in the character of effects seems not very easy to distinguish: probably, very commonly in both characters.

Hilarity, in a proportion more or less considerable, is, in the same way, a very frequent, not to say a constant, accompaniment of vanity: hilarity and not unfrequently benevolence. From small manifestations of esteem, vanity, in proportion to its intensity, receives large gratification: the smaller, the more easily had; the more easily had, the more frequently; and the more frequently, the more frequent the causes of exhilaration.

Pride is naturally conjoined with taciturnity; vanity, with talkativeness. The proud man sits still, waiting for those demonstrations of esteem which, with more or less of expectation, it is his wish to receive, and which would not be indicative of a quantity sufficient to afford him a gratification unless they were spontaneous. He will not, or at least likes not to, call for them: he is content, or at least disposed, to wait for them. But to do so effectively he must, in a certain degree, possess the faculty of self-command. Esteem is the food he hungers for. His meal must be a full one, but he is able to fast.

Not so the vain man. His appetite is still keener than that of the proud man. But though no quantity of that ill food will definitively satiate it, yet a small quantity suffices to gratify it, and for a time to satisfy it. He therefore goes from door to door, and at every door calls for the food for which he has a perpetually self-renewing appetite.

When used in a good sense, the quality ascribed to [pride] is that of virtue: when in a bad sense, that of vice.

Taken by itself, i.e. without an adjunct, 'pride' is scarcely ever used otherwise than in a bad sense. With a suitable adjunct, it may indeed be used in a good sense: witness, 'honest', 'becoming', 'dignified' pride. But even here the notion of a want of strict propriety is apt to attach to it. When thus employed, the sense given to it is apt to present itself as being somewhat of the figurative and rhetorical cast.

'Pride', the word itself, yes. Not so its conjugate 'proud': at any rate when applied to a man and[1] employed to denote this part of

[1] MS has the interlinear insertion 'it is' before 'employed'; but the insertion seems unnecessary.

the character or the cast of mind of the man. Say ‘a proud man’: the intimation you thereby give is—that so far as regards this part of it his cast of mind is vitious.

‘A proud day’, you may say: ‘a proud situation’, you may say: and in this indirect way give intimation of an occasion on which pride may be ascribed to a man without its being a vitious pride.

Vanity is still worse dealt with. Vanity you can scarcely ascribe to a man without marking him out as being, as far as concerns this part of his character, an object of contempt or disesteem: an object, and that a fit one. Scarcely has ever been said, scarcely without impropriety could be said, ‘honest’, ‘becoming’, ‘dignified’ vanity.

‘A proud day’, you may say: ‘a proud situation’, you may say. But ‘a vain day’ you can not say: ‘a vain day’ nor yet ‘a vain situation’.

What, for practical purposes, in regard to pride, is on each occasion wanted, is to know whether it is of the nature of virtue or of the nature of vice. If of the nature of virtue, it will be referable either to the head of prudence or the head of benevolence (including beneficence). If of the nature of vice, it will be referable either to the head of imprudence, or to the head of maleficence. And so in regard to vanity.

And thus, and for the first time, we shall find clear ideas to attach to these appellatives which are in such constant use, which every day of the year are in the mouth of every body.

If pride be a modification of the desire of esteem, this description of it shews of itself that, whether in every given instance it be or be not of the nature of virtue, instances there can not but be in which it is of the nature of vice. Why? Because, though in most points the dictates of the popular or moral sanction, at least in a country [as] civilized as Europe in general is,[1] coincide with those of the principle of utility, yet, as yet, in no country do they in all points.

In regard to pride, and so in regard to vanity, whether the disposition shall have in it more of a tendency to[2] virtue or more of the character of vice, seems to depend in some measure upon the level occupied by the man in the scale of society.

As to pride—in the station of the ruling few, pride is more apt to dispose the mind to assume the character of vice than that of virtue. Vanity [is] more apt to dispose the mind to receive the character of [virtue].[3]

Pride, in the case in which it runs into vice, is the characteristic vice belonging to the station of the ruling few. Being, in a degree

[1] MS orig. ‘as Britain is’. [2] MS orig. ‘the character of’.

[3] MS ‘vice’, but the context seems clearly to demand ‘virtue’, in view of Bentham’s intended antithesis.

proportioned to his elevation, exempt from the need of spontaneous services at the hands of other men, to the man of rank the spontaneous services of other men, and thence their esteem, are to him, if not absolutely, comparatively at least, objects of indifference: and the less in his eyes is the need he has of their services, the less is he disposed to be at the expence of rendering services to them: even those services of urbanity which to him who renders them cost so little.

Pride therefore, in that situation, is apt to draw men aside from benevolence and beneficence: it presents to prudence, in the character of rivals, benevolence and beneficence.

In this same situation, contrary in this respect to those of pride are the suggestions of vanity. In consequence of the ever-craving appetite he has for esteem, he feels a constant demand, a demand at the hands of every one without distinction, for services of a certain cast: for those services, to wit, by which manifestations of esteem are made.

In that situation, accordingly, such is the tendency which vanity has to dispose men to benevolence and beneficence. Accordingly, those acts which, upon the face of them, have their efficient cause in pure benevolence—that is, in social sympathy, whether sentimental or reflective—have unquestionably in a very great part, though it is not possible to say in what part, their efficient cause in the self-regarding affection of vanity.

The effects of the act in question upon human feelings being given, whether it be in benevolence alone or in vanity alone, or in both together, and in that case in this or that proportion, that it has its efficient cause, is not worth regarding. But whereas neither in this part of the field of thought and action nor in any other do the dictates of the popular or moral sanction maintain a perfect coincidence with those of the principle of utility, hence it is that vanity will not, to the whole extent to which it operates, answer the purpose of and supersede the demand for benevolence and beneficence.

Whatsoever be a man's title to esteem, be it legitimate, be it illegitimate, by whatever display he makes of it, and in proportion to the extent of that display, he produces in the minds of other men a quality of competition for that same intangible source of pleasure. He produces in proportion to the success of such his display a portion of uneasiness. Vanity in a word, in this breast, calls into existence and thus into action the emotions, the affections, the passions, of envy and jealousy in those others: in each such breast, envy, from the notion of a man's not possessing so great a share, comparison made with that of the vain man, as he wished for; jealousy, in respect

of the fear of not possessing such comparative[1] share, or a share so much superior as he could have wished, in future.

In elevated life, the higher a man's station, the less is it apt to excite either envy or jealousy on the part of the subject many. Why? Because envy and jealousy can scarcely have place but in so far as competition has place, and the greater the distance between rank and rank, the less the room for competition.

At the same time, the higher a man's station, the greater the extent to which he is capable of exercising the faculty of beneficence: and in so far as it is in acts of beneficence that his vanity seeks its gratification, the consciousness or notion of esteem which he obtains by this means serves to counterbalance, and in general to outweigh, every pain and danger of which the envy and jealousy of others has its source, as well as the pain attached to the envy and jealousy in those breasts in which they respectively have place.

Not so in the station of the subject many. In that station, the ratio borne by his faculty[2] of exciting, by means of gratification afforded to his vanity, the emotions, affections and passions of envy and jealousy in the breasts of competitors, to his faculty of rendering useful services by the exercise of beneficence, is greater than in the station of the ruling few. By the superiority which his vanity may lead him to assume, by the claim he may be continually putting in to superior degrees in quantities of respect, 'the best wrestler on the green' may wound the feelings, and by that means call forth to a degree sensibly powerful the emotions of envy and jealousy in the breasts, of all the other wrestlers: while by all the services it is in his power to render, it may perhaps be out of his power to make any sensible addition to the happiness of any one of them, or indeed to the happiness of any other individual not comprised within his own domestic circle.[3]

Vanity is more nearly allied to benevolence: pride to self-regard and malevolence.

To each the object or end in view, [the] final cause of action, is the pleasure of the popular or moral sanction: esteem and respect at the hands of those with whom they have, or expect to have, to do.

The vain man regards himself as comparatively ill assured of the advantages which he is thus looking for at their hands. He is proportionably anxious to do what depends upon him towards the attainment

[1] MS orig. 'an equal'.

' MS orig. preferred to alt. 'means', to avoid the repetition of the latter word in the next phrase.

[3] At this point in the MS (xiv. 250) Bentham wrote the following note to himself: 'Consider the effects of pride on or with relation to prudence and benevolence in its application to the pleasure and desire of ingratiating oneself.'

of them: and for that purpose takes every occasion for making display of those endowments of his which, in his eyes, are the efficient causes of his title to those benefits and in which his hopes of obtaining them are accordingly founded. But to his purpose it is necessary that he should, moreover, to a certain degree possess their good will—-at any rate that he should not be an object of their ill will. Hence it is necessary, in effect, and at any rate in his eyes, that toward the persons in question his deportment should be conformable to the dictates of benevolence —of negative at least, if not effective, benevolence: that the sentiments produced by it as towards himself should be as far as possible those of esteem, which in its higher degrees is admiration—and by ill will or antipathy by whatsoever cause produced, the esteem and admiration, if not entirely excluded, are so in a greater or less degree.

As it is in general the object, so in general is it the effect, of the display he makes to afford more or less of pleasure to those in the eyes of whom he makes it. For by admiration surprise is excited, and a certain appetite—the appetite of curiosity, the love of the marvellous—more or less gratified.

But there are two cases in which this effect is liable to be not only counteracted and diminished, but reversed: 1. where the superiority displayed or the manner in which it is displayed is such as to produce humiliation, the sense of inferiority, in the breasts of those before whom the display is made; 2. this effect is proportionably encreased if in respect of the particular endowment in question, any particular competition as between a vain man and the persons in question happens to have place.

In so far as this is the case, benevolence and prudence concurr in recommending to him to abstain from his displays: benevolence because thereby on his part a pain of humiliation will be produced; prudence because in that case the passions of envy and jealousy, as towards himself will be apt to be excited and a sentiment of ill will, whence upon occasion the correspondent ill offices or withholding of good ones will be apt to be produced.[1]

Meanness has for its opposite, not so much pride as the compound appellative ‘elevation-of-mind’. But in the use of all these words there is much of indeterminateness. ‘Pride’, separately taken, is rather dyslogistic; ‘elevation of mind’ decidedly eulogistic.

So in regard to their opposites: ‘humility’ is rather eulogistic, ‘meanness’ dyslogistic. But in these two cases there is no such exact

[1] The next MS sheet (xiv. 253) is headed ‘Relation of Pride and Vanity to Meanness and Humility’, followed by this note: ‘See *Practical* Part. Deontology as applied to the relations between superior and inferior, viz. in the several scales of opulence, power and dignity, natural and fictitious.’

relation between opposites as that which has place between 'prudence' and 'imprudence', 'benevolence' and 'malevolence', 'beneficence' and 'maleficence'.

In the import attached to these words and the degree of approbation and disapprobation attached to the things signified by them, religion—the Christian [religion]—is apt to produce much wavering and inconsistency. In the Christian, there are two selves which are continually at variance: the original man of the world, and the religionist whom a Christian education has fastened upon his shoulders: the natural, *original* man, who in the path of life has[1] for his guide the imaginary directive[2] which has for its sanctionative appendage the popular or moral sanction; and the factitious[3] man who, in that same path, has taken the Bible, that is, on each occasion some one or other of its substitutes, the interpretations put upon it.

Thus, on many occasions, the same conduct which by the man of the world would be termed 'meanness', would by the man of Christ be termed 'humility'. But as the ideas respectively attached to these two words are most conveniently indeterminate, the man of the world, in his anxiety to avoid the reproach of meanness, receives not, when both are enclosed within the same instant, any very troublesome annoyance from any reproaches from the man of Christ on the score of a deficiency in the Christian virtue of humility.

To thicken the confusion, by the side of pride, elevation of mind, meanness and humility, comes and rests itself independence-of-mind.

For dispelling, as far as they are capable of dispelling, all these clouds, the nature of the case—in addition to the universally applicable instrument, the division of virtue into prudence and benevolence—affords one and but one instrument: the distinction between the desire and motive corresponding to the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction, and the motive corresponding to the pleasures and pains of amity—i.e. the desire of ingratiating oneself, not with indeterminate individuals as in the other case, but with determinate individuals.

Between the two desires, conflict will frequently be found to have place, they prescribing different and opposite lines of conduct: by which of them conduct shall be determined, it will be for prudence to decide.[4] As for benevolence, scarcely in these cases will it be found to have any application.

[1] MS 'takes', the words 'in the path of life has' being a subsequent interlinear insertion.

[2] MS orig. 'the law'.

[3] MS orig. 'engrafted', then 'adscititious'.

[4] Bentham has added here the following note: 'See *Practical* Part. Prudence, Self-regarding Prudence.'

As to humility, in so far as the conduct belonging to it comes under the head of virtue, that which is designated by it, taken in its most extensive acceptation, seems to be a modification of benevolence, namely, benevolence of the *negative* kind, considered as opposed to the so comprehensive view comprehensible under the name of selfishness.

On all the occasions here in question, as on all other occasions, the one thing needful is for a man to know what will be most conducive to his own happiness: to his own and, on that account, to the happiness of all such other persons whose happiness is in any way at stake. In so far as this point can be satisfactorily determined, whether to the line of conduct prescribed by such regard to human happiness, this or that one of the several appellatives of 'pride', 'elevation of mind', 'independence of mind', 'humility', or 'meanness' [should be ascribed] is but a question of words—a question concerning the import of words and as such, except in so far as the affections of other men are influenced by their association with those words, of no practical importance.

The misfortune is that, whatsoever may be the influence of the line of conduct in question on the sum of happiness, if it be ever so beneficial, still, if, for example, in the event of your pursuing it, it appears to a man that the quality designated by the term 'meanness' may with propriety be ascribed to it, you will, in proportion to the degree of meanness in question, be thereby rendered in the eyes of that man an object of disesteem or, say, contempt. And hence the call for engaging in a train of disquisitions affording so little satisfaction as those which have for their field the indeterminate and ever changing signification of terms designative of moral qualities or affections.

1.23

OF PURITY, CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO PAIN AND PLEASURE[1]

Arithmetical or *mathematical* on the one part, *rhetorical* on another, *physical* on a third—between these [three][2] senses in which the word

[1] The MSS for this section (UC xiv. 54-6) were written on 7 Sept. 1814 under the headings'Logic or Ethics. Ch. | I Object? § | I Purity and Impurity'. On the small brown folder in which these sheets were enclosed the heading 'Logic or Ethics' has been crossed out and replaced by 'Deontology. I. Theoretical'.

[2] MS 'two': Bentham at first referred only to the 'arithmetical or mathematical' and the 'rhetorical' uses of the terms under discussion, subsequently adding the 'physical'. In the margin at this point he wrote the further note: 'Add *economical* and *chemical?'*

purity has been employed, it is necessary in the highest degree to bring the distinction to view and place it upon the clearest ground. Throughout the whole field of morals, the solidity of the foundation built upon—the difference between sense and nonsense, between utilitarianism and asceticism, between wisdom in a word and folly—is in a predominant degree dependent upon it.

In the arithmetical or mathematical sense alone it is employed in this work or any other, unless it be with warning of the departure, of the author.

In this sense, a pleasure is impure exactly in so far as it is accompanied, pure in so far as it is unaccompanied, with feelings of the opposite quality, viz. with pains.

In this same sense, in regard to pains, what is equally manifest is that to them the attributives 'impurity' and 'purity' apply with exactly the same propriety as to pleasures.

In this sense then, in the account of well-being, by the help of the two words 'impurity' and 'purity' may be and are designated ideas no less clear than, in the account of money, those designated by the terms profit and loss. Purity is profit, impurity loss. The case of a pleasure preponderantly impure corresponds to the case of a money account of profit and loss, in which the balance is on the side of loss. The case of a pain preponderantly impure is the case of a money account in which the balance is on the side of profit.

In so far as by the medical practitioner, by the domestic ruler, or by the political ruler, whether in the character of a punishment inflicted in any other than a vindictive and tyrannic view, or in the character of a burden imposed for the purpose of producing a correspondent and preponderant benefit, pain is produced, it is produced in the design and with the endeavour that it should be as impure as possible.[3]

[a] For a grammatical purpose, if not with equal profit nor yet with equal expressiveness, at any rate with equal innocence, the words 'purity' and 'impurity' have been employed, as well as, in this discourse and others of the same author's,[*] [1] in the above-mentioned arithmetical or mathematical sense. In the Westminster Grammar,[2] if preceded by a vowel, a letter, be it vowel or consonant, is termed 'pure': if by a consonant, 'impure'. The analogy from the observation or imagination of which a connection was considered as subsisting between the original and archetypal, viz. the physical, sense of the terms and the import thus assigned to them, has not been found perceptible.

[1] MS orig. 'as well as by moralists in the above-mentioned . . .'. Bentham apparently decided to substitute a reference to his own use of the terms in this sense, though it is not clear to what 'other' discourses of his he could be referring.

[1] The reference is to the opening lines of *Rudimentum grammaticae latinae metricum, in usum Scholae Regiae Westmonasteriensis,* London, 1770.

Of all the several distinguishable conceptions that have ever been annexed to the attribution ‘pure’, the most original and most extensively annexed seems to be that in which it is employed to designate the absence of every substance which, being liable to be found mixed with the substance in question—with the substance to which this attribute is stated as belonging—is different from it and foreign to the purpose, whatsoever it be, for which it is proposed to be employed.

When employed for drink or in the preparation of food, water is liable to be in a state of mixture or combination with a variety of substances many of which would render it less fit, none more fit, for the purpose for which it is employed. In proportion as it is free from all such foreign admixture, it is accordingly termed ‘pure’; in proportion as any such foreign substance is regarded as being mixed or combined with it, ‘impure’.

Flour[1] would be rendered impure by an admixture of coal dust. Coals themselves, when in a scuttle, would be rendered impure by a sprinkling of flour or hair powder.

When the foreign part is regarded as unwholesome or offensive to sense, proportioned to the supposed degree of unwholesomeness or the degree of offensiveness, whether to sense or to imagination, is the degree of intensity ascribed to the impurity.[2]

1.24

OF THE PASSIONS[3]

For the nature of the passions, refer to the list of pleasures and pains; for the principles by which they are to be governed, to the list of virtues and vices.

Take, for example, the passion of anger. When operated upon by that passion, a man is suffering a pain—a pain of mind produced by the consideration of the act of some other person, of an act by which the passion has been excited.

Of the pain thus suffered one consequence is a desire to produce in the breast of the party by whom the anger has been excited a pain in some shape or other according to circumstances. Here then are

[1] MS ‘flower’.

[2] The discussion breaks off at this point (xiv. 56). It is clearly incomplete, but no continuation or related material has been found.

[3] The MSS for this section are UC xiv. 256-63. The first four sheets are dated 1819 and headed ‘Deontology private. Theory. The Passions’; the last four sheets are dated 31 Oct. 1819 and headed ‘Deontology. Passions. 1. Anger’. All the MSS are in the hand of an amanuensis, apart from the heading on p. 260 which is in Bentham’s hand; and the sheets are numbered 1-8.

two constant ingredients in the case of anger: pain suffered by one, viz. the angry man; a desire to produce pain in another, viz. the person by whom he has been made angry.

Now as to the virtues and vices which have application to the case, viz. the two all comprehensive virtues, and the two vices, their respective opposites.

In the first place, no anger without pain, but to do any thing by which a man draws pain upon himself, that pain not being compensated and over-balanced by more than equivalent pleasure, is what can not be done without imprudence; without violation of the law of self-regarding prudence.

Turn now to the next effect, viz. the desire to produce pain in the breast of the person by whose act or supposed act the passion has been excited. Here then is a desire to produce pain on the part of another. But setting aside any pleasure that may be produced or pain that may be excluded by means of the pain desired to be produced, here we have a desire which is endeavoured to be gratified and which can not be gratified without an act of malevolence and maleficence: without a violation of the law of benevolence. Thus in the case of anger we have an exemplification of the relation which has place on the one hand between passion on one part and pain and pleasure on the other, on the other hand between passion on the [one] part and vice and virtue on the other.

Question. Is it then true that no anger can have place without vice in both its modes; without violation of virtue in both its modes; without violation in the first place of the law of self-regarding prudence, in the next place of the law of benevolence?

The answer is, no; in so far as the emotion rises to the height of passion: and here should be added another, and though more remote, yet commonly much more mischievous, violation of the law of self-regarding prudence. The passion can not receive its gratification but pain is produced in the breast of the individual by whose act the passion has been excited. But neither in this breast can it have been productive of that effect without producing in that same breast, in so far as he is apprized of the cause whereby that pain has been produced, a counter desire to give birth on his part to pain in the breast of him by whom his pain had been produced. To the first pain, viz. that which has accompanied the birth of the passion of anger, there is always a termination, and that commonly a speedy one; but to the second and remote pain which may have constituted the third link in this chain of causes and effects, there is no certain termination. In the breast of the party of whom vengeance, as the phrase is, has been taken, anger in the more durable form in which it is called enmity

has been created, and to the duration of this permanent passion, or to the quantity of mischief to which it may happen to give birth, no determinate limits can be applied.

Since then anger can not have place without vice in both shapes, what is to be done? Can man exist without anger? Without anger can injuries be averted? Can self-defence, can self-preservation, be provided for?

Answer. Certainly not without production of pain in the breast of the individual by whom injury has been inflicted. But to the production of this pain, anger is not necessary. Anger is not necessary any more than on the part of a surgeon by whom, to save life, a limb is amputated, anger excited by view of the suffering of the patient and by contemplation of the still greater evil which without such amputation is about to have place, is necessary. That anger never should have place is not possible, is not consistent with the structure of the human mind. This, however, may be said, and without exception, that in every case the less there is of it the better: for whatsoever of pain is necessary to the production of the useful effect, will be much better measured out without the passion than by it.

Circumstances, it may be said, there are, in which not merely pain, the natural fruit of anger—pain purposely produced—but anger itself, the passion, is not merely useful to society but even necessary to its existence: the passion itself, and this so conditioned as not to be regulated according to the dictates either of self-regarding prudence or benevolence. These circumstances are no other than those which have place in this country throughout the whole field of penal jurisprudence. I have been robbed: the circumstances of the offence are such as, in case of conviction, subject the offender either to capital punishment or, at least, to transportation in a state of servitude. Shall I prosecute the offender? Not if self-regarding prudence, and she alone, is to be my counsellor; for what would be the result? To the loss sustained by the robbery I should add the further loss inflicted upon the prosecutor by the prosecution. Not if benevolence is to be my counsellor; for of benevolence, in my view of it, the response may be that the punishment is too great for the offence. Such accordingly is the response which, as everybody knows, is to a great extent considered by men as actually given in this case, in particular where the punishment is death. But of benevolence, if the matter were rightly considered, the response, it may be said, would be that prosecution should take place notwithstanding; and that for so important a good to the public at large neither the suffering of the offender, in the shape of punishment, nor the suffering of the prosecutor, in respect of expence and vexation, should be grudged.

Good. But in the first place, I can very ill afford it: so ill that the effect of suffering produced by the pecuniary burden upon me may be greater than any good, the uncertain and imponderable nature of it considered, that can be clearly seen [to][1] be sufficiently promised by the prosecution and its result.

In the next place, the responses of benevolence, be they ever so decisive, have no influence on me; or, what comes to the same thing, have no adequate influence. Here then in neither shape has virtue sufficient force to produce the effect in question: and yet without the frequent production of such an effect, the security of society would suffer a shock more or less grievous according to the failure in respect of frequency. And, supposing it never produced at all, security would be entirely destroyed, and the general destruction of property would be the result. This supposed virtue in both its forms is insufficient for the preservation of society. Anger, the passion, dissocial as it seems to be on first appearance, is indispensably necessary.

To these observations it seems not easy to oppose a refutative reply. But in this country in the present state of the laws, others there are by which it may be made appear that the necessity of the passion does not at any rate arise altogether out of the nature of the case, but is in no small degree produced by the imperfect state of the laws: insomuch that if in the particulars in question the laws were in the state in which they might be, the demand for anger, the passion, would, in no inconsiderable degree, be reduced.

In the first place comes the factitious part of the expense and vexation procured to the prosecutor by the prosecution: and so great is the factitious part, that in many instances, were it taken away, the response given by self-regarding prudence might be opposite to what it is.

In the next place comes the punishment, and so excessive in many cases is its severity, that if the excess were removed, in cases to no inconsiderable extent, if general opinion is to be trusted to, the response of benevolence would be opposite to what it is.

One thing is to be considered, that if you suppose a state in which the passion of anger were, generally speaking, in a state of subjection to the conjunct influence of the two all-comprehensive virtues, self-regarding prudence and benevolence, you would thereby suppose a state in which offences of the sort in question, and consequently the demand for anger in a state of excess beyond the limits prescribed by self-regarding prudence and benevolence, would be proportionably rare.

[1] MS‘should’.

Note, that in the present state of society, this is not the only case in which the dictates of general utility present an appearance of being in opposition to the dictates of the two virtues in question, all-comprehensive as, when taken together, they are. Thus would it stand if the welfare of society depended altogether upon the quantum of these two virtues having place in the breasts of individuals; but here comes the demand for the two virtues, and in particular for the virtue of benevolence, acting upon the national scale. Though in the breasts of individuals, individually taken, both virtues might join in inhibiting the gratification of the passion to the extent in question, benevolence, acting in the breast of the legislator upon the national scale, recommends the doing what seems conducive and necessary to the keeping it up beyond those limits to the extent required for the public purpose of keeping delinquency in general within bounds.

II.1

INTRODUCTION

(i) *Expository*[1]

'Deontology' is from the Greek. It is here used for no other reason than that there exists not in the original part of the English language any single word by which the same meaning can be expressed.

By Deontology, taken in its largest sense, is meant that branch of art and science which has for its object the doing on each occasion what is right and proper to be done.

In its ordinary acceptation however, the use of it was confined to that part of the field of thought and action which is considered as forming the subject matter of Government and Morality.

For distinction sake, in so far as it takes for its subject matter that part of the field to which Government applies itself, Public Deontology is the name that may be employed: in so far as the application of it is considered as confined to those parts of the field of thought and action which Government has left free, Private Deontology is the name that may be employed.

By Private Deontology considered as an art, understand the art of maximizing the net amount of happiness in that part of the field of thought and action which is left free by the power of law and government. To the words 'proper' and 'propriety', by this definition, the only end which is either intelligible or useful is assigned.

Considered as a science, it is the science by which a man knows how to exercise to advantage the art above defined.

On some occasions, the happiness a man is able to procure for himself may be procured independently of any relation he bears to others. To these occasions corresponds that branch of the art and science which may be designated by the appellation of 'purely self-regarding prudence'. On other occasions, a man's condition in respect of happiness is influenced by some relation that has place between himself and others: to these occasions corresponds a branch of the art which may be designated by the appellation of 'extra regarding prudence'.

[1] The MSS for this subsection are UC xiv. 274-5. The first sheet, which provides the first four paragraphs of the text, is dated 12 Aug. 1823 and headed 'Deontology Private. Practical Part. Beginning', and is in Bentham's hand; sheet 275, which provides the next four paragraphs, bears the same date but is in the hand of an amanuensis, apart from a few insertions made by Bentham.

On these occasions, a man's condition in respect of happiness is regarded by him either as influenced or as not influenced by the condition of others in respect of happiness. In so far as a man's condition in respect of happiness is regarded by him as being improved by the condition of others in respect of happiness, it is regarded by him as being improved by and in proportion to their happiness, or by and in proportion to their unhappiness. In the first case the branch of the art in question may be designated by the appellation of 'effective benevolence'; in the other case by that of 'effective malevolence'.

(ii) *Mode of exercising the function of the practical moralist*[1]

During the length of time in question—be it the whole of the man's life or this or that part of it—a man's well-being will be at a higher pitch, at the higher degree of the scale, the greater the quantity of pleasure and the less the quantity of pain which for and during that length of time he has experienced.

But, to encrease the amount of his own well-being is actually the object of every man's wish—of every man's endeavour, from the beginning of his life to the end of it, that part alone which is passed in sleep excepted.

But to each man what is pleasure? To every man what is the greatest pleasure? To every man what is pain? To every man what is the greatest pain? That which in his own judgment, assisted by his own memory, and through that printed upon his own feelings, is so. Reader, whoever you are, ask of yourself and answer to yourself these questions: Is there—can there be—that man who knows or who can know as well as yourself what it is that has given you pleasure or what it is that has given you most pleasure?

Of these observations[2] what is the obvious practical conclusion?

* The MSS for this subsection (UC xiv. 142-5 and 148-53) were written between 31 Aug. and 19 Sept. 1814. The original heading 'Logic or Ethics' has been replaced on several sheets by 'Deontology II. Practical'; and sheets 142-4, which are dated 31 Aug. 1814 and provide the text down to p. 251 at n. 2 below, are also headed 'Ch. 2. Modes of moralizing. § 1. Proper mode'.

[1] Above this paragraph, at the top of the sheet (xiv. 143), Bentham wrote the following notes:

'1. Each man best judge of what has been conducive to his own well being. Yes, if accustomed to correct and compleat reflection—and permitted by his passions to employ it.

'2. But in a book of practical Ethics, it is the *future* always that is in question and here right judgment depends upon ulterior reflection, and upon inference as to the most probable means.

'3. In regard to the future, enquirendum how far the pursuit of a mans own well-being requires for his own sake to be limited by a regard to the well-being of others.'

That, being the best judge for himself what line of conduct on each occasion will be the most conducive to his own well-being, every man, being of mature age and sound mind, ought on this subject to be left to judge and act for himself: and that every thing which by any other man can be said or done in the view of giving direction to the conduct of the first, is no better than folly and impertinence.

Even upon a nearer—even upon the closest view—such in truth it will be found to be.

But, specious as it is throughout, as well as in no inconsiderable part solid, it is not without exceptions, and those to no inconsiderable extent, that the proposition 'each man is the best judge of what is most conducive to his own well-being' will be found correctly true.

Of the practical moralist what then is the proper function? For the use of each man to lay before his eyes a sketch of the probable future more correct and compleat than, without the benefit of such suggestion, inflamed by the view of present or speedy pleasure or pain, men's appetites and passions will be apt in general to suffer them to draw for their own use: to assist them in making reflections and drawing comparisons—in taking a correct and compleat account of the past—and from thence in drawing inferences and forming eventual calculations and eventual conjectures in relation to the future; thereby to assist them—in the first place in the choice of subordinate, i.e. particular, *ends*—in the next place of the *means* through which the obtainment of those pleasures respectively shall be aimed at;[1] of particular *ends,* i.e. in regard to pleasure, the choice of the species of pleasures to be sought after and of the situations in which and occasions on which each pleasure shall be reaped; in regard to pain, the choice of the species of pains most studiously to be avoided.[2]

Of that which has presented itself as the proper office of the deontologist an indication has been already given: in itself it is neither more nor less than that of a *scout-,* a man who having put himself upon the hunt for consequences, for such consequences of a particular kind as have been found apt to result from a particular species of course, collects them as he can, and for the use of those who feel themselves disposed to accept of his services, spreads them out in their view.

In this mode of executing the office, how much there is of labour, how little of self-assumed importance, let any one judge.[3]

[1] The words from 'subordinate' to 'aimed at' are an insertion.

[1] The next MS sheet (xiv. 145) is dated 19 Sept. 1814 and headed thus: 'Ch. | | Of the Deontologist or Writing Moralist-------- proper and improper Modes of exercising this Function. § 1. Proper Modes.'

[3] At this point in the surviving MSS there are two sheets (xiv. 146-7) which are dated 31 Aug. 1814; 146 has the following headings, presumably intended as

Very different is the mode in which this office has with few if any exceptions been hitherto exercised.

The tone[1] of the Schoolmaster, or of the Magistrate—at any rate the tone of authority, is the tone in which he delivers himself. He alone is strong and wise and knowing and virtuous; his readers are weak and foolish and ignorant and vitious. His voice is the voice of power, and it is in the superiority of his wisdom that his title to that power is composed.

In what has thus been described no real mischief has yet been brought to view. If without prejudice to any one else the pride of the individual enjoys a gratification so much the better: it constitutes the matter of a reward—of a sort which if productive of real service would not be improperly employed.

The misfortune is, that in the case of this literary moral power, as in the case of political power, arrogance has for its natural attendants indolence and ignorance. Even when the laws or precepts, or by whatsoever other name the emanations of authority are called, are of a nature to afford good reasons, to give to these reasons due expression and arrangement is commonly a work of no inconsiderable difficulty: a task for which few indeed have hitherto been found competent. But on giving the laws or precepts themselves no difficulty at all is commonly attendant: it is an operation to the performance of which every man who has power is competent—the most foolish not less than the most wise. Ignorance has not a more convenient cloak than Arrogance.

Of the combination thus formed of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance, sufficient[2] exemplification and sufficient evidence will be found contained in the compass of a single word. This word is the word 'ought': to which will be to be added, according to the nature of the acts to which it is applied, the opposite expression 'ought not'.

You *ought* to act this way—you *ought not* to act that other way. To execute in this way the office of moralist requires nothing but the repetition of these expressions, coupled with the description of the species of actions which it is or is pretended to be the will of the writer to see exercised or not exercised.

alternatives: *§2. Usual and improper mode of exercising this function. §2. Hitherto ordinary mode of exercising the function of practical moralist—its arrogance, absurdity and facility'. These MSS have been omitted from the text as they appear to have been superseded by 148-9. The latter sheets, which provide the next nine paragraphs of the text, are dated 19 Sept. 1814 and headed thus: 'Ch. | | Deontologist's Office. § 2. Improper Mode'.

[1] MS alt. 'situation'.
[2] Word bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

These words—if for this one purpose the use of them may be allowed—*ought* to be banished from the vocabulary of Ethics.[1]

With few if any exceptions, open any book that takes for its subject any part of the field of morals, the following you will find is the state of mind in which he enters upon the subject: this is the use he makes of the word 'ought' and its contrary.[2] He begins with investing himself with the character if not of legislator, of preceptor of mankind: in conformity to this character he places himself in a commanding attitude, he expresses himself in a commanding tone. Whatsoever it would be his pleasure they should do, he tells men that they *ought* to do it: whatsoever it would be his pleasure to see them forbear doing, he tells them that they *ought not* to do it. 'I *ought* to do so,' should any one say, 'but *why* ought I?'—'I ought not to do so, but why ought I not?' To any such question no answer does he consider it as incumbent on him to give. Whatever it be, for the enforcement of which this language is employed, to say it *ought* to be done is easy in the extreme: easy to every man in proportion to the facility with which the component letters of the word 'ought' can be made to flow from his pen. To say *why* it ought will in every case be [a] matter of comparative difficulty, and in many cases, as for instance when that which is there recommended is what it too frequently is, *folly* or *improbity,* is not possible.

'Whatever it would be his pleasure to see done or forborne to be done'—no, not exactly so: the mode of prescription[3] here in question is frequently if not constantly, in a degree more or less considerable, the produce of a still more deeply seated cause. This cause is the advantage by the prospect of which in whatever shape or shapes the author was engaged to give utterance to such his discourse. In the composition of this inducement the part played as above by the love of ease can not in the nature of the case be other than a secondary one: this love of ease were it a primary object, to attain it the way would be not to write this thus glibly and concisely, but not to write at all.

On this occasion as on every other [the object][4] is the deriving from his labours *advantage*—advantage to himself—in whatsoever shape or shapes the situation he occupies in life affords him a prospect

[1] The next four MS sheets, which provide the remainder of the text of this subsection, are xiv. 150-3; they are dated 6 Sept. 1814 and are headed thus: 'Ch. | | Object. § | | Ought it not?'

[2] The last twelve words of this sentence are bracketed in MS for possible deletion.

[3] MS orig. 'species of doctrine'.

[4] The insertion of some such phrase seems necessary to complete the sense.

of being able to reap it: money, reputation, situation conferring both, jointly or severally. By prospects such as these are the cast and character and tenor of his discourse determined.

Severe he thus stands engaged to be—at any rate on the side of severity he beholds his safe side, and the only one that is so.

Reputation he must make sure of, at any rate, at any price. Reputation has its value not only on its own account, but on account of the proportionable profit—profit by the sale of his work—of which it is pregnant: this in certainty, not to speak of situation in contingency.

For the hope of reputation, one thing he must be sure to do—viz. to keep fair with public opinion, with public opinion taken as it is: to no current prejudice, to no generally prevalent bias, on any occasion, may his discourse in any part of it stand opposed.

1. Throughout the whole field, with very little exception, the bias of public opinion is on the side of severity. Why?—Because in every restraint or constraint imposed on his neighbour every man beholds an encrease of his power and a gratification to his pride and his vanity: provided always that by his own self-esteem joined to his own self love, some pretence, how slight soever, can be found for exempting himself from the general imputation and the consequences of the general law.

2. In the next place, be the practice in question what it may, the greater the severity manifested by him in speaking of it, the more generally obvious and natural the conclusion that he himself has ever been pure of it: for what so unnatural and improbable as that a man should be forward in passing condemnation on himself?

Thus it is that, by all these motives in which man's actions are most in use to find their cause, the moralist stands engaged to lean, and by constantly leaning constantly to err, on the side of *severity.* From laxity he has more or less every thing to fear—nothing to hope; from severity he has every thing to expect—nothing to fear. Thus it is that without reason and almost without thought, taking for his instruments these craven words 'ought' and 'ought not', he goes on laying on commands and prohibitions—imposing on mankind in both shapes those fictitious and metaphysical but not the less heavy and afflictive chains and burthens.

By the exercise of tyranny in this shape, thus it is that in so many agreeable and useful shapes profit is to be made. Scarce in any other way is any thing like equal profit to be made at so small an expence —[or] of any thing like equal profit, is the expence in the way of thought so inconsiderable. Applied to the description of the line of conduct which a man proposes to himself to recommend, the word 'ought', or applied to the description of the opposite line of conduct

the words 'ought not', are altogether sufficient for the purpose. Observation, enquiry, reflection—these and all other mental operations are altogether as superfluous as they are laborious. Wheresoever a man's *ipsedixit* passes for argument he has no need of any other.

Exercising themselves in this field, folly and arrogance, the blindest folly and the most assuming arrogance, find themselves altogether at their ease. By these physicians of souls, pleasures are ordered off the table—pains ordered instead of them—with as much ease as by the wand of the miserable physician the meats were ordered off the table of the famished Sancho.[1]

(iii) *Effective benevolence: its pleasures how new*[2]

In the history of the life of one of the Imperial Roman tyrants as delineated by Suetonius[3] a premium is mentioned as having been offered by him to him who should invent a new source of pleasure.

By it is not remembered what moralist—not improbably by a multitude of such moralists—this endeavour, howsoever ineffectual to add to the aggregate mass of human enjoyment, is numbered among the most obvious of the tyrant's crimes.

In every aggregate of human beings to a certain degree civilized—in every metropolis in particular—the premiums to an indefinite amount directed to the like object are virtually in a state of perpetual advertisement. To this head belong for example all theatrical exhibitions: all exhibitions of objects by the rarity of which the desire of obtaining perception of them is excited.

The tyrant in question being moreover a sensualist, and a sensualist taking for the source of his enjoyment the operation of the sexual organs, what seems to have been assumed by these moralists is that it was from that source in particular that it was the desire or expectation of the advertiser, or at any rate from some source of the pleasures of sense, that the desired new pleasure should be derived.

In China, for example, a mode is in practice of deriving, by titillation applied in a particular manner, for the organs of sight and hearing respectively a pleasurable sensation of the purely physical kind over and above those pleasures of a mixt kind of which in the practice of that as well as other countries they are the inlets or the seats.

[1] The reference is to the passage in *Don Quixote* (part II, chap. 47) in which the barber, by means of a whalebone wand, waves away the food set before Sancho Panza.

[2] The MSS for this subsection (UC xv. 90-2) are dated 5 May 1824 and have the general heading'Deontology private'.

[3] Bentham is probably alluding here to Suetonius' life of Tiberius, which records that he established a new office for the devising of novel pleasures (*Tiberius,* 42).

If this to us in Europe unknown pleasure is not attended with pain to a preponderant amount, no rational objection can be opposed to the use of it. The utmost that in that case can be said against it is that it is not a social pleasure: that by one and the same act, in no greater number of persons than one can the pleasure be produced at the same time.

But in this respect it is not below the level of that which is derived from tobacco: for example in the leaf, in the way of mastication, or in the shape of powder applied to the organ of smell. Upon the whole it will stand upon a higher level than that of taking tobacco in either of these forms: for taken in each of these shapes annoyance in some degree is not uncommonly afforded to those to whom the use of the drug does not in either of these ways afford pleasure; for by the spectacle of a person chewing tobacco the idea of uncleanliness is conveyed to spectators; and by the inhaling of tobacco in the form of snuff, and the excretions produced by it, the like uneasiness in a stronger degree of intensity is produced in many persons through the evidence of the olfactory as well as visual organ.

At any rate against no pleasure can any rational objection be found in the observation, supposing it ever so unquestionably true, that other pleasures superior to it are also within man's reach.

As to the pleasures of the eye and the ear in the Chinese taste as above, a notion also has place that in some way or other the enjoyment of the anomalous and new invented pleasure is prejudicial to health, and that in such sort that the pain resulting from it is, sooner or later preponderant over the pleasure. If in the report there be any truth, then in so far as it is true the objection against the endeavour to participate in them is a rational one.

Be this as it may, to this chapter and section belongs an aggregate of pleasures, to which at any rate any such objection as the above can not with truth be said to have any application. Taken in the aggregate they may be designated by the appellation of 'the pleasures of Effective Benevolence'.

What may be said of them with indubitable truth is that in no one of them would any thing be found but what not only has been experienced, but is moreover generally known to have been experienced.

Still, however, from the indication thus afforded the merit of novelty can not be said to be altogether excluded. For what is not, it is believed, as yet to be found in any book is any thing approaching to a compleat indication of the vast variety of acts by which from the source in question pleasure in various shapes may be said to flow.

Let us then suppose a premium for him who shall have succeeded in shewing the greatest variety of shapes in which pleasure derived

from this source may each of them in the greatest degree of magnitude-intensity, duration and extent taken together—be derived.

What follows in this work may as to a great part of it be considered as an Essay written and published for the hope of obtaining the premium which by a sort of fiction may be spoken of as having been offered: an allegation which, untrue as it is, can not be said to add to its untruth any of that moral depravity with which the fictions so denominated by the lawyer tribe are so disastrously abundant.

II.2

SELF-REGARDING PRUDENCE

(i) *Command of mind over thoughts*[1]

Instructions for the management of the thoughts suppose the existence of this sort of command to a certain degree. In general it supposes the absence of any considerable strong excitement from other causes—case of the malefactor who possessed this command in such a degree as to empower him to endure the most excruciating torments. When an idea or set of ideas [is] already in possession of the mind, the mind can in a direct way keep them there. It can not however in any such way help an idea out of the mind—it may keep itself full but it can not keep itself empty—[for][2] getting rid of an idea it has no continually effectual means but by turning aside from one idea and calling in and attaching itself to some other. When the ideas thus dealt with are arguments on the opposite sides of a controverted question the process thus carried on is the self-deceptive process—the mind fixes its attention upon the arguments on one side, keeping it carefully turned aside from all the arguments on the other side. In this way there is no proposition so absurd but man may in some sort keep himself tolerably persuaded of the truth of it. It is by fear and hope, but particularly by fear as being the stronger passion, that the command thus exercised over the mind is obtained.

Use to be made of the command possessed by the mind over the

[1] The MSS for this section are UC xiv. 238, xv. 387^{v}, 402^{v}, 409^{v}, 405^{v}, and xiv. 196. The first two sheets, which provide respectively the first and second paragraphs of the text, are dated 6 May 1819 and are in the hand of an amanuensis; xiv. 238 is headed thus: 'Deontology Private. II. Practical. Prudence purely self-regarding. § 1. Of the command which the mind has over the thoughts.'

[2] MS 'or'.

thoughts.[1] First general rule—find out and keep in [mind] so far as you can such thoughts as are most pleasant. Second general rule—keep out of your mind as far as you can [such thoughts as are most unpleasant].[2]

To rid himself of an unpleasant object of the corporeal class a man may employ direct means: he may either remove himself out of the presence of it, for example out of the sight of it, or he may remove it or cause it to be removed out of his presence. When the fatal apple was presented to her. Eve might either have turned her back upon it, or made a present of it to an attendant pig.

Not so if the object be of the mentally perceptible or psychological class: an idea presented by simple memory or by imagination. In this case a man has no direct way of getting rid of it. He has but one way and that an indirect one: viz. to attach his mind to some other object of a different nature.[3]

When your wish is to drive or keep any idea out of your mind do not, for that purpose, apply your attention to the idea itself, [for][4] by that means you do but fix the idea in so much the faster, and thus counteract your own intentions. Instead of so doing, take up any other idea that presents itself or look out for some other idea, the most interesting you can think of, and apply your attention to that. If the idea you wish to be free from is to a certain degree afflicting, and you can not find a pleasant idea to lay hold of and by force of attention to keep in your mind, in this case, an idea even of an unpleasant kind may be of use and will proportionably be so if it be less afflictive than that which it is your wish to free yourself from. In this case, the remedy employed is analogous to that which is employed in

[1] In MS, this sentence is the subheading at the top of xv. 387[v]; but it is incorporated in the text as being necessary to the sense.

[2] Words supplied in order to complete the sense. MS continues with the following note regarding further treatment of the subject: 'What follows will consist of the exceptions and the applications to be made of these two general rules.'

The next two paragraphs are taken from xv. 402[v]. The MS is dated 30 Apr. 1819, written in Bentham's hand, and headed as follows: 'Deontology private. II. Practical. Ch. 1. Prudence self-regarding. § 2. Power which the mind is capable of having over the thoughts----- how to exercise it with most effect.'

[3] In MS this paragraph includes a further sentence, which is omitted from the text because it is similar in substance to the first sentence of the next paragraph.

From this point to the end of the section, the text is taken from xv. 409[v], xv. 405[v], and xiv. 196. These sheets, dated 1817, are in the hand of an amanuensis and are numbered sequentially in pencil; xv. 409[v] is headed thus: 'Deontology----Foundation of. Ch. 1. Self-regarding. §| I Power over the thoughts --- how to exercise it.'

[4] MS 'or'.

the case of a blister. By a pain less intense or less lasting, a pain more intense or more lasting is thus got rid of.

In this way it is, for example, that the grief produced by the [death][1] of a near and dear relative is mitigated by plunging into business: and if the grief be to a certain degree afflictive, business, though in itself [it] would be afflictive, such as a trade by which loss is produced or intercourse productive of altercations and quarrels, may still be of use.

But a condition necessary in this case is that the pursuit engaged in, in the character of a remedy, should be such as to create a necessary demand upon you for continuity of attention. For if it be of such a nature as still to leave you at liberty, you will scarcely answer your purpose. Thus, if, by way of remedy against the grief produced by the loss of a friend, you betake yourself to mere reading, especially light reading, the demand thereby produced for attention will be apt to be so weak that the attention will not pay obedience to it; and instead of the ideas which the book presents the afflictive idea will present itself at every turn and so keep its place. Here we see one of the great advantages attendant on a busy, in contradistinction to an idle, life: on the being fitted for and practised in a variety of occupations in comparison of one only or a few; on the having a mind brought into a highly cultivated state by study in comparison of a mind left in a state of emptiness and heaviness for want of culture. The class of persons to whom a loss of this sort is apt to be most afflictive and irremediable are persons who with moderate or small fortunes and little or no education live, as the phrase is, upon their means.

Power over his own mind: how far a man possesses it. In this question is involved that concerning liberty and necessity. Liberty, i.e. the sense of liberty, exists beyond dispute: yet necessity is not excluded by it. It is in virtue of the command, the power, which I have over my own thoughts—which every moment I feel myself in possession of—that I am writing or dictating these observations. But what was it that set me upon this occupation? It was something exterior to these same thoughts, or some thought which was already in my mind without any exertion of will on my part to bring or keep it there.

[1] MS ‘wrath’.

II.3

EXTRA-REGARDING PRUDENCE: NEGATIVE

(i) *Introduction*[1]

In private Deontology the rule of Benevolence and Beneficence bears a certain analogy with the head of Offences termed 'Negative Offences' in the penal branch of Law.

A negative offence consists in the purposed forbearance to prevent this or that positive offence or the sort of mischief which it is in the nature of such positive offence to produce.

A transgression of the general rule of negative benevolence and beneficence consists in acting in such manner as to produce a net balance on the side of evil in a case where such evil may be produced by a man without his being thereby exposed to punishment or to suffering in any other shape at the hands of the law.

On the other hand, an infraction of the moral rule of negative benevolence and beneficence is an act of the positive kind: an infraction of a law constitutive of a negative offence is an act of the negative kind.[2]

Negative beneficence is exercised by me in so far as evil which by an act of mine might have been done to another is purposely forborne to be done.

It has benevolence for its cause or at any rate for its accompaniment, in so far as the contemplation of the evil in question, and the present desire and endeavour to avoid contributing to the production of it, has place in my breast.

To the cultivation of negative beneficence and negative benevolence in my breast, an effectual process is to have present to the mind several causes or sources in which evil-doing to others is liable to have its rise. These causes or sources will be either 1. Motives, or 2. Occasions.

The sources or motives in which evil-doing as towards others is liable to have its rise may be thus comprehended and distinguished:

1. Self-regarding interest at large—and in particular interest of the palate, sexual interest, interest of the purse, interest of the sceptre.

[1] The MSS for this subsection are UC xv. 110, 473, and 580[v]. The first four paragraphs of the text are taken from xv. 110, which is a half-sheet of MS in Bentham's hand, without date or heading, attached to a sheet containing material in Bowring's hand.

[2] The next part of the text, down to p. 261 at n. 2 below, is taken from xv. 473. This sheet is dated 23 Apr. 1820 and headed as follows: 'Deontology Private. II. Practical. Ch. | | Negative Beneficence'; it contains various amendments made to Bentham's MS by Bowring, but these have been excluded from the text as here presented.

2. Interest of the pillow: interest corresponding to the love of ease, to the aversion to labour of body and mind. In this case the cause of the evil may generally be expressed by some such single words as heedlessness, carelessness, inadvertence through indifference.

3. Interest of | |.' Interest corresponding to the pleasures and pains of the popular or moral sanction. In this is included the interest affected by wounds to pride and vanity.

4. Interest to the gall-bladder: interest corresponding to the motive termed ill-will or antipathy.[1] [2]

For *negative* effective benevolence *put abstinential.* For discovering modifications of[3] *active* effective benevolence by analogy and contrast, look to ditto of *abstinential* effective benevolence.

N.B. Effective benevolence, whether abstinential or active, stands in need of a definition; viz. to shew how it agrees and differs with self-regarding prudence.

Ex. gr. *Abstinential* effective benevolence: Abstain from holding up to a man's view imperfections which it is clearly beyond his power to remedy. Ex. gr. *Active* effective benevolence: Hold up to a man's view his accomplishments. If he be *not* in a situation to do you any particular service, this is active effective benevolence—if he be, it is active effective benevolence, and self-regarding prudence likewise.

On this part of the field of action abstinential effective benevolence needs no conditions or limitations:

1. Be the accomplishment what it may, care may be requisite, according to his disposition, lest it give inordinate encrease to his pride or vanity, and thereby become productive of evil to himself or others.

2. If what appears in his eyes an accomplishment is of such a tendency as in the course of the exercise given to it is productive of preponderant evil to men or other sensitive beings, the flatterer becomes thus an accessory to all the evil produced in consequence by the person flattered.

3. If you exceed the bounds of truth and the object of your flattery perceives it, and perceives that you yourself are conscious that it does so, you may thus become an object of contempt to him, and whatever praises you may on former occasions have gratified him with may thus have lost their value.[4]

[1] Bentham left a blank at this point, which Bowring filled up with the words 'the trumpet'.

[2] From this point to the end of the subsection, the text is taken from xv. 580. This sheet has no date or heading, as the top part of it has been cut away.

[3] MS orig. 'modes of'.

[4] In a MS fragment (xv. 471) dated 15 Jan. 1821 and headed 'Deontology

(ii) *Modes of annoyance*[1]

Modes of annoyance: 1. By words; 2. By deportment. For the several modes of annoyance see Penal Code. The names of offences there may serve for the names and modes of annoyance here. The only difference is that in those cases the annoyance is such that for the exclusion or the depression of it the force applied by the legal sanction is not looked upon as too great: whereas in the cases that belong to this head the force of that sanction is looked upon as too great. In this case, if either the force of the moral sanction [or][2] that of the retributive sanction has any application, here will be so many reasons, referable to the head of prudence, for the abstaining from the exercise of the annoying acts. But reasons not belonging to either of those sanctions may in some cases be seen applying their restrictive force to that same act: reasons for example belonging to the head of prudence—self-regarding prudence; and reasons belonging to the head of beneficence and benevolence, which are so intimately connected. Virtues come themselves under the head of self-regarding prudence in so far as it is the interest of man on the one part to stand well in the affections of man on the other part.[3]

Modes of annoyance by discourse are:

1. Afflictive and useless information. N.B. This of itself imports not any assumption of superiority.

private. Benevolence and Beneficence', Bentham gave the following 'General rules of negative benevolence and beneficence':

'1. Never do evil, in any shape or quantity, to any individual, but for the purpose of some determinate and specific greater good: good to yourself, to the other party in question, or to third persons---------- to third persons assignable or unassignable. In one verse: "Evil do never, but for greater good."

'2. Never do evil, on no other ground than that of its being deserved. In one verse: "Evil do never, for mere ill-desert." '

[1] The MSS for this subsection, with their respective dates, are as follows: UC xv. 561^{v} (16 Apr. 1819), xv. 517^{v} (n.d.), xv. 518^{v} (8 May 1919), xv. 480 (18 May 1820), xv. 519^{v} and 503^{v} (25 Feb. 1821), xv. 481 (18 May 1820), xv. 514 (15 Nov. 1822), xiv. 239 (n.d.), clxxiii, 72^{v} (Apr. 1822), clxxiii, 71^{v} (Apr. 1822), clxxiii. 77 (May 1822), xv. 533^{v} (30 Jan. 1830), xv. 516 (6 Dec. 1824), xv. 510 (15 Dec. 1824), xv. 513 (8 Aug. 1824), xv. 94 (23 Sept. 1824), xv. 523-4 and 526-9 (3 Mar.-2 Apr. 1821). Except where otherwise indicated, the MSS are all in Bentham's hand. The headings vary somewhat, but most of the MSS have the general heading 'Deontology Private. Beneficence negative'.

The MS which provides the first paragraph of the text(xv. 561^{v}) is arranged in columns and is in the hand of an amanuensis.

[2] MS 'for'.

[3] The MS from which the next two paragraphs are taken (xv. 517^{v}) is in the hand of an amanuensis and has the subheading 'Ch. or § I I Modes of annoyance by discourse'.

2. Annoyance involving assumption of superiority in the scale of power: power over the person to whom the discourse is addressed or immediately communicated.

[3.] Annoyance involving assumption of superiority in the scale of wisdom.

Under the head of assumption of superiority in the scale of power may be distinguished the following sub-modifications:

1. Imperiousness at large—i.e. the general tone or style.

2. Coercive mandate: i.e. requiring something to be done or forborne to be done.

3. Coercive interrogation: i.e. requisition of an answer to a question put—to a discourse by which information is called for. N.B. Interrogation in so far as from a superior is a mode of imperation.

Modes of assuming superiority in conversation are:

1. Command direct imperative whether positive or negative—i.e. injunctive or prohibitive, as the case may be.

2. Interrogation—if otherwise than in the way of request, interrogation is command.

3. Advice-giving.

4. Censure in the way of disapprobation.

5. Censure in the way of commendation.

6. Direct and avowed interruption of one speaking.

7. Indirect and unavowed interruption by loudness of discourse continued while another party is yet speaking.

8. Departure while another is speaking.

9. Affectation of heedlessness while another is speaking.

Modes of annoyance in conversation without assumption of superiority:

1. Interrogation, direct or virtual. Inquisitiveness in gratification of curiosity, into the private affairs of the person addressed.[1]

Uneasiness may be produced by man in man, 1. by acts at large,

2. by discourse—i.e. by such acts in particular by which discourse is produced.

Uneasiness in so far as producible by discourse forms the subject of the present head.

General Rule: Whatever you are about to say consider in the first place whether among the effects of it may not be the producing uneasiness in some shape in the breasts of some one or more persons in whose minds the ideas conveyed by it may be produced.

[1] The remainder of this sheet (xv. 518[v]) is left blank. The MS which provides the next five paragraphs of the text (xv. 480) bears the following subheadings: 'Ch. I | Uneasiness by discourse. Reasons against producing uneasiness by discourse, except as excepted.'

Discourse is either conveyed by evanescent or by permanent signs: when evanescent commonly by word of mouth, when permanent usually by writing or printing.

Word of mouth discourse being the most simple and the only original mode, with this let us commence. And in the first place let it be to one person alone that the ideas thus expressed are communicated. That person may be either present at the utterance of the discourse or absent. If among its probable effects be that of producing uneasiness, consider in the next place whether in the account of good and evil, in compensation for the uneasiness so produced, good may not be produced in some shape or shapes in which it will be preponderant in value with reference to the uneasiness. More briefly thus. If uneasiness be among the probable effects of it, consider then whether the uneasiness may not be compensated for by some greater good—by a more than equivalent good. In this case comes the consideration of the *justifying causes* for producing uneasiness by discourse?

Justificative causes (true or proper) for giving uneasiness in the way of discourse:

1. Exercise of domestic authority.
2. Exercise of public authority in an official situation—exercise of the power of the political sanction.
3. Exercise of the power of the popular or moral sanction.

False justificative causes for the production of uneasiness by discourse in the case where no preponderant good promises to result from it in any one of the above three shapes:

1. Truth of the assertion.
2. Misconduct in any shape on the part of the person in whom the uneasiness is produced?

In the case where uneasiness to the other party is regarded as a probable consequence, consider whether among the effects or accompaniments of such uneasiness anger of which you are the object may not have a place.

For want of a sufficient attention to the particular causes by which uneasiness is liable to be produced by discourse, uneasiness on the part of others is liable to be produced in an indefinite quantity, without any considerable satisfaction to its author—without any thing more than that minimum of satisfaction without which in

[1] The next two paragraphs of the text are taken from two sheets bearing the same date (xv. 519^{v} and 503^{v}), and consist merely of notes indicating how Bentham intended to treat the topics concerned.

[2] On the sheet which provides the next two paragraphs (xv. 481) extensive alterations were made to Bentham's MS by Bowling, but these have been excluded from the text.

the character of a cause the discourse in the character of an effect could not take place.[1]

If you think a man has used you ill, do not reproach him with it nor so much as let him hear that you think he has used you ill, unless in so far as may be necessary to prevent the like from him in future.

When it appears to you that you have cause for complaint against a man on the ground of some conduct on his part in relation to you, and that either on his account or on your own, or in short on the account of any body whatsoever, it may be of use that you should let him know as much, and avoid as much as may be the causing him to suppose that on the account in question you think ill of him: speak to him in such manner that he may regard you as ascribing such his conduct to whatever cause would reflect least, if any, blame upon it.

If for instance, you sent or wrote to desire to see him and, though he ought to have come, he did not, or [though he] ought to have written an answer he did not, impute it to the miscarriage of your letter: or if the message was a verbal one, to misconception on the part of the middle man, misconception of what you said to him, or incorrect expression of the words employed by him in delivering the message, or forgetfulness, in consequence of which it failed of being delivered altogether.

The effect being always producible by any one of these causes, there is no insincerity in a man's representing himself as supposing as much.[2]

If in conversing with a man you find him imbued with opinions which to you seem mischievously erroneous, if there be a probability of converting him make the attempt—giving him as little uneasiness as may be. But if there be no such probability, do no such thing: as when there is no probability of your seeing him often enough. You wound his feelings, and you draw upon yourself his displeasure.

If you find a man out in any design against you that he would be ashamed of, act accordingly: but do not let him know of your discovery : for the more ashamed he is, the more intensely will he be your enemy. If while contriving for his own advantage a scheme by which you would not be benefit!ed], but even injured, he tells you your benefit is the sole object he has in view, contradict him not, but thank him.

If you want a man to do a thing, to save him the pain of refusal

[1] The next paragraph is from xv. 514[v], and the three subsequent paragraphs are from xiv. 239.

[2] The next three paragraphs are three separate entries in Bentham's memorandum-book (clxxiii. 72[v], 71[v], and 77), each of which has the general heading 'Deontology Private'. They are undated but are found with entries dated April and May 1822.

put it to him as slightly as may be. Formulary recently introduced—perhaps you will do so and so.[1]

If a man is doing or saying any thing which is unpleasant to you, instead of directing him to cease, rather propose something else: start some other topic.

If in any thing done by a person on your behalf there be any thing that you are dissatisfied with, think whether on the account of the future there be any need of his being apprised of your dissatisfaction: if not, do not let him perceive it or hear of it.[2]

If in your presence, an attack is made upon you, be it ever so outrageous, especially if there be others in company, treat it, if you can, either with plain good humour or with pleasantry, as occasion serves. The more outrageous the attack, and to the assailant who makes it the more disgraceful, the more effectually will he be thus put down: disappointed, humbled, and yet not irritated, not made your enemy in a greater degree than he was before—possibly even reconciled. As to disappointment it follows of course: at any rate if no other person were present. For in this case what could have been the object of the attack? By the supposition no other than the making you suffer: and the more compleatly undisturbed your complacency, the more compleat his failure.

This is, no doubt, of the number of those lessons which it is so much easier to give than to practice: few lessons, be it repeated, either of self-regarding prudence or of effective benevolence can be more difficult than this.

This, however, or any other conquest over temptation may, on on adequate inducement, be effected by previous preparation. Exercises for the strengthening the body have been invented, and with illustrious success brought into practice; this is of the number of those exercises by which, on a similar principle, strength—the passive strength of patience—may be given to the mind.[3]

Never bring to view irremediable disasters: especially to or in the hearing of any who, in the eyes of others or their own may have contributed to those same disasters, or the like.

In your intercourse with a child, servant or other dependent, in regard to every fault or imperfection not incorrigible by his exertions, remind him of it every time you observe it, so long as prospect of amendment has place. If ever all prospect is at an end, cease reminding him, and never afterwards let him see that you observe it.

[1] The next two paragraphs are from xv. 533[v].

[2] The MS which provides the next three paragraphs of the text (xv. 516) bears the following subheadings: 'Ch. | | Quarrels. Patience under invective.'

[3] The next two paragraphs are taken respectively from xv. 510 and 513.

Exceptions excepted,[1] be more forward in bringing to view points of concordance than points of discordance.

In cases of difference of opinions, where the difference is worth settling, endeavour to give the discussion the character rather of a joint enquiry after truth, than that of a contention for victory.[2]

Of the five senses, the feeling and the taste do not, on this occasion, come in question: annoyance to either of these senses presents itself in the form of a legally punishable offence; annoyance to the touch or feeling presents the idea of what, in law language, is called assault; annoyance to the taste presents the idea of poison; and, unless deceit or intimidation be employed as the instrument of it, can not but involve in it an offence of the nature of assault.

In a word, the only senses exposed to what, on this occasion, is meant by annoyance are the three senses which are capable of being operated upon without any operation in consequence of which contact is generally regarded as having place. These arc the smell, the hearing, and the sight.

l.The smell. The ways in which annoyance may be inflicted on this sense are, for the most part, sufficiently obvious. Under this head, some cautions there are which may not be altogether without their use.

Trifling as they may seem at first sight, in regard to all these modes of annoyance which operate through the senses, such may be the effect as to banish one friend from the society of another, and even render a man an object of recorded aversion to a whole company in any degree numerous. Trifling as it may seem, what renders the mischief in this case the more serious is that, by a sort of mixture of shame, fear, and sympathy, the person by whom the annoyance is felt is apt to be restrained from making communication of his feelings to the person who is the author of it. Here, then, is the case of an act which, having the effect of maleficence, stands clearly prohibited by the dictates of negative beneficence, and thence of self-regarding prudence. Trifling as it may seem in the extreme, greater annoyance is produced by it than would be produced by many a

[1] Above this paragraph, at the head of the sheet (xv. 94, dated 23 Sept. 1824), Bentham wrote the following note dated 4 Oct. 1824: 'For Deontological cases see Manuel des Meres de Pestalozzi traduit de I'Allemand Geneve et Paris chez Paschoud 1821'. The reference is to a work by the Swiss educational theorist Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827).

[1] The MSS which provide the remainder of the text of this subsection (xv. 523-4 and 526-9) are all in the hand of the same amanuensis and bear various dates between 3 Mar. and 2 Apr. 1821. The first three sheets bear the subheading: 'Annoyance corporeal'. Some amendments made to the MS by Bowring have been excluded from the text.

punishable offence, at the same time that, by the circumstance just mentioned, the injury, such as it is, stands precluded from the benefit of pardon.

The cautions in question are conveyed by presenting to the reader this or that circumstance which, though really productive of mischief in the shape in question, has been found by experience to be liable to escape notice.

First, then, as to annoyance in that shape in which the seat of it is in the sense of smell.

The most obvious is that which is produced by the emission of gas from the alimentary canal.

Of gas of that species which is emitted from the lower part of that canal, the emission is, in general, optional: in such sort that, in general, annoyance, in this shape, can not be inflicted without being intended; forbearance is in the power of the individual by whom it is inflicted.

In the production of annoyance which has place in this shape, though the sense is the immediate seat of it, imagination acts the principal part: the self-same scent which, if emitted from a man's own body would not have been productive of any annoyance to him, is rendered productive of annoyance to him in a highly offensive degree by the mere circumstance of its being by another person that it has been emitted, and the annoyance is capable of being mitigated or enhanced by a variety of circumstances connected with the person of the individual whose body has been the source of it.

As the share which the imagination has in the production of annoyance in this shape is so great, annoyance may, in this case, have place without any actual impression by the organ which is the natural seat of it. Such is the disgust apt to be produced by the impression that, by means of the principle of association, a disgust correspondent in its nature though inferior in degree, is commonly produced by the idea when excited by operations which apply not to any other sense than that of hearing.[1]

2. Hearing—sense of hearing. To this sense, annoyance may be applied in a direct way or in a collateral way by the instrumentation of the association of ideas.

In a direct way, either by the quality of the sound or by its quantity.

Annoyance by means of sounds offensive by their quality indepen-

[1] At this point there is the following note in pencil at the bottom of the sheet (xv. 524): 'Unfrequency of this annoyance under tolerable education. Pass on to emissions from the upper part.' No such continuation has been found; but for a brief treatment of this topic see pp. 276-7 below.

dent of their quantity is not very apt to be inflicted without intention: without intention, having, for its end in view, the production of such an effect. If inflicted in pursuance of any such intention, it might, perhaps, be considered as forming the matter of a legally punishable injury: at any rate, any warning to abstain from the practice can be no better than superfluous and useless.

3. By the principle of association, any sound the effect of which is to call up and place in the mind the idea of an application offensive to any other sense, such as for example the sense of smell, becomes thereby itself noisome.

Annoyance through the ear to the inside of the nose and mouth by the power of sympathy.

By an assortment of glands opening into the nose, the interior of the mouth, and the passage called the larynx into the lungs, a viscous liquid, subservient to various uses—a liquid, but in some cases, partly by its original texture, partly by evaporation, approaching to solidity —is discharged. This liquid, when accumulated in the passages, to a certain quantity becomes, in various ways, productive of disagreeable sensations which can not be removed but by the expulsion of it. That portion of it which lines the lungs, the larynx, and the interior of the mouth, is capable of being discharged through either of two channels: through the mouth, in which case it is expelled out of the body altogether, and in its own form; or through the gullet into the stomach, in which latter case it mixes with the food, and after having undergone like changes, is finally expelled through the same passages. That which lines the nose, the upper part of it at least, is capable of being discharged through any one of three channels,[1] viz. at the nostrils, at the mouth, as above, or into the stomach. When at the [nostrils],[2] it is driven out from above by an extraordinary quantity of air inhaled for that purpose: in this case, the nose is said to be bio wed; that which is expelled through the mouth is discharged partly by means of a current of air inhaled for the purpose, partly by means of the muscular force of the tongue and the lips. In the instance of some persons, if, instead of being expelled from the mouth or nose, this mucus is swallowed, sickness is apt to be produced: sickness partly by the difficultly digestible quality of the matter when taken into the stomach, partly by its tenacity by which it is kept in a state of continuous strings extending themselves down the gullet, and stimulating it in such manner as to produce a sort of convulsion called ‘reaching’.

A man who is liable to be thus affected when, by the sense of hearing, he perceives that another person, experiencing annoyance

[1] MS alt. ‘orifices’. [2] MS ‘mouth’.

from the accumulation of mucus in an extra quantity is, in order to relieve himself, swallowing or preparing to swallow it into his stomach instead of expelling it through the mouth or the nose, such a man is apt to receive from such perception no inconsiderable annoyance. This annoyance has for its cause the affection of sympathy. By his own experience, in his own case, the idea of sickness is associated with the idea of that state of things.

Very considerable indeed is the suffering produced by a cause apparently so inconsiderable, and the nature of which seems not to be commonly understood.

A distinction must here be observed between the cases in which the bodily organ—the organ of sense—is itself the seat of annoyance suffered and the cases in which it is but an inlet to the impression made on some other part of the body or on the mind.

Thus for example the organs of sight and hearing are each of them exposed to particular modes of annoyance, of which they are respectively the seats. But taken together they are the inlets to an infinity of annoyances as well as of enjoyments, the seat of which is not in the respective organs but in the mind: in a word, of the annoyances and enjoyments capable of being afforded by the means of discourse.

The only cases in which it is worth while for the present purpose and on the present occasion to bring a mode of annoyance to view, are those in which it is in a man's power to avoid giving the annoyance without taking himself out of the presence of those who are exposed to it. There are some persons to whom the sight of a person whose eyes are the seat of a certain morbid affection is sufficient to produce a similar affection: no forbearance except the forbearance to introduce himself into the presence of the person labouring under this morbid susceptibility being sufficient to prevent the annoyance, the case belongs not to this head. On terms of less inconvenience than that of their avoiding each other's presence the annoyance may be avoided by an easy forbearance on the part of the person labouring under the morbid susceptibility: viz. by his avoiding to turn his eyes towards those eyes by the morbid state of which the morbid sensibility is affected and the annoyance produced.

(iii) *Of relations between men and men*[1]

In regard to the relations between men and men may be considered
1. the relations themselves; 2. their respective causes, efficient causes.

[1] The MSS for this subsection are UC xv. 459^{v}, 464^{v}, 454-5, 457^{v}, and 456. The first two sheets are dated 18 May 1820 and written in Bentham's hand, and 459^{v} bears the following headings: 'Deontology Private. Prolegomena. Ch. I I Of the *relations* between men and men: and of the correspondent *situations.*'

The relations themselves are either 1. of the most general description having place in all men, or 2. of some particular description.

Those of most general description are the relations of superiority, inferiority, and equality.

Superiority and *inferiority* suppose each other: neither can have place without the other; equality is the absence or negative of both.

Superiority and inferiority suppose the existence of, and have place with reference to, and in so far as understood must be understood with reference to, some object of human possession usually considered as desirable, i.e. as being to the possessor a source of good, of pleasure or exemption from pain. The different quantities of which this object is susceptible may be considered as so many distinguishable degrees rising one above another in a scale: in a *scale of superiority and inferiority.*

Of these possessions[1] that in regard to which the relations of superiority and inferiority are most obvious, most readily conceived, and most early in respect of their existence have place to the greatest extent, is power.

Of superiority and inferiority in respect of power that which is first in time and necessity is that between mother and infant child.

The power in this case is most absolute. At every moment the child is absolutely dependent on the mother for its existence.

Its existence is most necessary. No child comes into existence without a mother: without the existence of a determinate individual with reference to whom it bears this relation of extreme inferiority and absolute dependence. No woman can become a mother without having a child: without giving existence to a determinate individual with reference to whom it bears this relation of extreme superiority and absolute power.

These observations will be apt to appear trivial and trifling. The obviousness of their truth when presented is the cause of that appearance. Yet in the conception of those by whom this part of the field of knowledge has been touched upon, others which have no such truth seem to have occupied their place.

Of primaeval and necessary and absolute power—of superiority in the highest degree—the relation between father and child has by some been taken for an example. But when the same woman has at times nearly contiguous had sexual intercourse with two or any greater number of men and at the end of the usual length of time bears a child, the father may be altogether indeterminate: there is in

[1] Above this paragraph, at the head of xv. 464[v], the following words appeal-crossed through in pencil: '1. Power. 2. Opulence. 3. Reputation. 4. Factitious dignity.'

that case no person between whom and the child this power of correspondent relation can have place.[1]

By superiors, as above, is to be understood superiors in power: and, consequently, on the part of the persons who are considered as their inferiors, there exists, as towards them, a correspondent degree of dependence. In regard to the deportment proper to be maintained as toward such superiors by their inferiors error is apt to have place, of a sort prejudicial, at once, to beneficence, as well as prudence: and which is apt not to stop at the breach of these negative virtues, but to go on to a violation of the corresponding positive ones. A sort of merit is attached, by some, to the manifesting, towards the feelings of superiors, a degree of regard which, by the same persons, would not be refused to equals or to inferiors. To this supposed merit is annexed more or less of self praise on the score of spirit, as it is called: on the score of a spirit of independence. But, if there is no merit in the violation of the dictates of a single virtue, viz. beneficence, negative or positive, still less can there be, in the violation of the dictates of that same virtue, added to the dictates of self-regarding prudence.

In this particular, a difference may have place according as, on the occasion in question, third persons are, or are not, present.

The case where third persons are present, is the case in which a display of this sort of spirit is most apt to be made.

It will depend, however, upon the cast of mind that has place on the part of the persons thus present. It may happen that, in the opinion of them, or some of them, the character of the person in question may be raised by this display of independence. So far as this is the case, what a man loses in the affection and regard of the superior in question, this, or more, he may gain by increase in regard on the part of these same third persons. So much for the case where third persons are present. In this case, a sort of conflict has place between the two virtues. The dictates of beneficence are neglected: those of prudence—self-regarding prudence—are consulted and conformed to.

In the other case—in the case where no other persons are present—if imprudence, in this shape, is committed, ill humour—anger—is apt to be the cause. By the anti-social passion the joint force of the self-regarding and the social affections is overborne: weakness presents itself to him under the garb of merit; he fancies himself to be displaying strength, when, in fact, he is betraying weakness.

[1] The next six paragraphs of MS text are taken from xv. 454-5. These sheets, dated 31 May 1820, are in the hand of an amanuensis and are headed thus: ‘Deontology. Comportment towards superiors.’

A case, not absolutely impossible or unexampled, is that, by this display of hostility in a case where obsequiousness is not only more advisable but more common, the inferior entertains a hope of praise of himself in the estimation of the superior; and where that hope may even be attended with success. But the experiment is a hazardous one, and requires no small degree of skill and attention to be made a successful one.[1]

Whatsoever inducements you have to the exercise of beneficence towards inferiors and equals on the score of beneficence and self-regarding prudence, you have for the exercise of beneficence towards superiors those same inducements, with the addition of others which belong to the account of self-regarding prudence.[2]

1. In regard to money and beneficence by means of it, forget not the difference that may have place in the quantity of good producible by the same money in the case of the superior and in that of the inferior.

2. Note the illusion by which in contrariety to the dictates of self-regarding prudence and even of beneficence, the inexperienced are sometimes betrayed into haughtiness or indifference towards superiors.[3]

Of equality the nature and existence is as easily conceived as that of superiority and inferiority: it being a negation of both.

But between no two persons is the existence of it capable of being demonstrated, or with any thing like precision capable of being ascertained.

Suppose, for argument sake, the existence of it ascertained as between yourself, whoever you are, and another person, whoever he is. From self-partiality, you in your own scale may be placed above him; he in his scale above you.

This difference therefore it belongs to you to bear constantly in mind as well with regard to beneficence as with regard to self-regarding prudence.

The difference, however, is not so great in the case of those classes,

[1] The two sheets which provide the remainder of this subsection, xv. 457[v] and 456, are both undated, written in the hand of an amanuensis, and headed 'Deontology private'. In addition, 457[v], which provides the next three paragraphs, has the subheading: 'Of comportment towards superiors as such: viz. superiors in general'; and the following notes are written at the top of the sheet: 'Worth is 1. General, 2. Special. When superiority etc. is spoken of in general terms, superiority in power, as being the most efficient article, will require to be understood, especially a power in relation to the person in question.'

[2] The next two paragraphs are notes for further treatment of the subject.

[3] xv. 456, from which the next five paragraphs are taken, has a subheading, 'Of comportment towards equals', which has been crossed out.

which have least, as in the case of those which have most powerful incentives to emulation. Examples—day-labourers on the one hand —professional men on the other.

(iv) *In using the sanctions*[1]

Conduct of the individual in the distribution of the good and evil applied in the exercise of the power of the retributive sanction.

Conduct of the individual in the character of Judge in the tribunal of the popular or moral sanction.

It should be restricted and guided by the same rule, *mutatis mutandis,* as that of the political sanction. In the application of evil by the punitory branch, care should be taken in like manner never to apply it in gratification of mere antipathy;never but in so far as it is deemed subservient to and necessary for the purpose of one or more of the proper ends of punishment, viz. determent of others by the example, determent of the transgressor himself, i.e. reformation, or disablement, viz. disabling him from inflicting the like evil on himself or others; and in each of these cases the quantity should not be more than sufficient for the production of the good aimed at—for the accomplishment of the benevolent purpose. Nor should it be inflicted even in that case if the quantity of evil thus produced would be greater than the quantity of evil excluded, or more than equivalent to the quantity of good produced.[2]

(v) *Interrogation: an instrument of tyranny*[3]

An instrument of evil—in various shapes, and to no inconsiderable amount—is the act of *interrogation,* or say of putting questions, of question putting.

Correspondent will be the good producible by any means of eluding the application and force of it.

Circumstances on which the magnitude of the evil depends are:

1. Situation of the interrogator in reference to the interrogatee—superior—equal—inferior.
2. Subject matter of the interrogation.

[1] The MS for this section (UC xv. 88) is dated 1 June 1819 and has the following headings: 'Deontology Private. Practical. Beneficence and Extra-regarding Prudence.'

[2] On xv. 89 appears the following note: 'Under another head, viz. Beneficence (negative) i.e. absence, non-exercise, of maleficence, speak of the practice of "quizzing"---- i.e. exposing others to contempt, in gratification of the love of sport or pride. It is one of the fruits of the aristocratical spirit.'

[3] The MS for this subsection (UC xv. 431^{v}) is dated 1 June 1830 and headed thus: 'Deontology Private. Extra-regarding Prudence. § | | Interrogation an instrument of tyranny—how to check it?'

3. Occasion on which the question is put.

1. Interrogator is superior; here evils 1. interrogation is in the hands and to the benefit of the interrogator an instrument of tyranny; 2. at the charge of the interrogator a source of suffering, and of mendacity —self-preservative mendacity.

Means of eluding an annoying question: 'What a question!' 'Lackaday! You are not serious.' 'Fiddle-de-dee.' Invent various *formulae* adapted to the various relative situations.

One is—'I make it a rule never to give an answer to . . .' then mention the sort of question that the question belongs to.

Example of a question which may be very annoying from which soever situation it emanates.

Subject matter, authorship of a literary erotic, the author of which would be sorry to be known or supposed to be such.

(vi) *Arrogance in communication ofalledged facts'*

In preference to general assertions employ the most particular, stating the authority or authorities: the person or persons who with reference to yourself are the narrating witness or witnesses.

General assertions are but conclusions—conclusions done by the judgment from particular supposed fact. Assent to a general assertion supposes two things: unlimited confidence in the appropriate aptitude of all supposed witnesses through whose minds and tongues or pens the supposed fact has passed or is supposed to have passed; a like confidence in the rectitude of the conclusion—thence in the general rectitude of the intellectual faculties—of him by whom the communication has been made.

If it be to a familiar friend that the communication is made by you, the non-mention of the individual person or other source of evidence from whence your belief has been derived is a token of want of confidence in him: if by any tie of propriety you stand precluded from making the disclosure, acknowledging that this is the case is less offensive than the arrogance which calls for implicit credence; it indicates some confidence, not the absence of confidence.

(vii) *Good breeding*[1] [2]

Good breeding is that branch of Morality (alias Private Deontology) which respects deportment in respect of those incidents of trivial

[1] The MS for this subsection (UC xv. 492) is dated 1 June 1824 and headed thus: 'Deontology Private. Beneficence negative. Vitanda 1. Arrogance: in communication of aliedged facts.'

[2] The MS for this subsection (UC xv. Ill) is undated and headed 'Deontology Private'.

occurrence and when separately taken comparatively inferior importance by which the greatest portion of that part of every man's time which is passed in the company of another or others is occupied.[1] It corresponds pretty exactly to what in French is designated by the appellation of La Petite Morale. In Good-breeding two branches may be distinguished, the negative or restrictive, and the positive or active.

The negative consists in abstaining from all acts by which annoyance is given to third persons: at any rate from all acts by which more annoyance is afforded to others, than gratification to the agent himself.

In comparison of this negative branch the positive comes within a very narrow compass: in so far as practised it consists in the performance of acts from whence in some shape or other other persons receive gratification. By regard to the larger branch of morality joined to indispensable personal prudence the exercise of this negative branch is necessarily confined within very narrow limits: so narrow that so long as the disposition be understood to be sincere it may be said to consist in the general disposition to contribute in all unforbidden shapes to the gratification of all such persons as come within a man's field of action.

Points of bad breeding to be avoided. N.B. Several of these have been noticed by Lord Chesterfield.[2] But without assigning the grounds of the prohibition, he contents himself with prohibiting them.

1. In conversation, beware of interrupting the person you are conversing with: every such interruption is in the attempt *injurious,* and in case of success *oppressive.* When by such interruption the thread of a man's discourse is broken, it is frequently irrecoverable. By a man with a stronger voice, one with a voice less strong may thus be rendered at any time virtually dumb, the weak-voiced man kept in a sort of depressed and slavish state, and the strong-voiced man deprived of whatsoever benefit he might have derived from the conversation of the other.

2. Solid, liquid or gaseous, the contents of one man's stomach are not agreeable to the sense of smell in another. As often as a portion of gas makes its way from your stomach, be careful therefore so to direct the course of it that no person in the whole company shall be within the range of it. By a turn of the head while at table this may always be managed. But if, sitting with his face to the company,

[1] A sentence similar to this one appears without any continuation, on another sheet, xv. 566[v], which is dated 12 Sept. 1814, and headed thus: 'Logic or Ethics. Ch. I I Pleasures of Amity. Good Breeding.'

[2] See *Letters written by the late Right Honourable Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield, to his Son Philip Stanhope, 2* vols., London, 1774, i. 95.

a man stops the blast by keeping his lips closed, and then suffers it to escape without change of position, the consequence is that, by the tensed state of his lips, the whole company feel themselves threatened with the explosion, and whether the smell does or does not reach the organ so as to affect the sense, uneasiness is produced by the apprehension of it.

(viii) *Ill-will*[1]

Ill-will or antipathy considered in respect of its source or cause may be thus distinguished:

1. Ill-will or antipathy by reason of rivalry, opposition of interests in respect of self-regarding interest at large.

2. Ill-will by reason of trouble—i.e. labour of mind regarded by me as produced in my mind by the individual who is the object of the ill-will thus produced.

3. Ill-will by reason of wounded pride or vanity—pains of the popular or moral sanction experienced by me and regarded as having their source in some act, habit or disposition of his.

4. Ill-will or antipathy having its source, its immediate source, in sympathy; in sympathy for the feelings of some person to whom evil in any of its shapes is regarded by me as being done, or more or less likely to be done, by the instrumentality of the individual in question in whom this antisocial affection of mine beholds its object.

5. Ill-will on the score of difference in opinion. In this case the interest affected is composed of the interests respectively corresponding to love of power, and to the love of the pleasures and aversion to the pains of the popular or moral sanction. 1. In a man whose opinions are in respect of some system or point of importance in a state of determinate opposition to mine, I behold a man in whose breast there can not be that esteem or that affection which there might be in the opposite case. 2. I behold a man in whose instance my love of power can not receive that exercise and that gratification which it would receive if I could cause him to give up that adverse opinion of his and adopt mine. 3. I behold a man at whose hands I receive the evil consisting in the suspicion of an exemplification of mental weakness on my own part. For the greater the number of the persons by whom the opinion opposite to mine is entertained, the greater the probability is that mine may be erroneous.

When it is settled in a man's mind that such or such another is a

[1] The MSS for this section are UC xv. 474 and 553. The first sheet is dated 23 Apr. 1820 and headed thus: 'Deontology Private. II. Practical. Ch. | | Negative Beneficence.' The second sheet which provides the last three paragraphs of the text, consists of two fragments pasted together, without dates or headings.

bad man, one effect apt to be produced by such judgment is a settled affection of antipathy, of antipathy more or less strong according to the temper of the individual. Thereupon without troubling himself to measure out the proper quantity of punishment which[1] it would be proper for him to administer, upon every opportunity that presents the means of expressing towards him the affection of hatred and contempt he accordingly employs it: and in so doing he prides himself upon the evidence he affords to others of hatred of vice and love of virtue; while in truth he is only affording a gratification to his own dissocial and self-regarding affections—to his own antipathy and his own pride.

The happiness of the worst man of the species forms as large a part of the happiness of the whole species as that of the best man.

On every occasion in which evil done to a delinquent does not afford an adequate promise of greater good, to the delinquent himself or others, so far from doing evil to him, the law of benevolence enjoins us to do as much good to him as is consistent in other respects with the dictates of beneficence and extra-regarding prudence.

II.4

EXTRA-REGARDING PRUDENCE: POSITIVE

(i) *Positive effective benevolence*[2]

1. Whenever you have nothing else to do, in other words whenever you have no particular object in view of pleasure or profit, of immediate or remote good, set yourself to do good, in some shape or other, to sensitive beings rational or irrational, assignable or unassignable.

In so doing, and in proportion as you do so, you will be producing a stock of sympathy and good reputation, laid up in the breasts of others, ready upon occasion to be brought into action for your advantage. In the meantime, whatsoever be the result in both or either of these shapes, you will have been giving exercise to your faculties, mental and bodily, and by means of such exercise, strength: and experiencing and enjoying the pleasure of power—that sort of pleasure

[1] MS del. 'in quality of Judge and executive officer of the tribunal of the popular or moral sanction'. The deletion may have been made by Bowring.

[2] The MSS for this subsection are UC xv. 575-6 and 543v. The first two sheets, which provide all but the last two paragraphs of the text, are dated 15 Jan. 1821 and headed as follows: 'Deontology Private. Benevolence and Beneficence. Positive. Rules of positive benevolence and beneficence.' Some alterations made to Bentham's MS by Bowring have been excluded from the text.

which is capable of being reaped from the mere exercise of power, independently of all advantage in the shape of fruit or result of such exercise.

That pleasure may be reaped from the mere exercise of power, independently of all fruit expected from it, is true beyond dispute, proved to be such by universal experience. Witness the pleasure derived from games of skill from whence all pecuniary profit-seeking is excluded: for example, among mental exercises, chess and draughts; amongst bodily exercises, walking and riding with extraordinary speed or perseverance.

2. When you have it in view to be employed in doing good to an individual, in other words to do him service, if there be any option as to the mode or way, consider and observe what mode of being served to the effect in question is most to his taste.

If you serve him as you think, or say in a way which is yours and not his, the value, if any, of the service may by an indefinite amount be thus reduced. If the notion of serving a man not in the way in which he wishes to be served but in the way in which he ought to be served or the way in which it is best for him to be served be carried to a certain length, this is tyranny not beneficence: an exercise of power for the satisfaction of the self-regarding affection, not an act of beneficence for the gratification of the sympathetic or social affection.

True it is that so you do but produce to the individual in question a balance on the side of good, the choice as to the quantity you will produce is yours, and be it greater or less, your act is an act of beneficence. But if by a little self-restraint at the end of a little reflection you could do good to him in his own way—serve him in his own way—it is bad economy and mischief on your part to choose to serve him or do less good to him only because it is your own way, rather than do more good to him-—render him greater service—as you might do by serving him in his own way instead of yours?

One of the good effects produced to you by the habit of effective benevolence is, that in case of a rupture between yourself and an associate of yours, the presumption antecedently to particular investigation will be against him in the minds of your common associates. You have laid up a fund of reputation which works for you without your knowing it.

Let a man be naturally ever so stupid, do not let him see, much less give him to understand, that you think him so. Nothing you can say to him to this effect can make him less so, and everything you

[1] The sheet from which the next two paragraphs are taken (xv. 543[v]) is dated 2 Apr. 1826 and headed ‘Deontology Private------- Hints of Cases’.

say to him on it may and naturally will have bad consequences to you both: to him, by the uneasiness it can not fail to give him; to yourself by the resistance and ill-will which to a greater or less amount it can not fail on his part to provoke.

(ii) *Art of ingratiating*[1]

To ingratiate yourself with another person, is to comport [yourself][2] in relation to him, as that on this or that occasion or on all favourable occasions in general he may, by considerations of an agreeable nature to himself, feel disposed to render you in this or that particular shape, or in any shape that may happen to present itself, special services: services over and above any that he would be disposed to render to a person altogether unknown to him.

There are two distinguishable and contrasted modes of self-ingratiation: the actual exemplification or in any other means the manifestation of a disposition to render service to the object of courtship; the endeavour to produce in his mind that same disposition by inducements which, though not of a nature disagreeable to himself, are not created either by the receipt of services from you or the expectation of them.

The mode first mentioned consists in the exercise of benevolence and beneficence positive and negative in regard to the person courted: under that head they have been brought to view. When directed to this end in one word it may be termed ‘courtship’.

The other mode consists in the endeavour to cause yourself to appear in his eyes a proper object of social affection[3] or esteem or both in one at the hands of persons in general: it may [be] termed ‘self-recommendation’ or ‘self-elevation’.

With some persons self-elevation is the most efficient instrument of self-ingratiation: with others, courtship. Or rather, in some persons self-elevation may be employed with less reserve than with others.

For there are none on whom courtship will not, unless accompanied with extraordinary imprudence and injudiciousness, be employed with full assurance of success. But there are few on whom self-recommendation can not be employed without more or less hazard of lowering one’s place either in the scale of their esteem or in the scale of their social affection or both.

[1] The MSS for this subsection (UC xv. 449[v] and 448[v]) are dated 24 March 1821 and bear the following headings: 'Deontology Private. Extra-regarding Prudence. Ch. I | General Matter. § I I Self-ingratiation.’ xv. 449[v] also bears the following subheadings, presumably intended as alternatives: ‘Art of ingratiating one’s self. Modes of ingratiating one’s self.’


[2] MS ‘one’s self’.

[3] MS orig. ‘love’.

Of the two self-elevation is naturally most agreeable to self. It is therefore proportionably apt to be employed on such occasions and in such manner as to counteract the purpose for which it is practiced.

The sort of mind most apt to fall into this error is the mind of a young person who, by any state of things having been led to assign to himself a place above the ordinary level in the scale of general estimation, is rendered averse to the practice of courtship, by the fear of its being regarded in the light of disreputable flattery, and in such sort as to lower his place in the scale of general estimation.

ARTICLE ON UTILITARIANISM



The facsimile is taken from UC xiv. 399. This section of the text is the start of the short version of the *Article on Utilitarianism,* and is printed below at p. 320.

ARTICLE ON UTILITARIANISM: LONG VERSION MARGINALS[1]

1. Locution 'principle of utility' and conjugates' history.
2. First mention in Hume's *Essays,* vague idea there attached to it.
3. In Helvetius' *Esprit,* commencement of practical application.
4. For pains and pleasures, scanty stock of denominations devised by Helvetius.
5. In *Hartley on Man,* greater but still incomplete number of species mentioned.
6. 'Greatest happiness of the greatest number' first mentioned by Priestley, Anno 1762 to 1769.
7. Circulating Library at Harper's Coffee-House.
8. Anno 1768, Mr. Bentham's last visit to Oxford.
9. From that phrase in Priestley's pamphlet, J. B.'s principles of morality determined.
10. 1776, J. B.'s *Fragment on Government.*
11. 1781, *Introduction to Morals and Legislation.*
12. 1817, J. B.'s *Springs of Action.*
13. Dyslogistic and Eulogistic names exhibited by J. B.
14. J. B. and Lord Bacon. *'Fiat experimentum',* Lord B's aphorism in physical science. *'Fiat observatio',* J. B.'s aphorism in political science.
15. Legislation: the making a choice of evils.
16. J. B.'s application of greatest happiness principle—non-disappointment principle.
17. Names by which the principle has been designated in many points inappropriate.
18. Principle of utility, misexpressiveness of the term.
19. The word regarded as calling for approbation of every measure contributing to an end whatever that end be.
20. Consequence of the mistake—disapprobation supposed to be called for to the pursuit of pleasure.
21. Substitution by J. B. of the name of *greatest happiness principle* to that of principle of utility.
22. Lady Holland's answer to the principle of utility.
23. Locke's misconceptions: 1. that morals and politics founded on the relation between word and word; 2. narrow view taken of pleasures and pains.

[1] These marginals are based on UC xiv. 314-16 and 355-7. For further details see Editorial Introduction, p. xxxiv.

24. Adversaries to greatest happiness principle: 1. property trumpeting principle; 2. the original contract.

25. Use made by misrulers of the substitution of this partial to the general end.

26. Corruptive oaths in support of original contract.

27. In J. B.'s mind, the word 'utility is associated with happiness principle, owing to the use made of it by Hume and Helvetius, also Horace.

28. Conjugates of 'utility': 'utilitarian', 'utilitarianism'.

29. For expressing in a word, happiness principle, 'Eudaimonology' would do: if so, custom must be departed from in not rendering it 'Eudaemonology'.

30. No opposition (in J. B.'s mind) made to this principle by the Tusculan Questions, where pain is said to be no evil, and virtue is happiness.

31. To shew how virtue contributes to happiness—of use; this done ever and anon by J. B.

32. Would it relieve a man suffering from gout or stone to tell him he is happy?

33. This nonsense talked by the Stoics: Stoics who.

34. *'Ipsedixit'* equally commodious with 'utility' as to conjugates: 'dixitists', 'dixitical', 'dixitism'.

35. In this respect perhaps 'felicity better than 'happiness', with the addition of maximizing or maximization.

36. People little aware of importance of nomenclature in planting or disseminating ideas.

37. J. B. more successful husbandman in this way than Roman Emperor. See 'international', 'codification', and their conjugates.

38. As to want of appellative, see Statute Book. At the Union, we had Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

39. For thus placing these substantives in opposition in Statute Book, the sovereign power was adequate: not so to establish the *possession-indicating* and *predication-effecting* conjugates 'British' and 'Irish'—the things signified by them being different, as religion, interests, affections.

40. Seeing the inaptitude of these composite appellatives, J. B. gave 'Brithibernia' which presents no such idea of repugnance as 'British and Irish'. The signs of the things signified being melted into one, might have served as a cement.

41. J. B. gave these ideas to a noble friend in a situation to give them practical effect: no such visible result in consequence.

42. To a sense of connection between new signs and new things signified, or utility of ditto, especially *ideas,* none so active as J. B.

This no secret to thrones, etc. Hence in their opposition to him they are as industrious as in causing base coin to be distrusted.

43. 'Virtue', 'vice', 'justice', 'injustice' intelligbile only when referred to one of these three principles: 1. greatest happiness; 2. asceticism; 3. ipsedixitism. Explanation of these three principles already given. Ipsedixitism pursued by disciples of Pythagoras.

44. J. B. would now substitute in his *Introduction* the principle of ipsedixitism for that of sympathy and antipathy. It may be said to have two branches, one applying to civil, the other to penal law. To the remuneratory branch only does it apply.

45. Virtue and vice: one conduces to happiness; the other to unhappiness. Adjunct to virtue: self-denial—i.e. sacrifice of present good to supposed future good. Such sacrifice scarcely ever made; example, pleasures of sense in general.

46. But if a man has his desires so under control that the sacrifice causes no uneasiness, will you say his virtue is on a lower level in his mental frame, because this is no self-denial?

47. No room to speak of distinction between effective benevolence and self-regarding prudence. J. B.'s private Deontology, what.

48. In opposition to happiness principle is justice, a subordinate of *ipsedixit* principle. Assumptions: 1. that justice is the proper standard; 2. that so and so is one of its dictates.

49. An exemplification of rebellion against the sovereignty of this principle in Godwin's *Political Justice.* A use in shewing the relation of the import which justice bears to greatest happiness principle.

50. In employing word 'justice', two assumptions: 1. that it is the general rule of action, laid down by competent authority; 2. that whatever is meant by rectitude and propriety, this rule is a proper one. Take any maxim of justice and apply it so that justice will be done. It will be found that a dictate of happiness principle is the same thing as dictate of justice.

51. To have a clear idea of it, justice must be divided into civil and penal.

52. All-important principle in civil justice according to J. B. is the non-disappointment principle. See Review of Humphreys.

53. In the penal branch, a different aspect. Object, minimization of wrongs. Remedies classed, four headings by J. B.: preventative, suppressive, satisfactive, and punitive.

54. Greatest happiness of greatest number. Error in this appendage found out some years ago. Apparent cleanness and correctness, really the reverse.

55. Suppose 4001 equally happy, give to 2001 the shares of the remaining 2000.

56. Instead of the happiness taken from the 2,000, give unhappiness as much as they can receive. To the aggregate of happiness of the 4001, will the result be net profit? Loss, because receptacle capable of receiving more unhappiness than happiness.

57. The 4001, being equal in all respects, make the 2000 slaves and divide them among the 2001. Will the happiness of the whole be increased?

58. Were it so, see the practical results. In England make the Catholics slaves and divide them among the Protestants. In Ireland divide the Protestants.

59. *Chrestomathia* in 1769. Happiness taken as a common trunk for all the branches of art and science. The trees of Bacon and D'Alembert torn up by roots by J. B.

60. Dumont. Kindness of French press to J. B. Greater honor conferred on him in France than here.

61. Portrait by Pickersgill. Bust by David.

62. The gratitude of his country waits till the day when his happiness cannot be increased by it.

63. J. B. never punished or prosecuted.

64. This being the only principle conducive to greatest happiness, any proposition exhibiting any other ultimate end isself-contradictory.

65. If this principle be the only guide to conduct public and private, any other must be improper.

66. A principle not subordinate to this may be opposed to it in two ways, diametrically and collaterally. *Qui non sub me contra me.*

67. To ascetic principle, J. B. godfather in *Introduction.*

68. If a man does not deny that the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is conduct not worthy of reproach, on him rests the *onus* to shew any occasion on which such a line of conduct is exposed to reproach.

69. J. B. Hercules has overthrown in *Introduction* Daemon of Asceticism or Father of Lies.

70. In the same work, also overthrown is the indirectly opposite —*ipsedixit* principle. See no. xx, W. *R.*

71. Nonsense—the progenitor of *ipsedixit* principle.

72. Its characteristic properties: mischievousness, absurdity, inconsistency, self-contradictoriness, all in the extreme.

73. Locke held up to view, in connection with injustice, property —leaving out power, reputation, condition in life, exemption from pain: so many subject matters of *maleficence for* individuals and of inhibition by Government.

74. Sad failure that attempt at founding human happiness on justice. Property the only object of care to Government. Persons

possessing it alone entitled to representation. West Indies the meridian for these principles of this liberty-champion.

75. Locke, to whom mankind owe a debt, had not then got beyond Aristocracy. The subject-many had not got within his sphere of observation.

76. Indisputable evidence of this, his Constitution for one of the Carolinas.

77. Accordingly the best of all Gods for Whig idolatry in conjunction with Catholic slavery, constitution of 1688.

78. 'Despise pleasures: pleasure' (says Horace) 'bought with pain is noxious.' Silliness of this principle exposed.

79. Has at bottom a spice of Utilitarianism. Horace no ascetic.

80. In J. B.'s memoriter verses, elements of value in pains and pleasures given.

81. The attributes of *purity* and *fecundity* ascribed by J. B. to pains and pleasures remarked upon.

82. J. B. has expressed surprise at want of instructiveness in the examples in Sanderson's *Compend.* As little logical instruction as there is political in the *Contract Social.*

83. Two material attributes of greatest happiness principle: its all-comprehensiveness and consistency. It takes charge of Morals and Politics (Government and Legislation) and International Law—each *as it is* for hope of rendering it what it ought to be.

84. It cannot be applied on too large a scale. Not so with asceticism. No ascetic would deprive a whole nation, much less the human race, of all enjoyment. If yes—damnation would be the proper end in view.

ARTICLE ON UTILITARIANISM: LONG VERSION[1] [2]

1. In and by means of the locution of phrase 'principle of utility', the signification of the word 'utility', with its conjugates, as the logicians say, 'Utilitarian' and 'Utilitarianism', has on this occasion amongst others attracted so much of public attention and become an object of such importance that a short history of its adventures, so to speak, may perhaps be not altogether unacceptable to our readers.

2. The first work in which it ever made its appearance in the character of a subject of discussion was the work entitled *Essays,* by David Hume, date of the first edition, as far as recollection serves,

[1] This text is based on UC xiv. 317-54, 358-97, 423-5, 432-3, 438-9, 446-7, 450-1. For further details see Editorial Introduction, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

the year 1742 or thereabouts.[1] In that work it is spoken of as the name of a principle which might be considered as the foundation or corner-stone of one of the systems of morals at that time known and embraced by a philosophical sect, the moral sense being the denomination of a different system and that in truth a very widely different one. In that work of David Hume's the idea attached to it was altogether vague: the general idea not being followed up and by the means of any particular ideas exhibited as representative of so many species contained in the genus so denominated, liquidated as it were and applied to practical use.

3. Not long before or after this time came out in French the then, and still, so highly celebrated work of Helvetius entitled *Surl'esprit.*[2] In this work, a commencement was made of the application of the principle of utility to practical uses. To the direction of human conduct, in the ordinary course of life, a connection was formed between the idea attached to the word 'happiness', and again between the idea attached to the word 'happiness' and the ideas respectively attached to the words 'pleasure' and 'pain'. To several pleasures which as yet had been without a 'local habitation and a name',[3] both those appendages were now and thus attributed: attached to the words 'utility' and 'principle of utility' were now ideas in abundance, ideas which could not but be continually present and familiar to the most inattentive, unobservant and scantily-instructed minds.

4. Meantime, great as were its merits in several important respects, ample as was the contribution made by it to the stock of substantial and practical art and science, scanty was still the stock of denominations devised by the French philosopher for the purpose of giving expression to the various universally-experienced modifications of pain and pleasure. To give to this stock, if not absolute completeness, at any rate a degree of plenitude not much short of it, was reserved for a later period, of which presently.

5. In the year 1749[4] appeared the work of David Hartley, Doctor of Physic, known by the short title of *Hartley on Man.*[5] It came out

' The first edition of David Hume's *Essays, Moral and Political* was published in Edinburgh in two volumes in 1741-2. Bentham seems to have had in mind, however, Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,* London, 1751, Section V, 'Why utility pleases'. The *Enquiry* was incorporated in later editions of the *Essays* (cf. p. 350 n. 4 below).

[2] Claude Adrien Helvetius, *De I'esprit,* Paris, 1758, especially Discours III, chap. XIII.

[3] *A Midsummer Night's Dreamy.* i. 17.

[4] In the manuscript this date was left blank.

[5] David Hartley, *Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations,* 2 vols., London, 1749.

of the hands of the author in two volumes octavo: which two volumes were, in an edition some years afterwards published by Dr. Priestley,[1] by elimination made of a quantity of useless, or to use a quaint appellative once in vogue 'quisquilious', matter, reduced to one. In this work of David Hartley's a greater number of species were, it is believed, ranked under the two genera of pain and pleasure than are to be found in the work of Helvetius.[2] Still, however, it was far from being all-comprehensive: far, widely far from being adequate to the demand which the application of this branch of art and science to the purpose of giving direction to human conduct in the several walks of life, public as well as private, is continually presenting: as will be seen when the work already alluded to comes to be distinctly brought to view.

6. Between the years 1762 and 1769 came out a pamphlet of Dr. Priestley's, written as usual with him *currente calamo*[3] and without any precise method predetermined, but containing at the close of it, it is believed in the very last page, in so many words the phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', and this was stated in the character of a principle constituting not only a rational foundation, but the only rational foundation, of all enactments in legislation and all rules and precepts destined for the direction of human conduct in private life.[4]

7. Somehow or other shortly after its publication a copy of this pamphlet found its way into the little circulating library belonging to a little coffee-house called Harper's Coffee-house, attached as it were to Queen's College Oxford, and deriving from the population of that College the whole of its subsistence. It was a corner house having one front towards the High Street, another towards a narrow lane which on that side skirts Queen's College and loses itself in a lane issuing from one of the gates of New College. To this library the subscription was a shilling a quarter, or in the University phrase a shilling a

[1] Joseph Priestley, *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, on the Principle of the Association of Ideas; with Essays relating to the Subject of it,* London, 1775.

[2] Hartley, *Observations on Man,* i. 418.

[3] 'straight off'.

[4] The reference is to Joseph Priestley's *An Essay on the First Principles of Government and on the Nature of Political, Civil and Religious Liberty,* London, 1768. The phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' does not in fact occur in this work; but it does contain (on p. 17, which is not the final page) the sentence: 'The good and happiness of the members, that is, the majority of the members of any state is the great standard by which every thing relating to that state must be finally determined.' Bentham may in fact have derived the phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' from the English translation of Beccaria's *Dei dehtti e delle pene:* see *An Essay on Crimes and Punishments,* London, 1767, p. 2.

term. Of this subscription the produce was composed of two or three newspapers, with magazines one or two, and now and then a newly-published pamphlet. A moderate sized octavo was a rare, if ever, exemplified spectacle: composed partly of pamphlets, partly of magazines half-bound together, a few dozen volumes composed this library, which formed so curious a contrast with the Bodleian Library and those of Christ Church and All Soul.

8. The year 1768 was the latest of the years in which Mr. Bentham ever made at Oxford a residence of more than a day or two. The occasion of that visit was the giving his vote in his quality of Master of Arts for the University of Oxford on the occasion of a Parliamentary election. His not being at that time arrived at the age of twenty-one, this deficiency in the article of age might have given occasion to an election contest in the House of Commons had not the majority been put out of doubt by a sufficient number of votes not exposed to contestation. This year, 1768, was the latest of all the years on which this pamphlet could have come into his hands.[1]

9. Be this as it may, it was by that pamphlet and this phrase in it that his principles on the subject of morality, public and private together, were determined. It was from that pamphlet and that page of it that he drew that phrase, the words and import of which have by his writings been so widely diffused over the civilized world. At sight of it he cried out as it were in an inward ecstacy like Archimedes on the discovery of the fundamental principle of Hydrostatics, *Eὑprjka.* Little did he think of the correction which within these few years on a closer scrutiny he found himself under the necessity of applying to it. But of this presently.

10. In the year 1776 came out his first publication entitled *A Fragment on Government.* On this occasion borrowing the phrase from David Hume, regarding himself as amply warranted in making use of it by a philosopher the most eminent of his day, the idea of happiness being in his mind constantly connected with that of utility, and not suspecting that it could fail of being so in any other, this was the denomination he on that occasion employed, that phrase of Priestley's, by which so strong an impression had been made upon him, not having presented itself to his view as having ever been employed in giving denomination to a principle. In this work the use made of

[1] Priestley's *Essay* was published early enough in 1768 to be reviewed in the April number of the *London Magazine;* and a surviving copy of the poll shows that Bentham voted in the parliamentary election of 23 March 1768. See Robert Shackleton, 'The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: the History of Bentham's Phrase', *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century,* xc (1972), 1464.

it was the endeavour to procure for it reception in the character of a fundamental principle of government in preference to the fiction stiled 'the original contract." Great as was the name of the author, for that author was John Locke, this fiction was not capable of blinding the eyes of a mind, rich by the use made of it, to the purposes of lawyer-craft, [and] had, from the time when at the age of sixteen he had heard it lauded while sitting at the feet of Blackstone,[2] been an object of abhorrence. He grappled With it and threw it to the ground, from whence it has never since ventured to rear its head—or say from whence no man has since ventured to take it up and give support to it.

11. In the year 1781 was committed to the press his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.*[3] It was not till the year 1789 that it was brought into the state in which it now appears in regard to completeness, and put to sale. In this work, keeping pains and pleasures all along in view in the character of the principal materials of which the structure of the human mind is composed, he undertook to frame the first inventory list that had ever been attempted to be framed in the sort of articles called Motives.[4]

12. In 1817 came out Mr. Bentham's little tract entitled *Springs of Action,* which is composed of a pretty extensive Table explained and elucidated by Notes.[5] In his *Introduction to Morals and Legislation,* he had brought to view the several Motives by which human action in all its modifications is produced: these motives being accompanied and explained by the several correspondent pleasures and pains: a motive being nothing but the fear of some pain, in the event of a certain mode of action which accordingly the will is urged to avoid, or the hope of a certain pleasure which accordingly the will is urged to put the individual in question in a condition to experience. In this *Table* for the first time a third list of Interests was added: to wit a list of interests was added to the two former lists. Each motive had in the first work been explained by its connection with the correspondent pain or pleasure; now in this second work each interest is explained by its connection with the correspondent pain or pleasure,

[1] See *A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government (CW),* pp. 508-9.

[2] For Bentham's attendance at Blackstone's lectures in 1763-4, see *Correspondence (CW),* i. 81n., 85 & n., 86 & n.

[3] *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* was in part printed in 1780. See *Correspondence (CW),* i, p. xxx.

[4] For Bentham's list of motives, see *An Introduction* (CW), pp. 103-16.

[5] *A Table of the Springs of Action* was printed in 1815, and published in 1817. See editor's Introduction, pp. xii-xvii, for a discussion of the publication of this work.

as also with the correspondent motive. By this means, if the list of pains and pleasures is complete, so also is the list of motives, and if the list of pains and pleasures in conjunction with the list of motives is complete, so also is the list of interests: each of these words contributes to give precision and fixity to the import of every other. To the indications given of these three sorts of psychological entities, if so they may be termed, is added that of a fourth sort, namely desires. Between motives and desires, the only difference is that by the word 'motive' reference is made to some correspondent mode of action to the production of which it is represented as conducive, an indication which is not given by the word 'desire'.

13. In the construction of this *Table,* an observation which Mr. Bentham found occasion to make is that of a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation which in the case of almost every sort of desire had become attached to the name of it. Hence, in most instances, for each desire he found three sorts of denominations, namely, one in which a sentiment of approbation, another in which a sentiment of disapprobation, were thus superadded: a third by which no other idea was excited than that of the desire, clear of both those opposite additaments.[1] Having made observation of the prodigious extent to which these collateral adjuncts are in use to operate in the character of instruments of delusion and deception, especially in the hands of interested deceivers, an operation that to his view promised to be a useful one was the marking out and as it were giving warning of the characteristic difference between the three classes by means of appropriate denominations. Accordingly, for the designation of the case in which, to the idea of desire, the idea of disapprobation as existing in the mind of him who is speaking of it is attached, he employed the epithet 'dyslogistic'; as a synonym he might have added 'disapprobative'. And for the designation of the case in which, to the idea of desire, the idea of approbation as existing in the mind of him who is speaking of it is attached, he employed the epithet 'eulogistic'; as a synonym he might have added 'approbative'.

14. On his entrance into the moral, including the political, branch of art and science, he found it in much the same condition as that in which Lord Bacon found the physical. The matter of what was called 'the science' was composed of a more or less copious assemblage of words, and the instruction afforded, such as it was, consisted principally, if not exclusively, in conveying intimation of the relation borne

[1] At this point A contains the following marginal note: 'Go on to speak of the synonyms. Apologize for the new words. And speak of emotions, passions, and affections.' (UC xiv. 321.) A refers to one of the manuscripts used for the *Article.* See Editorial Introduction, p. xxxiv, for a further explanation.

by the import of one of those words to the import of another. *Fiat experimentum* was the aphorism of Lord Bacon: and by this one direction that philosopher was regarded, and with truth, as having done more towards the advancement of that branch of art and science than had been done by all that had gone before him. *Fiat observatio* was the aphorism of Mr. Bentham: for 'ohseruah'o', not *'experimentum',* was the appropriate word here. The phenomena of the material world, not only as they presented themselves, but also as they could be made to present themselves, together with the relations in the way of cause and effect that appeared to have place between them, might, without reserve, so as injury to persons and things were avoided, be taken for subjects of experiment, as well as observation, when applied to the material world. In the case of moral and political science the proper subject-matters of observation were pains and pleasures as they respectively resulted from the several modifications of which human conduct, or say agency, is susceptible. Without reserve these might be taken for subject matters of observation, but not without great reserve and caution for subjects of experiments, especially in the case where the institutor of the experiment is any other person than the Sovereign or a person or persons constituted for the purpose in authority under him. Accordingly, it is by the observation of the occasions on which, and shapes in which, pain and pleasure result from the modes of agency respectively productive of them—pains more especially—that Mr. Bentham deduces the quantity and quality of the applications he proposes in the character of remedies for the evils which actions of the maleficent class may be seen to bring in their train; and while the graphic pencil is kept employed in the delineation of their respective qualities or forms, scales with weights and measures are at the same time kept employed in giving intimation of their respective quantities.

15. Whatsoever is done in the way of legislation is done by making a choice of evils. No legislation, no government without coercion: and taken by itself every course of coercion is in the extent of it an evil. In whatever instance good—that is to say, positive pleasure or exemption from this or that particular pain—is produced pure, it is produced in the way of private agency, by individuals not on that occasion employed in the exercise of the powers of authority under Government.

16. After laying down in the character of the all-directing principle the greatest happiness principle, at the very next step the nature of the case brings Mr. Bentham into the field of particular pains and pleasures. Accordingly the first application, or say emanation, of the greatest happiness principle is the disappointment-prevention, more

briefly styled the non-disappointment, principle. It is by this principle that, on the most serious and numerous occasions, direction is given to the arrangements of which the law of property, under which in its most extensive sense may be included all objects of general desire, is composed. Let disappointment as far as possible be prevented. Why prevented? Answer—because disappointment cannot have place but a sensation of a painful kind has place. Inseparably connected with the idea of disappointment is the idea of expectation: disappointment has place in so far as expectation of the agreeable kind fails to be realised, fails to be followed by the results it has anticipated.[1]

17. To the diffusion of the system, on the reception and adoption of which the maximum of happiness in the whole human species, not to mention others, is so inseparably and incontrovertibly dependent, it happens rather unfortunately that the denominations by which, at different times, it came to be designated were in many points so far from being apt ones.

18. At first, the name was the *principle of utility*. Here the fault was that, by the expression thus employed, not the idea meant to be conveyed, but one widely different from it, was in fact at all times *liable* to be conveyed, and to no inconsiderable extent actually conveyed; and of this mistake in discourse, one bad effect in practice was the drawing down to a correspondent extent the sentiment of disapprobation upon the opinion on the reception of which all the good that could be produced by the dissemination of the principle depended.

19. To the extent in question, the principle of utility was, in a word, regarded, as above,[2] by which approbation was called for by every opinion or operation by which a contribution was made to this or that end, whatsoever might be the nature of that end: instead of its being regarded as the principle by which approbation is called for, for such measures alone as are contributory to human happiness taken in the aggregate, to the maximum of the happiness enjoyed by the aggregate composed of the several members of which the community in question is composed.

20. Of this mistake one consequence was that of its being a principle by which disapprobation was called for to the pursuit of pleasure, to every action by means of which pleasure was either at the moment

[1] At this point, A contains the following marginal note: ‘Proceed to exemplify the cases in which this principle determines the course taken by the penal and civil branches of the law.’ (UC xiv. 324.)

[1] At this point A contains the following marginal note: ‘Look at the anterior passage referred to.’ (UC xiv. 325.)

produced, or a probability of seeing it at a future time produced. Whereas in the intention of the originator of it, if such he may be styled, the same sentiment of approbation is called for every action without distinction of which pleasure in any shape, at the moment or any subsequent moment, is produced: such approbation being given on the single condition that by such action, pain or loss of pleasure to a greater amount be not produced. Thus on every occasion happiness is in his view of considering it a subject-matter of account and calculation, of profit and loss, just as money itself is—that precious matter which, but for the happiness which it is contributory to the production of, would be altogether valueless.

21. It was not till within these few years, in consequence of that habit of still closer and closer and ever important scrutiny to which mankind has been indebted for his discoveries, that Mr. Bentham arrived at last at the perception that in the same phrase, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', lurks a source of misconception. The discovery made, no time was lost in making communication of it to all such persons whose situation happened to be within the field of his intercourse, oral and written together. Unhappily errors in the [...?] walk of art and science more especially, once fallen into, are not so easily corrected as the perception formed of them is communicated.[1]

22. By the latter misconception was produced an observation which in certain circles became a source of some pleasantry and some merriment. A lady of high quality, and not less conspicuous for discernment, for intellectual strength, could never be recruited to the ranks of the principle in question by this its name. For some time this was a source of no small wonderment. At length the discovery was made that in this same principle, by the same lady, was viewed a *veto,* a general and peremptory veto, put upon *pleasure:* and as, so it happened, her relish for pleasure in a certain particular shape had been put out of doubt by evidence, of the divulgation of which pain in no small quantity had been among the results, the cause of the antipathy became no longer a matter of doubt to any of those to whose minds the marks of her aversion towards the unfortunate principle had presented themselves.[2]

' The last two sentences of this section are bracketed in MS for possible omission.

[2] Bentham is referring to Elizabeth Vassall, who was married in 1786 at the age of fifteen to Sir Godrey Webster, and was divorced by him in 1797 on the ground of her adultery with Henry, 3rd Lord Holland, whom she married in the same year. For evidence of the adultery, see *Journal of the House of Lords,* xli. 333-4.

23. Notwithstanding the prodigious obligations which mankind are under to the herculean mind and beneficent labors of John Locke, several misconceptions under the weight of which he continued to labour to the last are matters neither of doubt nor controversy.

23(1). One was the supposition that, by indication made of the relation of the import of one word to that of another, the foundation of morals or politics could be laid, or, [that, by] the title of any principle defined on that part of the field of thought and action, the title to approbation, reception and application to practice could be established. Witness the proposition, 'Where there is no property there is no injustice'.[1]

23(2). Another misconception concerned the result of the narrow and not sufficiently attentive view taken of the subject matter of the principle of utility—the field of pain and pleasure, [of] human feelings, of the feelings of sensitive creatures. 'Uneasiness'—that was his word, 'uneasiness'—was the first motive by him held up to view in the character of the efficient cause of human action in every shape of which it is susceptible.[2]

24. These two, together with the original contract, all emanating from the same illustrious and justly-respected source, were all of them so many adversaries of the greatest happiness principle:

24(1). The property-trumpeting principle, as an opinion and axiom leading into an erroneous and maleficent course, of which more particularly presently, by pointing to a wrong object or end in view, in the character of a polar star by which the course of human conduct ought to be directed.

24(2). The original contract, by teaching men to look for the proper end of government, not in the conduciveness of its forms and arrangements to the greatest happiness of the community, but to the observance of a fiction which, even if it had been a reality, would have wanted much of being an adequate substitute to the greatest happiness principle. For true it is indeed that in most cases observance of contracts is conducive to the maximum of happiness. But in cases to a vast extent, so far from being conducive to that purpose, it would be destructive of it. Take for example the whole field of crime. Suppose a contract having for its object the perpetration of any one of the crimes contained in that same field. Such accordingly is the species of contract actually entered into in the case of every individual crime in the contrivance of which there is concert as well as co-operation on the part of individuals more than one: individuals who

[1] John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding,* ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975, p. 549.

[2] Ibid., p. 249.

in consideration of such concert are with reference to one another, in familiar as well as legal language, stiled 'accomplices'.

25. In this substitution of a comparatively narrow and only partially subordinate and conducive end to the only legitimate and all-comprehensive one, may be seen one instrument which is but too extensively and frequently made use of, for the purpose of engaging men to give adherence and support to maleficent principles and arrangements on the field of government.

26. By fear or hope, for example—by corruption, in a word, in any shape—an influencing individual or assembly are led to make declaration, with or without the sanction, such as it is, of an oath, to maintain at all times an invariable line of conduct. The once so famous and influential supposed promise—the original compact—would, had it been a real species of engagement, a reciprocal one being supposed, have been entered into by two contracting parties. The just-mentioned declaration is another species of engagement, namely, a single-seated one, and as it may happen to any such double-seated engagement to have for its object or practical end in view the production of crime, evil, or human suffering in any shape or quantity, so may it happen to this double-seated one.

Curious are the exertions made by men of the most powerful talents and, for their times, the most comprehensive minds to shut, and keep shut, their eyes against the light of human reason, universal experience and common sense.[1]

27. No wonder that in Mr. Bentham's mind the word 'utility' became originally, and for so great a length of time continued to be, associated with the idea at present expressed by [the] denomination 'the greatest happiness principle'.

The works of Hume and Helvetius were, as above, those by which the idea was originally blended in his mind. But various passages of classical writers were eagerly embraced as they happened to present themselves, and contributed to strengthen the hold taken by it. *'Utilitas, justi prope mater et aequi',* says Horace: by these words this principle was laid down in form as furnishing the science of morals and judication. *'Nisi utile est quod facis stulta est gloria',* says Phaedrus somewhere.[2]

[1] At this point, A contains the following two notes: 'Go on to speak of Locke's doctrine about uneasiness.' 'J. B. makes no scruple of declaring that such contracts are not binding any more than if entered into by a man in a state of drunkenness.' (UC xiv. 330.) For Locke's discussion of uneasiness, see *Essay,* pp. 249-58.

[2] Horace, *Satirae,* 1. 3. 98; Phaedrus, *Fabulae,* 3. 17. 12. For Bentham's translations of these quotations, see Short Version, sections 8 and 9.

28. It is in some sort and degree rather unfortunate that the only denomination by which an apposite and correct conception of the idea is conveyed is one from which, as a root, the stock of conjugates requisite for the purposes of holding discourse on the subject of it can scarcely be made to spring: and that in consequence it is to the word 'utility', a denomination so much less apposite, that this finitive must be left to be preferred. From 'utility' we have 'utilitarian' and 'utilitarianism': 'utilitarian' for the class of persons by whom the principle is embraced and recognised as the source of right and wrong; 'utilitarianism' for the system embraced in the doctrine taught by those same persons. From the locution, or say denomination, 'greatest happiness principle', no word to answer these two purposes can be deduced.

29. For giving denomination to the branch of art and science of which this principle is the foundation, or say the root, the word 'eudaimonology' might serve for the use of those to whose minds the signification of these words, borrowed as they are from the Greek, are present. But on the part of the language, the want of familiarity seems to oppose to the employment of it an objection which seems scarcely surmountable. At any rate, should it ever be employed, usage must in such sort be departed from (the usage that has place in cases where a word of Greek origin is transplanted into the Latin language or any other the bulk of which is derived from that ancient language) as is necessary to the retaining the *ai* diphthong unchanged, instead of changing it into the *ae* diphthong. For 'eudaemonology' would be apt to present the idea of an art or science of which devils were the subject, and thus give umbrage to pious minds.

30. To the possession taken of his mind by this principle, no sort of opposition was made by the trash with which, at a very early age to his no small annoyance, he had been bored by the so-stiled philosophical works of Cicero. He had not completed his thirteenth year when, at Queen's College Oxford, the task was imposed upon him, not indeed by his academical instructors but by a not less irresistible authority, of rendering into English that work of his which is known by the title of *The Tusculan Questions* or *Tusculan Disputations.* Pain, he there learnt, was no evil. Virtue was, and is, of itself sufficient to confer happiness on any man who is disposed to possess it on those terms.[1] What benefit in any shape could be derived from impregnating the memory with such nonsense? What instruction from a self-contradictory proposition or any number of such propositions?

[1] *Tusculanae disputationes,* 5. 13-15. It was Bentham's father who imposed on him the task of translating part of this work in 1761: see *Correspondence* (CW), i. 34-44, 53-5.

When it happens to a man to have a pain, whether the head or the great toe or any intermediate part of the body is the seat of it, is it in the nature of the case that by saying to himself or any body else, 'Pain is no evil', any the slightest diminution should be effected in it?

31. As to virtue, to have shown in how many different ways, or though it were but one way, it contributes, as it really does, to happiness, this would have been of some use and might have been of great use. Accordingly it is an operation with which Mr. Bentham has been ever and anon occupying himself. But to say that virtue is of itself to produce and maintain happiness, whatsoever be a man's condition in other respects, what possible use can there be in giving utterance to a position so directly in the teeth of universal and constant experience?

32. To have given a definition to the word 'virtue', or rather an exposition—for by so short a species of document as that designated by the word 'definition' no adequate conception can be given—this would have been something; and this is what the greatest happiness principle will enable a man to do. But if it happens to you to see a man suffering under a fit of the gout, or the stone, or the *tic douloureux,* informing him that he is happy, or that if he is not it is for want of virtue, would this be any relief to him? Would it not rather be a cruel mockery, an insult?

33. This was the sort of trash which a set of men used to amuse themselves with talking while walking backwards and forwards in colonnades called porches—that is to say the Stoics, from 'Stoa', the Greek name for a porch. In regard to these the general notion has been that compared with our contemporaries in the same ranks they were, generally speaking, a good sort of men: and assuredly, in all times, good sort of men talking all their lives long nonsense in an endless variety of shapes never have been wanting. But that, from talking nonsense in this or any other shape, they have [been] in any way or degree the better, this is what does not follow.

34. *'Ipsedixit'* shares with 'utility' the advantage of being a sort of stock on which, for the purpose of accommodating the radical idea to the various ramifications requisite to the business of discourse, conjugates may, in any number, be grafted. Thus, as 'utility' lends itself to 'utilise', 'utilitarian', and 'utilitarianism', so would *'ipse-dixit'* to 'ipsedixitists', 'ipsedixitical', and 'ipsedixitism'. Of 'the greatest happiness principle', the texture is not thus felicitous: the substantive, with its adjective before it, will not thus coalesce into one word capable of its receiving its cluster of grammatical conjugates.

35. 'Felicity', the Latin-bred word for the same idea, would in this respect serve better than the Teutonic-bred word, 'happiness'. Of logical conjugates, it has already 'felicitous' and 'felicitate'. It might

be made to have 'felicitists', 'felicitism' and 'felicitarianism', but the requisite, not to say necessary, adjunctitious idea associated with the word 'greatest', would in this case be still wanting. 'Felicity-maximizing' or 'felicity-maximization' principle are denominations not incapable of being proposed for consideration as candidates for the honour of being employed for this same purpose. For, although in both these cases the appellation is composed of two distinct words, yet these coalesce with little, if any, less facility than the two words *'ipse'* [and] *'dixit'*[1] which, for a time beyond the memory of man, have in this their combined and conjugal form had place in the language.

36. Little aware are people in general of what importance the business of *nomenclature* (nomenclature [as] an instrument in the hand of Logic) is in the plantation of new ideas and dissemination of already-rooted ones: how extensive, serious and indisputable the importance of it may be in practice; how considerable the benefit sometimes capable of flowing from the possession of an apt appellation; how considerable the inconvenience, the evil, capable of growing out of the want of it.

37. In this species of husbandry Mr. Bentham has, already in his lifetime, laboured with a success which the power of the Roman Emperor found itself insufficient to command.[2] Witness the adjective 'international', and the substantive 'codification', with its conjugates 'codify' and 'codifiers', to which, upon occasion, might be added 'codificationists'. In the business of human life, what is the number which the most diligent search could present of those which are of more intense or extensive importance than that of codification? But this same operation, how can it be performed, or so much as attempted, without being spoken of? And how can it be spoken of without a name to speak of it by?

38. Of the want of an apt appellative—apt to the purpose of receiving conjugates—an example may be seen in that repository of imperfections of all sorts and sizes, the Statute Book. Thus, on the occasion of the Irish Union, when the operation came to be performed, the two kingdoms, that of Great Britain and that of Ireland, came to be spliced together and joined into one, and for that purpose, of necessity, spoken of as being one. 'Kingdom of Great Britain and

[1] MS *'ipsedixit'*.

[2] Bentham wrote the following footnote referring to this sentence: 'To J. Bo. and T. P. T. insert the Emperor (Augustus?) and the word which he could not get to grow.' 'J. Bo.' refers to John Bowring, 'T. P. T.' is Thomas Perronet Thompson. What Bentham perhaps had at the back of his mind was the attempt of Claudius to add three new letters to the Roman alphabet: see Suetonius, *Claudius,* 41.3.

Ireland' was accordingly the appellation framed for this purpose and inserted first on the vellum of the Parliament office, then and from thence on the paper of the Printer's office, by law-learned hands.[1] Clumsy as it was, this substantive, as such, was not altogether incapable of being put to use. But the operation of enactment was not the only operation for the purpose of which need for an appellation in this form had place: the Statute Book was not the only publication in which this same kingdom required to be spoken of. Presently came the demand for a conjugate, in the grammatical form of a noun adjective, possessing the function of a substitute of the genitive case of the substantive.

39. For the purpose of forcing together on the leaves of the Statute Book, in a state of mutual *opposition,* the two substantives 'Great Britain' 'Ireland' with the conjunction 'and' between them, the power of the Sovereign of the British Empire was not found inadequate. But if to the planting on this stock the *possessive-indicating* and *predicative-effecting* conjugate 'British and Irish' any attempt was made, it stuck at the stage of inchoation, consummation was found impracticable. 'British-and-Irish interest'—-'British-and-Irish affections'—'British-and-Irish religion'—when these locutions are brought to view, correspondent to the difficulty of bringing into union the *things signified* was found the difficulty of bringing into the like state these same signs of them. British interests being one sort of thing, Irish interests were found, or thought, or said, to be another and very different sort of thing: and so in regard to *affections, religion* and but too many other subject-matters of thought, action and discourse that might be named.

40. Mindful of this inaptitude on the part of the composite appellatives thus employed, and not incapable of observing, in the womb of the logical disorder, its political evil consequences, Mr. Bentham set his mind on the inquiry after a remedy, and the appellative 'Brithibernia' was the result. 'Interests', 'affections', 'religion': to all these several substantives, the adjective 'Brithibernian', instead of 'British and Irish', being added, no such idea as that of *repugnancy* and consequent contestation which by the locution 'British and Irish' is so unhappily forced upon the mind would have been obtruded: for the keeping together the things signified, the signs employed, when thus melted into one, might have performed the office of a solder or a cement; and of the hurts which, in such unhappy abundance, have been produced by collision, generation of a part more or less considerable might have been avoided.

[1] The Act of Union was 39 & 40 Geo. Ill c. 67 (2 July 1800).

41. These ideas Mr. Bentham, at one time, took upon him to submit, in black and white, to a noble friend, whose situation at one time might have made them productive of effect on practice:[1] but from this comparatively inconsiderable part, as from so many other parts of his labours, no visible effect has been produced, nor in black and white, till now, any mention appeared.

42. To a sense of the intimacy of the connection, on the one hand between novelty in signs and novelty in the things signified, on the other hand between novelty of ideas signified and utility of the things signified—more particularly where these things are *ideas*—nobody perhaps has as yet been so fully active as Mr. Bentham. Hence his industry in the endeavour to turn these same relations to account. Nor of these same relations has the importance been altogether a secret to the 'thrones, dominations, princedoms, virtues, powers',[2] whom, in their character of anti-Utilitarians *(anti-Utilitarians:* alias enemies of reform and improvement in the more important walks of life), he had to contend with: accordingly, the labour applied to them in procuring distrust and rejection for the base metal of the foundry of a malefactor has had its counterpart in that employed in procuring the like reception for the sterling productions of the laboratory of this philanthropist.

43. 'Virtue' and 'vice','justice' and 'injustice'—words, all of them, universally employed in spoken and written discourse, not altogether so universally understood. No otherwise than by reference made to the greatest happiness principle can any clear and useful application be made of them or any one of them. Never has any one of them been employed but reference expressed or implied has been made by it to one or other of three principles, or say standards, of right and wrong, namely, 1. the greatest happiness principle, 2. the principle of asceticism, which is the direct opposite to it, or a 3rd which may be denominated the principle of *ipsedixitism,* or the *ipsedixit* principle. Of the greatest happiness principle, sufficient explanation has it is hoped been given. So likewise of its opposite, the principle of asceticism, for it is in the nature of opposites to afford explanation of one another. By the *ipsedixit* principle, understand that principle or say that commencement or train of reasoning, which does not make reference either to happiness or unhappiness as the end in view or standard of right and wrong in human conduct: but either tacitly or expressly and avowedly the opinion—the declared opinion—of either the writer or speaker himself or some other individual named

[1] Bentham had communicated his idea to Lord Holland in 1811 (Bowring, x. 467).

[2] Milton, *Paradise Lost,* v. 601.

or unnamed. This appellative is not a new one invented for the present purpose, but an old one borrowed from an antique and consequently high authority. It is the principle pursued, so Cicero informs us, by the disciples of Pythagoras. *'Ipse'* (referring to Pythagoras) *'ipsedixit'*: 'He has said the matter is so and so, therefore', said a disciple of the illustrious sage, 'so it is'.[1]

44. When Mr. Bentham's *Introduction to Morals* etc. above mentioned was first published, had his views been as clear and comprehensive as they are at present, this same *ipsedixit* principle or principle of *ipsedixit* he would have substituted to his principle of sympathy and antipathy therein mentioned.[2] The *ipsedixit* principle may be considered as having two branches, the one applying to the so called civil branch of law, the other to the so called penal branch of law. To the penal branch and that alone of law, or rather to that and the remuneratory branch together, has the principle of sympathy and antipathy any application: the affection of sympathy being in this case the sole inducement for every application made of the matter of reward as such; the affection of antipathy, of every application made of the matter of punishment. The 'principle of caprice'[3] was the appellative that afterwards occurred to, and has been employed by, him for the designation of that branch of the *ipsedixit* principle which applies to the civil, or say non-penal, branch of law, including every portion not comprised within the denomination of the penal: the civil, or say non-penal, over which in his system we have found presiding the non-disappointment principle.

45. To return to virtue and vice. By virtue, under the direction of the greatest happiness principle, is understood that line of conduct and correspondent disposition which is conducive to happiness. In the case of the virtue, one addition, however, and that productive of a limitative effect, requires to be made: this is that of the sort of action denominated 'virtuous' the exercise required more or less of self-denial; that is to say, of a sacrifice made of the present good, whether pleasure or exemption from pain, to some greater good to come. For keeping the position in question within the pale of truth, this limitative adjunct is altogether indispensable. For see now whether it be not so. Among the actions by the exercise of which the existence of the individual is continued, and among them, of those by which pleasure is experienced or pain reverted and excluded, small is the proportion of those by which virtue in any shape can

[1] Cicero, *De deorum nature,* 1. 5. 10.

[2] *An Introduction* (CW), pp. 21-5.

[3] On this principle, see Bentham's note printed in January 1789, *An Introduction (CW),* p. 21 n.

with propriety be said to be exercised. Why? Because in the exercise made of them no self-denial, no sacrifice of the present to the future good, is performed. Thus it is, for example, with the pleasures of sense in general.

46. But, here comes in an objection. Suppose a man to have his appetites and desires of all sorts in such complete subjection that, in the sacrifice of the lesser present to the greater future good, no uneasiness is experienced: nothing that can be called 'self-denial' is practised. Of such a man will you say, that in his mental frame virtue is on a lower level in the scale of perfection than in the case of one in whom the contest between the lesser present and greater future good, or, according to Dean Swift's emblem, the game of leapfrog between flesh and spirit,[1] is continually renewed? No, assuredly. But, for this not less true it is that, to the applying with propriety to a man's *habit* and *disposition* the appellatives 'virtue' and 'virtuous', the supposition of the existence of reluctance and *self denial* in the character of an accompaniment or an ingredient in the habit is indispensable. At the time in question, no such unpleasant sensation has place: but at some anterior point of time it had place; only in the intervening space of time it has been gradually worn away, as a file is smoothed down by usage.[2]

47. Here, if there were room, might be the place to speak of the distinction between virtue, in that shape in which it is by persons other than the agent himself that the benefit of it is considered as being reaped, and virtue in that shape in which it is by the agent himself and him alone that it is considered as being reaped: in a word, between effective *benevolence* which may be the name of the modification of virtue in the one case, and self-regarding *prudence* in the other case. In some papers of his on which he has occasionally been at work in his way for years, making occasional additions at the moment of their presenting themselves, and on the occasion of each without recurring to former ones, the field of private morality, or, as in his mind it answers to the name of, *Private Deontology,* these are the two compartments into which the whole of that field is partitioned out: effective benevolence being further divided, or say subdivided, into positive and negative—positive consisting in the doing good, negative in the abstaining from the doing evil—and self-regarding prudence into purely self-regarding and extra-regarding; by the purely self-regarding branch, no feelings other than those of the agent himself being taken for objects of regard; by the extra-regarding

[1] *A Discourse on the Mechanical Operations of the Spirit,* in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift,* ed. H. Davis, 14 vols., London, 1939-64, i. 169-70.

[2] At this point the following note is found: 'J. Bo. substitute a better emblem.'

branch, the feelings of other persons, on account and in consideration of the influence which those same feelings may have on those actions of the persons in question by which his own feeling—his own happiness—may be affected. But on the present occasion the bare mention of these distinctions, with the all-comprehensive system of which they present the outline, will, if not super-abundant, be at the least pronounced sufficient.

48. An indirect, but not the less operative, mode of opposition to the greatest happiness principle is the setting-up under some other name, indeed under any other name, and making reference to it in the character of an end in view or instrument of guidance, any appellative by which reference is made and homage paid to the principle itself—that principle which is the sole defensible instrument of guidance to human conduct. Such, for example, is the word 'justice', another subordinate of the *ipsedixit* principle: the word 'justice' being set at the 'head and front of the offence'-committing work.[1] Thereabouts come one after another strings of directions, precepts, mandates, call them which you will—saying in effect and substance to everybody who will read—'On the occasion in question, do so and so, for this is what is required by justice.' On each occasion, here are two assumptions made, made in the genuine *ipsedixit* style: assumption the first, justice is the proper and sufficient standard of reference; assumption the second, this is of the number of the dictates of that same principle; assumptions (need it be said?) both of them unsupported by argument—both of them, in one word, as the phrase is, gratuitous.

49. Of an act of insubordination, not to say rebellion or high treason, against the Sovereignty of this only legitimate all-ruling principle, an exemplification presents itself at this moment in the style and title assumed by Mr. Godwin's *Political Justice:* and, if the memory of the writer of these pages has not deceived itself, some atonement has since been made for the offence by the imputations cast upon it by certain errors in matters of detail with which the work has been charged.[2] Into the validity of these charges, it is neither our business nor our intention to make, in the present instance, an enquiry. What is more to the purpose and on that score,

[1] Bentham appears to be referring to William Godwin's *Enquiry concerning Political Justice* (first published in 1793), which is discussed in the next section. There is also a partial quotation here from Shakespeare's *Othello,* I. iii. 80.

[2] Bentham may be referring here to Malthus's famous attack on Godwin's book in his *Essay on the Principle of Population,* London, 1798, or perhaps to the more recent critique by Francis Place, *Illustrations and Proofs of the Principle of Population,* London, 1822.

as well as in itself, if we do not deceive ourselves, more useful is to bring to view the relation which the import of the word 'justice' presents itself as bearing to the greatest happiness principle—an indication by which alone two useful operations can be performed, namely, in the manifestation a clear explanation of the import of the word, and manifestation made of the allegiance due from it.

50. In and by the employment given to the word 'justice', two assumptions are implicitly contained: assumption 1. that by competent authority the general rule of action has been laid down; assumption 2. that whatsoever be meant by rectitude and propriety, this rule is itself, reference had to the situation in which it is thus placed, a right and proper one. Now then, take for exemplification and explanation's sake any one of the rules of detail brought to view in the character of rules or maxims of justice, rules by the observance of which justice will be done, rules by the non-observance of which justice will be violated or, in other words, injustice will be done. If then so it be that the rule thus exhibited in the character of a maxim or dictate of justice is the same which on this same occasion would be found to be a dictate, or say precept, emanating from the greatest happiness principle, then thus far are the notions of the author of the rule in a state of conformity and due subordination with reference to the greatest happiness principle; and the dictate, or say precept, thus deduced on the greatest happiness principle may be said to be a dictate of justice in consideration of the determinateness of the form of words by which it stands expressed.

51. Vague, obscure and little satisfactory as the incomplete explanation of the word 'justice' must as yet be confessed to be, this is all that can yet be done towards rendering the import attached to it clear and determinate. Before the conception conveyed by it can be clear and adequate, a division of its import must be brought to view, a division which has been made by the hand of custom and of which the words 'civil' and 'penal' have been made the instruments.

52. According to Mr. Bentham, the one all-comprehensive rule of civil justice applicable to the purpose of giving import and expression to all arrangements having for their subject matters the subject matters of proprietary rights in all their several shapes, or still more generally all objects of general desire and seats of value, is that which he has termed the 'non-disappointment' or say 'disappointment-preventing principle', a principle of which [there is] some further explanation herein below, as also in the article on Mr. Humphreys' work on the Real Property in no. x of this Review.[1] Not that without

' For this article by Bentham, see *Westminster Review,* vi, no. xii (Oct. 1826), 446-507; and for the 'Disappointment-preventing principle', see p. 500.

some modification received from two other sources this subordinate principle can, consistently with the dictates of its superordinate the greatest happiness principle, be employed to determine the expression given to all the arrangements belonging to this branch of the all-comprehensive rule of action: but to make any further advance into this field would be to diverge too widely from the track properly belonging to this Article.

53. So much for the civil, now for the penal, branch of justice. Here [are] the rules by which, in general terms, indication is undertaken to be given of the subordinate ends in view. In the arrangements belonging to this branch of the field of law [there is] a very different aspect, and [they] do not suggest the idea of any explicit correspondency. The penal branch of law having for its peculiar end in view the minimization of the aggregate or wrongs, and thereby in so far of the sources of unhappiness, such remedies as present themselves as furnished by the nature of things as being capable of being applied with advantage to the reduction of the number of those wrongs, or of the quantity of sensible evil producible by them, have been by Mr. Bentham classed under four heads, namely, the preventive, the suppressive, the satisfactive, and the punitive, or say subsequentially preventive: the punitive in consideration of its effect on the feelings of the alleged malefactor, to whom application is made of it; the subsequentially preventive in consideration had of, and reference made to, the benefit expected to be done to the community by keeping out of existence future contingent wrongs similar to that in consideration of which the malefactor in question is purposely made to undergo the suffering thus created.

54. Greatest happiness *of the greatest number.* Some years have now elapsed since, upon a closer scrutiny, reason, altogether incontestable, was found for discarding this appendage. On the surface, additional clearness and correctness [was] given to the idea: at the bottom, the opposite qualities. Be the community in question what it may, divide it into two unequal parts, call one of them the majority, the other the minority, lay out of the account the feelings of the minority, include in the account no feelings but those of the majority, the result you will find is that to the aggregate stock of the happiness of the community, loss, not profit, is the result of the operation. Of this proposition the truth will be the more palpable the greater the ratio of the number of the minority to that of the majority: in other words, the less the difference between the two unequal parts: and suppose the condividend parts equal, the quantity of the error will then be at its maximum.

55. Number of the majority, suppose, 2001: number of the

minority, 2000. Suppose, in the first place, the stock of happiness in such sort divided that by every one of the 4001 an equal portion of happiness shall be possessed. Take now from every one of the 2000 his share of happiness, and divide it anyhow among the 2001: instead of augmentation, vast is the diminution you will find to be the result. The feelings of the minority being by the supposition laid entirely out of the account (for such in the enlarged form is the import of the proposition), the vacuum thus left may, instead of remaining a *vacuum,* be filled with unhappiness, positive suffering—magnitude, intensity and duration taken together, the greatest which it is in the power of human nature to endure.

56. Take from your 2000 and give to your 2001 all the happiness you find your 2000 in possession of: insert, in the room of the happiness you have taken out, unhappiness in as large a quantity as the receptacle will contain. To the aggregate amount of the happiness possessed by the 4001 taken together, will the result be net profit? On the contrary, the whole profit will have given place to loss. How so? Because so it is that, such is the nature of the receptacle, the quantity of unhappiness it is capable of containing during any given portion of time is greater than the quantity of happiness.

57. At the outset, place your 4001 in a state of perfect equality in respect of the means, or say instruments, of happiness—and in particular power and opulence: every one of them in a state of equal liberty, every one independent of every other, every one of them possessing an equal portion of money and money's worth: in this state it is that you find them. Taking in hand now your 2000, reduce them to a state of slavery, and, no matter in what proportion, of the slaves thus constituted divide the whole number with such their property among your 2001. The operation performed, of the happiness of the whole number, 4001, will an augmentation be the result? The question answers itself.

58. Were it otherwise, note now the practical application that would be to be made of it in the British Isles. In Great Britain, take the whole body of the Roman Catholics, make slaves of them and divide them in any proportion, them and their progeny, among the whole body of the Protestants. In Ireland, take the whole body of the Protestants and divide them in like manner among the whole body of the Roman Catholics.

59. In the year 1769 or thereabouts, at the age of about twenty-one, it occurred to Mr. Bentham that the relation respectively borne by them to *happiness* might with no small practical advantage be taken for a common bond of connection, a common club room, as it were, a common stock, for all the several branches of art and science:

a common trunk for all the branches (this was the emblem he found in use) for the Encyclopedical tree. In the year 1817,[1] of this general idea application was made by him in detail in his work entitled *Chrestomathia.* In that work, taking for his starting post in the career of improvement the tree first devised by Lord Bacon,[2] afterwards taken in hand and in some sort improved by the French Philosopher D'Alembert, and employed for giving method to the French Encyclopedia,[3] by which the bulk given to the work by the Englishman Chambers[4] had been multiplied by twelve, he set himself to make examination into the aptitude of the method given to those former works, in none of which, in speaking of the arts and sciences, was any notice taken of that property to which they were, every one of them, indebted for whatsoever value they could lay claim to. Sincere and intense had always been his admiration of Bacon: not less so of D'Alembert. Not the less completely torn to pieces were the two trees which, by the hands of these illustrious Nurserymen, had been successively planted.

60. Kind and magnaminous on every occasion had been the treatment received by him at the hands of the French nation. By M. Dumont of Geneva, the service rendered by the English, though living, was placed on a higher level than that which had been rendered by the French, though departed, Jurist. By *Chrestomathia,* the like had been the result with respect to comparative altitude in the scale of philosophical merit. Yet from the press of France, in speaking of Mr. Bentham, never has any sentiment but that of kindness and admiration ever manifested itself. Greater—far greater—is the honour bestowed upon him in that foreign country than in his own: for, having its root in the nature of the human as in every other sensitive species, scarce in any instances has this proposition ever failed to be exemplified.

61. In the present Exhibition at Somerset House, while among the paintings was a portrait of Mr. Bentham for which the artist, Mr.

[1] The year was left blank in the manuscript, but the Short Version (p. 326 below) records that Part I of *Chrestomathia* was published in 1816 and Part II in 1817. For Bentham's examination of D'Alembert's 'Encyclopedical Map or Tabular Sketch', see Part II, appendix V, section 7.

[3] Francis Bacon, *Of the Advancement and Proficience of Learning, or The Partitions of the Sciences,* Oxford, 1640, 'The Platforme of the Designe'.

[3] *Encyclopédic, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres,* 17 vols., Paris, 1751-65. D'Alembert's 'arbre encyclopédique' appears in vol. i in the 'Discours préliminaire des Editeurs', between pp. xlvi and xlvii; and the debt to Bacon is acknowledged on p. xxv.

[4] Ephraim Chambers, *Cyclopaedia: or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences,* 2 vols., London, 1728.

Pickersgill,[1] has received from the Royal Institution in testimony of his acknowledged preeminence a present of one hundred Guineas, among the sculptures is a bust of the author of *Chrestomathia,* a present to Mr. Bentham. A bust executed and presented to the original—and by whom? By M. David, a man acknowledged to be at the head of that class of artists in France.[2]

62. The day on which the happiness of this manufacturer of the commodity is no longer in a condition to receive encrease at the hands of gratitude, is the day which the gratitude of his own countrymen waits to see before it manifests itself.

63. Never has he yet been punished, nor so much as prosecuted. In this negative shape has manifested itself the gratitude testified towards him by his own country's government.

64. If in public as well as private life the greatest happiness principle be the only principle the observance of which affords any promise of being conducive to the maximum of the quantity of happiness in the community to which application is made of it, a proposition exhibiting to view any other word or phrase in the character of an appellation of any other ultimate end in view is little if any thing different from, and better than, a self-contradictory one.

65. If the greatest happiness principle be the only self-proffered guide to human conduct in every walk, public as well as private, of human conduct which can with truth be stated as a right one, every other guide which can be proffered for that same purpose, every other such proffered guide by whatsoever appellative denominated, cannot be anything better than an improper or wrong one.

66. There are two modes, or say ways, in which a principle not subordinate to the greatest happiness principle may be acting in opposition to it. The one is by acting in direct, or say diametrical, opposition to it: this is what the principle styled the ascetic principle would be, if it [were] all-comprehensive and consistent. In the other case is every principle other than the greatest happiness principle and the ascetic principle. In this case in a state, though not of diametrical opposition, still of opposition, which in this case may be styled indirect or collateral, is this same third of all possible assignable principles. *Qui non sub me contra me*—'he who is not under me is against me'—may be said with metaphorical truth by the greatest happiness principle; with literal truth by every partisan of the greatest happiness

[1] The portrait of Bentham by Henry William Pickersgill, R.A. (1782-1875) was shown at the Royal Academy's annual exhibition at Somerset House in 1829. It is now in the National Portrait Gallery.

[2] Pierre Jean David d'Angers (1789-1856) executed a bust of Bentham when he visited England in 1827.

principle, speaking as such. Not of arrogance of disposition is this declaration the result, but of the nature of things and of the necessity of the case. No such sentiment as that of unkindness towards a partisan of either of the opposite principles is either a necessary or a natural accompaniment of it.

67. To the ascetic principle—the direct opposite of the greatest happiness principle—Mr. Bentham stood Godfather, and under that name brought it to view in his *Introduction to Morals* etc., as above.[1] Amongst other characteristics and distinguishing properties it has this, namely, that to present it in the character of an all-comprehensive principle—a principle of which, on every occasion of life, application to practice ought to be made—a principle to which on every such occasion human conduct ought to make itself and be made conformable, is what no man was ever known to advance, no man without presenting an incontestable title to a situation in a lunatic asylum can ever advance.

68. No man will deny but that occasion has place in which the enjoyment and accordingly the pursuit of pleasure in some shape or other, and the endeavour to avoid experiencing pain in some shape or other, are modes and courses of action not exposed to well-grounded reproach. But if this is true in any one case, on any one occasion, it rests upon him who says that there is any occasion on which it is not true to produce this same occasion and say why it is that, on that same occasion it is not true—and so in the case of every exception which he would be for cutting out of the general rule. In a word, on the opponent of the greatest happiness principle, on the partisan of the ascetic principle, lies the burthen of proof—the *onus probandi,* in the more familiar, though at once antique and foreign, costume in which the intellectual obligation is commonly clothed.

69. In that just-mentioned work of his, this Hercules of ours has grappled with the Evil Genius of Asceticism, and thrown him on the ground—or, if to any lover of imagery the idea of a deeper spot is more agreeable, his native hell, from which no bottle-holder has as yet appeared to take him up. And in truth, it seems not altogether easy to find for the Daemon of Asceticism a more legitimate progenitor than him on whom by such high and incontestable authority, has already been conferred the style and title of the *Father of Lies.*[2]

70. Of the two opposites, the two rivals and antagonists of the greatest happiness principle, remains the indirectly opposite, the *ipsedixit* principle. With this principle also, in that same work, though under the as yet inadequate and in that respect unapt name, Mr.

[1] *An Introduction (CW),* pp. 17-18. [2] John 8: 44.

Bentham grappled, and dealt by it in the manner which may thus be seen. In short, he found in it a very Proteus: and a dozen or thereabouts were the different forms in which he had to encounter it, as may have been seen in No. XX of this our Review.[1]

71. To the *ipsedixit* principle, not to refuse to it its due, no worse progenitor can by any the most ill humoured adversary be ascribed to it than the Genius of Nonsense.

72. Mischievousness, absurdity, inconsistency, self-contradictoriness—all in the extreme—such are some of the properties which, under the name of characteristic properties, may without much hesitation or danger of error be ascribed to the principle of asceticism. Mischievousness, in exact proportion to the extent in which application is made of it to practice: for if this is not, what is? Absurdity, for if in this principle absurdity be not found, in whatever other seat can it be? Suppose a man running his head against a brick wall—to the operation by which this exploit was performed—to any opinion, or say principle, by which that same operation had been recommended and produced, you would not to a question 'Is this opinion an absurd one?' find much difficulty in answering in the affirmative. But of this opinion, and this practical application of it, the conformity to the principle of asceticism—of the principle which presents to view the augmentation of unhappiness as the proper, or as a proper, ultimate end of human action—is above dispute.

Absurd a proposition may be without inconsistency: inconsistent a proposition cannot be without absurdity, without including absurdity in its texture.

Self-contradictoriness in one and the same proposition is inconsistency in its most flagrant form—inconsistency carried to an extreme.

73. In thus holding up to view *property*—that being the appellation employed by him, though the *matter of wealth* would have been the more determinate and better defined one—-in thus holding it up to view in connection with *injustice,* the opposite to *justice,* Locke showed that on that occasion he had missed sight of so many other valuable subject matters of possession, namely, power, reputation, condition in life in so far as beneficent, not forgetting exemption from *pain* in all the several shapes in which either body or mind is the seat of it (a possession for which, unfortunately, language has

[1] The reference is to *Westminster Review,* x, no. xx (Apr. 1829), 384-6. The article, of which the author has not been identified, was a reply to an article in the *Edinburgh Review* on Bentham's *Rationale of Judicial Evidence;* and it quotes the long note in *An Introduction (CW),* pp. 26-8, in which Bentham examined the various guises in which the principle of sympathy and antipathy had appeared.

not been found to furnish any shorter name), possession giving security to which is among the functions and cares of justice: so many subject matters of *maleficence* on the part of individuals, of inhibition and punishment at the hands of government, and to the extent of such inhibition (termed also prohibition) of delinquency on the part of individuals.

74. Sad, unguarded, unfelicitous was in truth that ill-considered definition—that attempt to lay with such loose materials the foundation of human happiness, in so far at least as resting upon justice. Sad the triumph which, by a designing and uncandid antagonist, might on that occasion have been reaped over that honest, candid and in every respect amiable mind. Property the only thing entitled to be the object of care to government! Possessors of property accordingly the only persons entitled to be objects of that same care! The possessors of property the only persons entitled to be represented in and by a representative body forming part and parcel of the sovereign authority! The poor in a body a community which the rich in a body are entitled to make slaves of and for ever treat as such. Corporal slavery, a state of things still worse perhaps than individual slavery, a state of things the production and maintenance of which is a proper object of government. Meridian of the West Indies the meridian for which the principles of this supposed champion of liberty and good government! In this strain might the suppositions of John Locke have continued, it is difficult to say to what length, with but too much semblance of reason on his side.

75. The case is that, in the mind of this philosopher—to whom, after all, the debt owed by mankind is so indisputable, real and extensive—expansion had not, at that time at least, gone beyond *aristocracy,* the opulent, ruling and influential few: the people, the purely subject many, had not as yet fallen within the sphere of his observation—arrived at the apparent magnitude necessary to the being numbered among the objects of his care.

76. That in respect of expansion such was the state of his mind—that, in respect of objects belonging to the art and science of morals, politics, and thence legislation included, is a proposition the truth of which is rendered but too incontestable in and by his constitution of one of the Carolinas: a performance which from that day to this has never been spoken of in any other character than that of a failure.[1]

77. He is accordingly the properest of all Gods which, within the sphere of politics, can be found for the idolatry of the Whigs, for the

[1] On *The Fundamental Constitutions for the Government of Carolina* which Locke composed or helped to compose in 1669, see Maurice Cranston, *John Locke: a Biography,* London, 1957, pp. 119-20.

worshippers of the matchless and all perfect Constitution, for the Glorious Revolution of 1688, with the slavery of all Roman Catholics under all Protestants, which forms so prominent an article in the list of the blessings that have been discovered flowing from it.

78. *Speme voluptates,* says Horace: *nocet empta dolore uoluptas.* 'Despise pleasures: pleasure bought with pain is noxious.'[1] Silly enough all this: but, sound, when with a small admixture of good sense it is styled poetry, is by general consent made to pass for an equivalent for pure sense (as, in the small money of France, base metal with a small alloy of silver is received as an equivalent for silver with a small alloy of the base metal). If pleasure is a proper object of contempt, what is it that is the proper object of esteem, pain or apathy? 'Pleasure paid for by pain is a bad bargain,' says the philosopher in his fool's cap, scratching his head for [a] jingle: just as if, at a party, a man you knew nothing of were to come to you and say, 'Sir, you pay too dear for your sugar', not knowing what you pay for your sugar, any more than where you buy it. In the one verse may be seen the ascetic principle and the greatest happiness principle come out with the same breath. 'Despise pleasure' is *asceticism tout pure* —you may call it [that] whether it is a Frenchman you are speaking to or an Englishman.

79. 'Pleasure paid for in pain is noxious' has at bottom a spice of utilitarianism, though by stale water made up into this mawkish draught. Not that in his own composition Horace had any thing of asceticism, any more than any of his friends he speaks of: asceticism is one of the last sins he will be accused of by any one who has any acquaintance with his works.

80. Mr. Bentham, when in his memoriter verses[2] he gives the elements or dimensions of virtue in pains and pleasures, goes on to ascribe to them the attributes of *purity* and *fecundity.* This serves as a help to *memory,* but it stands in need of an observation to preserve it from throwing a cloud over conception: when pleasure is followed by pain, what it is produced by is not, properly speaking, the pleasure, but the same act, whatever it be, by which one after the other they are both of them produced.

81. Speaking of a mixture of pleasure as giving impurity to pain, as well as a mixture of pain as giving impurity to pleasure, Mr. Bentham exposed himself to the charge of paradox: purity not being commonly used in any other than what in his language is a dyslogistic sense, in which case, a proposition speaking with approbation of the

[1] *Epistulae, 2. 1.* 166. For the essay written by Bentham at the age of thirteen on the theme of this quotation, see *Correspondence* (CW), i. 47-9.

[2] See *An Introduction* (CIV), p. 38 n.

addition supposed to be made of pleasure, when the pain is spoken of as impure, would be a self-contradictory one. It looks as if, when composing these verses—of which some will say, as was said of Pope's pastorals, that if not poetry they are something better[1]—he had in his mind's eye the passage in Lilly's or the *Westminster Grammar* in which purity and impurity are applied to *letters. Litera, si praeeat vocalis, pura vocatur, ceu reus: impura est, praeeat si consona, ceu rus:*[2] it is to the letter *u* that these two opposite qualities are ascribed in the two cases. Purely neutral (it need scarce be said) was the sense in which he found both these words 'purity' and 'impurity' employed in that part of the so elaborately constructed and labour-saving specimen of didactic metre. The genius of Lilly manifested itself in giving personality to letters and parts of speech, as that of Darwin did afterwards in bestowing the same attribute on plants:[3] too happy mankind, had legal fictions been as innoxious as these *grammatical* ones!

82. When speaking of the Aristotelian logic, otherwise called logic of the Schools, Mr. Bentham has often been heard calling to mind the surprise and disappointment experienced by him at observing, in Bishop Sanderson's *Compend,*[4] well digested and useful as it is, the utter want of instructiveness in the examples, numerous as they are, which it contains: this actual nothingness forming so curious a contrast with the magnificence of its pretensions, professing as it does to contain within itself a sort of Encyclopaedia in miniature, teaching everything that is worth knowing. The case is that what is taught by these examples, and given for demonstrations, is little if any thing more than the relation which, in common speech, the import of one of two words bears to that of another, and much of a sort with the encyclopaedical instructions thus conveyed by these systems of logic is the political instruction conveyed by Rousseau in his *Contrat Social:* as little use made in the one as in the other of the only source of real information—observation, experience, and experiment.

[1] It was Pope himself who wrote, in an anonymous article in the *Guardian,* 27 Apr. 1713, that it could be said of his pastorals, as of some of Virgil's *Eclogues,* 'they are by no means pastorals, but something better'.

[2] 'A letter is called pure if it is preceded by a vowel, as in *reus:* it is impure if preceded by a consonant, as in *rus.'* These are the opening lines of *Rudimentum grammaticae latinae metricum, in usum Scholae Regiae Westmonasteriensis,* London, 1770, a work which was based on the famous grammar of William Lily (14687-1522).

[3] See Erasmus Darwin's *The Botanic Garden; A Poem in Two Parts,* London, 1791, especially Part II, 'The Loves of the Plants'.

[4] The *Logicae artis compendium* of Robert Sanderson (1587-1663), bishop of Lincoln, was first published in 1618 and went through many subsequent editions. Bentham studied it when an undergraduate at Oxford: *Correspondence (CW),* i. 47.

83. Among the meritorious attributes of the greatest happiness principle, two which are too material to be forgotten are the all-comprehensiveness and consistency, meaning exemption from the danger of inconsistency (of which it may be said to be in so eminent a degree susceptible, if it may not with more propriety be said to be actually in possession), to the securing of which valuable properties to the details of any work carried on under its direction, it affords such important assistance. It takes alike under its charge and gives character and direction to the details of Morals and Politics, including under Politics Government and Legislation and International Law: each of them considered as *it is,* for the hope of seeing it rendered what it *ought to be.* Morals is the doctrine of what ought to be done by man when acting on the small, the individual, scale: Politics the doctrine of what ought to be done by him when acting on an enlarged, a national or international, scale.

84. Of the greatest happiness principle, application cannot be made upon too large a scale: it cannot be carried on too far. Note here how striking the contrast it forms with the principle of Asceticism. Whatsoever merit he may descry in imposing sufferance on or denying enjoyment to himself, the most devoted partisan of the principle of Asceticism will hardly make a merit of dealing in the same manner with a whole nation, still less with the whole of the human race at all times: if yes, damnation, universal and direct, would be the right and proper end in view, the attainment of which ought to be the object of all endeavours.

ARTICLE ON UTILITARIANISM: SHORT VERSION MARGINALS[1]

1. Greatest happiness principle by J. B. put to use as a Direction post.

2. It is the oracle to applicants for instruction.

3. As such, it serves: 1) as end in view; 2) as a means of attaining that end; 3) as a motive inducing men to act in ways conducive to that end.

4. For making application of it, another instrument, a list of pains and pleasures, was found necessary.

5. These articles, the stock employable by human happiness manufacturers.

6. The history of the principle is the indication of the several contributions to this stock.

7. In other words, the indication of the several literary works by means of which any advance has been made toward the practical application of the principle.

8. Epoch One. Horace's *Satire, Utilitas. 'Sensus moresque repugnant atque ipsa utilitas justi prope mater et aequ^'* Instruction as far as it goes correct in this observation.

9. Epoch Two. Phaedrus' *Fables. 'Nisi utile est quod feceris stulta est gloria.'*

10. In both these instances, the principle in embryo only.

11. The principle unheeded from that time to the next epoch.

12. Epoch Three. Anno 1742, David Hume's Essays. First mention of utility as a principle.

13. Used merely as synonymous to 'conduciveness to an end'.

14. No intimation of happiness as connected with the idea.

15. No mention of pleasures and exemptions from pain as ingredients of happiness.

16. Of pleasures, no mention but in the general way in which utility is mentioned. Of pains, no mention, or next to none.

17. Of particular *virtues,* named in abundance, but all placed on the same level and undistinguished.

18. None but vague generalities on the subject.

19. So of reason and sentiment as the foundation of morals.

20. On good and evil, as on utility, all he says is mere speculation.

21. Epoch Four. Anno 1749. *Hartley on Man.*

22. Epoch Five. Anno 1758. Helvetius' *de I'Esprit.* Light thrown on the field by that book.

[1] These marginals are taken from UC xiv. 398.

23. J. B. much indebted to that work.

24. In that work, no nomenclature or classification of pains and pleasures.

25. The most instructive of the lights thrown by it is that which presents to view the influence of interests on opinions.

ARTICLE ON UTILITARIANISM: SHORT VERSION[1]

History of the principle originally styled the principle of utility, now at last the greatest happiness principle.

1. The character in which, for so many years past, Mr. Bentham has been putting this principle to use is that of an instrument of direction: or, say, in more familiar language, a *direction* for pointing out the path most proper to be pursued, on every occasion, in public as well as private life; to be pursued by every individual, whether acting in his private and individual capacity, as a member of the whole community, for his own benefit alone, or in his public capacity acting for the benefit of others in the character of a member of the governing part of the community, in the exercise of the powers belonging to him in that same character.

2. It is the oracle to which, on every occasion, he applies for instruction: and the several arrangements which in relation to the several parts of the field of thought and action it suggests, together with the reasons from which those same proposed arrangements derive their explanation and support, constitute its *responses.*

3. To this purpose it renders service to him in three distinguishable capacities: 1. as end in view; 2. as a storehouse of means employable for the attainment of that end; 3. as a storehouse furnishing motives by the force of which, on the several occasions, men may be induced to act in ways conducive to that end.

4. To the making application of it to these several aims or purposes, another instrument was found indispensably necessary, namely, a list of the several pleasures and pains of which man's nature is susceptible. In the several pleasures, and in exemption from the several pains, he saw the elements of which happiness is composed, and of which, in number and value taken together, it was to be a constant object of his endeavours to shew how the greatest quantity possible may be made to have place. In the several pleasures and exemptions from pain operating in the character of motives, he saw

[1] This text is taken from UC xiv. 399-411,

so many *means* adapted to the purpose of attaining or, say, of accomplishing, those same ends.

5. Applied to the business of government, legislation and administration included, the indication given of the above-mentioned articles may be considered as so many elementary parts of the stock employable by men in the manufacture of human happiness.

6. The history of the principle in question will consist of an indication given of the several distinguishable contributions made towards supplying the manufactory of the several articles of stock necessary to the carrying on of its several operations, and to its capacity of turning out, whenever, if ever, it shall happen to them to be bespoken, the several articles of finished work to which that same manufactory is capable of giving instance.

7. In other words, it will consist in an indication of the several literary works by which, by means of the instruction respectively afforded by them, so many distinguishable advances were made in the road leading from the principle in its purely speculative and unemployed state, to the state in which, in a degree of detail the most immediately applicable to practice, that is to say, in the state of a list of laws expressed *in terminis,*[1] application is made of it.

8. Epoch the first. A few years before Christ. Earliest known mention of the principle, or allusion to it, that made by Horace in his *Satires, Satire the Third, Utilitas.*[2] After speaking of the doctrine attributed to the Stoics, namely that all misdeeds *(peccata)* stand upon the same level in the scale of ill desert, or, say, in respect of the degree of disapprobation with which they ought to be considered, to this doctrine he says: *'sensus moresque repugnant Atque ipsa utilitas justi prope mater et aequi",* in a state of repugnancy to this doctrine are men's feelings, their customs, and utility herself, mother as she may in a manner be said to be of justice and equity. Instructive, as far as it goes, and, even metre notwithstanding, *correct* is this observation. True it is on this occasion [that] by utility may have been meant conduciveness to an end, whatsoever be that end: but on this occasion, there is but one end, namely, that to which justice and equity tend and are subservient—that is to say happiness. What is more, another intimation conveyed by it is, that the idea of utility is the source from which our ideas of justice and equity will, if clear and correct, have been deduced.

9. Epoch the second. A few years before or after Christ. Second known mention of, or allusion to, the principle, that made by Phaedrus in his *Fables. 'Nisi utile est quod feceris, stulta est*

[1] 'in definitive form'.

[2] See Long Version, p. 299 n. 2. The *Satires* were written c.35-30 BC.

gloria':[1] unless there is something of usefulness in that mode of conduct for which glory is assumed by you, the assumption is a foolish one.[2]

10.[3] On neither of these occasions does it present itself (so to speak) in the character of a full-grown principle capable of being adopted and worshipped by a house of votaries. In neither instance is it in any other than as it were an embryo state: or residing as yet in the Elysian fields, among the *'Illustris animas superumque ad lumen ituras'*[4] which Anchises in his situation of Inspector General was found by Aeneas passing under review.

11. Its unheeded state from those times down to that of the next epoch presents itself as resembling that of the aphorism by which ideas of all other sorts are stated as having their origin in the five senses: the loose hint which somehow or other had incidentally dropped from the almost unconscious pen of Aristotle without being accompanied with so much as the faintest concept of the important consequences deduced from it by Locke,[5] and employed in the subversion of the universal empire usurped by Logic under the command of this same Aristotle.

12. Epoch the third. Year 1742: year in which David Hume's *Essays* made their first appearance.[6] Contained in this year was the first moment at which it came out in the garb and with the style and note of *a principle.*

13. Ambiguous, however, and variable was the character under which on this occasion the idea of *usefulness* presented itself: sometimes indeed as being synonymous to 'conduciveness to happiness',

' See Long Version, p. 299 n. 1. Phaedrus was active around AD 40.

[2] Here Bentham wrote the following note to Bowring: 'I must beg of you to fill up the gap with matter correspondent to that which is inserted under the last preceding head. I have no copy of Phaedrus' Fables. A Delphin Edition has, I suppose, an Index Verborum, as that of Horace has.' The *Delphin and Variorum Classics* was an early nineteenth-century series of classical texts.

[3] Sections 10 and 11 are taken from UC xiv, 402. Portions of this sheet were crossed out by Bentham, the sheet as a whole having originally belonged to a slightly earlier version of the opening passages of the essay. (It bears the date 9 June, whereas sheets 399-401 and 403 are dated 10 June.)

[4] The reference is to the passage in the *Aeneid* where Aeneas finds his father Anchises in Elysium, reviewing the souls destined for rebirth in the world above. The line Bentham has in mind is book 6, line 680, 'Inclusas animas superumque ad lumen ituras' ('imprisoned souls destined to pass to the light of the upper world'); but he has not remembered it quite correctly, as the word *illustris* belongs to line 758 of the same book ('Illustris animas nostrumque in nomen ituras').

[5] Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora,* II. 19, 100a4-6. Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding,* ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975, pp. 104-5.

[s] See Long Version, p. 290 n. 1.

but at other times as being synonymous to *'conduciveness to the end* or purpose proposed', whatsoever may happen to be that same end or purpose. Accordingly inanimate are among the subject matters in which it is then spoken of as capable of being found *inhering:* 'a machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a house'.[1]

14. On no occasion is any express intimation given, that the idea of happiness is inseparably connected with the idea signified by it. Incidentally, it is true, do the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' on that occasion present themselves: but no where are pleasures and exemptions from pain presented to view as the elements of which the aggregate designated by the word 'happiness' is composed.

15. Pleasures, pains, desires, emotions, affections, passions, interests, virtues, vices, talents and other psychological entities are brought together like so many equestrians in the ride called 'Rotten Row': but the whole group in a state of the most perfect confusion and without any attempt to show in what relationship they stand to one another; all these objects undefined and indistinct, dancing before the eye like atoms in the sunshine.

16. As to pleasures, mention is indeed, as above observed, made of them, but no otherwise than in the same general way in which utility itself is mentioned: and as to pain, exemption from which is at least as necessary to happiness as pleasures are, instead of correspondent mention, either no mention is made, or next to none; nor of any such idea as that of giving a list of the different sorts of end is any the least trace visible. Of these elementary component parts of every mass of good and evil, whether pure or mixed, no account is taken —no criterion of right and wrong—no answer to the question, 'What *ought to be done* and what ought to be left undone?' is on any occasion endeavoured to be furnished.

17. As to *virtues,* of particular virtues names in great abundance are scattered here and there, but, for want of any instruction to the contrary, they are all placed on the same level, as by the Stoics, if Horace is to be believed, misdeeds *(peccata)* are in express terms;[2] nor are any boundary lines by which they might be distinguished from one another any where attempted to be drawn. They are distributed into classes: but by the classification given to them little, if any, assistance is given to the operation of determining in what different ways or proportions they are conducive to happiness.

[1] The reference is to Hume's *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,* London, 1751, p. 27: 'A machine, a piece of furniture, a garment, a house, well contrived for use and conveniency is so far beautiful, and is contemplated with pleasure and approbation.'

[2] Horace, *Satirae,* 1. 3. 18.

18. Visible scarce any where is any proposition of a character more instructive than that for the designation of which the term 'vague generalities' has been devised by Mr. Bentham. As on the field of law till of late years what *ought to be* is seldom made a question, and, when it *is,* is, without notice, confounded at every turn with the question *what is,* so in the field of *morals* in this work of David Hume.

19. Employed as the title to one part of his awkwardly divided hodge-podge are the words 'Of the general Principles of Morals', and presently afterwards, after speaking of the general foundation of morals, *reason* and *sentiment* are spoken of as the only *foundation (terrain* would have been more appropriate) from which they can have been derived;[1] but the whole composition being a tissue of vague generalities, no reference is there, or so much as allusion, to particular pains and pleasures; and, upon the whole, the question is left by him in a state of confusion little if any thing less thick than that in which he found it.

20. As to *good and evil,* as it is no otherwise than by observation made of the pleasures and pains issuing from the several species of action in question and of the elements of value in regard to each that any account can be taken or estimate (made of the good)[2] and evil respectively produced by them, all that he says on these subjects, including all he says on the subject of *utility,* consists of mere speculation; no part of it has been applied by him, or is capable of being applied, in such sort as to be of use to practice: like a cloud which, floating in the air at different levels but never in the form of rain descending upon the earth, does but tantalize the thirsty traveller without contributing any thing towards his relief.

21. Epoch the fourth. 1749: date of the first edition of *Hartley on Man.* In that work, for the first time, an intimation is given of the connection of the import of the word 'happiness' with that of the word 'pain' and that of the word 'pleasure'; and a translation is thereby made of the language (so to speak) of happiness into the language of pain and pleasure; a list is given of pleasures and a corresponding and parallel one of pains.[3] But neither by the name of the greatest happiness principle, nor by that of the principle of utility, nor in short by any other name, is any express mention made of the principle in question in the character of an all-directing guide in the walks of public as well as private life.[4]

[1] Hume, *Principles of Morals,* pp. 6-8.

[2] MS damaged.

[3] David Hartley, *Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations, 2* vols., London, 1749, i, pp. ii-iii.

[4] Here Bentham wrote the following note to Bowring: 'Not having a copy of that book, I am under the necessity of leaving to you if you think it worth

22. Epoch the fifth. Year 1758: date of the first publication of the work of Helvetius entitled *de I'Esprit:*[1] a word to which, unhappily, no clear idea stands attached and of which no equivalent is to be found in the English language. Important is the service for which morals and legislation stand indebted to this work: but to give in any small number of words any totally correct and complete conception of the virtues of that service is scarcely possible. The light it spreads, on the field of this branch of art and science, is to that steady light which would be diffused over it by a regular institute or say didactic treatise, like what the meridian sun sheds over a place when bursting forth one moment from behind a cloud it hides itself the next moment behind another, is to that comparatively pale but regular and steady system of illumination afforded to a street by two constantly lighted rows of lamps.

23. To this work Mr. Bentham has often been heard to say that he stands indebted for no small part of the ardour of his desire to render his labours useful to mankind upon the largest scale, and for the energies he finds to persevere in them, and for the hope and belief that they would not be altogether fruitless.

24. In that work, mention of different sorts of pleasures does indeed occur: but [neither] in the marshalling of them is any method observed, nor is so much as the idea started of any such task as that of making out a list of them.

25. Of the lights just mentioned as derived by him from that work, one of the most instructive he felt to be that which presents to view the influence exerted by *interest* on *opinions:*[2] and those not only opinions declared but opinions actually entertained; and from these lights it is that he deduced those ulterior ones by which he was enabled to make out the list he has so often employed of the four psychological causes of misconduct in men, more particularly public men, that is to say, sinister interest, interest-begotten prejudice, authority-begotten prejudice, and primaeval or say inbred weakness.

26. Epoch the sixth. Year 1768: date of Priestley's tract entitled *Essay on Government.* In the concluding page of it, if memory is not deceitful, on the character of the only proper end of government, appears in italics the phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'.[3] Of this phrase, the good effect is the substituting to the

while the task of consulting it for the purpose of security against misrepresentation.'

[1] See Long Version, p. 290 n. 2.
[2] Claude Adrien Helvetius, *De I'esprit,* Paris, 1758, Discours II, chap. III.
[3] See Long Version, p. 291 n. 4.

equivocal word 'utility' the unequivocal phrase of which happiness is the principal and sole characteristic ingredient. In the change herein consists the whole of the improvement at this time made.

27. Epoch the seventh. Year 1776: date of the publication of the *Fragment on Government.* In this publication, the *principle of utility* is, under that same sense, taken in hand and placed up against the Original Contract. On this occasion, the language of *happiness,* so to speak, is not *substituted* to that of utility, the word 'utility' being employed as well as the word 'happiness'; but the two languages are translated into one another, and the two locutions represented as interconvertible. This is all that on this occasion is done. Neither the language of *utility* nor that of *happiness* [is] rendered into that of *pain* and *pleasure.* No such things [are] brought to view as the names of particular species, either of pains or pleasures. Scarcely, as yet, do any such words as 'pain', 'pleasure' or 'happiness' make their appearance.[1]

28. Epoch the eighth. Year 1789: date of the publication entitled *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.* On this occasion, for the first time, not only are pains and pleasures brought to view under heads the list of which is regarded as complete and sufficient for all purposes, or not wanting much of being so, but the several corresponding motives are brought to view by the side of them respectively, and the idea associated with the word 'motive' is for the first time rendered clear and determinate.[2] Notice is also taken, and that for the first time, of the three species of denominations employed in speaking of the same motive: the eulogistic, expressive of a sentiment of approbation as attached to the idea of the motive; dyslogistic, [expressive] of a sentiment of disapprobation; and neutral, expressive of neither the one nor the other of those two collateral and frequently irrelevant and delusive adjuncts.[3] But on this occasion neither of interests nor of desires is any thing said: nor of the above-mentioned denominations is any endeavour applied to the rendering the list complete. Word here employed in the mention made of the principle, 'utility' alone: not as yet 'happiness'.

29. Epoch the ninth. Publication of the work entitled *Chrestomathia.* Year of publication, of Part 1,1816; of Part II, 1817. Design and business of it, amongst other things, bringing and by tables

[1] The last three words have been crossed out in MS but are necessary to the sense.

[2] *An Introduction* (CH'j, chap. 10.

[3] Ibid. pp. 115-16. Bentham is incorrect. He appears to have used the terms for the first time on 2 Jan. 1805 (see UC xiv. 21). They appear in print for the first time in the 1815/17 version of the *Springs* (see in particular p. 95 above).

holding up to view the conduciveness of the several branches of art and science to the maximum of happiness, and, by means of that common property, exhibiting their relations to each other.

30. Epoch the tenth. Year 1817: date of the publication entitled *Table of the Springs of Action.* Here, for the first time, the list of the above-mentioned denominations of the three classes is endeavoured to be rendered complete. Here, too, to pains, pleasures and motives are added the corresponding *desires* and *interests,* and so, for the sake of consistency and completeness, names are proposed for the several interests: as in some instances, though without any view toward completeness, had been done by Helvetius. Lastly, here, for giving facility to comparison and observation of the *mutual* relations of the several classes of objects, one to another, they are placed together on one surface, in the form of a *Table.* To it are subjoined Notes in which of other psychological entities, such as affections, passions, virtues, vices, moral good, moral evil, etc., in no inconsiderable number, explanation is given, and the sense rendered clear and determinate by indication given of their relation to the beforementioned ones. But of the all-embracing and all-ruling principle, no need was found, on this occasion, of making mention, by either of its names.

31. Epoch the eleventh. Year 1822: date of the publication entitled *Codification Proposal* etc.[1] In this publication, for the first time, to the words 'greatest happiness' addition is made of the words 'of the greatest number',[2] and of each of the several arrangements proposed, averment is made that 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number requires' etc.: and the three languages above-mentioned, that of utility, that of happiness, and that of pains and pleasures, are brought together, and rendered and thoroughly explained by each other: indication at the same time given how, by exemption from pains—from particular pains—the happiness of all will be augmented by the all-beneficent means there proposed.

32. In the above-mentioned .year, 1817, under the title of *Papers relative to Codification,* had been published a work having for its object and business the recommendation of that same measure: but, on that occasion, under no other name than that of *the principle o f Utility* is the principle in question spoken of: no epoch, accordingly,

[1] *Codification Proposal addressed by Jeremy Bentham in all Nations professing Liberal Opinions,* London, 1822 (Bowring, iv. 535-94).

[2] Bentham had in fact used the whole phrase 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' in 1776 in the Preface to his *Fragment on Government',* see *A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government (CW),* p. 393.

with reference to the present purpose, does that publication constitute.

33. In the year 1785 came out for the first time the work of the Reverend Dr William Paley entitled *Elements of Moral and Political Philosophy.* But, in the catalogue of the works constitutive of so many epochs in the history of the principle in question, this work has not been inserted, because though, to wit by the name of the principle of utility, mention is made of this same principle, yet, as to any indication made of the relation borne by the idea attached to it to the ideas attached to the words 'pain' and 'pleasure', no such elucidation does it give. The eyes for which the work was designed were those of the youth belonging to the University of Cambridge in one of the Colleges of which he was at that time Tutor:[1] in that meridian eyes were not strong enough, nor was it his desire that they should be strong enough, to endure true lights in such a field. In black and white, professed and self-declared advocate of insincerity and subornation of insincerity in the shape of subscription to articles —over a bottle, self-avowed lover of *corruption,* rich enough to keep an equipage but not 'to keep a conscience'[2]—after publishing editions upon editions of that same work and filling both universities with them to saturation, he departed this life in the year 1805, knowing better all that time [than] to know any thing of the works in and by which that of which mention has here been made had even then been done towards putting to its use that all-beneficent principle, or to know that any such person as the author was in existence.

' William Paley (1743-1805) was elected a fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, in 1766 and was appointed tutor in 1771. He left Cambridge, having been presented to the rectory of Musgrave in Cumberland, in 1776.

[2] According to G. W. Meadley, *Memoirs of William Paley,* 2nd edition, Sunderland, 1810, p. 89, Paley sympathized with the Feathers Tavern Petition of 1772 for a relaxation of the terms of subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles, but declined to sign the petition, saying that he 'could not afford to keep a conscience'. According to H. D. Best, *Literary and Personal Memoirs,* London, 1829, p. 184, Paley said in conversation: 'I was always an advocate for bribery and corruption. . . . Who is so mad as to wish to be governed by force? Or who is such a fool as to expect to be governed by virtue? There remains then nothing else but bribery and corruption.'

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEDACOLOGIA: ART AND SCIENCE DIVISION

The text reproduced below from UC ci. 456-70 is part of a larger discussion (ci. 428-98) which was written in February 1815 under the general heading 'Dedacologia' and the chapter-heading 'Art and Science Division'. Sheets 456-70 have the additional heading 'Deontology'.[1]

In UC ci. 434, Bentham refers to somatology or somatics, psychology and psychics and writes: 'To one or other of those denominations will every branch of science which has for its subject the field of (to us) perceptible existence, the class (to us) of perceptible being —be found referable.' At UC ci. 451-5 there is a passage concerned with psychology, and sheet 456, which is the start of the text reproduced below, relates deontology to somatology and psychology.

A portion of this text seems appropriate for the insertion which Bentham intended to make following the first paragraph of Deontology I. 2 (p. 000 above). But the text as a whole is probably too general to have been incorporated into the work at this point. However, given that no other appropriate writings have been found, and given that Bentham's note relating to the insertion was written after UC ci. 456-70, it is likely that he had the content of these sheets in mind as the basis for what he intended to insert.

THE TEXT

From somatology and psychology taken together, eudaemonics—or the art of applying life to the maximization of well-being—derives its knowledge of the phenomena belonging to human existence considered as applicable to that its purpose. In the significance of [the] one word 'deontology', may be designated the knowledge, in so far as by art it is attainable, of the causes by which on each occasion those means may, with most advantage, be rendered conducive to that common end.

In the field of deontology as thus explained will be found included the several fields of Ethics, meaning Private Ethics or Morals, Internal Government and International Law.

If on ground so thorny and so slippery enquiry could be warranted

[1] UC ci. 456, 457, par. 1, 458, par. 2 and 3, were used as the basis of a portion of Bentham's *Essay on Logic:* see Bowring, viii. 289. According to the manuscript, the word 'unfit* in the note on p. 289 should be replaced by 'ought*.

in expressing itself with that intensity of persuasion, that fulness of assurance, which is designated and included in the import of the word 'knowledge', the field of deontognosy would be the more expressive denomination for the designation of the field of this branch of art and science. In that case Deontognosy would be the knowledge of what on every occasion is, by the person in question, proper[3] to be done.

Were it not for the extent thus given to Deontology, upon a great part, not to say the greatest part, of what has been advanced and written on the subject of Ethics, of Government, and of International Law taken together, an exclusion would be put.

But in the present sketch, Deontology is considered as neither more nor less than a branch of the all comprehensive art with its attached science, the art of Eudaemonics. And thus limited and expanded, it means neither more nor less than the consideration, not to say the knowledge, of what on each occasion is most conducive to well-being: i.e. in what manner the means furnished by the several other branches of the art of Eudaemonics, with their attached branches of science, may to most advantage be employed for the attainment of well-being.

Well-being, good: but whose well-being? the well-being of what person or persons?

In the answer given to the question will necessarily be included the determination of the different sub-branches into which this branch of Science is sub-divisible and, accordingly as above, is wont to be divided.

Between the several branches in question the limits, most unhappily, are essentially and unavoidably indeterminate. To give warning of this inconvenience is all that can be done. To remedy it is impossible: by the very nature of the case all remedy is excluded.

Of deontology, in the case in question, the field is either private or public, and for the division of the science itself these adjuncts may accordingly be made to serve.

Intransitive and transitive: to one or other of these denominations will the whole contents of the field, whatsoever belongs to the subject of private deontology, be found referable: intransitive, in so far as that individual and no other whose agency is, on the occasion in question, the object of consideration, the person for whose guidance

[a] Of this word 'proper', with its conjugate 'propriety', and its quasi-conjugate 'ought', the use made has for its causes, efficient as well as rational, the desire of including whatsoever has been advanced on the subject, without, as well as with, regard to the effect producible in respect of well-being by the course of conduct which on the several occasions has, under the notion of its propriety, been prescribed or recommended.

the enquiry is made, the party whose well-being is taken into consideration and included in the account; transitive, in so far as in the account in question the well-being of any other individual or individuals.

National and international: to one or other of these denominations will whatsoever belongs to the subject of public deontology be found referable: national, in so far as in the consideration of the effects of the act or course of conduct which is in contemplation, in the list of the persons whose well-being is taken into account, all the members, rulers and subjects taken together, of the political state in question—of all these but of no others—are taken into the account; international or universal, in so far as the well being of the members of all other political states taken together, or of this or that political state in particular, or of this or that individual member of such foreign political state, is taken into account.

With reference to all these several fields, all differing in extent, a man's interest will of course be altogether different according to the situation or situations which it happens to him to occupy in the whole of society in the universal field: according as he is a member of no other society than that of the subject many, or is in lieu of or in addition to that character a member of the society of the ruling few.

From every extension given to the field in which he acts, the field on which, on the occasion in question, his conduct is capable of exercising an influence, a man receives a fresh interest which is capable of running into competition with and operating in opposition to his purely personal interest—that species, and the only species, of interest which no man can fail of possessing and being operated upon by. His interest as the member of a family, his interest as the member of this or that particular public society included in the general society composed of all the members of the political state to which he belongs (and to the number of these so included societies of which it may happen to the same individual to be a member there are no determinate limits), his interest as a member of that society, his interest as a citizen of the world—corresponding to all these several conditions in life may be seen distinguishable interests, each of which is capable of coming into competition with and operating in opposition to all the others.

On all these occasions, the interest which according to the nature of man will generally be predominant is the narrowest of all interests, purely personal interest. For any regard that is capable of being had for them, all these other interests can not have any thing to trust to but the forces of the several sanctions, viz. political, including the legal, popular or moral, religious, and the force of sympathy: for

sympathy is capable of having for its object not only this or that individual, but this or that portion or any number of portions, howsoever extensive, of the whole species, or even the whole. In addition to this sympathy, which from cultivation is happily capable of continuing to receive, as it has received, continual encrease, what the narrowest personal interest has to depend upon for any corrective of which it may be susceptible is composed of the man's own opinion concerning what, in relation to the matter in question, is the free opinion and will of the public at large, i.e., of that portion of it, greater or less, on whose opinion and will he regards himself as more or less dependent: concerning what will eventually be the opinion, will and practice of the members of the government to which he is subject—their practice, viz. in respect of the application expected to be made by them of the matter of punishment or reward or both: [and] concerning what will be [the] eventual will and conduct of the almighty being.

In so far as the person in question is considered as occupying the situation of a member of the ruling few, the art and science of deontology will coincide with the art and science of government: within the field of which art and science is included the art and science of legislation, together with what remains of the field of government after abstraction made of the field of legislation, which remainder may be designated as it commonly appears to be by the appellation of the field of administration.

Whensoever every interest capable of acting in opposition to the interest in question is absent, any the slightest interest according to the conception formed of it may have power enough to determine action: and it is on this account and this account only that the question, 'What course of action will on the occasion in question be most conducive to the general welfare of mankind?', can be worth writing about. Upon the sensibilities of the individual in question, the consideration of the general welfare of mankind may operate in either or both of two different ways: 1. immediately, by means of any sympathy on his part to which in his breast it may happen to that general interest to be the object; 2. less immediately, by means of the religious or the popular or moral sanction: for independently of any such sympathy as above, a man may be engaged to act in favour of what he regards as the general interest of mankind, being thereto determined either by the consideration of the eventual treatment expected by him at the hands of the almighty or by the consideration of the eventual treatment expected by him at the hands of the tribunal of public opinion.

Thus in the case of the Slave trade. On the part of many of those

who have neither possessed nor conceive themselves to possess any personal interest in the continuance of that pernicious traffic, sympathy for the species in general, and thereby for the interest [of] that particular portion of the species who are the subject of that trade, may to a very considerable extent, there can be no reason to doubt, have sufficed to engage them to take a part more or less active in favour of abolition.

But to these instances there can be as little doubt that others might with truth be added: composed of those who, though in the shape of personal interest they found their breasts operated upon with more or less force by views of interest against the proposed abolition and in favour of the continuance of that trade, yet, to the personal interest corresponding [to] the interest of the purse, found an opponent or opponents, and in the force of these opponents an overmatch, in the interest of the trumpet and in the interest of the altar acting in conjunction: in corresponding pleasure and pain respectively expected at the hands of the tribunal of public opinion and the tribunal of Almighty God.

As for its end, to pathematology,[1] so it is to thelematology[2] and thus to psychological dynamics that Deontology looks for its means.

In relation to these means, for the promotion of any ends which it may be his endeavour to promote, all that in a direct way the Deontologist as such is capable of doing consists in indication, a given indication: viz. indication of the course of conduct which on each occasion presents itself as most conducive to the well-being of the person or persons whose well-being is by the deontologist on that occasion taken into consideration, among whom it is not natural that those of mankind at large should be altogether unthought of or unmentioned.

But though in a direct way the word ‘indicate’ is expressive of all the means by which, and all the force with which, the Deontologist as such can expect to operate, yet indirectly, acting in the situation thus assumed by him, and that by means of the very indication thus given, nothing is more natural than that he should at the same time operate in a more efficient character: viz. in the character of a member of the tribunal of public opinion, whose motives will, in proportion

[1] Previously explained by Bentham as follows: ‘by this name may be designated the science of psychology in so far as pleasure or pain are taken for the subjects of it’ (ci. 453).

[2] Previously explained by Bentham as follows: Tn so far as the will is concerned in the production of any result, the field of the corresponding branch of science which takes cognizance of such result may be termed the field of thelematology’ (ci. 452).

to the strength of the grounds and reasons which they have for their support, their grounds and reasons being composed of this indication so far as they are regarded as correct, will naturally—viz. on the part of all those whose sympathy for the general interest, supported by such natural supports as that sympathy as above is provided with, is not overpowered by interests of a natural and, because more concentrated, a more powerful complection—be likely to find approvers and supporters in a number proportioned to the skill and felicity with which those indications have been brought to view.

And with this sort and degree of influence in so far as he is reasonable he will find no difficulty contenting himself.

It is only in so far as it is considered as bearing relation to pleasures and pains, that any clear and determinate idea can be annexed to the word 'interest'. Correspondent to well-being as above defined is interest taken in its most general term. Every man has an interest in the possession of the maximum of well-being. To possess the maximum of well-being is the interest of every man. But the maximum of well-being is the maximum of pleasure in all shapes taken together, accompanied throughout life with the minimum of pain in all shapes taken together.

So many different shapes as pleasures and pains, taken together, are capable of assuming, so many shapes is interest capable of assuming: so many species of pleasures and pains, so many species of interest.

Original or independent personal interest—personal interest created by sympathy—personal interest created by public opinion—personal interest created by religion: to these four heads will all the modifications of interest be found in every case reducible. And in this way, though the modifications of the sympathetic interest, all capable of operating in opposition to one another, may be as numerous as the divisions which the aggregate number of the whole species of mankind, not to speak of inferior sensitive beings, will admitt of, yet, by the operation of the above four heads of interest, the number of the actual contending parties to such a composition will, in practice, be found reduced to that moderate and easily observable number. For by the interest created by religion or the interest created by public opinion or both together, the claims of sympathy as excited by all those contending extra-regarding interests, be they ever so numerous, will commonly without difficulty be decided upon, and the force of them without difficulty overborne.

Deontology, i.e. the mode of treating this branch of art and science, the mode of giving instruction in it, is of two kinds.

In the teaching of deontology, i.e. in the shewing in what manner

on each occasion in the situation in which a man is placed it is proper for a man to conduct himself, either the teacher confines himself to the consideration of what is the manner in which, on that same occasion or that same situation, it is the interest of persons in general (due allowance not being forgotten to be made in every instance to idiosyncracy and idiopathy) to conduct themselves, or takes upon himself, to a greater or less extent, to determine what, on such occasion or such situation, it is proper for them to do without regard to their respective interests.

Considered in respect of the principle pursued as above in treating of it, deontology may accordingly be divided into the deontology of utilitarianism or the deontology of ipsedixitism.

Being coextensive with and exactly commensurate to the field of pleasure and pain, the field of interest, viz. of interest in respect of pleasure and pain, outstretches by far the utmost extent that was ever endeavoured to be given to the field of duty.

Yet, to the word 'interest', throughout the whole course of his enquiry into what is proper to be done, the ipsedixital deontologist, the ipsedixital moralist, in one word, the ipsedixitist (and to this class has belonged almost every man who has ever written or spoken on the subject) substitutes commonly the word 'duty': and for the determination of what is a man's duty, throughout the enquiry to the consideration of what is the interest of the person in question, the supposed agent, substitutes the consideration of what on the occasion is his own will and pleasure. On no occasion does he take up the pen but to lay down the law. In the stile in which the legislator within the field of his actual existing authority expresses himself in the offering of his laws, the ipsedixital moralist expresses himself in the offering of his aphorisms. Not so the utilitarian.

The mood in which the utilitarian expresses himself is never other than the indicative. Disguised or undisguised, the mood in which the ipsedixitist expresses himself is never other than the imperative.

Cloathed and backed by pleasure and pain in inexhaustible abundance, the expression given by the legislator will within the field of his power present at all times the most perfect of all titles to regard. Destitute of their support, the expression [given] by the ipsedixital moralist to his will is generally speaking completely devoid of all title to regard. The character in which he holds himself up to view is the fancied and assumed character of legislator of the human race. The human race has never had more than one Orator, and that was Anacharsis Cloots.[1] Legislators it has had almost as many as it has moralists.

[1] Cloots, Jean Baptiste Du Val-de-Grace, Baron von (1755-94), known as Anacharsis Cloots. Born near Cleves, the son of a secret agent of the King of

Duties of Men—Duties of Women. Whole Duty of Man.[1] Anacharsis was a man deserving of general respect, a respectable personage compared with the men, who, turning aside from or turning their backs upon the consideration of interest, jogging on from first to last in the track of ipsedixitism, of ipsedixital didactics, deliver to the world their will and pleasure in the form of books published with such titles.

Anacharsis pretended not to anything beyond persuasion: those men undertake to set the law. The sin of Anacharsis went not beyond vanity: the sin of these men is the proudest of all pride.

Destitute of all just ground, is this arrogance without effect? By the whole amount of whatsoever that be, it has more than for the good of mankind were to be wished. But by a man unprovided with everything that goes by the name of power, and not vouchsafing so much as to profess to a thought on what may be the interest of those to whom he is addressing himself, in what way is it, it may be asked, that any such influence can thus successfully be exerted? In this way. The power of the popular or moral sanction, the power of the tribunal as it is called of public opinion (though of opinion, the power would be nothing without will, nor will itself without action) is one of the four or five distinguishable forces by joint operation [of] which will in every action is determined—by which man, in a word, is governed. The tribunal of public opinion is a Standing Committee in which all who write or speak to the public have voices. In this Committee, the ipsedixitist makes his motions correspondent in extent and number to the proposed laws of which his book is composed. And though these powerless and spurious laws are commonly no less bare of reason than are the genuine ones, yet such, in the mouth or pen of him who has boldness enough to assume the exercise of it, is the force of intellectual authority, that a motion of this sort could scarcely be so absurd or mischievous, as not to find men in considerable numbers to vote for it.

Severity, the grand engine and trust of the vulgar among legislators, is also that of the vulgar among moralists. No reason does he employ or find himself to stand in need of when he is calling upon men to

Prussia, he settled in France in 1789. He wished to bring about a universal federation of all peoples, and came to be known during the Revolution as 'the orator of the human race'. He was given, at the same time as Bentham in 1792, the title of French Citizen, but was guillotined during the Terror.

[1] *The Whole Duty of Man,* attributed to Richard Allestree, was first published under the title *The Practice of Christian Graces* in 1659, and went through numerous subsequent editions. Another work, *The Whole Duty of a Woman,* was published *c.* 1700.

give up their dearest pleasures, as little when he is calling upon them to embrace pains. Severe to others, the conclusion is that he could not take upon him to be so, unless he were at least equally so to himself: severe in doctrine, the conclusion is that he can never be less so in his practice. Thus, without any the smallest expence to himself, at any rate without need of it, he purchases at the expence of those listening to him the reputation of wisdom and virtue: and in proportion to the extent to which he acts the part of an enemy (for what is it but the part of an enemy to engage men, without any equivalent, to sacrifice pleasure or embrace pain?), finds those who are weak and misguided enough to cherish and respect him as a friend.

In so far as it is from religion that he draws his principle or his motives, the deontologist acts in the character of an utilitarian. For by what means does religion operate or seek to operate on the will of man, but by the pains of hell and the pleasures of heaven?

But while drawing upon heaven and hell for motives, it is upon his own will under the guise of his own opinion [that] the ipsedixital moralist and religionist draws for precepts: upon his own personal will determined like other wills by considerations of personal interest, real or imagined. There lie the sacred books, but they are but for shew. For use he is full freight with an ample stock of substitutes: substitutes more commodious and in every respect preferable; a Liturgy, a set of creeds, and a whole swarm of Articles. As much fitter for use as his Liturgy, his creeds, and his Articles are than the sacred books, so upon occasion, under the name of interpretations, are his own conceits, or what is better, the conceits, real or pretended, of those who turn the cock of the fountain of preferment are than are the firstmentioned immediate set of substitutes. And thus upon exposition mounted upon exposition, as it were upon pillow mounted upon pillow, ipsedixitism, in its travels over the field of theology, supports itself and slumbers at its ease.

The substitutes all the while are of no value but in virtue of their conformity to the originals. But by oaths and solemn engagements, the violation of which would have among the number of effects exclusion from all hope of preferment, and ill will on the part of all who look for it, this indispensable conformity is effectually secured.

APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS

The following French text is taken from UC xiv. 290-6. The manuscript sheets, which were written by a copyist, are numbered sequentially and dated 18 Mar. 1828. The aphoristic character of the entries that are referred to as definitions and the broad range of topics covered suggest that the manuscript is a copy of a series of notes written by Bentham.

THE TEXT [1]

1. La prudence est (soit dit) *interne,* en tant que l'acte qu'elle dirige n'influe pas sur le bonheur d'autrui.

2. La prudence est (soit dit) *externe,* en tant que l'acte influe, de quelque manière que ce soit, sur le bonheur d'autrui.

3. La bienveillance effective est l'union de la bienveillance avec la bienfaisance.

4. Otez la bienfaisance, reste la bienveillance, dont la valeur effective est zéro.

5. La bienfaisance peut être au maximum sans le moindre sentiment de bienveillance.

6. Autres choses égales, la bienfaisance d'un individu est en raison de sa dépense.

7. C'est ainsi que le despote le plus malfaisant peut avoir été en même terns le plus bienfaisant.

8. La bienveillance effective est ou positive ou negative.

9. La positive a lieu en tant que c'est par un acte positif qu'elle produit son effet.

10. La négative a lieu en tant que c'est par un acte négatif qu'elle produit son effet.

11. Si le bonheur d'un quelqu'un reqoit une augmentation, c'est de l'une ou l'autre de deux manières—1. par l'augmentation de la somme de ses plaisirs; ou 2. par la diminution de la somme de ses peines.

12. Pour opérer une augmentation de bonheur, soit de soi-même, soit d'autrui, au moyen d'un acte positif, il faut par dessus la volonté en avoir le pouvoir necéssaire.

13. Pour autant qu'il s'agit de decider entre la production d'un

[1] The MSS are dated 18 Mar. 1828 and headed 'Deontology'. The text reproduces them exactly, apart from the supplying of some missing accents.

plaisir ou d'une peine, et i'abstention de produire un plaisir ou une peine équivalente, un acte négatif peut produire le même effet qu'un acte positif.

14. Pour s'abstenir d'opérer une diminution du bonheur de qui que ce soit, il ne faut que la volonte.

15. Ce n'est qu'a proportion de ses moyens qu'on peut exercer la bienveillance effective d'une maniere positive.

16. Tout homme peut exercer d'une manière parfaite envers chaque autre la bienveillance effective negative.

17. Malheureusement, le bien qu'un homme quel que ce soit, même le plus puissant, peut faire est peu de chose en comparaison du mal que ce meme homme peut faire soit a lui-meme soit a autrui.

18. Cependant, il ne suit pas de là que la somme du bonheur dans 1'epèce humain[1] est plus grande que la somme du malheur: puisque du malheur possible la quantite actuelle depend en si grande proportion de la volonte des individus qui s'y trouvent exposes.

19. Pour savoir exercer d'une manière parfaite la bienveillance effective negative, en petit, et dans la vie ordinaire, il faudrait faire dresser un catalogue de toutes les manières de malaise possible en grand et en petit, et dans toute situation, tant privée que publique, de toutes occasions qui en peuvent amener la faculte. Pour en voir un échantillon on peut consulter les Lettres de Lord Chesterfield à son fils[2] et les Misères de la vie humaine (Miseries of human life),[3] ouvrages Anglais tous les deux. Surtout, n'oubliez pas les malaises si intenses et si étendues, si durables et si variées dont le discours est l'organe.

20. Pour concevoir la nature et la quantité de chaque malaise, imaginez quel en serait l'effet sur vous-même: toujours, en notant la différence que peut amener la différence de caractère et de relations extérieures d'une coté et de l'autre.

Probablement, si non effectivement, tout homme s'enrichit a proportion de tout service qu'il a rendu a tout autre.

Chaque fois qu'un homme se donne un plaisir, ou bien évite une peine, que sans cela il auroit portée, il augmente son bonheur d'une manière directe, articulee et certaine: chaque fois qu'il rend un pared service à d'autres, il augmente son propre bonheur d'une manière indirecte, non-articulee et probable. Chaque moment que vous

[1] Thus MS, in error for 'espece humaine'.

[2] *Letters written by the late Right Honourable Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield to his Son Philip Stanhope, 2* vols., London, 1774.

[3] [Rev. James Beresford,] *The Miseries of Human Life, or the Groans of Samuel Sensitive and Timothy Testy, with a few supplementary Sighs from Mrs. Testy,* London, 1806.

n'employez pas à augmenter votre bonheur d'une manière directe, employez a l'augmenter, et de cette meme façon indirecte.

La nuit doit vous suffire pour le repos et la jouissance sexuelle: le jour mieux vaut employer le terns à augmenter votre bonheur permanent dût-ce n'être que de maniere indirecte, que de la laisser non augmenté.

Fumez le tabac, goûtez le café, autant que cela vous est agréable: mais tout en fumant et en goûtant vous pourriez songer toujours aux moyens de porter a son maximum augmentation, tant positive que négative, de votre bonheur des deux manieres directe et indirecte.

Addition de 20.

Par la voye del'analogie et du contraste, les malaises dont l'absence est le fruit de la bienveillance effective négative, pourraient sur quelques parties du terrain [fournir] des exemples a la bienveillance effective positive.

1. Le bonheur est un compose de biens tant positifs que negatifs.
2. Un bien est un plaisir, ou l'exemption de telle ou telle peine, dont, a telle ou telle occasion, on se trouve menacé, ou une cause de l'un ou de 1'autre de ces deux effets.
3. Appellez *bien positifun* plaisir, ou la cause d'un plaisir.
4. Appellez *bien négatif* une exemption de peine comme ci-dessus, ou une cause de telle exemption.

Toutes sensations sont ou *interessantes* ou *non-interessantes.*

Appellez *intéressante* la sensation accompagneé soit de plaisir soit de peine.

Appellez *non-interessante* la sensation qui n'est accompagneé ni de l'une[1] nidel'autre.

La valeur d'un plaisir séparément considere est en raison de ses trois dimensions: c'est-a-dire *intensite, dúree, etendue.*

C'est en raison de ces trois dimensions là qu'il contribue a la masse de bonheur général: de meme que c'est en raison de sa longueur, de sa largeur et de sa profondeur qu'une pierre contribue a la masse d'un bâtiment.

La grandeur d'un plaisir est composée de son intensite et de sa durée.

L'étendue d'un plaisir est en raison des personnes qui l'éprouvent.

Il en est de meme a l'egard des peines.

[1] Thus MS, in error for 'l'un'.

La grandeur d'un plaisir ou d'une peine dans une de ces dimensions là peut en compenser la petitesse dans une autre.

Considére par rapport a d'autres plaisirs, un plaisir peut être ou *fécond* ou *stérile:* il en est de meme a l'egard d'une peine.

Un plaisir peut être fécond ou en plaisirs ou en peines: fécond en plaisirs il est (soit dit), fécond en même espèce, ou bien *en sens directed* fecónd en peines, il est (soit dit) fécond en espèce opposée: ou bien *en sens contraire.*

Il en est de meme a l'egárd d'une peine.

Un plaisir peut être dérivé ou d'un autre plaisir, ou seulement de l'acte, par lequel cet autre plaisir est produit: si c'est de l'acte seulement, c'est l'acte seulement qui est fécond, non pas le plaisir: si c'est du plaisir produit par l'acte, c'est ce plaisir qui est fecond.

Un plaisir produit immédiatement comme ci-dessus, par la contemplation d'un plaisir censé éprouvé par autrui, est un plaisir de sympathie.

Une peine produite de même par la contemplation d'une peine censée éprouveé par autrui, est une peine de sympathie.

Un plaisir produit de même par la contemplation d'une peine censée éprouveé par autrui est un plaisir d'antipathie.

Une peine produite de même par la contemplation d'un plaisir censé éprouve par autrui est une peine d'antipathie.

La bienveillance d'un individu est étendue en proportion du nombre des individus dont le bonheur est la source d'un plaisir de sympathie, ou le malheur d'une peine de sympathie qu'il eprouvé.

Un homme est vertueux dans le rapport du nombre des individus dont sa bienveillance s'attache a augmenter le bonheur (y compris la quantité du bonheur d'un chacun), conjointement avec le sacrifice que pour cet effet il fait sciemment de son propre bonheur interne.

Ce n'est que par rapport à la balance du compte entre les plaisirs et les peines que les actions dont il s'agit produisent ou tendent à produire, que la *vertu* et le *vice* sont autre chose que des mots vides de sens.

Cependant il n'est pas vrai que la quantité de bonheur tient aucun rapport a la quantité de vertu: car, renfermeé dans l'idée de vertu est l'idée de difficulté aussi bien que l'idée de fécondité en fait de bonheur: et plus est grand le sacrifice ci-dessus mentionné plus est grande cette difficulté. Les actes, par lesquels est produit[2] la plus grande partie, sans comparaison, du bonheur qui se produit, sont ceux par l'exercise desquels aucune vertu s'exerce—temoins ceux par lesquels 1'individu, et ceux par lesquels 1'espece, se conserve.

' Thus MS, in error for 'direct'.

[1] Thus MS, in error for 'produite'.

Tous ces actes là sont des actes de bienfaisance: aucun n'est un acte de bienveillance. Une proposition, par laquelle on diroit, parlant d'une vertu, que, à tout prendre, elle produit plus de malheur que de bonheur, ou bien parlant d'un vice, plus de bonheur que de malheur, seroit en contradiction avec elle-meme.

APPENDIX C


HUME'S VIRTUES

The text found below is based on UC xiv. 297-301 and 303-5. Sheets 297-9 were written by Bentham on 27 June 1828 in longhand. The first two sheets are headed 'Deontology Private' on the left side, and 'Hume's Virtues' on the right side; the third sheet is headed 'Deontology Private' on the left side, and 'J. B.: Intellectual Faculties' on the right side. UC xiv. 300, 301 and 303-5 were written in June 1828, mainly in a private shorthand, and are entitled 'Hume's Virtues and J. Be[ntham]'s Intellectual Faculties'. These sheets, with the exception of 301, are double sheets, and the material is arranged in columns, with four columns on the left side of the sheet and four on the right. At some points, especially on 300/left/l and 303/left/l, the material is in longhand in Bentham's handwriting. But most of the columns are in shorthand, with only occasional words appearing in longhand. These words are in Bowring's handwriting, and it would appear that Bowring was using the shorthand to record material dictated to him by Bentham.[1] Most of the columns have been lined through in pencil, which suggests that the material may have been copied out, but no such copy has been found.

Bentham's shorthand was decoded by Dr Frank Gramlich. His explanation of the code follows.

The basic system of Bentham's shorthand

This is a representation of words as they are *pronounced,* regardless of spelling. Thus, for example, c in 'cat' and k in 'bake' are represented by the same symbol. Vowel sounds are not represented if they occur in a context surrounded by consonant sounds. When occurring at the beginning or end of a word, vowel sounds are represented by '.'. Consonant sounds are represented as follows. (Arrows indicate directions of the strokes.)



' Shorthands were popular at the time. Peregrine Bingham, a friend of Bentham's, published *A System of Shorthand: on the Principle of the Association of ideas,* London, 1821.

-TION • occurring above the last consonant of the root word

-TIONS occurring above the last consonant of the root word

-LY • occurring below the last consonant of the root word

Examples. regarding zO/z x vicious

disclosure *Lr^* attention •(;

would *Off* actions •/A

whether breach ^/C

system highly

expression disappointment

shape =-r queer *rV*

Variations on the basic system

1. Some commonly used words are further abbreviated.

and, in, on, an	o	he, have	
is, as, us	—	may, my, many	
all		no	ZA
or, are, our	z	such,each	C
of, if	\	time, that	1
by, be, been	s.	the,they	c

2. When the same consonant sound occurs twice in succession (separated only by a vowel sound), this is represented by writing the symbol for the sound only once, but enlarging it. For ‘did’ (/), or ‘says’ (-------), this is equivalent to writing the same symbol twice in a row. The difference shows up in such words as ‘probable’ ( ), and ‘non’ (k_y).

3. The symbols for ‘b’ (<<), ‘p’ (f), i’ (<<), ‘m’ or ‘ment’ («-), and ‘w’ or ‘wh’ (£~N) all begin with a circular motion. Sometimes the preceding stroke leaves the pen going in an awkward direction. So in some cases, the loop is turned around. For example,

sympathy ~~*t*^ growing

government exhibition OQ

4. The symbols representing ‘-tion’ (•) and ‘-tions’ (>) sometimes occur at the end of the word, particularly if the last consonant sound is ‘t’: e.g. ‘repetition’ = z|> . The symbol for ‘-ing’ (/) is sometimes a dot placed underneath the last consonant: e.g., ‘divulging’ =

5. Some consonants are symbolized that on our pronunciation at least are not voiced: e.g. 'high' = , 'talk' = , 'exhaust' = Aj.

6. Bentham is not completely consistent in applying his system: e.g. 'may' is rendered both by <r— and by <?-• ; 'an' by o and •◡; 'bringing' by V7' and ; 'knowledge' by and , .

7. The symbols for 'd', 'r' and 'ing' are identical as to shape (/). Where these letters occur sequentially they are sometimes represented by the single symbol.[1]

THE TEXT[2]

If, as believed, virtue is not the *genus generalissimum* employed by Hume, the circumstance that his qualities, many of them, do not properly come under that denomination reflects no imputation upon his discernment.

'Virtue'—at any rate in the useful sense of it—denotes a factitious quality, in contradistinction to a natural one. I say useful, for in so far as it comes of its own accord, no attention, no regard paid to it is either needful or useful. In so far as factitious, it is the result of will, an exercise of the attention fixt upon the subject, and having an end in view. In the first instance, requiring a sacrifice of present to future contingent good is required and is accompanied with self-denial, which supposes more or less of uneasiness. But as practice grows into a habit, the uneasiness grows less and less and in many instances will vanish altogether, as in the case of positive effective benevolence.

Every virtue is a moral quality in contradistinction to an intellectual; i.e. a quality that belongs to the volitional, not to the intellectual department of the human frame: a quality which is the result of the exercise given to the will, not of the state and condition of the understanding, except in so far as the beneficial state of the understanding is itself the result of exercise given to the will. But this is a case of an exercise given to the will acting through the medium of the understanding. This premised, Hume's desirable qualities may be distinguished and grouped into the cases following.

I. Case 1. The quality, a quality not belonging to the will, but to the understanding.

II. The quality, a quality of the will but neither a virtue nor a vice

[1] This convention was discovered by the editor.

[2] The title used here occurs in that form on several MS sheets, though the heading on UC xiv. 300 is more explicit: 'Hume's Virtues and J. Be.'s Intellectual Faculties.' Bentham's primary object was to compare Hume's account of virtues or moral qualities in *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* with his own analysis of intellectual faculties and their relation to morality.

exclusively; but either a virtue or a vice, or perhaps an indifferent, or say neutral quality, according to the object, whether beneficient or maleficent, to the production of which it is directed.

III. The quality virtuous in every case, but belonging to one or more of J. B.'s 4 classes[1] according to the application made of it.

IV. The quality virtuous in every case and belonging to one or other of J. B.'s 4 classes; it being a particular modification of the generic quality in question.

Relation of the modifications of the intellectual faculty, for example, as enumerated by J. B. in *Chrestomathia,*[2] to virtue and vice and thence to Deontology.

They belong to Deontology in so far as a beneficent or maleficent direction is capable of being given to the will to the exercise of them, and in so far as, the character given to them being beneficent, it is in the power of the will to add to the degree of their effective forces.

Thus the faculty of invention belongs to the understanding—is an intellectual faculty. But according as it is applied to beneficent or maleficent purposes it is, though not itself either a virtue or a vice, an instrument in the hands either of virtue or of vice.[3] [4]

Intellectual Faculties

Qualities of mind are:[4]

1.1	Perception	1	IV.3	Synthesis	6
II.l	Judgment	2	1.3	Imagination	7
1.2	Memory	3	IV.l	Invention	8
IV.4	Deduction	4	III.l	Attention	9
IV.	Abstraction	5	III.2	Observation	10

[1] This is the first time that Bentham refers specifically to four classes of virtue. It appears to be related to his division of virtue into primary (intrinsically useful) and secondary (subservient or ancillary) in which prudence and beneficence (together with probity) constitute the two classes of primary virtues and all others which are subservient to these two compose the two classes of secondary virtues. See pp. 210-11 above.

[2] Cf. *Chrestomathia,* Part II, London, 1817, pp. 143-8 (Bowring, viii. 74-6).

[3] The longhand MSS for the section end at this point (xiv. 299), apart from occasional words and some lists. The text below proceeds to the mainly shorthand material on 300-1.

[4] After numbering these 'qualities' in simple sequence, as reproduced below, Bentham then added the different enumeration at the left of each entry except the last. This alternative numbering is somewhat obscurely indicated in the sentence following the list; and Bentham then proceeded to begin an analysis in accordance with this scheme. He then, however, further complicated the matter by using Roman numerals both in the list and for the broad division into 'passive' and 'active' faculties. The second set of Roman numerals is represented here in lower-case Roman.

IV.6 Comparison 11 IV. 2 Analysis 14
IV.5 Generalization 12 V.2 Methodization 15
V.l Induction 13 V.l Distribution 16
Communication 17

If I were to take these now I should divide them into four groups: in Roman the first group, and the others in Arabic.

I. *Faculty passive*

i. Operating without need of attention or comparison of more than one subject-matter.

1. Perception.
2. Memory.
3. Imagination.

ii. Operating upon one or more subject matters but without need of attention:

1. Judgment, as in the case of vision.

II.Faculty active = volitional

iii? Operating without need of the judgment in more than one subject matter:

1. Attention.
2. Observation—attention considered as applied to some object in particular?

Imagination[3] is a passive faculty often, as in dreams. As seen, if it is an active faculty, it becomes invention.

Memory is an active faculty when attention is applied to it, working about in some way or other [in] the substance of the brain.

Perception must be the source of all the other faculties. The seeing is a case of doubt as to whether judgment is or [is] not exercised.

Once I set myself to copy from the dictionary all moral terms. It will be a good thing to class them.

Habit is the result of a multitude of acts. Disposition is the result of habit. Habit is a fictitious entity, the fictitious progeny of acts. It supposes the existence of acts, though it is spoken of independent of acts, without which in truth it has no existence.

[1] MS 'II'; but this is evidently the third of Bentham's subdivisions in the list above.

[2] The analysis breaks off at this point, apart from the following note in the margin dealing with what would have been item IV. 1: 'Invention is performed by the use of all intellectual faculties, including attention, in an intense degree under the direction of the judgment; the whole having for its end in view the production of some new effect or the formation of some new idea or combination of ideas.'

[3] The material which follows, from xiv. 301, is somewhat loosely connected with what precedes it here by this opening reference to imagination, memory, and perception.

All our psychological ideas are copies of our physical ones. We have no means of finding expression for this but by physical phraseology. Some ideas are in, some out, some about, some go in, some go out.

Hume made a most important distinction between impressions and ideas.[1] I do not know what people did before this distinction. It was a great discovery. My impression of you is from seeing; my idea I have when, after seeing you, I shut my eyes. I would like to conjure up David Hume just to have a level conversation with him.

Hume does not see the connection between passion, and pleasure and pain. Emotion is evanescent, passion more permanent. Appetite is more general and includes both. Affection is more permanent than passion. Passion is a fictitious entity generated by emotion.

Undoubtedly hope and fear may exist together. Fear is the apprehension of the privation of the objects of desire: 'Hope thou nurse of young desire.'[2]

Hume frequently makes distinctions with[out] a difference. When he gives no examples, it is fiddle-de-dee.

Hume proves nothing by his phraseology about what is becoming.[3] Pleasure and pain form the only key for opening the lock. Fumble about it as you will, you will never open it but with this key.

*Hume's Virtues: in his Essays'**

Sociability is very ambiguous. [It] may be without benevolence and may just be for the sake of self-regard. It is a mere desire of associating with other persons. When a man has that desire it may be self-eulogistic.

Sociability is a disposition to be in company with persons, [and] at the same time to avoid negative maleficence in every shape, or what comes to the same thing, to conform to the dictates of negative

' See Hume's *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,* sect. II *(Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals,* ed. L. S. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edn., revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975, p. 18).

* Isaac Bickerstaffe (C.1735-C. 1812), *Love in a Village* (1762), act I, scene i.

[3] Probably a reference to *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,* sect. VIII, 'Of qualities immediately agreeable to others'.

[4] This is the heading of xiv. 303, which opens with two columns devoted largely to lists---- sometimes with short notes attached to the headings-------- of qualities treated by Hume as virtues. The order is, more or less, that of *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,* first published in 1751: the word 'Essays' in Bentham's headings indicates that he was using the text included in Vo). Ill of Hume's *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects,* published in 1753. Bentham's discussion of these topics is found, apart from the opening paragraph below (from xiv. 303/left/3), in xiv. 304. Cf. Hume, *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,* sect. II.

effective benevolence. In open [?] conformity [?] to their benefit. Under opposite conditions it may be tyranny—where sociability desires to plague, as in case of wit, where others are objects of it—so that sociability depends upon the way in which he proposes to himself to behave. There may be sociability for the purpose of insolence, of which there are many instances, such as Cicero.

1 remember being shocked when thirteen at some of his[1] abominations. Burke and Longinus seemed monstrously insipid. I looked for morality or pleasure and found neither one nor the other. I was surprised to find him taking notice of Moses. Newton went a little further than that.[2]

Good nature is the same thing. It is the behaviour of a man acting as prescribed by sociability. But in all these there is a mixture of the natural with the moral quality. It may be only a beautiful [...?]. There is no more virtue [in it] than [in] beauty.[3] It makes a man or woman the more agreeable, independent of his or her conduct.

Humanity is the same thing exercising itself where considerable suffering is at stake. It is good nature on extraordinary occasions, where it depends on the person to be able to encrease or lessen, *to a considerable degree,* the suffering. Humanity supposes the object on whom it is exercised to be exposed to a high degree of suffering. This however must be taken with exceptions. The humanity of a king would lead him to pardon at the expense of penal justice. He would do good on a small scale, harm on a large scale, so that there would be a great loss in the balance. Virtue, doing a small quantity of good, may be accompanied with vice in great quantity. A man is rescued from prison whose death might be a public benefit.[4]

Mercy is the same thing, supposing the person on whom it is

' i.e. Cicero's. Bentham's reference here is obscure; but it is relevant to recall that, as an Oxford undergraduate at the age of thirteen, between February and December 1761, Bentham wrote and sent in instalments to his father a translation of Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes: Correspondence* (CW), i. 34-42.

[2] Though the drift of Bentham's discussion here is obscure, his reference to Burke is presumably to *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1756). The author of the anonymous and probably first-century treatise *On the Sublime,* conventionally attributed to 'Longinus', cites 'the lawgiver of the Jews': for a much earlier reference by Bentham, cf. *A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government* (CW), p. 276 at n. 1. Since the 'Longinus' citation is Gen. 1: 3-------'And God said, Let there be light: and there was light'--- Bentham may, in his reference to Newton, have had in mind Alexander Pope's 'Epitaph intended for Sir Isaac Newton': 'Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: / God said, "Let Newton be!" and all was light.'

[3] MS seems in fact to read 'There is no more virtue than beauty is a virtue'.

[4] The last two sentences in the paragraph seem clearly to belong here, though in the MS they follow the paragraph on gratitude below.

exercised to be still more in the power of the mercy-exercising persons. And to [a] degree still more indeterminate, the forming a right judgment on the cases in which it ought to be exercised depends on the intellectual part, the disposition to it on the moral part. It gives the idea of tyranny and of a person having power. The humane principle does not suppose power.

Gratitude is benevolence. Its efficiency does not form part of the cause. It grows out of benefits received. It is the desire to exercise effective benevolence towards a person by whom kindness has been exercised.

Effective benevolence may be more efficient where gratitude has no place. Every body lauds gratitude. It is extremely popular because every body who does a favour considers himself as entitled to a favour in some decent or indecent shape. So gratitude is fed by self-regard. So ingratitude is looked upon as a great vice, because when a benefit in some shape is conferred by one man on another the public opinion tribunal expects that a corresponding benefit suited to the powers of the recipient will be received by him. Every man has a greater expectation of benefit from him to whom he has done a service than from a stranger. If I wanted your assistance, I should be more annoyed by your refusing it than if refused by any body else.

Friendship is a disposition, like good nature, to confer benefit on him with whom we have had intercourse in whatever shape the occasion may present. It imports more than the disposition, the sentiment of sympathy one would suppose it to accompany. The notion of a friend always involves with it the notion of sympathy. In politics sympathy is pretended not felt. Self-regarding interest also produces friendliness. A code of morals ought to apply to that which can be modified, not to what can not.

Generosity is friendliness on *a* larger scale. It is a disposition to be friendly to persons in general. A miser may be generous in a particular instance as a miser may have a feast. Friendliness imports a preference.

Beneficence may be a virtue or not. When it is virtue we give it the name of 'effective benevolence'. Every man who spends money is benevolent, i make water—that is beneficence: I do a good deed by relieving myself of the water. Take pleasure of exemption from pain, no matter how produced, that is always a good unless overborne by some greater corresponding evil.[1]

[1] The discussion above of topics mentioned in sect. Il of Hume's *Enquiry* follows Bentham's numbered list inxiv. 303/left/2: a similar but differently ordered list is in 303/left/l. In both lists the next topic is justice, presumably with reference to Hume's sect. III. Bentham deals with this topic in 305/right/3-4, reproduced below.

Justice in civil matters and in penal matters are quite different things. In the social field, justice is only the application of the disappointment-preventing principle. Otherwise, justice is justice, which is what any [...?] person chooses to call justice. The law 'Do unto others'[1] will not serve as a definition, because no one would inflict punishment on himself.

Justice in penal matters is the application of penal remedies. The best justice is the most appropriate application of the remedies against the evils of maleficence. Maleficence is better than delinquency, which implies something taken as the subject of prohibition, to which of course penalties must attach, or prohibition is nothing. Justice in civil matters and justice in penal matters, [...?] so far as power or the factitious repetition in any modification of the matter of prosperity, is the disappointment-preventing principle. Condition in life, as far as it is beneficial, including domestic relations, has virtue consisting in the disposition to do what is conformable to these several principles. In penal justice, it is to do whatever is conducive to the application of the civil remedies in so far as justice consists in the endeavour to abstain from acts of maleficence. But there must be exceptions for the exercise of the power of the state, the justification of which power, the acts, belong to the field of legislation; the dispositions, as separated from the acts, to the moral field. The disposition that does not proceed to act is nothing.[2]

It is a sort of discovery of mine that the non-predominance of self-regard over [regard for] others would be inconsistent with the preservation of the species. If I thought more about you than I thought about myself, I would be the blind leading the blind and we would fall both of us into the ditch.[3] There are many who exaggerate

[1] Matt. 7: 12: 'Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.' Cf. also Luke 6:31.

[2] The discussion of justice, ending with some reference to government, might have been expected to be followed by some treatment of the themes raised in Hume's sect. IV, 'Of political Society'. Bentham however indicates by his marking of various lists of headings on xiv. 303/left/3 that these themes (chastity and allegiance), under the general heading 'Qualities useful to Society', were to follow his discussion of matters arising in Hume's seventh section: cf. p. 362 at n. 5 below. His next major preoccupation at the present stage is with Hume's analysis, in sect. VI, of 'Qualities useful to Ourselves'. Bentham does not seem to have commented on Sect. V, 'Why Utility pleases', but the following paragraph, from 305/right/2, may have some reference to the discussion of self-love in the second part of that section.

[3] Matt. 15: 14; and cf. Luke 6: 39.

the selfish principle and who think that by swelling their notions of themselves they are still serving their race.[1]

Industry is the active faculty, physical, psychological, or both.

Discretion is a right judgment formed for the purpose of action in cases of more or less difficulty.

Frugality imports action, positive or negative. A man may very properly be made to suffer a merited fine who neglects to do what he is bound to do for the benefit of another.[2]

Fidelity[3] is a modification of the active faculty. It is the observance of contracts.

Truth: he should have spoken of veracity, which is the faculty and the virtue.[4] Truth is a fictitious entity. Brissot was misled by it. He wrote a book on *Vérité*:[5] sometimes it was a knowledge of things, at others veracity; it was sometimes love of truth as opposed to religious tyranny. He meant the subject matter of knowledge, the result of evidence. It is the knowledge of what facts did really exist. Truth is a mighty queer sort of a personage in the abstract, as slippery as an eel.

Veracity is the disposition of a man to give to others the exact images he has in his mind [for] the avoidance of misrepresentation, and with an attention equal to the importance of the representation.[6]

Caution is near akin to discretion, with more timidity, and is applied to subjects from which greater danger may arise than in the case of discretion.

Enterprise is activity combined with comparative fearlessness with reference to evil results. A modification of activity, it is a sort of psychological courage, either facing danger, i.e. probable danger, or

[1] The text now proceeds to the series of twenty-five supposed virtues mentioned in the course of Hume's sect. VI. These are listed by Bentham in 303/left/2-3: the discussion is in 300/left/2-right/l.

[2] This paragraph is obscure, and it may be worth remarking that Bentham, in his discussion, passes over the heading 'Honesty' in the list on 303/left/2 (opposite which he has written '=Justice') and proceeds directly from 'Frugality' to 'Fidelity'. The second sentence in this paragraph might perhaps refer to 'Honesty' rather than 'Frugality', but the point is in any case far from clear.

[3] Opposite this heading in the list on 303/left/2 Bentham has again written '=Justice'.

[4] In the list on 303/left/2 Bentham has added the following note to the heading 'Truth': 'Not a virtue but a bare quality. See Veracity.'

[5] Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville (1754-93), with whom Bentham had some acquaintance and correspondence in the 1780s and during the period of the French Revolution, published *De la vérité, ou Méditations sur les moyens de parvenir à la vérité dans toutes les connoissances humaines* in 1782 (2nd edn., 1792).

[6] This paragraph is in 300/left/3, but is marked for transfer to the preceding column and should presumably follow the discussion of 'Truth' with its explicit reference to 'Veracity'.

turning aside from it when turning aside may be for want of the application of the will to the subject. Attention is the application of the will to a subject with a considerable degree of force.

Assiduity is enterprise applied for a considerable length of time to the same subject with little or no interruption; and if interruptions, they must be short.

Economy[1] is a combination of frugality with other things, and is frequently used with the other. Frugality implies a self-denial which economy does not necessarily: though a good economist is a man who is continually practising self-denial, all men being surrounded with temptations to dissipation.

Prudence to be divided into self-regarding and extra-regarding.

Temperance[2] is a modification of self-regarding prudence. Temperance applies to all sorts of pleasures, *sobriety*[3] [applies to] any thing producing intoxication.

Patience[4] may refer either to sensation or action. It is the non-giving indication of suffering equal to the actual suffering. When a man is patient, the less is his suffering increased by duration.

A man who swears in giving vent to his anger only becomes more angry. The oath said is combined with the outward sensation and gives encreased strength to it. If it is not [said], it is self-regarding prudence. If you heard a man cry it would affect you with pain. So would you do if you heard yourself cry out.

Constancy[5] is very ambiguous [and] has several meanings. Constancy on a bad course would be no virtue: it is only perseverance. On a course, whether right or wrong, it is perseverance notwithstanding temptation to depart from the practice. A man constantly eats and drinks: it may be either indifferent, virtuous or vicious.

Perseverance rather imports continuity in the action and an intense action of the attention.

Forethought is imagination applied to future contingent events. It is necessary to the exercise of self-regarding prudence, which always includes forethought. The greater or less remoteness and complication of what is distant is that which gives the more or less exercise to forethought.

[1] Opposite this heading in the list on 303/left/2 Bentham has written '"Frugality combined with good management'.

[2] Opposite this heading in the list on 303/left/2 Bentham has added ^Prudence self-regarding *quoad hoc'*.

[3] 'Sobriety' is the next heading in the list on 3O3/left/2.

[4] Opposite this heading in the list on 303/left/2 Bentham has written 'Prudence self-regarding *quoad hoc'*.

[5] Opposite this heading in the list on 3O3/left/2 Bentham has written 'Prudence when a virtue'.

Considerateness is the bringing together all the ideas that bear on the subject with a reference to the end in view.

Secrecy[1] is a negative quality: absence of negative maleficence in that shape, negative effective benevolence applied to the case where disclosure of facts would be prejudicial to self or others. When a secret is committed to you and no harm would be done to yourself or others by its divulging, that divulging is a breach of contract.

Order[2] is a modification of method. It is putting things one after another by which some particular end is ensured. 'Order' is an abstract word which you cannot do without any more than you can do without the word 'time'. Order is the placing things in a line, that is, the placing events. Order is a compound non-entity growing out of the idea of space and time.

Insinuation is the faculty of recommending oneself to a man by actions or discourse or both in such a way that he shall not perceive it is the result of endeavour directed to that end: i.e. the constituting oneself an object of sympathy. It is ingratiating oneself.

Address is an instrument of insinuation. It is insinuation applied in a wider field of thought and action.

Presence of mind is a power over one's own mind—the faculty of bringing into view with promptitude all the several considerations necessary to the taking of an apt course with a reference to the object or end in view. It is that which takes measures for the prevention of evil.

Quickness of conception ought to come first. It is a simple idea. It is implied in presence of mind and from which it derives.

Facility of expression is no virtue. It is only a faculty. It is the quickness of conception necessary to give expression of the idea.

To these terms 12 to 25 he says nobody can for a moment refuse the tribute of praise and approbation.[3]

The Edinburgh Review people thought because they had got

[1] Opposite this heading in the list on 303/left/2, Bentham has written, 'Prudence or effective benevolence, when a virtue'.

[2] In 303/left/3, but marked for this heading in the list in the preceding column, Bentham has the following note: 'Intellectual [order] a branch of *Method.'*

[3] Bentham's reference here is to the items from 'Temperance' to 'facility of expression' above. Cf. Hume, *Enquiries,* ed. Selby-Bigge, pp. 242-3. The relationship between Hume's textand the first eleven items in Bentham's list (303/left/2) is more complicated and need not be examined in detail here. It is noteworthy, however, that Bentham does not follow precisely the list which Hume gives immediately before the passage just referred to of 'endowments . . . whose very names force an avowal of their merit' (ed. cit., p. 242). Among other points, that list includes two items to which Bentham makes no reference: 'good-sense' and a 'discernment'.

Hume's list of virtues that they had done every thing that was to be done for morals.[1]

Qualities useful and qualities agreeable[2]—[the term] 'useful' is ambiguous: it may be conducive to pleasure or to any end, whatever that end may be. So there is a fundamental ambiguity, as what makes 'useful' recommend itself is the recommendation of pleasure on the whole, though remote, in preference to that which, though less on the whole, is immediate.

Moralists are so afraid of pleasure that they would put it aside and make all manner of confusion rather than [...?] it as the end. How vague all these ideas are! With the proper system all is plain sailing.

Taking first what is agreeable to others[3]—

Politeness is more negative than positive: the avoiding such modes of action or behaviour as may be disagreeable in any way to the person with whom you have to do. Its positive branch is doing whatever may [be] agreeable to others you should do, and this exhausts the whole. The highest order of politeness is the application of the rules according to the practice of high life.

The Spaniard says, 'This house is yours', which is to tell a lie to no purpose whatever.[4] In the forms of politeness so called, there is much unnecessary lying. Lying may not do harm to others; it always does harm to a man's self. It will certainly lower him in the opinion of others, unless he is specially endowed with the privilege of lying, as in the case of the lawyer or divine.[5]

Politeness must not degenerate into self-esteem. Many men intend to give pleasure by stories which are the cause of weariness and annoyance. Montaigne says[6] that every body ought to be honest in

' It is not clear to what particular article or passage (if any) Bentham was here referring.

[2] This refers to the distinction made by Hume in the headings of his sect. VI, 'Of Qualities useful to ourselves', and of his sects. VII and VIII 'Of Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves' and 'Of Qualities immediately agreeable to others'.

[3] This indicates that Bentham had decided to reverse the order adopted by Hume in sects. VII and VIII of the *Enquiry :* cf. n. 2 above. A numbered list on 303/left/3 confirms this and also indicates that he proposed to follow Hume's order in discussing politeness, wit, decency, and cleanliness under this general heading.

[4] Hume *(Enquiries,* ed. cit., p. 262) says: 'A Spaniard goes out of his own house before his guest, to signify that he leaves him master of all.' Though Bentham's remarks in this and the next paragraph occur in a different part of the MSS (305/Ieft/4) they seem clearly to belong with the discussion of politeness on 303/right/l.

[s] The last two sentences in this paragraph are at the foot of 305/left/3, but they evidently belong to the discussion of 'polite lying' in the next column.

[6] MS 'Montaigne who says . . .' but Bentham did not follow through this construction.

talking of his own virtues.[1] But he forgets that he will so wound the *amourpropre:* theself-preference of one will not be tolerated by two.

Wit is a very ambiguous virtue. Locke says that wit consists in striking resemblances [and] judgment in discovering differences.[2] Wit confers power and therefore is an object of desire. It is the power of giving pleasure to some, but often at the expense of pain to others. If the subject of malevolent wit is present, it is his pain. If absent, he suffers from losing a portion of the good opinion of others, and then it cannot be traced. Wit to be good must be unexpected. There is a species of wit which may be manufactured out of a dictionary. *Quidlibet cum quolibet*[3] applies to it as to all inventions. It is juxtaposition for the purpose of association. Wit has no existence except where the analogy [is] elicited and brought to view. It may be also in contrast. In both cases, the analogy and contrast must be uncommon and unexpected.

Decency is extremely vague. It refers to the absence of what which from every cause is disagreeable to others. This is negative. Positive decency is an ecclesiastical virtue. It is the application of the whole [?] of wealth to produce illusion. Such is the throne, the palace, mitres, lawn sleeves. This is [the] Church of England. Decency in the temporal sense is[4] the avoiding of practices which are considered indecent.

Delicacy is another branch. There is physical and physiological. There is often weakness, avoidance of the suffering pain from objects which cause no pain to others. So they take merit to themselves. And why? Because it is a mark of their belonging to the influential classes: the ruling few.

Indecorum[5]—a man in matters of small moment exposes himself to the contempt of others. Lord Chesterfield must be closely examined. So also *Miseries of Human Life.*[6]

Cleanliness is the absence of practices by which disease or the

[1] Bentham may have had in mind Montaigne's essay 'De la présomption', in which he says that a man should not, for fear of erring on the side of presumption, undervalue himself (Michel de Montaigne, *Essais,* ed. P. Villey and V. L. Saulnier, Paris, 1965, p. 632).

[5] John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding,* ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, 1975, pp. 156-7.

[3] 'Anything with anything'.

[4] MS 'it is'; but the pronoun seems redundant.

[5] Though this short paragraph occurs detached in another part of the MSS (305/left/4), it seems to belong with the discussion of decency in 3O3/right/2, for Bentham is evidently picking up Hume's reference under that heading to 'the indecorum which is expounded so much at large by Cicero in his Offices' *(Enquiries,* ed. cit., p. 266).

[6] Cf. p. 183 n. 3 and p. 276 n. 2.

apprehension of disease is produced. As connected with a man's person, it gives the idea of disease. Dirt is that which gives the idea of mislocation of matter in small particles.[1] Charcoal is dirt on a white garment; and the most delicate white powder is dirt on a scuttle of coals.

[Taking next] those [qualities] which produce pleasure to ourselves[2]—there is no virtue where there is no difficulty.[3] Virtue implies a conquest over something. There is no virtue in eating one's victuals. There must be self denial [and] a certain degree of uneasiness. It is the sacrifice of a small quantity of present pleasure to obtain a great quantity of future pleasure. So we undergo a quantity of pain to get rid of disease by submitting to an operation. This is only self-regarding prudence, taking out a decayed tooth before it can affect others.

Cheerfulness[4] is the fact of being pleased and expressing pleasure. This to a great extent is a natural endowment. Virtue is something at our own command. A disposition to sadness or a disposition to gladness is not at our own command. By study we may diminish the one and encrease the other, and in so far as this is done, we give evidence of self-regarding prudence: so in the pursuit of persons whose society is agreeable. Nine tenths of cheerfulness is inherent, though it can be acted on by philosophy. The 'habit of doing good' is the best instructor [of] how to make the instruments of cheerfulness. Every friend is a source of future pleasure and of exemption from future pain.

Dignity[5] may be in behaviour or a mere exhibition of the instrument of dignity.

The examples of Hume are the mere taking credit to himself for higher virtues than the man he was speaking to. If that man were faulty [in] discipline, he deserved a reprimand.[6]

[1] MS 'Dirt, that is, dirt which gives the idea . .."etc., as though Bentham intended to distinguish one meaning of the term 'dirt' from others: the intention was not fulfilled, and it seems best to read as above.

[2] Bentham now turns to the qualities discussed by Hume in sect. VII of the *Enquiry,* which he lists and numbers on 303/left/3---------- 'Cheerfulness, Dignity, Courage, Tranquillity'.

[3] MS has 'but' before 'there is'. However, in the absence of an appropriate context for the conjunction, 'but' seems best omitted.

[4] In his list on 303/left/3 Bentham has the following note on cheerfulness: 'In so far as natural, no virtue: in so far as factitious, prudence.'

[5] To the heading 'Dignity' in his list on 303/left/3 Bentham has added 'or magnanimity-----when a virtue, extra-regarding prudence'.

[6] The examples in question are those cited by Hume in his discussion of dignity *(Enquiry,* sect. VII, ed. cit., pp. 250-60). Bentham's paragraph is extremely elliptical: it presumably refers to one of Hume's examples---------- most probably the interchange between Alexander the Great and Parmenion.

Merit in others which has variability at the bottom of it which is murder on a large scale, it is prosperity.[1] 'Right of empire' a mere privileged concupiscence, fit to be praised by that vile scoundrel, the Prince de Conde.[2] *'Myself—myself,* here is nothing but insensibility to happiness or unhappiness from external sources.[3] Insensibility to the external causes of evils is an advantage to the [dejbased. Phocion's [insensibility] is only self-esteem. If it lessened his sense of his own misfortune, well, there was little politeness in Phocion's representing himself as an object of greater esteem to his fellow sufferer than his fellow sufferer was to himself. This is mere arrogance.[4] [5] Vitellius calls for respect because he had possessed the highest portion of prosperity. If that was consolation, so much the better for him and not the worse for others?

Courage[6]—this too is a natural quality to a great extent. It does not always imply self denial.

An advocate is a man whose power is in his tongue, which he uses as it may be. This is an age in which a man can ask another whether he is an advocate. The old days were days of force; these are the days of fraud. Formerly, it was the powers of the body, now, those of the mind. This apropos of Thucydides, who says that one hero could ask another whether he were a robber.[7] Formerly it was physical force; now it is mental fraud.

Tranquillity [is] insensibility to external causes of suffering and

[1] Thus, apparently, MS; but the passage seems evidently garbled.

[2] Hume refers to the admiration expressed by the Prince de Conde´for Alexander's words to the soldiers who refused to follow him to India: 'Go tell your countrymen that you left Alexander completing the conquest of the world'; and the phrase 'right of empire' occurs in the words quoted by Hume from the PHnce. Louis II of Bourbon, Prince of Conde´ (1621-86), was one of the outstanding military commanders of his age.

[3] This sentence refers to Hume's citation of the words of Medea in Euripides' tragedy of that name. Asked what support she has against her enemies, she replies: 'Myself—myself, I say, and it is enough.'

[4] Hume quotes from Plutarch the words of Phocion to a man who was being led with him to execution and was lamenting his fate: 'Is it not glory enough for you that you die with Phocion?'

[5] Hume refers to Tacitus for the story of how Aulus Vitellius, briefly Roman Emperor in AD 69, when about to die at the hands of a mob, said to a tribune who insulted him: 'I am still your emperor.'

At this point 303/right/4 closes with the following, which does not seem to belong to Bentham's discussion of'qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves': 'Maleficence matches beneficence. It is an excellent contrast to it. Its conjugate is evil-doer.'

[6] To the heading 'Courage' in his list on 303/left/3 Bentham has added: 'Virtue or vice according to the application made of it.'

' Hume cites this point from Thucydides, Book I.

especially of distant suffering. Every man likes to keep in view pleasant objects and out of view unpleasant objects. Socrates' contempt for riches is vanity and pride. Like standing a long while on one leg, it is denying to himself the doing the good which could only be done by riches. So, his denying himself assistance from others was only to excite their self esteem for other purposes. He does a calculation: he refuses £100 to get £200. Epictetus[1] had more pleasure in pride than in benevolence. He paid himself out of testimonials of respect. He calculated on getting more from self denial than he could get without. He was much less meritorious than the Faquirs[2] who suffered more than he. It is the feeling of misers, who store their wealth that at any future time they may command what they please by holding on to the instrument of power. He pays himself with the pleasure of imagination, which is to him greater than that of fruition. Now misers as they grow older have less sense of present enjoyment and are therefore more disposed to avarice, which looks to a future reward.

Benevolence,[3] sympathy is agreeable to ourselves. If we can exercise beneficence, we must avoid precipitation of the pain we are incapable of relieving. You do yourself no good by throwing yourself in the way of suffering. In the Elysian fields they must be sadly *ennuyé*—each is sufficient to himself. If they have no physical pleasures, they will find they have no pleasures at all.[4]

A man is too good when he injures himself more than he benefits others.[5]

Henri IV did a monstrous deal of mischief by his amours.[6] He made war upon Spain merely for the purpose of getting hold of another man's wife. He sacrificed every now and then a portion of his army for the sake of having his pleasure with the Mlle

[1] Hume refers to the story that the Stoic philosopher Epictetus had no door to his hovel and, having been robbed of an iron lamp, 'the only furniture which he had worth taking', replaced it with an earthen one 'to disappoint all robbers for the future'.

[2] i.e. Fakirs, Muslim (or Hindu) ascetics.

[3] Though benevolence is not listed as one of the topics for discussion under this heading, Bentham follows Hume in bringing in a reference to its agreeable, as distinct from its useful, aspect.

[4] Hume refers to poetic descriptions of Elysium, 'where the blessed inhabitants stand in no need of each other's assistance'.

[5] Bentham is commenting on Hume's reference to the usage whereby we say of someone that he is 'too good', 'too high-spirited', etc.—'reproaches, which really, at bottom, imply more esteem than many panegyrics'.

[6] Hume maintains that though 'the amours and attachments of Harry the IVth of France, during the civil wars of the league, frequently hurt his interest and his cause', they endeared him to 'all the young, at least, and amorous, who can sympathize with the tender passions'.

Gabrielle.[1] Those who do the like will give him their sympathy. But why should we? If he had lost a leg or an arm when having his pleasure with that woman, what then? His partisans' loss[2] was by thousands. What cared he?

Cha[rle]s XII[3] would have been more mischievous if he had not been controlled by his madness. His obstinacy in doing mischief by wholesale was just like Henry IV's was. One sacrificed thousands for selfish enjoyment in one shape and the other in another shape.[4]

Chastity[5] is the refraining from sensual indulgence where it ought not to be indulged—where the indulgence would be more a source of pain to others than of pleasure to himself. Constipation is a virtue of the same quality as chastity.[6]

Modesty'[1] is not a branch of chastity necessarily. There may be constant unchastity without immodesty. A woman may talk bawdy all her life long without having sexual intercourse. She is immodest, but not unchaste. Another may have sexual intercourse with hundreds, and yet preserve her modesty. A clap doctor is not immodest though occupied all his life about the sexual urgencies.

In incest, both sexes have a mutual aversion. Among the Greek Egyptians marriage with a half sister that a male had not had any intercourse with [.. ,][8]

Allegiance to the right system is a virtue. It is obedience to the existing government, which is a good thing when the government behaves well, bad when it behaves itself ill.

Allegiance is altogether vague unless the special object is shewn; and then it is a modification of effective benevolence on the largest

[1] Gabrielle d'Estrees (1573-99) became the mistress of Henri of Navarre (later Henry IV of France) at the time of the siege of Navarre in 1591.

[2] MS decoded 'lost'.

[3] Hume refers to Charles XII of Sweden as an example of 'excessive bravery and resolute inflexibility'.

[4] Charles XII (1682-1718) succeeded his father as king of Sweden in 1697: throughout all but the first three years of his reign the country was involved in the Great Nordic War (1700-21).

[5] At this point (305/right/l) Bentham takes up the third of the groups of qualities listed on 303/left/3-------'Qualities useful to society'. These, in his list, he designates as 'Chastity' and 'Allegiance', his primary reference thus being to Hume's discussion in *Enquiry,* sect. IV, 'Of Political Society'. However, there are other references in Hume to chastity: cf. esp. *Enquiry,* sect. VI (ed. cit., pp. 238-9).

[6] This sentence, detached from Bentham's main discussion of chastity and modesty, is in the middle of 305/right/2.

' Hume deals with modesty, in this sense, in the passage cited at the end of n. 5 above.

[8] The sentence breaks off at this point: Bentham presumably meant to write 'was lawful' or something to that effect. He is referring no doubt to royal marriages in the Ptolemaic dynasty of Hellenistic Egypt.

scale—that is, supposing the object of allegiance is conformable to the greatest happiness principle. All depends on the form of government. Allegiance may be a crime. A good government is, of course, that in which the power is in the hands of those who are interested in the exercise of benevolent power. The only object of balancing powers in government is to obtain an end attainable without the balance.[1]

[1] Hume does not mention the balancing of governmental powers in his brief discussion of political society in the *Enquiry;* but Bentham may have had in mind Hume's essay 'On the independency of Parliament'.

APPENDIX D

JEVONS' SYSTEMATIC MORALITY

The text found below is based on UC xiv. 302. Although the manuscript sheet is undated, its content was, in all likelihood, written at about the same time as the notes entitled 'Hume's Virtues and J. Be[ntham]'s Intellectual Faculties' (see Appendix C). It too is written in shorthand and consists of notes on William Jevons Jr.,[1] *Systematic Morality, or a Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Human Duty, on the Grounds of Natural Religion,* 2 vols., London and Liverpool, 1827.

THE TEXT

Love of action without an object is nothing.[2]

The love of novelty[3] is the expectation of pleasure in a form undivined or only partly divined. The pleasure from novelty is the acquisition of a new article of knowledge. It is a sort of pleasurable disappointment. I have a notion that there is something of an undivined pleasure being excited as from dramatic entertainment at a difficulty overcome.[4] It is difficult to trace a connection between the case of pleasure here and in other cases.

The pleasure of memory[5] is the pleasure of *a* power. It is that power over things that promises utility through the medium of ideas. The pleasure of power is the pleasure of expecting all things which are a source of power. There are odd sorts of workings of the mind. What we would recall we cannot; what we would not comes upon us with strong influence.

[1] Jevons (1794-1873) was a Unitarian minister. A Liverpool man, he was probably related to the economist W. S. Jevons (1835-82).

[2] Jevons discusses the love of action in the context of the origins of moral sentiments and human affections generally, *Systematic Morality,* i. 26-8. This note of Bentham's is preceded by a short, perhaps incomplete, and partly illegible note on self-love, which Jevons discusses (i. 17-18) primarily in order to dissociate himself from the 'revolting doctrine' of 'some ethical writers, among whom may be reckoned Hobbes, Mandeville, and Rochefoucauld'.

[3] Cf. Jevons, i. 29-32: 'Of the Love of Novelty, and the Emotions of Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, and Admiration'.

[4] It may be worth noting that there is evidence to show that Bentham occasionally went to the theatre at this period of his life: cf., e.g., George Bentham, MS Autobiography (Library of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew), ii. 392.

[3] Cf. Jevons, i. 32-6.

Pleasures of conception:[1] they depend upon the subject matter and source.

The desire of property[2] is the vague desire of the things that are to [be] had for property.

Gratitude[3] respects good deeds and resentment evil deeds. Resentment has been used in an ambilateral sense of resenting a kindness.[4]

In the affections produced by kindred[5] there is a mixture of self and social regard.

In a proper system of morality, every proposition must be a source of happiness either to the man himself or to [some] other or others.[6]

There is no virtue in eating or drinking, and the devil is in it that they have not a tendency to promote happiness. There must be something of self denial [in virtue].[7]

It is foolish to talk of duties,[8] which is itself a disagreeable thing. A man gets into an elbow chair and talks pompously of duties. The first thing to talk about is interests.

Where is the duty of *industry*[9] if you have enough to live upon? It is an ambiguous word: it supposes labour applied to a purpose not illaudable. It includes activity with a view to profit. It may be an instrument in the hands of other virtues: it is none of itself. It is neither he, she, nor my aunt.

Beneficence[10] is, *per se,* nothing. By every bit of bread you eat you add to the happiness of the baker.

Most preached morality is only this: abstain from things to which I attach dyslogistic expression.

Method:[11] I have been sadly puzzled with this word. As applied to aggregates, there is a mixture of analysis and synthesis. To put them into exact groups, either as to consideration of order, which shall come first?

Perseverance[12] is the application of the will for a considerable length of time without relinquishing the subject.

[1] Cf. Jevons, i. 37-41, 'Of the Pleasures of Conception and Imagination*.

[2] Jevons, i. 66-9. [3] Jevons, i. 79-80.

[9] *OED* does not record the word 'ambilateral*.

[5] Jevons, i. 80-4.

[6] This sentence may have some reference to Jevons's discussion 'Of the Formation of Moral Sentiments', i. 115-34, esp. p. 123.

[7] Bentham's comment presumably has some reference to Jevons's discussion (i. 135-56) 'Of the Criterion of Virtue'.

[8] Bentham most probably had in mind here Jevons's 'Preliminary Remarks' to Book II ('Practical Morality') of his treatise (i. 189-92).

[9] Jevons, i. 194-207.

[10] Jevons, i. 207-25, 'Of Beneficence or Usefulness'.

" Jevons, i. 225-8. [12] Jevons, i. 228-30.

The devil of any virtue is enterprise:[1] there is bad enterprise as well as good. It is the struggle after something attended with difficulty.

Dispatch[2] is quickness without precipitation: the employment of the least quantity of time that is sufficient for the attainment of the object. It is the opposite to delay, which may be from ignorance or from design. In the case of the cursed lawyers it is from design.

Fixed attention[3]—that a virtue! So that if I propose to murder you and fix my attention upon it, that is a virtue! Fixed attention is the quality which distinguishes a botanist who gathers his flowers from the clown who tramples them under his feet.[4]

Prudence :[5] does he make the distinction between thorough self-regarding and extra-regarding? My object is throughout to shew the connection between effective benevolence and self-regarding and extra-regarding prudence. Pursue your own interests at the expense of a rival, that is merely self-regarding prudence without benevolence.

Justice,[6] civil and penal, are quite distinct. No definition will include both. As respects property, it is the operation of the disappointment preventing principle. I rejoice in the names I have found for the lawyers: the imitation principle, the goose principle, or the thief principle.[7] So many tares sown by the devil in the field of thought and action: I have gathered them in a bundle and shall proceed to burn them.

Moderation[9] means just nothing at all. Analysed, it comes under the head of restraint: *ne quid nimis.*[10]

What is temperance[11] but moderation? It is enough to make a pope sick to read.[12]

[1] Jevons, i. 230-2. [1] Jevons, i. 232-3.

[3] Jevons, i. 233-4. In fairness to Jevons it should be pointed out that he does not, as Bentham goes on to imply, refer to 'fixed attention' as a virtue: it is grouped with the four preceding items as 'Qualities or Habits conducive to the successful Discharge of Active Duty in general'.

[4] This sentence, though it presumably belongs here, occurs in an earlier column of xiv. 302. Also the phrase is repeated in 303/left/3, where it is in juxtaposition to Bentham's list of the qualities mentioned in sect. VI of Hume's *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals:* that list has several items in common with Jevons's discussion.

[5] Jevons, i. 237-50. [6] Jevons, i. 250-6.

[7] Bentham's point here is extremely obscure. It may be noted, though the relevance is at best doubtful, that, in a passage not otherwise adverted to by Bentham, Jevons (i. 44-50) discusses 'the Principle of Imitation'.

[8] Cf. Matt. 13: 24-30;and the exposition in verses 37-43.

[9] Jevons, i. 265-9. [10] 'Nothing in excess'. [11] Jevons, i. 270 ff.

[12] Given Bentham's hostility to 'asceticism', this cryptic comment may have reference to the discussion of chastity together with temperance by Jevons (i. 270-80).

So says the great [. . . ?]:[1] 'Every body is to do whatever is their duty.' Like a fine speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He is to take the passed [?] taxes, and the member who rages to do whatever is for the good of his country, and the parson to put the 39 Articles into verse, and to preach the Athanasian creed, and to teach the sense of theology which is incomprehensible. I remember being highly delighted when I found that this Athanasius, he who wrote it, must have been a vile scoundrel. Be he who he might, the damnation is so intense, if you quote it merely, they say you imply ridicule. Though you only uttered the words, the words are self condemnatory.[2]

[1] Name illegible in MS.

[2] The Athanasian creed, so called from St. Athanasius (c.296-373), whose views on the doctrine of the Trinity it embodies though he was probably not the author of it, is the third principal Christian creed.

Bentham's comments on Jevons's *Systematic Morality* end at this point, about three-quarters of the way through the first volume and leaving the second wholly untouched.

APPENDIX E

MANUSCRIPTS NOT USED

Each manuscript sheet listed and described below was left out of the text for one or more of the following reasons:

1. It was too fragmentary to be used;
2. Its content was more fully or more clearly stated elsewhere;
3. It consisted merely of outlines.

It should be understood that any comment to the effect that a manuscript is missing refers solely to its absence from the Bentham papers located at University College London.

MANUSCRIPTS NOT USED IN MARGINALS FOR *A TABLE OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION*

clviii

52 Title: Springs of Action Table—Contents of the Sheets of Marginals. Date: 9 Feb. 1814.
Description: A four-column organizational outline of the marginals.
Comment: This is the only outline found providing a complete list of topics and their arrangements.

66 Title: Table of Springs of Action—Explanations. Dates: 24 June, 11 Nov. 1813.
Description: A three-column set of marginals, some crossed out, concerning psychology.
Comment: Approximates to clviii. 7 which refers to the discussion at the start of 'Observations'.

67 Title: Table of Springs of Action—Observations. Date: 23 June 1813.
Description: Columns three and four are concerned mainly with the improper application of the terms 'good' and 'bad'.

MANUSCRIPTS NOT USED IN *A TABLE OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION*

xiv

21 Title: Table of Motives, shewing how far they are respectively provided with single-word appellatives, neutral, eulogistic and dyslogistic. Date: 2 Jan. 1805.
Description: A table of motives, together with a table of single-worded appellatives of motives.

xviii

172-5 Title: Springs or Influence or etc. Date: 10 Apr. 1816.
Description: A four-page discussion of the two senses of the Principle of Utility.

xlvii

422 Title: Table of Motives as deduced from their correspondt Pains and Pleasures: distinguishing the Motives into Neutral, Eulogistic and Dyslogistic, according as an emotion or judgmt of approbatn or disapprobatn, or neither, is tacitly expressed by their respective names. Date: 27 Nov. 1804.
Description: A ten-column outline, mostly crossed out, of a table of motives.

423-4 Title: Spring Motive Table. Date: 26 Aug. 1806.
Description: A two-page discussion concerning social pleasure in relation to self-regarding interest.

Ivi

29 Title: Springs of Action Addendum. Date: 7 Jan. 1827.
Description: A five-line discussion of love of reputation and sympathy.

MANUSCRIPTS NOT USED IN THE *DEONTOLOGY*

xiv

15 Title: Art of Pleasing. Date: 23 May 1795.
Description: A nine-column outline of the art of pleasing intended for *Deontology* I.
Comment: There is no substantive writing which corresponds to this outline.

16 Title: Morals—Virtue what. Date: 8 Sept. 1795.
Description: A six-column description of virtue.
Comment: This discussion is not as complete as xiv. 265-7. The latter is part of *Deontology* I. 13.

17 Title: Moral Entities. Date: 12 Sept. 1795.
Description: A seven-column outline of *Deontology* I and II and a catalogue of virtues as presented in the Oxford *Ethices Compendium.* The last column refers to a bibliography of useful books and an *Index Expurgatorius* of useless books on the subject of private morality.
Comment: No such bibliography or index is to be found.

18 Title: Ethics—Analysis of by? Date: 25 Sept. 1805.
Description: A nine-column outline of moral philosophy and the virtues discussed in the *Ethices Compendium.*

Comment: There is clear evidence that this outline refers to topics discussed in a manuscript consisting of seventy-five sheets. No such body of writing is to be found.

19 Title: Catechism or Jug. True—Deontology private. Date: None.
Description: A full page discussion of the relationship and competition existing between piety, probity, beneficence, and self-regarding prudence.
Comment: There is internal evidence that this page was intended for *Deontology* II.

20 Title: Morals—Definitions. Date: None.
Description: A full-page characterization of Ethics or the science which teaches us how to achieve happiness.
Comment: Related to the content of *Deontology* I. 2.

122 Title: Logic or Ethics—Veracity. Date: 14 Sept. 1814.
Description: A half-page discussion of the reducibility of veracity to prudence, probity, and beneficence.
Comment: Although veracity is referred to as one of the virtues found in the *Ethices Compendium* (see xiv. 17) and referred to in one outline (xiv. 225), there are no additional references or relevant writings to be found.

125 Title: Logic or Ethics—Causes of Immorality. Date: 16 Sept. 1814.
Description: Four notes concerning the prevalence of self-regarding interest to social interest; the preference for lesser present causes to greater distant ones; false principle of morals; and the misapplication of religion.

146-7 Title: Logic or Ethics—Modes of Moralisms. Date: 30-1 Aug. 1814.
Description: Two half pages concerned with the mode of exercising the function of the moralist.
Comment: Superseded by xiv. 148-9.

174-9 Title: Logic or Ethics or Deontology. Date: 7 July 1815.
Description: A six-page lined-out draft subtitles ‘Of Deontology in General’.
Comment: Related to *Deontology* I. 1.

189 Title: Ethics or Deontology—Exegetic. Date: 13 May 1816.
Description: A full-page schematic discussion of expository matters.
Comment: Related to *Deontology* I. 2.

192-4 Title’Deontology. Date: 17 Nov. 1817.
Description: A three-page discussion of expository matters.
Comment: Related to *Deontology* I. 2.

195 Title: Deontology—Foundations. Date: 18 Dec. 1817.
Description: A half-page discussion concerning the extra-regarding branch of deontology.
Comment: Appears to be related to xiv. 192-4.

225 Title: Deontology private—Definitions. Date: March or April 1819.
Description: A three-quarter page analysis of the nature of virtue.
Comment: A more adequate account found in xiv. 266 was used *in Deontology* I. 13.

226 Title: Deontology Private—Rudiments. Date: 16 Apr. 1819.
Description: A four-column outline of private deontology and a title.

227 Title: Deontology—Theoretical. Date: 26 Apr. 1819.
Description: A discussion of 'Prudence' and 'Beneficence' as the virtues to which all others are reducible.

228 Title: Deontology Ch. 1. Rudiments or anticipated contents. Date: 26 Apr. 1819.
Description: A full-page outline of man's interests and duties.
Comment: Related to the headings in xv. 160-6.

229 Title: Interest and Duty. Date: 28 Apr. 1819.
Description: An empty page containing the subheading 'Interest and duty, their relation to Virtue and Vice'.

237 Title: Interest and Duty—Preface or Introduction. Date: 11 June 1819.
Description: A five-line fragment about the connection between the practical and theoretical parts of the work.

240 Title: Marginals revised. Date: 24 June 1819.
Description: A four-column set of marginals, numbered 1-13, introducing the topic of private deontology.
Comment: Corresponds exactly to xiv. 232-5 used in *Deontology* I. 1.

241 Title: Deontology Private. Dates: 24 June 1819, 10 Sept. 1821.
Description: A third of a page containing a title proposed on 24 June 1819, a title proposed on 10 Sept. 1821, and a statement proposing to divide the whole work into five parts.
Comment: The 1819 title resembles the title in xiv. 195; the 1821 title resembles the title in xv. 219^{V}.

255 Title: Deontology Private—Rudiments—Pride and Vanity.
Date: 4 Sept. 1829.

Description: A full-page discussion of the rudiments of pride and vanity (in copyist's hand).
Comment: Related *to Deontology* I. 22.

264 Title: Deontology—Theoretical. Date: Dec. 1819.
Description: A three-quarter-page discussion of envy and jealousy.
Comment: Related *to Deontology* I. 24.

268 Title: Deontology—Self-regarding prudence—its relation to taste. Date: Dec. 1819.
Description: A full-page discussion of self-regarding prudence.
Comment: A more adequate account found in xiv. 231 was used in *Deontology* 1.13.

269-71 Title: Deontology Private—Theoretic and Practical Part. Date: 26 Feb. 1821.
Description: A three-page collection containing a title and outline of the theoretical and practical parts of *Deontology*.

272 Title: Deontology private—I. Theory. Date: 18 June 1821.
Description: A half-page fragment dealing with the distinction between prudence and benevolence.

276 Title: Deontology Private—Theoretic or Practical Part. Date: 12 Aug. 1823.
Description: A quarter-page fragment containing section headings referring to the relation of the several branches of deontology to one another.

280 Title: Deontology private, or | |. Date: 25 Feb. 1825.
Description: A two-thirds-page discussion of the sense of sympathy.
Comment: Related to xiv. 202, used in *Deontology* I. 15.

286-7 Title: Deontology Private—Beginning? Dates: 27 Apr. 1827 and 1826.
Description: A one and one-half page discussion of private deontology in relation to happiness, virtue, and vice.
Comment: Related to xiv. 93, used in *Deontology* I. 7.

288 Title: Deontology Private. Date: 18 Mar. 1828.
Description: A full-page, half crossed-out, containing aphorisms by Bentham, Helvetiŭs, and Dean Swift.
Comment: The remarks of the latter two are found in xiv. 223-4, used in *Deontology* I. 14.

289 Title: Leading Principle of D(eontology). Date: 18 Mar. 1828.
Description: A heading 'Morality made easy: or say Private Deontology'.

306 Title: Deontology Private—Self-regarding Prudence. Date: 12 Aug. 1828.
Description: A half-page fragment on physical desires.

307-9 Title: Deontology Private. Dates: 1 and 3 Dec. 1828.
Description: Two full crossed-out pages on virtue and vice.

308 Title: Deontology. Date: 1 Jan. 1831.
Description: A seven-line fragment on vanity and pride.

310-12 Title: Deontology Private—Beginning. Date: 6 Jan. 1830.
Description: A two and one-half page discussion, the last two crossed out, concerning prudence and effective benevolence and calling for the happiness of all sensitive beings to be promoted.

313 Title: Deontology Private. Date; 6 Jan. 1831.
Description: A full-page discussion of envy and jealousy.
Comment: Related to *Deontology* I. 24.

xv

85 Title: Deontology Private. Date: March or April 1819.
Description: A full-page, incomplete discussion of the connection between beneficence and prudence.

93 Title: Deontology—Benevolence and Beneficence. Date: 5 Mar. 1821.
Description: A three-line fragment on self-sacrifice.

95 Title: None. Date: None.
Description: A five-line fragment which appears to discuss mischievousness.

97 Title: Effec(tive) Ben<evolence>. Date: None.
Description: A scrap containing the headings 'Patriotism', 'Love of Glory', 'Military Distinction'.

98 Title: Effective benevolence—Discourse. Date: None.
Description: A five-line summary concerned with the influence of conversation.

99 Title: Practical Part. Date: None.
Description: An empty page containing only the subheading 'Efficient Benevolence—Positive'.

100 Title: Practical Part. Date: None.
Description: An empty page containing only the subheading 'Extra-regarding Prudence'.

101-8 Titles: Deontology private—Practical Part, Deontology, and untitled. Dates: Nov. 1817, Feb.-Mar. 1819, Dec. 1824, 27 July and 8 Aug. 1830,11 Jan. 1831.
Description: Five pages of outlines set in columns concerning various parts of practical deontology.

112 Title: Deontology private. Date: Oct. 1821.
Description: An eight-line enumeration of the modes in which pride and vanity may be hurt by discourse.

113-18 Title: None. Dates: 1827-30.
Description: Six pages of notes set in columns concerned with positive and negative beneficence and benevolence.
Comment: Perhaps used by John Bowring as notes for his version of *Deontology*.

119 Title: Deontology Private? Errors of the Popular or Moral Sanction, including matter which must not be published unless it be after my death. J. B. Date: 12 Jan. 1829.
Description: A fragmentary set of notes written in four columns concerning the errors of the popular or moral sanction.
Comment: no substantive writing has been found on this topic.

120 Title: Deontology private—Beneficence negative. Dates: 28 Mar. 1824, 2 July 1829, Oct. 1831.
Description: Three columns on negative effective benevolence.

121 Title: Deontology Private—From Chadwick. Date: 13 Sept. 1831.
Description: A full-page discussion of the perfect gentleman.

122-3 Title: Extra-regarding Prudence—Deontology Private—Practical Part. Dates: Jan. 1820, July 1828, 5 Aug., and 17 Nov. 1829.
Description: Two pages of notes set in columns concerning the giving of advice, good and bad breeding, pride and vanity, and self-regarding prudence.

124 Title: Self-regarding Prudence. Date: 30 Apr. 1819.
Description: A two-column outline on the distribution of expenditures.

125 Title: Deontology Private. Date: 13 Sept. 1829.
Description: A page-and-one-eighth reproduction of an article from *The Examiner* of 13 Sept. 1829 concerning civility, charity, and generosity.

160^{v}-6^{v} Title: Interest and Duty. Date: 28 Apr. 1819, with the exception of 165^{v} which is dated 11 June 1819.
Description: Empty pages each containing one of the following section numbers and headings: 2. Interest—its relation to pleasures and pains—to happiness and unhappiness; 3. Interests, pleasures and pains—their relation to good and evil—good and evil, physical and moral; 4. Interests, pleasures

and pains—their relation to desires and motives; 5. Interests, pleasures and pains, and motives—their relation to the several sanctions—Sanctions a source of interests and motives^. Interest, modifications of—interest of the moment, of the subject, the occasion—the whole of life—interest true and false; 7. Obligation and Duty, their relation to interest and certain of the sanctions—how counted—proper senses and improper or figurative senses of the word duty.

Comment: see Editorial Introduction, p. xxviii.

220v Title: Deontology. Date: None.

Description: An outline of *Deontology* I.

266v Title: Deontology. Date: 6 Mar. 1819.

Description: A three-line fragment on self-regarding pleasure.

271v Title: Deontology private. Date: None.

Description: A quarter-page fragment concerning the dictates of justice, benevolence, and utility.

272v Title: Deontology Private. Date: 5 Oct. 1814.

Description: A four-column numbered outline of the pleasures of amity.

Comment: This is the outline for *Deontology* I. 20.

273v Title: Logic or Ethics. Date: 19 Sept. 1814 [?].

Description: A quarter-page fragment on prudence and beneficence.

274v Title: Deontology. Date: 18 Mar. 1828.

Description: A full-page fragment in French on benevolence.

227v Title: Deontology Private—Theoretic Part. Date: 24 Apr. 1820.

Description: A four-column outline of negative beneficence.

295v Title: Deontology—Beneficence. Date: 17 Feb. 1819.

Description: A half-page, crossed out, concerning justice and beneficence.

299v Title: None. Date: None.

Description: A three-line fragment concerned with a man valuing himself or his courage.

319-20v Title: Deontology private. Date: None.

Description: A half-page fragment on beneficence.

344v Title: Deontology Private. Date: 24 Dec. 1820.

Description: A full-page discussion of the dictates of prudence and benevolence.

Comment: Related to xv. 473, used *in Deontology* II. 3 (i).

362v Title: Heads Unarranged. Date: None.

Description: Three columns of headings referring to topics in *Deontology* II.

401v Title: Deontology private—Self-regard. Date: None.
Description: A four-fifths-page discussion of the imagination.

407v Title: Deontology private—Self-regard. Date: None.
Description: A four-fifths-page discussion of free thought.

458 Title: Deontology Private—Prolegomena. Date: 18 May 1820.
Description: A half-page discussion of the power possessed by a father over his children with reference made to Sir Robert Filmer.

460v Title: Deontology Private. Date: 24 June 1819.
Description: A five-line outline entitled 'Plan of Part II: the Practical part'.

462v Title: Deontology private—Prolegomena. Date: May 1820.
Description: A seven-line outline of parts of *Deontology* II.

475v Title: Deontology Private. Date: 4 Jan. 1821.
Description: A quarter-page reference to the second rule of negative benevolence and beneficence.
Comment: Related to *Deontology* II. 1 (ii).

483 Title: Deontology Private—Beneficence. Date: None.
Description: A full-page discussion of the production of preponderant good.

487v Title: Deontology Private—Rudiments. Date: 5 Dec. 1821.
Description: A half-column fragment concerning one's response to a man asking a favour.

513v Title: Deontology Private—Benevolence negative. Date: 24 Mar. 1821.
Description: A one-third page fragment indicating that one should give least offence to the self-esteem of a person when correcting him.

525v Title: Deontology Private—Theoretical. Date: 1819.
Description: A full-page discussion of annoyance.
Comment: Related to *Deontology* I. 14.

530v Title: Deontology private—Beneficence negative. Date: None.
Description: A half-page characterization of a general rule of negative beneficence.
Comment: Related to xv. 480, used in *Deontology* II. 3 (ii).

532v Title: Deontology Private—Beneficence negative. Date: 3 Oct. 1823.
Description: An eight-line fragment concerning one's encounter with a person who is mentally and physically inferior.
Comment: Related *to Deontology* II. 3 (iii).

539v Title: Deontology private—Practical. Date: 17 Apr. 1819.
Description: A quarter-page of chapter and section headings concerned with good breeding.

556v Title: Deontology Private—Practical. Date: 11 Aug. 1823.
Description: A four-line fragment indicating that positive benevolence is a better policy than being honest.

557v Title: Deontology Private—Effective Benevolence. Date: 24 Jan. 1822.
Description: An eight-line fragment on how to exercise effective benevolence.

563v Title: Deontology Private—Beneficence negative. Date: 29 May 1820.
Description: A half-page outline of the occasions on which evil-doing and well-doing are appropriate.

585v Title: None. Date: None.
Description: A fragment, mostly shorthand, on effective benevolence.

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202 Title: Logic. Date: 23 July 1814.
Description: A discussion of the general and subordinate ends of Ethics.

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70 Title: Deontology private—Greatest Happiness Principle. Date: 7 Apr. 1822.
Description: A page-and-five-line discussion of death, the amount of pleasure and pain in life, and views of Locke and Maupertuis concerning pleasure and pain.

75v Title: Deontology Private. Date: 4 May 1822.
Description: A seven-line discussion on Bentham's reason for believing that the Emperor of Germany was not a gentleman.

78v Title: Deontology or Jug. Util. Date: 17 May 1822.
Description: A seven-line discussion of the sources of inducement of the retributive and sympathetic sanctions.

85 Title: Deontology Private. Date: 4 Sept. 1822.
Description: A nine-line discussion of the utility of general urbanity to self-regarding interest, with reference to Eldon, Sidmouth, Castlereagh, and Canning.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Note. The following is a unified index which refers to the text of *A Table of The Springs of Action, Deontology, Article on Utilitarianism* (long and short versions), and Appendices A, B, C, and D, without identifying the particular work in question.

The symbol 'vs.' is used below to indicate 'as distinct from' or 'as opposed to'. The symbol '(Fr)' is used to indicate that the content is in French. Other abbreviations used are:

p. of u.: principle of utility
g.h. of g.n.: greatest happiness of the greatest number
g.h.p.: greatest happiness principle
pl.: pleasure
pn.: pain

References to Bentham's notes are given by means of the page and identifying letter.

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