

but unrepentant, pluralist, confronting this complexity, would lose hope. In this mingling of penetrated and penetrating, the 'separate ultimates' of pluralism, so convenient for practice, have vanished, and unity, concretely embodied, fills beyond all doubting the view.

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THE BISHOP OF MANCHESTER ON "SYMBOLISM AS A
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE".

IN his article in the last number of *MIND*, the Bishop of Manchester claims that Will gives an explanation of the 'very existence of the Universe' as 'no other hypothesis available affords us any hope of doing'. But has the Bishop at all made clear how he takes Will to be explanatory of its own existence? No doubt he speaks of Will as 'self-explanatory' but by immediately going on to show how will or purpose is commonly regarded as a satisfactory explanation of things other than itself, he seems to cast a doubt on his real meaning as if it were no more than an explanation of the rest of the Universe by reference to the Divine Will, which is only an explanation of part by part not, in principle, different from others.

A somewhat similar obscurity appears to attach to the statement, "value and value alone is substance or has substantial reality". At first sight this seems sufficiently definite, but the Bishop goes on to speak of the Good and the good thing, and though he adds that they are not properly distinguishable, yet even to speak of one and then the other would seem to make them not strictly identical, and when the Bishop goes on to distinguish grades of reality according to their self-subsistence, reality as distinct from value seems to reappear in the form of reality in so far as it is not self-subsistent, since to be this it must still be something, and it becomes more difficult than ever to see what precisely is gained by the attempt to treat value as a substantive.

E. W. EDWARDS.

A CORRECTION.

IN a letter to the Editor of *MIND*, Mr. G. T. Bennett of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, points out a stupid slip which I made on page 499 of *MIND*, N.S., No. 124. In illustrating Mr. Johnson's analysis of the subsumptive syllogism in my review of his *Logic*, Part II, I took as a major premise the proposition "Everything with sides and angles is equiangular, if equilateral". This is, of course, ridiculously false, as Mr. Bennett points out. A figure made of four equal jointed rods could be pushed into many different shapes. I want to make it quite clear that this is a slip of my own, and that nothing of the kind occurs in Mr. Johnson's book. Of course, for purposes of illustration, it is a matter of indifference whether we choose false propositions or true ones, so that no injustice has been done to Mr. Johnson's theory. But I am not going to pretend that I did not think this proposition to be true at the moment when I wrote it down. I am sorry to have been so careless, and I should be still more sorry if anyone should have ascribed the carelessness to Mr. Johnson himself and not to his reviewer. I must thank Mr. Bennett for pointing out the mistake.