

that, however destructive he may have been as a thinker, he appeared on my return to have been a model tenant.) It was an immense pleasure to us all at Trinity to have Russell among us once again,

per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum.

full of vigour, making many new friends among the younger Fellows, and adding enormously by his good company and his brilliant conversation to the pleasure of dining in Hall and frequenting the Parlour afterwards. When the tenure of his Title B Fellowship was about to end in 1948 the Council prolonged it until Michaelmas 1949. And when Russell vacated the prolonged Fellowship on September 30th of that year, he entered the haven which all good Fellows of Trinity hope to reach, viz., a Fellowship under Title E, in virtue of which he is now a Fellow of the College for the rest of his life.

In latter years Russell has unfortunately not been able to be much with us in Trinity. On May 18th, 1962, his nintieth birthday, the Fellows of the College assembled in the Combination Room after dinner to drink his health. We should have been delighted if he had been able to be present; but he had had to decline our very cordial invitation because he was, very naturally, involved as the central figure in the more formal and more widely representative celebrations of the event which were taking place in London. So we had to be content to drink his health *in absentia*. There was a record attendance of Fellows and their guests in the Combination Room, and it was only just possible to seat the whole company. I was invited by the College Council to make the speech proposing Russell's health. I felt it to be a great honour to be entrusted with that duty, and it was extremely pleasant to me personally to have this opportunity of expressing, in presence of my friends and colleagues, my gratitude to Russell for all his kindness to me as a young man, for the stimulation of his wit and humour, and for the immense debt which I owe, in respect of my philosophical work, to his conversation and his writings.

It is on that note that I would wish to end.

(II) *Some Remarks on Sense-Perception*

I shall try to elucidate some of the main concepts which seem to me to be involved in the philosophical analysis of sense-perception, and to define the meanings which I should at present be inclined to attach

to certain technical terms which have frequently been employed in discussing that topic.

(1) *'Ostensible Perception,*

I shall use this as a general phrase to cover such experiences as ostensibly seeing or hearing or touching, etc., external bodies or physical events or processes, and also to cover such experiences as ostensibly feeling states of, or processes in, one's own body. The phrase is intended to include normal waking sense-perceptions, waking hallucinations (whether delusive, or—if such there be—veridical), and dreams.

Whenever a person is having such an experience he would, if he were to describe it to himself or to another, say: 'I am seeing so-and-so', 'I am hearing so-and-so', etc. The phrase 'so-and-so' would be a name or a description of an actual or possible *body* or *part of a body*, or of an actual or possible *physical event, process, or state of affairs*. E.g. 'a cow', 'the top of a penny', 'a flash of lightning', 'a booming noise', 'an itching in my toe', and so on.

Now we ordinarily use words like 'seeing', 'hearing', 'touching', etc., in such a way that, e.g. a statement of the form 'I am *seeing* so-and-so' would not be true unless the following two conditions were fulfilled, viz. (i) that the experience is in the main *veridical*, and (ii) that it is *normally evoked*.

By calling such an experience 'veridical' I mean that, at the time when it was happening (or at such an earlier time as would be required by light, sound, etc., to have reached the percipient's body from the place which he ostensibly saw or heard 'so-and-so' as occupying), there did exist, at the place which 'so-and-so' was ostensibly perceived as occupying, something answering fairly closely to the description 'so-and-so'. By calling such an experience 'normally evoked' I mean that it was evoked by the stimulation of the appropriate sense-organ (e.g. *eyes*, in the case of seeing) in the normal way by an appropriate physical process (e.g. *light-waves*, in the case of seeing), coming, directly or indirectly, from the thing, event, process, or state of affairs ostensibly perceived.

These two conditions are different, though they are no doubt as a rule closely bound up with each other. A telepathic or clairvoyant experience might take the form of an ostensible seeing, hearing, etc., and it might be veridical; but it would not be normally evoked. Conversely, an experience of an optical illusion would be normally evoked, but it would not be veridical. In neither case, if one were fully informed of the facts, would one accept a statement of the form: 'I am *seeing* so-and-so', made by the experient. In the former case

one would say: 'He is not really *seeing*; though what he is ostensibly seeing as occupying a certain place does answer, to a degree not reasonably ascribable to mere chance-coincidence, to the particular thing or event or state of affairs which is in fact occupying that place at that time.' In the latter case one would say: 'No doubt he is really *seeing something*, but it is not what he takes himself to be seeing.' Similar remarks would apply *mutatis mutandis* to ostensible hearing, ostensible touching, and so on.

If and only if an ostensible perception is *normally evoked*, I shall call it 'non-hallucinatory'. Otherwise I shall call it 'hallucinatory'. So far as these definitions go, an ostensible perception of either of these two kinds may be either *veridical* or *delusive*. Veridicality is a matter of degree. An hallucinatory ostensible perception may be, and usually is, *completely non-veridical*. A non-hallucinatory ostensible perception generally has *some* degree of veridicality. A *completely non-veridical* ostensible perception may be called 'delusive'. An example would be an ordinary dream. An ostensible perception which is non-hallucinatory, but is predominantly though not completely non-veridical, may be called 'illusory'. An example would be the experience of 'seeing a mirage'.

There is a close phenomenological resemblance between all such experiences, whether hallucinatory or non-hallucinatory, veridical or non-veridical. And they all differ utterly from such experiences as *thinking of* a body or of a physical event or process or state of affairs in absence, *remembering* such an object, *calling up an image of* such an object, and so on. I use the name 'ostensible perceptions' to mark off the class of experiences having these phenomenological features common and peculiar to them. I will now consider these features in more detail.

(2) 'Ostensible Perception'

In every ostensible perception the experient takes himself to be perceiving a certain body or part of a body, a certain physical event or process, or a certain physical state of affairs. Let us lump these alternatives together under the phrase 'physical entity'. The sentence '*O* is the *ostensible perceptum* of the ostensible perception *P*' is to be understood as follows: The word or phrase '*O*' correctly names or describes the object (actual or possible) which the person who is having the ostensible perception *P* then takes himself to be perceiving by it. According as the ostensible perception is an ostensible seeing, an ostensible hearing, and so on, we can call its ostensible perceptum an 'ostensible *visum*', an 'ostensible *auditum*', and so on.

An ostensible perception is *delusive*, if there is, at the relevant

time, *no* physical entity at the relevant place, answering even remotely to the description of its ostensible perceptum. It is *more or less veridical* in so far as there is, at the relevant time and place, a physical entity answering more or less accurately to that description. If an ostensible perception is (a) non-hallucinatory, and (b) predominantly veridical, we can speak of the physical entity which fulfils the above conditions as its '*actual* perceptum'.

(3) '*Sensibly Appearing*'

In having an ostensible perception the experient does not merely take himself to be 'in presence of' an object of a certain kind (e.g. a penny, a flash of lightning, the sound of Big Ben striking, and so on). The object also 'sensibly appears' or 'sensibly presents itself' to him as characterized in certain ways, e.g. it *looks* brown and flat and round, it *feels* cold and smooth and round, it *sounds* booming and rhythmic, and so on.

Very often the experient simply takes for granted that the object which he is ostensibly perceiving *is* as it then looks or feels or sounds to him to be. On some occasions, however, he is doubtful whether it is or is not as it sensibly appears to him to be, or he may be practically certain that it is *not* so. In ordinary life we tend to use phrases like '*looks* so-and-so', '*feels* so-and-so', etc., only or mainly on occasions of the *latter* kind. I intend to ignore that restriction, and to use such phrases *without* any implication or suggestion either that the ostensibly perceived object is *not*, or that it *is*, as it looks or feels or sounds to the person who is ostensibly perceiving it. I shall use the phrases 'sensibly appearing so-and-so', or 'sensibly presenting itself as so-and-so', to cover 'looking so-and-so', 'feeling so-and-so', etc., where these latter phrases are to be understood in the way in which I have said above that I intend to use them.

Now we must carefully distinguish the following two things: (i) A *sensory experience*, in and through which an ostensible perceptum sensibly presents itself to the experient as so-and-so. (ii) A *judgment* to the effect that such and such an ostensible perceptum is sensibly presenting itself as so-and-so to a certain experient. Such a judgment might be either autobiographical or heterobiographical, i.e. either made by the experient himself or made by some other person concerning him. If it be heterobiographical, it is obvious that it differs from the sensory experience. So we may confine our attention to autobiographical judgments of this kind. Such an autobiographical judgment might be concerned either with a *past* sensory experience had by the same person, or it might be concerned with a *simultaneous* sensory experience of his. It is obvious that a *retro-*

spective judgment must differ from the *past* sensory experience with which it is concerned. So we need consider only the case of a person who is (i) having a sensory experience in which an ostensible perceptum sensibly presents itself to him as so-and-so; and who is (ii) simultaneously making a judgment to the effect that such and such an ostensible perceptum is sensibly presenting itself to him as so-and-so.

Even in this case, it is certain that the distinction must still be drawn. *No* judgment of any kind can be made except by a being who has appropriate general ideas; and the capacity to have such ideas and to make judgments seems to be inextricably bound up with the ability to use some kind of language. But one can hardly doubt that an animal or a young child has sensible experiences in which an ostensible perceptum presents itself to him as what *we* (who have language and general ideas) would call 'red' or 'squeaky' or 'sour'. Moreover, when an ostensible perceptum sensibly presents itself as so-and-so to a being who is capable of making judgments, he does not in fact usually make a judgment to the effect that it is doing this.

Granted that the distinction must be drawn, I propose to call such a sensory experience a '*sensation*', and such a judgment a '*judgment of sensible appearance*'. It is certain that a sensation (or a *quasi*-sensation) is an essential factor in every ostensible perception; and it is equally certain that a judgment of sensible appearance is *not*. (I have added the alternative '*quasi*-sensation' to cover the case of *hallucinatory* ostensible perceptions. Here the experient is certainly having colour-experiences, sound-experiences, etc., extremely like those which are normally evoked by the stimulation of his eyes by light-waves, of his ears by sound-waves, and so on; and these experiences certainly play an essential part in his hallucinatory ostensible perception. But it might be thought misleading to call these 'sensations', since they are not evoked by the normal stimulation of a sense-organ. In the sequel I shall sometimes use the word 'sensation' to cover what would more accurately be called '*quasi*-sensations'.)

Any judgment is, as such, capable of being true or false. But it is difficult or impossible to formulate and to apply tests for judgments of sensible appearance. So such judgments are often described (rightly or wrongly) as 'in corrigible'.

(4) *Analysis of Ostensible Perception*

(i) Whenever a person is having an ostensible perception he is *ipso facto* having a certain sensation or *quasi*-sensation.

Let us take as an example the case of a person who is ostensibly seeing a cricket-ball. An essential factor in any such experience would be a sensation or *quasi*-sensation in which he is sensibly presented with a 'round-looking', 'brown-looking', 'convex-looking' expanse. (I use the phrases which I have put in inverted commas, in order to make it clear that 'round', 'brown', 'convex', etc., are to be understood in the sense in which they are intelligible and familiar to all speakers of English who can see and are not colour-blind, and would be unintelligible to anyone blind from birth.)

(ii) Although a sensation or *quasi*-sensation is an essential factor in any ostensible perception, there is always another and no less essential factor. In order to show this we will revert to our example of an experience which could be correctly described as 'ostensibly seeing a cricket-ball'.

By a 'cricket-ball' is meant something which is spherical and solid; which has coolness or warmth, smoothness and hardness, beside the brownness which is all that it presents to sight. It is something which has parts that are not at the moment presenting themselves sensibly to the person who is said to be seeing it; though they might do so to him at other times, and might do so to other percipients, differently situated, at the same time. It is something which has *causal* properties, such as mass, impenetrability, and elasticity; which cannot, from the nature of the case, be *sensibly* presented, like colour, temperature, textural-quality, etc., though they are ascribed, no doubt, *on the evidence of* certain regular conjunctions and sequences among sensations. By 'ostensibly seeing a cricket-ball' we mean (a) having a visual sensation or *quasi*-sensation of the special kind described above, and (b) being led by it (without any explicit process of inference, and without even any experience of associative transition) to take oneself to be facing an object answering more or less to the above description of a 'cricket-ball'.

This second factor has been called by Professor H. H. Price '*perceptual acceptance*'. It certainly cannot be identified with *judging*, in the sense in which that involves formulating and accepting or rejecting a proposition. The higher animals, other than man, almost certainly have experiences which may fairly be called 'ostensible perceptions'; but they are almost certainly incapable of making judgments, in the sense described above. Perceptual acceptance resembles judgment, in that it can be significantly described as 'true' or 'false', 'correct' or 'mistaken'. And there are well known and readily applicable tests for its correctness or incorrectness. Again, an experient who *is* capable of making judgments, could, if he should set himself to it, usually make a judgment corresponding more or

less accurately to what he is perceptually accepting on any given occasion.

We might put the case as follows. In order for an ostensible perception to occur there must already exist in the experient certain dispositions, which have been generated and organized in him through his having experienced repeatedly in the past certain conjunctions and certain immediate sequences of sensations. When he now receives the stimulus which produces a certain sensation in him, certain of these dispositions are simultaneously activated; and the experience which he has is the joint product of the sensory stimulus and the activated disposition. In an experient capable of making judgments, and in a frame of mind to do so at the time, the contribution made by the activated disposition might develop into an *explicit perceptual judgment*, such as: 'That which I am now seeing is a brown, cool, smooth, hard, massive, elastic, spherical body.' Even in an experient who is *capable* of making judgments, the contribution made by the activated disposition does not usually develop so far. Generally it issues only in a *readiness* to accept such judgments and to reject others incompatible with them, *if* suggested; in the acceptance of certain immediate developments of the present situation as *normal and unsurprising*, and the meeting of certain others with *surprise or dismay*; in the automatic adjustment of the relevant sense-organs and other parts of the body in ways which *would* be appropriate, *if* one had made such and such perceptual judgments; and so on. In an experient who is *incapable* of making explicit judgments, it is plain that the contribution added by the activated disposition to the sensational core can take *only* one or other of the latter forms.

Before leaving this topic I would like to add the following two remarks: (a) I should think it unlikely that visual, auditory, or tactual sensations, of appreciable intensity, often occur, in adult human beings in an attentive waking state, *without* activating some of the dispositions in question. I should therefore suspect that such sensations would seldom, if ever, occur in such persons, except as the sensory core of some *ostensible perception*, however vague and inchoate. (b) I should think it likely that the disposition to form such dispositions as lead to perceptual acceptance and ultimately to perceptual judgment, is innate in human beings and other animals. (We might call it an 'aptitude', borrowing that useful word from Professor Ducasse.) No doubt the *particular* dispositions, which are formed in an individual possessed of such an aptitude, depend on the particular kinds of frequently recurring conjunctions and sequences of sensations which he has experienced. But there is a

general character, common and peculiar to all such dispositions—a common and peculiar *theme*, on which they are all so many different variations. This expresses itself in the *categories* which are *explicit* in all perceptual judgments and implicit in all states of perceptual acceptance; e.g. that of *persistent thing and variable states*; that of a *single spatial system*, in which all things are located, and a *single temporal system*, in which all their states are dated; that of *causal interaction* between things, determining changes in their states; and so on.

In illustration of this second point, I would say this. I can imagine sentient beings, who shared with us the general capacity to form associations, and who had experienced the same kinds of repeated conjunctions and sequences of sensations as we have done; but who never attained to perceptual acceptance (and therefore never had ostensible perceptions), simply because they lacked our innate aptitude to form the peculiar kind of dispositions required. Conversely, of course, a creature might have the innate aptitude and yet never form the dispositions; simply because his sensations lacked that kind and degree of regular concomitance and sequence which is needed in order to set the aptitude at work and provide it with suitable materials.

(5) *Alternative Analyses of Sensation or quasi-Sensation*

At least three different kinds of analysis of sensation or *quasi-sensation* have been suggested, viz. the *Act-Object Analysis*, the *Internal Accusative Analysis*, and the *Neutral Monist Analysis*. I shall now say something about each in turn.

(A) *Act-Object Analysis*. Consider those visual and tactual sensations which occur as essential factors in experiences of ostensibly seeing or ostensibly touching a body of *definite outline*, to which one is *selectively attending*. In such cases, at any rate, the following account of the sensation seems *prima facie* plausible, viz. that to have such a sensation consists in being *immediately aware* of a certain particular *as having certain characteristics*. Or, to put it in another way, it consists in a certain particular *directly presenting itself* to one *as having certain characteristics*. Examples of such characteristics are *red* (in the sense in which a thing 'looks red'), *cold* (in the sense in which a thing 'feels cold'), and so on. We will call them '*sensible qualities*'.

The above is what I call the 'Act-Object' analysis of sensations. Such technical terms as 'sensible', 'sense-datum', and 'sensum' are bound up with and presuppose this type of analysis. I will now develop this further.

(i) On the assumption that the act-object analysis applies to at least some sensations, we can give the following definitions: (a), *Sensing* is the mental act of being immediately aware of a certain particular as having a certain sensible quality or qualities. (b) A 'sensible' is any particular which is capable of being sensed. (c) A sensible is a 'sense-datum' for a certain person when and only when he is sensing it.

These definitions are intended to leave open all the following questions: (a) Whether or not a sensible can be *sensed as having* a quality which it *does not have in any form whatever* (e.g. as red, though it has in fact no colour). (b) Whether or not a sensible can be sensed as having a quality in *a different determinate form* from that in which it in fact has that determinable quality (e.g. as elliptical, though it is in fact circular). (c) Whether or not one and the same sensible can *combine* sensible qualities which it can manifest only through *different kinds of sensation* (e.g. whether it could be both sensibly red and sensibly hot). (d) Whether or not one and the same sensible could be sensed *on various separated occasions* by the same person, either through sensations of the same kind (e.g. all visual) or of different kinds (e.g. visual on some occasions, and tactual on others). (e) Whether or not one and the same sensible could be sensed by *different* persons, either through sensations of the same kind or of different kinds. (f) Whether or not there could be sensibilia which are sometimes not sensed by anyone, or sensibilia which are never sensed by anyone. (g) Whether the sensible which a person senses when he ostensibly sees or touches a certain part of a certain body is *always*, or *sometimes but not always*, or *never* identical with that part of the surface of that body.

It is plain that certain answers to some of these questions would have a logical bearing on the answers to certain others of them. Suppose, e.g. that it be admitted that a sensible can be *sensed as having* a quality in a certain determinate form, though *in fact* it has that quality in a different determinate form. Then some of the arguments for *denying* that the sensible which a person visually senses when he ostensibly sees a certain part of the surface of a certain body, is *ever identical with* that part of the surface of that body, will collapse.

(ii) It has very commonly been assumed that any quality which a sensible is sensed as having *must* in fact belong to it, and that the sensible must *have* that quality in *the very same determinate form* in which it is sensed as having it. I shall call this the '*Assumption of Sensal Inerrancy*'. On any view, as I have already said, to sense a sensible as having a certain quality is utterly different from judging

that it has that quality. But, on the Assumption of Sensal Inerrancy, that difference is even more radical than the difference, already indicated, between perceptual acceptance and perceptual judgment. For, on that assumption, there can be no question of possible error in the case of *sensing*; whilst there is always the possibility of error in *perceptual acceptance*.

(iii) It seems to me that the Assumption of Sensal Inerrancy may be, and in fact has been, regarded in two fundamentally different ways.

(a) It might be held that 'to *have* the sensible quality *q*' and 'to be *sensed by someone as having* the quality *q*' have *different meanings*, and that the meaning of the second is *no part of* that of the first. On that view, the Assumption of Sensal Inerrancy is a *synthetic* proposition. It might be accepted either because it seemed self-evident on reflexion, though not analytic; or because there was thought to be adequate empirical evidence for it; or just as a convenient working hypothesis, against which there is no conclusive evidence.

(b) On the other hand, it might be held that, in the case of a *sensible* quality, the only meaning that can be attached to '*having* the quality' is *being sensed by someone as having it*. We might parody Berkeley by summing up the view which leads to this conclusion in the phrase: 'To be sensibly qualified = To be sensed as qualified.' I will call this '*The re-formulated Berkeley Principle*'.

I suppose that some philosophers may have started from the other end. They may have found the Assumption of Sensal Inerrancy self-evidently necessary. They may then have argued that, in order to be necessary, it must be analytic. And they may then have been led to the re-formulated Berkeley Principle as ensuring its analyticity.

(iv) The re-formulated Berkeley Principle would carry with it more than the analytic truth of the Assumption of Sensal Inerrancy. It would entail that it is self-contradictory to suppose either (α) that a sensible has *any* sensible qualities except when it is a sense-datum to someone, or (β) that, when a sensible is a sense-datum to someone, it has any sensible qualities *beside* those which it is then sensed as having.

It is important to notice, however, that the re-formulated Berkeley Principle would *not logically exclude* any of the following possibilities:

(a) That there might be sensibilia which are *sometimes* not sense-data to anyone, or sensibilia which are *never* sense-data to anyone. (b) That one and the same sensible might be sensed *on various occasions* by the same person, either through sensations of the same kind on each occasion or through sensations of different kinds on various occasions. (c) That one and the same sensible might be

sensed by *different* persons, either through sensations of the same kind or of different kinds.

But, although none of these 'possibilities' would be inconsistent with the re-formulated Berkeley Principle, it might fairly be asked whether any of them are 'real' possibilities. It will be noted that all of them presuppose the notion of *one and the same* sensible, considered in various contexts. Now that is not really intelligible unless there be some generally accepted and applicable criterion of identity or diversity for sensibilia. It may be doubted whether any satisfactory criterion has ever been formulated.

(B) *Internal Accusative Analysis*. The last paragraph forms a natural transition from the Act-Object analysis of sensation to what Professor Price has called the 'Internal Accusative' analysis of it.

According to this, a sensation or *quasi*-sensation is a unitary experience, not analysable into act of sensing and object sensed. To have a sensation of tiredness or of sickness, e.g. seems *prima facie* just to be feeling in a certain way ('tiredly' or 'sickly'), and not to be sensing a certain *object* as having a certain quality ('tiredness' or 'sickliness'). The Act-Object analysis seems most unpalatable here, whilst the Internal Accusative analysis seems most unpalatable in the case of such sensations as we considered under (A) above.

I suppose that the best that supporters of the Internal Accusative analysis could say of such a sensation as that which a person has in looking at a cricket-ball in a good light and in a fully attentive state, would be somewhat as follows. He might say that such a sensation has two different but inseparable aspects. In respect of one of them, which might be called its 'subjective' aspect, it counts as *so-and-so's sensation*, an event or phrase in a certain person's mental history. In respect of the other, which might be called its 'objective' aspect, it counts as a *sensation-of such-and-such*, e.g. of a brown-looking, convex-looking expanse. On this view, the fundamental mistake of the Act-Object analysis is to suppose that 'of' here has the same kind of meaning as 'of' in such phrases as 'perception of *x*', 'memory of *x*', 'thought of *x*', etc. In the latter phrases the word 'of' denotes the relation of a cognitive act or process to a cognized object. But in the phrase 'sensation-of such-and-such' it does not. It would be safer to talk of the 'content' or the 'objective aspect' of a sensation, and not of its 'object'.

For anyone who holds this kind of view the word 'sensible', as I have defined it above, becomes otiose and possibly misleading. The word 'sense-datum' might still be retained, for a sensation considered in its *objective* aspect. Speaking in terms of 'sensibilia', if one cared

to retain the word, one would have to say that any sensible is necessarily a sense-datum of one particular sense to one particular person on one particular occasion. On this view it could safely be *denied* that the sense-datum involved in ostensibly seeing or touching a body is *ever* a part of the surface of the body ostensibly seen or touched.

(C) *Neutral Monist Analysis*. There is a third analysis of sensation, which has been put forward by Lord Russell in some of his writings. It differs from both the Act-Object and the Internal Accusative analysis, but has certain affiliations with each of them. According to it, the primary notion is that of *sensible*, and a sensible is a particular which has one or more sensible qualities. In so far as it stands in a certain kind of relation to a complex of inter-related sensibilia of a certain kind, it counts as a 'part' (in a highly technical sense of that word) of a 'body' or of a 'physical event or process' (also to be understood in a highly technical sense). In so far as it stands in a certain quite different kind of relation to a complex of inter-related sensibilia and images of a certain different kind, it counts as a 'sense-datum' to a certain person. It is *logically possible* for a sensible to be either (a) at one and the same time *both* a 'part' of a 'body' or of a 'physical event or process' *and* a sense-datum to a person, or (b) to have *either* status *without the other*, or (c) to have *neither* status. And it is logically possible for one and the same sensible to be at one time in one, and at another time in another, of these situations.

(6) *The so-called 'Sensum Theory'*

I have so far had no occasion to use the word 'sensum'. I think that what is often referred to as the 'Sensum Theory' *commonly* (though by no means invariably) presupposes all the following propositions: (i) That ostensible perception must be analysed in terms of (a) a sensation, and (b) a state of perceptual acceptance based upon it. (ii) That the act-object analysis applies, at any rate to those sensations which are involved in ostensibly seeing or touching a body of fairly definite outline, to which the percipient is selectively attending. (iii) That any sensible must have any sensible quality which it is sensed as having, and must have it in the determinate form in which it is sensed as having it. (iv) That, nevertheless, 'to have the sensible quality *q*' and 'to be sensed as having *q*' do *not* have the same meaning, and that the meaning of the latter is no part of the meaning of the former. (v) That there is, therefore, nothing *logically inconsistent* in supposing that the very same sensible, which is at one time sensed as having a certain quality, should at other times be unsensed and yet have precisely the same quality. Nor is there

anything *logically inconsistent* in supposing that there may be sensible which *never are* sensed and which yet have sensible qualities.

Subject to all the above assumptions, we might define a '*sensum*' as follows. It is a particular, capable of being sensed, which has certain sensible qualities. If it should be sensed, it will sensibly present itself as having some or all of the sensible qualities which it has. It will not be sensed as having any qualities other than these, or as having these in any but the determinate forms in which it actually has them. But its *having* any sensible quality is *logically independent* of its *being sensed as having it*.

It should be noted that it is only *logical* independence that is relevant here. A person who accepted the existence of *sensa*, as defined above, might hold that it is *causally* impossible or highly improbable that a *sensum* should exist except as a sense-datum to one particular person on one particular occasion. Or he might hold that the supposition of unsensed *sensa*, though not ruled out by definition, is otiose or that it has no clear positive meaning. But he would have to adduce specific facts, and to produce specific arguments, in support of such opinions.

I think that *most* people who have held the *Sensum Theory* have accepted, explicitly or tacitly, one or more of the following propositions, in addition to those which I have given above as essential to it: (i) That one and the same sensible cannot combine sensible qualities which are normally manifested through the stimulation of *different kinds of sense-organ*, e.g. sensible whiteness and sensible coldness. (ii) That one and the same sensible cannot be a sense-datum to *more than one person*, and cannot be a sense-datum to a person on *several separated occasions*. (iii) That the sensible which a person senses when he ostensibly sees or touches a body (even in the most normal cases of sane waking sense-perception) is *never* identical with the part of the surface of the body which he is then seeing or feeling; and, indeed, is never identical with *any* part of the surface of *any* body, but is a particular existent of a quite peculiar kind.

Perhaps many philosophers would regard some or all of these propositions as an essential part of the content of any doctrine which they would recognize as a form of the *Sensum Theory*. (I note, e.g. that I included the third of them in my *definition* of the '*Sensum Theory*' on pp. 181-2 of a book which I wrote many years ago, entitled *The Mind and its Place in Nature*.) However that may be, it is important to see clearly that these propositions are *not* logically entailed by the five assumptions, stated above as characteristic of the *Sensum Theory*, together with the definition of '*sensum*' proposed above.

In this essay I have been concerned mainly with matters of linguistic usage, partly that of ordinary language and partly that of the technical terminology employed by certain philosophers. I am sure that this is a valuable and even a necessary *preliminary* to philosophical discussion on the topic of sense-perception. But it seems to me absurd to suppose that it could be anything *more* than an essential preliminary. The philosophical problems of sense-perception arise because of the co-existence of a number of relevant and closely inter-related *non-linguistic facts*, which are *prima facie* difficult to fit together into any one coherent system. Important instances of such facts are the following: Those of normal veridical sense-perception; those of incipient, moderate, and extreme illusory perception; those of hallucinatory *quasi*-perception, whether occurring in sleep or in the waking state, and whether delusive or (on rare occasions) veridical; those which physicists have established as to the finite velocity of light and of sound; those which physiologists have established as to the parts played by the brain, the sensory nerves, and the sense-organs in sense-perception; and so on. The business of the philosopher of sense-perception is to suggest and to defend a coherent and synoptic view of *all* such facts.

Many of these facts (e.g. the physical and the physiological ones) remained completely unsuspected until millions of years after the language that we use in daily life had fully developed. To imagine that a careful study of the usages, the implications, the suggestions, and the *nuances*, of the ordinary speech of contemporary Englishmen could be a substitute for, or a valuable contribution towards, the solution of the philosophical problems of sense-perception, seems to me one of the strangest delusions which has ever flourished in academic circles.