

VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Principle of Individuality and Value: the Gifford Lectures for 1911. Delivered in Edinburgh University by B. BOSANQUET, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xxxvii, 409.

It is somewhat difficult to criticise this most brilliant work. To discuss the main principle on which it is based would scarcely be adequate, since in that principle there is nothing new. On the other hand, to describe and criticise the original and interesting applications of that principle would take an entire number of *MIND*. A brief exposition of the chief thesis of each lecture, and a few comments on it, seem to offer the best compromise, though one which is scarcely adequate.

The main principle of the book may perhaps be stated in the words of the Preface: "The things which are most important in man's experience are also the things which are most certain to his thought. And . . . this is not an accident but inevitable because importance and reality are sides of the same characteristic." Dr. Bosanquet not only realises that this view has been stated before, but maintains that we may start by considering it proved. "Indeed, I do not conceal my belief that in the main the work has been done, and that what is now needed is to recall and concentrate the modern mind out of its distraction rather than to invent wholly new theoretical conceptions."

With this I feel myself unable to agree. I cannot think that we have as yet arrived at any general theory of the nature of reality which can be taken as proved. Even if it is the case, as I believe it will turn out to be, that some form of idealism is true, it seems certain that it is not any form of idealism which has yet been put forward. The criticisms of opponents may be in many respects mistaken, but in some instances they have certainly disclosed defects which will require fundamental modifications. And more pressing, perhaps, than the criticisms of opponents, are the difficulties which arise when we look at the systems from within. The invention of "new theoretical conceptions" is, I submit, exactly what is most required in the philosophy of the present day. *Wholly new*, of course, they could not be, and need not be.

The phrase already quoted—"importance and reality are sides of the same characteristic"—may perhaps be taken as the key-note

of the book. By importance Dr. Bosanquet means, I take it, what is sometimes called positive value. And the whole structure of his argument seems to depend on this view—that the real is the important, and the important is the real. It is not quite clear to me whether this connexion of importance and value is held to be analytic or synthetic. I suppose, indeed, that Dr. Bosanquet might regard the antithesis as unjustifiable. But at any rate it seems clear that the connexion is direct. It is not that the real has the qualities X, Y, and Z, and that whatever has the qualities X, Y, and Z, is important. There is no need of any such middle term. The real as such is the important, and the important as such is the real—a conclusion which, if true, is certainly most desirable.

The first lecture is entitled "Introduction—the Central Experiences". "We begin then with the principle—the truism if you like—that in our attitude to experience, or through experience to our world, we are to put the central things in the centre, to respect the claims of the obvious which is neglected—to take for our standard what man recognises as value when his life is fullest and his soul at the highest stretch" (p. 3). Our standard of what? If of value, the standard might be satisfactory if we were supplied with another standard by which we could recognise when our lives are fullest. But Dr. Bosanquet means, I think, more than this. He is recurring, I suppose, to the principle mentioned in the preface, and the standard is one by which we are to judge of reality. And then, I submit, he is most certainly wrong in calling it a truism. It may be true, but it is not generally admitted, and it is not self-evident. If we are to have a right to believe it, it will have to be proved, and, if it were proved, it would disprove most of the philosophy of the past. Such things are not truisms.

Indeed Dr. Bosanquet seems inclined everywhere to underrate the differences of opinion which are to be found in the world. He says, for example: "We shall, on the whole, express and define, I believe, the reasonable faith of resolute and open-minded men" (p. 30). But is there at present any faith common to resolute and open-minded men, or is there any sign of such a common faith in the future? Surely resolute and open-minded men are found in disagreement on every question which has ever been raised in philosophy.

The only other point I have time to notice in this lecture is the protest against "the attempt to take any form of immediateness, understood as excluding mediation, for an absolute and reliable datum, whether in the form of an object of simple apprehension, called by the name of fact, or in the form of an indeterminate creative impulse called by the name of life, or in the form of a subject of experience, impervious and isolated, called by the name of self" (p. 16). The last clause would seem only to protest against Leibniz's *Monadism*, for no other thinker of importance has regarded selves as isolated. But Dr. Bosanquet is always inclined to hold

that if anything is asserted to be ultimately real, or if the existence of anything is asserted to be immediately certain, the reality in question is asserted to be "impervious and isolated". And in holding this it seems to me that he often fails to do justice to the position of his opponents.

Lecture II. deals with "The Concrete Universal". And it is the most important lecture in the book, since it is here that Dr. Bosanquet defines what he means by Individuality. He begins with an attack on the significance and importance of abstract generalisation. The concrete universal is contrasted with this. The concrete universal is the nature of a system which may be called, we are told, an organism, but for which Dr. Bosanquet uses by preference the name of a world. "A world or cosmos is a system of members, such that every member, being *ex hypothesi* distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities which constitute its distinctness" (p. 37). He goes on to say that here "a systematic identity subordinates diversity to itself, or, more truly, reveals itself as the spirit of communion and totality, within which identity and difference are distinguishable but inseparable points of view" (p. 46). These two accounts are apparently given as mutually equivalent, but it seems to me that the second goes a good deal farther than the first.

We are told that "the true embodiment of the logical universal takes the shape of a world whose members are worlds," because "The Universal in the form of a world refers to diversity of content within every member" (p. 37). The inevitable conclusion from this would seem to be that the members of every world are worlds, and that therefore the series of worlds within worlds is endless. Dr. Bosanquet, however, in a very interesting note, regards the absolute reality of such series as unnecessary and improbable. How this can be reconciled with the statement in the text, I am quite unable to see.

That general laws are inadequate as an explanation of the universe without the further conception of systems whose parts mutually determine each other may be admitted, and Dr. Bosanquet's contention that the latter conception is the higher—a view which was also Hegel's—has much to recommend it. But I think that the author goes too far when he maintains, as I understand him to do, that by means of the conception of such systems we can transcend general laws altogether. He would, I suppose, take England to be such a system. But this does not enable us to transcend such general laws as "no Englishman is a slave," "the members of the House of Commons are elected," "every English child has a right to free education". They remain absolutely true, and if they, and similar general laws, were not true, England would not be what it is.

Nor does it seem to me that Dr. Bosanquet has sufficiently considered what the nature of the unity in such a concrete universal would be. The nature of such a universal—as Kant pointed out,

and as Dr. Bosanquet, if I understand him rightly, recognises—cannot be expressed separately in the words. We can only say that it is the aspect of unity which is manifested in just those parts in just those relations. But the difficulty which I must confess that I feel is whether, when we say that half a dozen things are conceived by a concrete universal, or form an organic unity, we are saying much more than that they are half a dozen things in the same universe. Dr. Bosanquet appeals to the unities of art, but it is just here that the difficulty lies. If a gasometer were substituted for the tower of Salisbury Cathedral, the new building would be a different unity from the old one, and a much less beautiful unity. It would, I imagine, be, as a matter of empirical fact, much less in harmony with the desires of most of the people who see it, and—partly on this account and partly on others—the change would diminish the total amount of good in the world. But I cannot see that the new building would be less of a unity, more self-contradictory, or less real.¹

The greater part of the Lecture is occupied with a discussion of the principle—so fundamental in Dr. Bosanquet's philosophy—that "truth is the whole". The question is too large for discussion here, and the author's arguments go along familiar lines. But we must notice his view that "we can and do stake" our whole belief in reality "on the general trueness and being of whole provinces of advanced experience, such as religion, or morality, or the world of beauty and of science. And these are a higher and deeper evidence of the being and motive of the real than are the formally undeniable judgments, undeniable because implying only the minimum of experience, to which the abstract shape of the principle of non-contradiction belongs" (p. 50). Whether the contention is sound or not—I am inclined to think that it is not—the arguments given in favour of it are of high importance, and deserve very careful consideration.

Thus we reach the idea of Individuality—"that which has nothing without to set against it, and which is pure self-maintenance within" (p. 68). Thus the Individual is a "world," but a "world" is not always an Individual. For, as Dr. Bosanquet points out, there can be no real Individual, by his definition, except the Absolute, while parts of the Absolute are also worlds.

I have only time to cite one more remark from this chapter: "There has been far too great a tendency to state the essence of Individuality not as the being oneself, but as the not being some one else" (p. 69). This seems to me profoundly true, and very important, though I am unable to agree with the author as to the

¹ I do not maintain that this is the truest view we can take of the universe. On the contrary I think that Organic Unity is an inadequate category—a view for which I can at any rate plead the authority of Hegel, however unpopular it may be among Hegelians.

precise sort of "being oneself" which deserves the name of Individuality.

In the Third Lecture the author maintains that uniformity and general law are not antagonistic to individuality. He discusses the views of Dr. Ward, Dr. Royce, Prof. Taylor, and M. Bergson. The first part of the lecture is occupied with argument on the nature of physical and psychical statistics, which would require special knowledge of a high order to criticise, or even to summarise. From this Dr. Bosanquet passes to the conception of the Uniformity of Nature, in the sense in which it is assumed by science. He points out that this principle does not in the least assert that the future will repeat or resemble the past (p. 92). It seems extraordinary that this point should ever have been misunderstood. It seems so obvious that such a law of progress, for example, as Leibniz asserts to be true of all spirits in heaven, would, just because of its absolute uniformity, render it quite impossible that the future should repeat or resemble the past. But the mistake has been made, and it was necessary that it should be pointed out. The particular form in which Dr. Bosanquet puts his refutation depends on his theory of the concrete universal, but the essence of what he says on this question does not depend on the acceptance of this particular form.

The result thus gained is then applied. "The important point is to disown the idea that the establishment of great *de facto* variety rather disproves true Uniformity (Relevancy) or proves a psychical nature. . . . Such an idea sets us wrong *ab initio* in our attitude to the characteristics of consciousness, teaching us to connect it with eccentricity and caprice—the negation of coherent system—instead of with system and rationality. The same fundamental error identifies the spontaneity of life with an unmotivated diversity, and intelligence proper with an impotent identity" (p. 94).

The Lecture then goes on to show that Individuality is not incompatible with the validity of general laws. The validity of general laws under any circumstances, however, is only admitted under restrictions which arise from the position taken up in Lecture II. They are not as truly universal as the relation of the parts of an organic unity (p. 106) and the "approximate repetitions" which they express are "an imperfection" (p. 120).

The Fourth Lecture deals with the Teleology of Finite Consciousness. The author maintains that "teleology is a conception which loses its distinctive meaning as we deepen its philosophical interpretation" (p. 123), and again: that "every purpose, no doubt, implies a subjective value, but there is no reason why every true value should be a purpose" (p. 127). In the later part of the lecture he argues—as it seems to me with complete success—that we cannot suppose that conscious purposes would ever produce an ordered universe if it had to act on material which, apart from those purposes, was real and yet "a directionless material"

(p. 134). And again he maintains that inorganic nature is no less suggestive of teleology than organic nature—in the sense in which teleology can be maintained at all.

Incidentally we may notice Dr. Bosanquet's denial that man is more important than other creatures or the future than the past. "It is obvious that no such ascription of ultimate value to a particular class of creatures nor to a particular moment in time can be justified as an ultimate conception" (p. 126). As to the first, if it is only meant that the value of men is no more ultimate than that of angels, monkeys, and other conscious beings, it might well be admitted. But I imagine that Dr. Bosanquet means to go farther, and to deny that ultimate value can be attributed to anything in the universe short of the universe itself. In that case I must confess that his proposition so far from seeming to me to be obviously true, seems to me to be obviously false. It appears to me self-evident that every conscious self has ultimate value, and that nothing which is not a conscious self—whether the universe or a part of the universe—has any ultimate value.

On the question of time the point seems more obscure, and I only wish to protest against Dr. Bosanquet's description of his solution as obvious. On page 136 he says that "the great enemy of all sane idealism is the notion that the ideal belongs to the future". Of course if time is an inadequate way of looking at reality the ideal cannot be really in the future. But the possibility remains that it may be much more truly in the future than in the past or present, and that it may be as truly in the future as to-morrow's breakfast is. And whether this possibility is or is not actual appears to me absolutely vital with regard to the values of our lives.

On page 130 will be found a discussion of the relation of desire and satiety to enjoyment. Dr. Bosanquet points out with great clearness that their relation to æsthetic enjoyment is of a very subordinate kind, but holds that the case is different with regard to sensuous pleasures—a distinction for which there seems no tenable defence. The pleasure of a hot bath may be preceded by a desire for it, and will be followed by satiety, if prolonged. The same is true, as Dr. Bosanquet admits, of a visit to a picture gallery. But this, as he points out, leaves it true, about the picture gallery that "it is not the transition towards an unattained terminus that makes the essence of the activity". Neither does it make the essence of our pleasure in the hot bath. Dr. Bosanquet would almost seem to have been touched by Green's curious prejudice against sensuous pleasure, since he opposes æsthetic enjoyment to it as "true fruition".

Lecture V. is entitled "The Bodily Basis of Mind as a Whole of Content". Dr. Bosanquet rejects, as is well known, the Idealisms of Leibniz and Berkeley. His Idealism holds that Matter is as really existent as Mind. This renders his system in effect Dualistic. And we find here a fresh example of the rule that a system

which sets out to be Dualistic has a strong tendency to end as Materialism. Almost every word that Dr. Bosanquet has written about the relations of Mind and Matter in this lecture might have been written by a complete Materialist. For example, on page 200 (the italics are mine, not the author's), "If an idea cannot secure its own adequate realisation, it is 'not ideal enough'. It has not enough conformity with the environment; it does not really contain as much of the secret of coherence or perfection as it professes to contain. *I take it that a glance at the nervous system shows us this incontrovertibly.*" This is perhaps the most striking passage, but the whole of the Lecture is in the same tone.

Of course Dr. Bosanquet's actual position is very far from being materialistic. But his right to call himself an Idealist depends, if I understand him rightly, entirely on his view that the universe is an Individual, and that selves "in a secondary sense" are Individuals. Thus everything turns on two questions. When we say that things are connected by a concrete universal, are we really saying more than the materialist would say when he called them a group or an aggregate? And, if we are saying anything more, is it anything which increases the positive value to be attributed to the object of our statement?

The detail of this Lecture is most interesting, and it is possible to disagree with its main contention and to find oneself in enthusiastic agreement with some of Dr. Bosanquet's criticisms on other writers. I have only time to notice one passage. We are told that "Hegel's 'actual soul' is the perfection of a living body highly trained and definitely habituated" (p. 178). It is true that Hegel says this of the "wirkliche Seele," and "actual soul" is the literal and accepted translation of "wirkliche Seele," though our ordinary use of the word soul makes the translation somewhat misleading. But the view of Spirit to which Hegel gives this name is held by him to be one of the lowest and least adequate ways of describing its true nature. Before we reach a satisfactory account of Spirit this view has to be transcended again and again. We might as well take the category of Pure Quantity as a true description of the Absolute Idea as take Actual Soul as a true description of Spirit. And yet it is thus that Dr. Bosanquet seems to take it, since he tells us it "is not a retrogression from the deepest insight into mind".

In the next Lecture is considered Self-Consciousness as the Clue to the Typical Structure of Reality. In the first place Dr. Bosanquet maintains that Contradiction is not essential to Self-Consciousness. We have an interesting discussion of Contradiction, in which we are told that "if we say what is self-contradictory cannot be actual fact, then we must deny the actuality of our whole normal world which is the field of our knowledge and action" (p. 226). And again "in the life of conscious beings, again, contradiction is a felt experience" (p. 228). In spite of the

authority both of Dr. Bosanquet and of Hegel—who in this case is unquestionably on the same side as Dr. Bosanquet—I venture to maintain that the first of these passages confuses the actual facts with our beliefs about them, and the second confuses a conflict with a contradiction. Now all contradictions may be conflicts, but all conflicts are not, I submit, contradictions.

What is essential to self-consciousness we are told is not Contradiction but Negativity. The principle is that "an element of Reality can find completion only in what is not itself" (p. 234). I do not know if Dr. Bosanquet would permit this to be interpreted "only in relation to what is not itself," or whether we are to take literally his expression that the self must be *in* the other. From the parallel which he draws between satisfaction and self-sacrifice (which latter phrase again he seems to take literally) it would seem that the self has really got to get satisfaction by passing into something not itself, and so being "beyond itself".

On page 239 one notices Dr. Bosanquet's opinions that, *inter alia*, pain and conflict are essential for the manifestation of Reality, and that "if you turn all things into persons the differences which make life interesting would be gone".

Then comes a discussion of evil. Pain, and sin, and evil, do really exist, but "if we knew everything we should see and feel what finiteness, pain, and evil mean, and how they play a part in perfection itself" (p. 241). This seems to me an untenable compromise. It seems impossible to fall back, as I suppose Dr. Bosanquet does, on the view that the evil is transcended in the Absolute. For if the description of anything as evil is transcended, then it is not really evil, and, if this is universal, evil does not exist. And we are told that it does exist. But if anything is really evil, then, either there is something outside the Absolute (a view which Dr. Bosanquet would naturally not accept) or else there really is a real part of the Absolute which is really evil. Since the Absolute is an Individual, the nature of its parts will be determined by the nature of the whole. And how this can be without the nature of the Absolute being, at least, partly evil, I fail to understand. But if it is partly evil, are we entitled to call it perfection?

Lecture VII., which is entitled "Ourselves and the Absolute," is devoted to the support of Dr. Bosanquet's theory of the comparative unreality of the Self. In the first place he points out that the question cannot be settled by any appeal to the *prima facie* reality of the Self, since it is impossible to think with any coherency on the nature of reality without rejecting much which appears *prima facie* to be real. "This then is the fundamental nature of the inference to the absolute; the passage from the contradictory and unstable in all experiences alike to the stable and satisfactory" (p. 268). With this view, I imagine, but few philosophers would disagree. But then the question arises—what is contradictory and unstable, what is stable and satisfactory?"

Dr. Bosanquet's view is that "individuality, the principle of reality and the consistent whole, takes us on beyond personality in the strict sense, beyond the consciousness of self which is mediated by an opposing not-self, into the region where we go out of the self and into it by the same movement, in the quasi-religion of social unity, in knowledge, art, and in religion proper" (p. 270). This passage is rather ambiguous. Does it mean that it takes us beyond that consciousness of self which is mediated by an *opposing* not-self, but that there is a consciousness of self which is mediated by a not-self which is not opposing? Or does it mean that it takes us beyond any consciousness of self which is mediated by a not-self at all? I suppose it to mean the latter, especially in view of his earlier statement (pp. 248, 249) that, though "the real foundation of self-hood" is "in some way possessed" by the Absolute, yet "contradiction and discrepancy are inevitable in the constitution of the finite self".

This doctrine seems to me quite untenable. Anything finite is inexplicable, and appears contradictory, if you ignore the existence of other things outside to which it is related, and with which it forms a unity. But this does not involve that there is anything untenable in taking the finite thing as absolutely real. There is nothing incompatible in the fact that A is in the relation B to the thing C, the relation E to the thing F, and so on, with the fact that A is a finite thing which, in its finitude and thinghood, is absolutely real. Dr. Bosanquet's argument seems to depend on a confusion of distinctness and isolation. Nothing finite is really isolated. But that need not prevent finite things from being really and ultimately distinct.

And to say that in proportion as the self develops it has to go out of itself seems to me a mere mis-statement. It has, no doubt, to connect itself by more numerous and more important relations with other selves, and with things of other sorts, if any other sort of things exist. But A does not cease to be A because its relations become more numerous and more important.

Nor can I agree with Dr. Bosanquet that in our highest experiences the self-hood of the self becomes less prominent. Our highest experience I take to be love. And in love it is just the particularity of the two selves which is the supreme element. The love is *his* love for *him*—and the he and the him are what makes it itself.

In the Eighth Lecture is discussed Individuality as the Logical Criterion of Value. Dr. Bosanquet first criticises the view that all judgment of value must be themselves/ultimate or rest on other judgments of value which are ultimate. He complains that the advocates of this view have not shown enough respect for Plato and Aristotle. "It is impossible not to feel a certain surprise that without any kind of notice or any argument advanced, the leading conceptions of such thinkers should be altogether set aside" (p. 292).

If no view may be put forward in philosophy without an explicit refutation of all previous thinkers on the subject, the process of philosophical argument will be somewhat cumbersome. Are we to blame Dr. Bosanquet because, in his account of the structure of reality, he has set aside without notice the leading conceptions of Geulincx and of Malebranche?

But the arguments of Plato and Aristotle, as given by Dr. Bosanquet, fail, it seems to me, to support him. "The principle of these arguments in a word is this, that positive pleasure and all satisfaction, as distinct from an intensity of feeling which there is reason to suspect of being illusory, depends on the character of logical stability of the whole inherent in the objects of desire, and that what in this sense is more real, that is, more at one with itself and the whole (*e.g.*, free from contradiction), is also the experience in which the mind obtains the more durable and robust satisfaction, and more completely realises itself. This consideration prescribes the nature of the ultimate good or end which is the supreme standard of value. . . . And by this standard any judgment as to ultimate end or value can be criticised or estimated" (p. 298). And again, "we adhere to Plato's conclusion that objects of our likings possess as much of satisfactoriness—which we identify with value—as they possess of reality and trueness" (p. 317).

One step in this argument then is that satisfaction is value, and that nothing else is value. Now if the supporters of this position should be confronted with Kant, who declares that other things have value besides satisfaction, or with Bentham who maintains that nothing but pleasure has value, what would they do? They would not agree with them. But could they argue with them? No argument is given here, nor do I see what argument would be possible. They could, I take it, only affirm that satisfaction, and nothing but satisfaction was value. And thus their argument would after all depend upon an ultimate judgment of value.

Dr. Bosanquet, I venture to think, has misunderstood the position which he is discussing. His arguments (pp. 295-297) seem directed against the view that our immediate experiences, in an uncriticised and unanalysed form, are the supreme ethical criterion. To confuse the immediate with the ultimate would, as he says, be a fatal mistake. But I do not believe that the authors whom he criticises have committed it. Their contention is, I think, that *all* judgments must either be, or rest on, ultimate judgments, and that as the idea of good is simple and unanalysable, all ethical judgments must either be, or rest on, ultimate judgments of which good is one of the terms, in other words, ultimate judgments of value.

Is the universe good or bad? Strictly, we are told, neither. It is above the good. "It is . . . perfection and the standard of all goodness and value. Strictly, you do not value it. you value all else by it. Its value is the unit, and all other values must be adjusted so as to amount to it" (p. 310). This is rather perplexing. "Its

value is the unit," then it has value. And if it has value, we ought surely to value it, *i.e.* to recognise its value, which is the only way in which we can value anything. But we are told that we do not value it. At any rate this is clear, that, according to Dr. Bosanquet, there is no independent standard by which we can measure the value of what exists, no quality of goodness, the possession of which makes the existent good, while its absence makes it not-good. If this view were true, it seems to me that no judgment about the good and bad could possibly be true. But I do not believe that the view is true, I believe that there is a quality of goodness, as there is a quality of sourness, and whoever has the idea of either quality has a standard by which he can judge everything, pronouncing it to be good or not good, sour or not sour. One set of judgments is much more important than the other, but the logical position of both seems exactly the same.¹

Lecture IX. is entitled Freedom and Initiation. In it the author takes up a position which I should be inclined to call determinist, though he himself rejects the name, and prefers to call it determinateness, to distinguish it from that determinism which does not find the explanation of all action in a movement of our progress towards the whole. "The crucial point, then, which separates determinateness from determinism is the distinction between logic and fatality" (p. 340).

The discussion of the asserted indeterminateness of artistic production, and of the true significance of the greater difficulty of prediction in this sphere seems to me quite admirable, although hampered by the author's statement—apparently as a concession to M. Bergson that "prediction means doing a thing before it is done" (p. 331). If a physician predicts that a man will die next week, does he kill him now?

The discussion of the ethical question offers less room for novelty of treatment. Yet the following criticism seems to me as novel as it is brilliant. "What the ordinary advocate of freedom at bottom demands as 'the power to have acted otherwise,' is in the same breath to act and not to act, or, acting, yet not to act. It is to repudiate, not to accept responsibility, that is the qualification of the self by its behaviour. He is offered what he pretends to ask, that his act shall be his and himself; and he runs from his demand the moment he is confronted with its meaning" (p. 343).

¹ In this lecture (p. 308) Dr. Bosanquet remarks "Mr. McTaggart sustains the ultimate reality of separate persons against that of particular moments of time. But if these latter are unreal, the states of consciousness which fill them must be also in the same degree unreal." Not necessarily, I should reply, unreal in the same degree. What appears to us as an hour's ride, or an act of self-devotion, is not what it appears to be, since it appears as temporal. But the realities which appear to us thus—and also the fact of the appearance—are non-temporal realities which have value.

The last lecture is entitled "Nature, the Self, and the Absolute". It is, to a considerable extent, a summary of preceding results, and does not call for much separate criticism. Dr. Bosanquet repeats his objections to Pan-Psychism. We may certainly, I think, agree with him that Pan-Psychism has not been proved. There are attempts to prove it in Leibniz, in Lotze, and, as I believe, in Hegel. But none of them can be considered as a solid proof, in the form given to them by their authors, and whether such a proof is ever to be found or not, it cannot be said to have been found yet. But I cannot see that it has ever been disproved, nor can I agree with Dr. Bosanquet's objection (p. 363). "What becomes of the material incidents of life—of our food, our clothes, our country, our own bodies? Is it not obvious that our relation to these things is essential to finite being?" It does not seem at all obvious to me. Whether a self can exist out of relation to substances which are, or appear to be, material, I do not see that we can tell. We have no direct experience of such a state, and our existence *may* depend on such a relation to the material by a law which has not yet been discovered. But in what we *do* know about the universe I fail to see the smallest indication that a self could not exist without being in relation to what was really, or appeared to it to be, material. And as a self in this position could still experience knowledge and error, virtue and sin, love and hate, it need not find its existence either very empty or very uninteresting.

And here I must close a most inadequate comment on a most remarkable achievement. No book, I think, gives so good an account as this does of the brilliant and fascinating school which counts among its members Dr. Caird, Lord Haldane, and Dr. Mackenzie, but of which Dr. Bosanquet is perhaps the central and most typical member.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism; the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the years 1907-1910. JAMES WARD. Cambridge, University Press, 1911. Pp. xv, 490.

I do not propose here either to summarise or to subject to elaborate criticism this most worthy sequel to Dr Ward's well-known Aberdeen lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. It is superfluous to summarise the argument of a book which all who care seriously for philosophy in Great Britain may be expected to study closely, sentence by sentence, for themselves, and elaborate criticism is hardly possible to a reviewer who agrees so thoroughly with all the main positions contended for that his natural impulse is simply to thank God that we have such a philosopher as Dr. Ward among us. At best, I can only offer the reader an impressionist picture of