

IV

LEWIS, PERRY, AND WHAT MATTERS

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'We can agree with Parfit', Lewis writes, '... that what matters in questions of personal identity is mental continuity or connectedness... At the same time we can consistently agree with common sense... that what matters in questions of personal identity is identity' (p. 19).¹ Despite the great resourcefulness of Lewis's paper, I still believe that this cannot be done. I shall first explain why, then suggest what this might show, and end with some remarks about Perry's paper.

I

Though the case of Methuselah is more important, it will be easier to discuss the case of division. This case seems to involve three people: the original person, and two resulting people. If we decide that the resulting people are indeed, as they seem to be, two people, we cannot claim that each of them *is* the original person. But we may conclude that 'the relation of the original person to each of the resulting people... contains... all that matters... in any ordinary case of survival.'² If this is so—if this relation does contain all that matters, but is not identity—then what matters cannot be identity.

Lewis redescribes the case. He suggests that it involves two partially overlapping continuant persons who share their initial stages (p. 25).³ The shared stage before the division Lewis calls 'S'; the two later stages 'S₁' and 'S₂'. The 'two... continuant persons' are 'C₁', who consists of S and S₁, and 'C₂', who consists of S and S₂. Lewis also calls mental continuity and connectedness 'the R-relation'.

Suppose we are discussing this case *before* the division. Let us first ask, 'Is C_1 's present stage R-related to the future stage of C_2 ?'

It might be objected that, before the division, we should not refer to ' C_1 '. Lewis claims that, when we are discussing people before a certain time, we should count them by the relation of identity-up-to-that-time. If we count in this way, we shall not now distinguish C_1 and C_2 ; we shall instead say that there is only one person who is going to divide. But this 'one person... is really two non-identical persons' (p. 28). While it may be 'harmless' to talk of the two people *as* one when they 'are indiscernible in the respects we want to talk about', Lewis admits that even 'before the fission... predictions need disambiguating' (p. 29). And if we can guess, now, that it is C_1 and not C_2 who is 'the next winner of the State Lottery', we can surely ask, 'Is C_1 's present stage R-related to the future stage of C_2 ?'⁴

The answer must be, 'Yes'. C_1 's present stage is the stage S_1 ; C_2 's future stage is S_2 ; and, as Lewis writes, S_1 is R-related to S_2 (p. 25).

We can now question the thesis of Lewis's paper. Can it be true, as he claims, *both* that 'what matters to survival' is identity, *and* that what matters to survival is the R-relation? We have just seen that C_1 's present stage stands to C_2 's future stage in the R-relation. On the thesis, this relation is what matters. But if C_1 now stands in the relation that matters to *someone else* in the future, how can this relation be identity?

Lewis has an ingenious reply. The R-relation holds between stages, so of course it cannot *be* the relation of identity. But it may *correspond* to identity—it may be the relation between stages which corresponds to the fact that they are stages of the same person. If it were, the R-relation would in this way coincide with identity: all and only stages which are R-interrelated would be stages of the same person. This coincidence, Lewis thinks, would preserve the view that the R-relation and identity are *both* 'what matters to survival.'

Lewis puts this point in another way. The relation which corresponds to identity—'the relation that holds between the several stages of a single continuant person'—he calls 'the I-relation' (p. 21). He then claims that the R-relation *is* the I-relation.

Turning to the case of division, Lewis would say: ' C_1 's present stage is, as you point out, R-related to C_2 's future stage, S_2 , that is, is R-related to S_2 . But S_1 is also I-related to S_2 ; these are both stages

of the same person. So the R-relation and identity still coincide.'

Will this do? C_1 's present stage and the future stage S_2 are indeed stages of the same person; they are both stages of C_2 . But isn't this the *wrong* person?

According to one half of Lewis's thesis, the R-relation is what matters in survival. So if there are future stages R-related to *my* present stage, they stand to my present stage in the relation that matters in survival. *Whose* survival? Obviously, *mine*. (When Lewis writes, 'what matters is mental... continuity between *my* present mental state and other mental states', he must mean 'what matters in *my* survival...' [p. 18, *my italics*].) The first half of the thesis must, then, involve the following claim: if there are future stages R-related to any person's present stage, this is what matters in *this* person's survival.

This half of the thesis is what Lewis calls the 'interesting philosophical... answer' to the question of what matters. The other half is the 'unhelpful... common-sense answer'. This runs: 'what matters... is identity—identity between the I who exists now and the surviving I who will... exist then' (p. 18). Just as obviously, this involves the following claim: future stages stand to any person's present stage in the relation that matters in *this* person's survival if, and only if, they are future stages of *this* person.

Let us apply this to the case of division. S_2 is R-related to C_1 's present stage; so, by the first half of the thesis, S_2 stands to C_1 now in the relation that matters in C_1 's survival. To reconcile this with his second claim, that what matters is identity, Lewis need not show that S_2 and C_1 's present stage are themselves identical. But he must show that they are both stages of C_1 . It is not enough to show that they are both stages of *someone else*. This is not enough even if this someone else— C_2 —shares his present stage with C_1 . 'Sharing a present stage with' is of course a peculiarly close relation; but it is not identity—and to Lewis 'what matters... is literally *identity*: that relation that everything bears to itself and to no other thing.' (p. 20).

More briefly: By the first half of Lewis's thesis, S_2 stands to C_1 's present stage in the relation that matters in C_1 's survival. The second half of the thesis therefore requires that S_2 be a stage of C_1 . It is not. So the case of division seems a counter-example to the thesis.

Why does Lewis think otherwise? The crucial passage runs:

It is pointless to compare the formal character of identity itself with the formal character of the relation R that matters in survival. Of course the R-relation among stages is not the same as identity either among stages or among continuants. But identity among continuant persons induces a relation among stages: the relation that holds between the several stages of a single continuant person. Call this the *I-relation*. It is the I-relation, not identity itself, that we must compare with the R-relation. In wondering whether you will survive the battle, we said, you wonder whether the continuant person that includes your present stage is identical with any of the continuant persons that continue beyond the battle. In other words: whether it is identical with any of the continuant persons that include stages after the battle. In other words: you wonder whether any of the stages that will exist afterwards is I-related to—belongs to the same person as—your present stage (p. 21).

In this passage Lewis treats the question, 'Will a certain person have a certain future stage?', as equivalent to the question, 'Is that future stage I-related to this person's present stage?' Let us call this 'the First Equivalence'.

If we accept this Equivalence, the account of division collapses. Both the later stages are I-related to the first stage of both the continuant people, so on the Equivalence they are both stages of both people. Lewis, then, must reject this Equivalence. In effect, he later does so. It is only after the quoted passage that he introduces the possibility that people might share stages. If we wish to allow for this possibility, much of the quoted passage needs to be revised, as does the assumed Equivalence.⁵

We can now return to the thesis of Lewis's paper—to the claim that the relation which matters in survival is both the R-relation and identity. This claim obviously requires that these two relations coincide. (If the two relations could diverge, they could not each be 'what matters'; each could at most be 'part of what matters'.) But there are two ways in which they could coincide. It may be true

(1) that all and only stages which are R-interrelated are stages of the same person—are, that is, I-related, or it may be true

(2) that, for any stage of any person, all and only stages R-related to this stage are stages of this same person.

What I argued earlier was this. Lewis's thesis requires the truth of (2). The claim that the R-relation is what matters in survival

must involve the claim that what matters in *my* survival is that future stages be R-related to *my* present stage. Only if these future stages are stages of *me*, as (2) requires, can we also claim that it is identity which is what matters. Lewis's account of division does not satisfy requirement (2). S_2 is R-related to C_1 's first stage, but is not a stage of C_1 . So his thesis cannot be maintained.

Lewis thinks it can. He believes that his thesis only requires the truth of (1). ('It is the I-relation', he writes, 'not identity itself, that we must compare with the R-relation.') And his account of division satisfies requirement (1); on the account, as he remarks, 'the I-relation and the R-relation coincide' (p. 25).

We can now suggest why Lewis only sets himself requirement (1). In the passage where he does so (quoted above) he assumes the First Equivalence. He assumes, that is, that all and only stages I-related to any stage of any person are stages of this same person. Naturally, on this assumption, it will seem enough to require (1), for on this assumption (1) and (2) are the *same* requirement, in different words. To require (1) is to require that all and only stages R-related to any stage of any person are I-related to this stage; and all such stages are, on the First Equivalence, stages of this same person, as required by (2).

In sum: if we accept the First Equivalence, Lewis only needs to show, as he can, that his account of division satisfies requirement (1); but on the First Equivalence the account collapses. The account is coherent only if we reject this Equivalence; but if we do, Lewis needs to show that the account satisfies requirement (2), which he cannot do.⁶

Could a different account satisfy the requirement? The main feature of Lewis's account is the suggestion that what seemed, before the division, to be one person, 'is really two non-identical persons.' In the paper he discusses, I had made—but rejected—a similar suggestion. This ran: 'We might say, "What we have called 'the two resulting people' are not two people. They are one person"'.' Lewis's two people start with a single body and a single mind; my one person ends with two bodies and a divided mind.

Both suggestions make us count people in a strange way. But there is a difference. My rejected suggestion treats what appear to be two people as one, but at least these two people are not just like

any ordinary pair of different people. They seem to remember living the same past life, they have the same character, and so on. Lewis's suggestion treats what appears to be one person as two, and in contrast this one person is just like any ordinary single person. We are to claim that he is really two people, not because of what he is like now, but only because of what will happen later. (Here is a parallel. We might claim that East and West Germany are not two different nations, but one nation with two territories and two governments. This is like my suggestion. We might instead claim that East and West Germany were different nations even before 1945. This is like Lewis's suggestion.)

Apart from this difference, the two suggestions are analogous. So we should expect that if Lewis's account does not satisfy requirement (2), nor would mine. This is so—for S_1 and S_2 are on my (rejected) account stages of the same person without being R-related, which violates (2).

I had also sketched—and rejected—a third account. According to this, we claim that the two resulting people *are* the original person—not that each of them is this person, but that they together are this person. They compose the original person, just as the Pope's crown is composed of three crowns.⁸ If we adopted this account, we should have to decide whether stages of the component people are also stages of the composite person. If they are, then S_1 and S_2 are again stages of the same (composite) person without being R-related, which violates (2); if they are not, then S and S_1 are R-related, but are not stages of the same person, again violating (2).

Our accounts so far take division to involve: a single person, a duo, and a trio. We could doubtless conjure up a quartet. But it would be tedious to consider more accounts—it seems safe to assume that none could satisfy (2). If so, the case of division remains a counter-example to Lewis's thesis. However we describe the case, the R-relation and identity fail to coincide—so they cannot *each* be 'what matters in survival'.

II

What conclusion should we draw? The immediate conclusion is that 'the interesting philosophical thesis'—that what matters is the

R-relation—and ‘the platitude of common sense’—that what matters is identity—cannot both be right. We must choose between them.

Lewis has no doubt which we ought to choose. ‘If the two . . . disagreed’, he writes, ‘we would have to prefer the platitude of common sense. . . . Else it would be difficult to believe one’s own philosophy!’ (p. 18). I am equally sure that we both can and ought to prefer the philosophical thesis. But this requires a great deal of argument, none of which I can give here.

What I shall do is assume the argument, and sketch two of the further conclusions that we might draw. One of these is that common sense has a false view about the nature of personal identity. But it will be simpler to start with a more direct conclusion.

We have seen that identity and the R-relation cannot *each* be ‘what matters in survival’. Suppose we are convinced, by the argument assumed above, that what matters is the R-relation. Then, says Lewis, our conclusion would be this: ‘What matters in survival is not identity. At most what matters is a relation that coincides with identity to the extent that the problem cases do not actually arise’ (p. 19).

This seems to me misleading. Very few of the problem cases do arise. In almost every actual case, questions about personal identity have definite answers. But even in actual cases it is still not true that what matters *fully* coincides with identity. We have been considering one difference between identity and the R-relation—that, while identity is one-one, we can imagine cases where the R-relation takes a branching form. There is a more important difference. ‘Identity’, as Lewis writes, ‘. . . cannot be a matter of degree’ (p. 32),⁹ but the R-relation, even in actual cases, holds to different degrees.

Lewis understates this second difference. He suggests that it is only ‘in principle’ that ‘the R-relation admits . . . of degree’ (p. 24). The reason that he writes ‘in principle’ is that he is thinking only about ‘problem cases’—cases where, in his words, the R-relation holds ‘to a degree so slight that survival is questionable’ (p. 19). In actual lives the weakening of the R-relation very seldom goes so far. That is why Lewis invokes Methuselah. But it is still true that between the parts of actual lives the R-relation holds to different degrees.¹⁰

We must remember here that the R-relation has two components: continuity and connectedness. To distinguish these, we first need the notion of a 'direct' psychological relation. Such relations hold between: the memory of an experience and this experience, the intention to perform some later action and this action, and different expressions of some lasting character-trait. We can now define 'connectedness' as the holding, over time, of particular 'direct' relations, and 'continuity' as the holding of an overlapping chain of such relations. For 'continuity', each 'link' in the chain must have a certain strength—must include enough direct relations. With the help of this requirement, we can define 'continuity' so that it has no degrees: if there is a chain of the required strength, it holds, if there is not, it does not. 'Connectedness', in contrast, has degrees. Between the different parts of a person's life the various direct relations—of memory, character, intention, and the like—are (in strength and number) more and less.

We can now return to the R-relation. Since one of its components holds, in actual lives, to different degrees, so too does the R-relation. This is why it makes a difference if it is the R-relation, not identity, which is what matters. For this will mean that even in actual lives there is this discrepancy: identity is all-or-nothing, what matters has degrees.

This discrepancy has various implications. One of these is hinted at in a remark of Lewis's. 'If you wonder', he writes, 'whether it is in your self-interest to save for your old age, you wonder whether the stages of that tiresome old gaffer you will become are R-related to you-now to a significantly greater degree than are the other person-stages at this time or other times' (p. 21). To this particular question the answer is always 'Yes'. The R-relation between you now and yourself in old age is always significantly stronger than the R-relation between you now and other people—for, as things are, there is *no* R-relation in this latter case. But it is also true that the R-relation between you now and yourself in old age is significantly *weaker* than the R-relation between you now and yourself in the nearer future. This is the fact which bears upon the question of self-interest.

The bearing is oblique. This fact cannot support the claim that it is any *less* in your self-interest to save for your old age. The notion of self-interest requires that equal weight be granted to all the

parts of a person's life—that the interests of his distant future count for as much as those of his near future. Nor can we criticise this feature of the notion by appealing to the fact that the R-relation has degrees. The R-relation holds between a person *at one time* and himself *at another time*, but the notion of self-interest is only relative to a person, not to a person at a time. When we ask if it is in *my* self-interest to save for my old age, we can ignore the R-relatedness of my old age to me now, for we are not asking about the interests of *me now*.

Though the notion of self-interest cannot be challenged by an appeal to the weakening of the R-relation, its importance can be. Many accounts of what it is rational to do give a central place to what is in the agent's interest. If what matters in survival is the R-relation, these accounts need to be revised. Since the R-relation holds between person-stages, we need a substitute for the notion of self-interest which is relative not only to a person but also to a time. It would be barbarous to speak of the interests of *me now*. But just as we speak of what is best from my point of view as opposed to other people's, so we could speak of what is best from my present point of view as opposed to my point of view at other times. This notion can be developed in various ways, and there are various grounds for giving it a central place in accounts of rationality.¹¹ But the fact we are discussing here, the weakening of the R-relation, seems to have at least the following significance. Most of us care less about our own more distant future simply because it is more distant; we have a 'discount rate' with respect to time itself. Some of us, though, have a discount rate with respect to the weakening of the R-relation. We care less about our further future, not because it is further, but because we know that less of what we are now—less, say, of our present hopes or plans, loves or ideals—will survive into the further future. We may, because of this, act knowingly against our own long-term self-interest. To act in this way, on these grounds, would be widely thought irrational. We should be told, 'Your further future is as much a part of your future.'¹² We could now reply: 'True—but since what matters is the R-relation, not personal identity, this fact is irrelevant. Where what matters holds to a lesser degree, it cannot be irrational to care less. My further future is less strongly R-related to me now; so it cannot be irrational for me now to grant it less weight.'¹³

This reply rests on the claim that what matters has degrees. This claim has, I think, various other implications, both for morality, and for the justification of certain attitudes and emotions.¹⁴ If we are convinced by the argument assumed above, we may come to accept a second claim, which in turn seems to have further implications. We may decide that what matters is 'less deep'—or 'involves less'—than common sense believes. We may decide that common sense thinks there is more to personal identity than, in fact, there is. We are back to the conclusion mentioned earlier: that common sense has a false view about the nature of personal identity.

This conclusion seems to be supported by our reactions to the 'problem' cases. For example: suppose we are persuaded that Lewis's thesis cannot be maintained—that the R-relation and identity cannot each be what matters. Suppose we are then presented with the argument assumed above, the argument to show that what matters is the R-relation. We may now reject this argument. We may say: 'Of course what matters in survival is personal identity! Therefore what matters cannot be mental continuity or connectedness' (p. 19).

This reaction—that identity must be what matters—'cannot', Lewis thinks, 'credibly be denied' (p. 18). I think that it ought to be denied; but it is certainly 'compelling'. Return to the case of division—on the account which involves three people: the original person, and two resulting people. If the R-relation is what matters, the original person should not be troubled by the thought that he will be neither of the resulting people, for his relation to each of them is as good as survival. But when we imagine ourselves as about to divide, we may well say: 'This cannot be right. If there will be no one alive who will be me, this is what matters. How can *ceasing to exist* be as good as surviving?'¹⁵

Before I sketch what this reaction shows, I must define a certain phrase. Suppose that the truth of a certain statement just consists in the truth of certain other statements. If this is so, we might say that the fact reported by the first statement is not a 'further fact', apart from the facts reported by the other statements. It is not a further fact because it just involves these other facts.¹⁶

We might now claim, as a first approximation, that the truth of statements about personal identity just consists in the truth of cer-

tain statements about psychological and (perhaps) physical continuity. The fact of personal identity is not a further fact, apart from certain facts about these continuities.¹⁷

Most of us seem inclined, at some level, to reject this kind of view. This is what is shown by our reactions to the 'problem' cases. We are inclined to think that even when, in these cases, we know all the facts about psychological and physical continuity, there must still *be* an answer to the question about personal identity. If we do think this, we seem to be assuming that the fact of personal identity is a further fact.¹⁸

A similar reaction is the one mentioned earlier—that identity must be what matters. Suppose that I am the original person, and am about to divide. If we took the kind of view that I have just sketched, we might reason as follows. The relation between me and each resulting person is the R-relation with its normal cause, the persistence of a sufficient part of my brain. If this same relation held between me and only one resulting person, he would be me.¹⁹ So the fact that, in this case, no resulting person will be identical with me just consists in the fact that I stand in this same relation to *more* than one resulting person. If we viewed the case in this way, it would be quite mysterious if we also claimed that this non-identity would, here, matter. If we do insist on this, we seem to be assuming that identity would be a further fact—that, in the relation between me and each resulting person, *something is missing*.²⁰

III

I shall end with a few remarks about Perry's paper. These will be brief, for as he says our views are very similar.

We agree upon the main point: that 'the importance of identity is *derivative*' (p. 81)—that what matters in the continued existence of a person are various 'special relationships' (p. 84).

Our views about the criteria of identity are also very close. Perry's view is that a person at one time and a person at another time are the same person if they stand in the relation which normally causes psychological continuity (p. 71). My view was that they are the same person if they stand in the relation of psychological continuity, my account of which required a normal

cause.²¹ So we agree that there is personal identity when there is both psychological continuity and its normal cause.

There are two special cases. There might, first, be psychological continuity without its normal cause. We both assume that the normal cause is the continuity of the brain, and both discuss a case where psychological continuity is instead produced by the creation of a replica.²² Perry thinks that in this case the replica would not be the original person. I thought that, if we wished, we could say that he was. But the difference here is trivial, for we agree that, whichever we say, being replicated in this way is as good as surviving.²³

In the second special case, there is the normal cause—the continuity of the brain—without psychological continuity. Perry thinks that in this case there would be personal identity (p. 84), as (more guardedly) did I.²⁴ But there would not be, we agree, what matters.²⁵

NOTES

1. David Lewis, 'Survival and Identity', chap. I in this volume. (All my simple page numbers refer to this volume.)

2. 'Personal Identity' (hereafter cited as PI), *Philosophical Review*, lxxx (January 1971), 10.

3. A 'person-stage' is just a person during a period. (Lewis writes both, 'You are wondering' and 'Your present stage that is doing the wondering.' Since you and your present stage are not identical, this implies that the same mental act has two different 'subjects'. This suggestion may seem absurd. (Criticising Locke and Russell, Shoemaker wrote, 'I am confident that nobody would want to hold this' (*Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, Cornell, [Ithaca: University Press, 1963], p. 54). But there are respectable precedents. The very same act can be the act both of a country and of its present government. So it is not absurd to introduce a way of talking according to which every act is done both by a person and by his present stage—or by his 'present self'.)

4. A different objection might be that, before the division, we have no descriptions which differentiate C_1 and C_2 . But we could easily give the name ' C_1 ' to 'the person who, after the division, will regain consciousness first' (or 'in the left-hand bed'). Besides, the argument in the text could be recast in terms of the following question: 'Is the present stage of each of the two continuant people R-related to the future stage of the other?'

5. Take the remark, 'In wondering whether you will survive the battle... you wonder whether the continuant person that includes your present stage is [one of the] persons that continue beyond the battle.' As Lewis later says, if your present stage is shared with another person, 'there would not be any such thing... as *the* person' who includes your present stage (p. 23). Nor can we just substitute the indefinite article; it is not enough to ensure *your* survival that *a* person who includes your present stage should survive, for that person may not be you. Nor

can the question 'whether you will survive the battle' be equivalent to the question 'whether any of the stages that will exist afterwards is I-related to . . . your present stage', for as we saw it is essential to Lewis's account of division that S_2 , though I-related to C_1 's first stage, not be a stage of C_1 . (If the First Equivalence must go, what should take its place? Something is needed, for as Lewis writes, 'questions of identity among continuant persons . . . are also questions of I-relatedness among person-stages' (p. 21). The natural suggestion would be this: 'Is that stage a stage of this person'? cannot be equivalent to 'Is it I-related to this person's present stage?', but it could be equivalent to 'Is it I-related to *all* of this person's stages'? This may seem, as Lewis writes, 'unhelpful; but if the I-relation is the R-relation, we have something more interesting' (p. 22). That this is the right equivalence is suggested by the remark: 'something is a continuant person . . . if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is . . . R-related to all the rest' (p. 22). This new Equivalence does not undermine the account of division. Though S_2 is R-related and hence I-related to C_1 's first stage, it is not R-related, nor hence I-related, to C_1 's second stage—to S_1 . So, on the new Equivalence, S_2 is not a stage of C_1 .

6. One remark of Lewis's calls for further discussion. This is: '*More precisely: if common sense is right that what matters in survival is identity among continuant persons, then you have what matters in survival if and only if your present stage is I-related to future stages*' (p. 21-22). The 'future stages' referred to here must be intended to be stages of *you*. (If they were not, the remark would not express the view that 'what matters . . . is identity.' It would allow that you might 'have what matters in survival' even though there will be no one alive in the future who will be you.) But only on the First Equivalence must the 'future stages' to which 'your present stage is I-related' be stages of you. Without this Equivalence, they might be stages of someone else (someone who shares your present stage). We are back with the dilemma presented in the text.

7. PI, p. 5.

8. Ibid., pp. 7-8. (On this account, the existence of the resulting people dates from the division.)

9. I should rather say, 'has no degrees', for identity may be said to be a 'matter' of degree in the sense that 'what it involves' has degrees.

10. There is perhaps a second reason why Lewis understates this second fact. He writes: 'We sometimes say: in later life I will be a different person. For us short-lived creatures, such remarks are an extravagance. A philosophical study of personal identity can ignore them. For Methuselah, however, the fading out of personal identity looms large as a fact of life. It is incumbent on us to make it literally true that he will be a different person after one and a half centuries or so' (p. 30). But we must distinguish (1) 'He will be a different person' from (2) 'It will not be him any longer, but a different person.' Only in (2) does the phrase 'a different person' mean 'numerically different'. In (1) it means 'changed'; what (1) says is that he, numerically the same person, will be qualitatively a different person. Consequently claims like (1) are not, as Lewis calls them, 'an extravagance'. Nor are they irrelevant to a study of personal identity. For the claim, 'He's become a different person', may report the kind of weakening in the R-relation which, if it took a more extreme (imaginary) form, would support the claim, 'It's no longer him; it's a different person'. (But, to anticipate, I would agree with Perry [p. 86] that this requires a break in continuity, not just in connectedness.)

11. The central feature of this notion, that it is relative to a person *at a time*,

can be supported by an argument which makes no reference to the nature or importance of personal identity. This argument attempts to show that 'self-interested' theories of rationality occupy an untenable mid-way position between the theories which do and the theories which do not make reasons for acting relative to a point of view. (If we allow force to the question, 'Why should I grant weight to desires which aren't *mine*?', why not to the question, 'Why should I now grant weight to desires which aren't *mine now*?'? (Cf. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics* [London, 1907], p. 418. This is just the opening move in the argument; much more needs to be said.) The resulting notion of rationality, relativised to the agent at the time of acting, is of course central to decision theory and to much of economics, but is there defended on different grounds.

12. Cf. John Rawls: 'In the case of the individual, pure time preference is irrational: it means that he is not viewing all moments as equally parts of one life' (*A Theory of Justice* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971], p. 295). This criticism is directed at a discount rate with respect to time itself—Rawls may not intend it to apply to a discount rate with respect to the weakening of the R-relation, and only if it were so applied could we directly give the answer in the text. (Someone who discounted with respect to time might answer Rawls by appealing to the weakening of the R-relation over time—but this would be a rationalisation.) (In Thomas Nagel's *The Possibility of Altruism* [London: Oxford University Press, 1970]), it looks at first as if he intends to argue for the irrationality of imprudent actions with a similar appeal to the importance of personal identity—see, for example, the remark at the foot of page 42. However, Nagel does not defend a self-interested theory of rationality; on the contrary, prudence for him is justified in the same way as altruism. Both justifications rest on his denial that reasons are relative to a point of view. Nagel's argument for prudence therefore appeals, not to personal identity, but to the claim that all of a person's life is 'equally real'—that 'the present is just a time among others' (p. 88).

13. Perhaps, though, we should start to consider it morally questionable. Later selves would otherwise be disenfranchised. (Cf. Rawls, *op. cit.*, pp. 422–423, and Nagel, *op. cit.*, *passim*.)

14. Some of these I discuss, briefly, in 'Later Selves and Moral Principles', in *Philosophy and Personal Relations*, ed. Alan Montefiore (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973) (hereafter cited as LSMP)—and in 'On "The Importance of Self-Identity"', *Journal of Philosophy* (21 October 1971) (hereafter cited as OIS).

15. Compare the chapter 'Resurrection' in T. Penelhum's *Survival and Disembodied Existence* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).

16. There might be said to be one sense in which it is a 'further fact'—viz., that a report of this fact has a different meaning from a report of the other facts. In LSMP I contrasted these two senses by saying that the fact of personal identity was only 'in its logic', not 'in its nature', a further fact; but I have now been persuaded (by P. Benacerraf and C. Peacocke) that these phrases are unfortunate. (C. Peacocke and J. De Witt have also helped me throughout the writing of this paper.)

17. It is a view of this kind which I seem to share with both Perry and Lewis. Compare IOS, footnote 11 with Perry's claim, 'his being me consists in his stages having the P-relation to mine' (p. 84). Lewis's equation of questions about identity and about R-relatedness suggests a similar view. (This equation seems to go too far. Lewis says that if you wonder about identity you *are* wondering about

the R-relation; I should rather say, 'You ought, instead, to be . . .'. He continues: 'If you are entering the duplicator, and wonder whether you will leave by the left door, or the right door, or both, or neither, you are . . . wondering which future stages, if any, are R-related to you-now' [p. 21]. This cannot be right; for you already know [since the machine is a *duplicator*] that both of the resulting people are R-related to you-now.)

18. Quine writes: 'The method of science fiction has its uses in philosophy, but . . . I wonder whether the limits of the method are properly heeded. To seek what is "logically required" for sameness of person under unprecedented circumstances is to suggest that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs have invested them with' (*Journal of Philosophy* [7 September 1972], p. 490, reviewing Milton K. Munitz, ed., *Identity and Individuation*). True; but the science fiction cases may serve a different purpose. Our reactions to these cases may show that we have beliefs about the nature of personal identity which go beyond, and even conflict with, the 'logical force' of our words. Thus the reaction I have mentioned—that, in these cases, questions about personal identity must have answers—suggests that we take a non-reductionist, realist view about personal identity; (cf. Dummett, 'The Reality of the Past', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 69 [1968-69], 240-243). This reaction is particularly clearly expressed by R. Chisholm in his 'Reply to Strawson's Comments', in *Language, Belief, and Metaphysics*, ed. H. E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970), pp. 188-189. Reviewing the case of division, Chisholm writes: 'When I contemplate these questions, I see the following things clearly and distinctly to be true. . . the questions "Will I be Lefty?" and "Will I be Righty?" have entirely definite answers. The answers will be simply "Yes" or "No." . . . What I want to insist upon . . . is that this will be the case even if all our normal criteria for personal identity should break down.' In 'The Self and the Future' (*Philosophical Review*, lxxix [1970], reprinted in *Problems of the Self* [London: Cambridge University Press, 1973]), Williams shows how natural this reaction is; in 'Imagination and the Self' (reprinted in *Problems of the Self*) he diagnoses one of the illusions on which it rests.

19. Cf., PI, p. 5. It might be denied that in this case the resulting person would be me. One argument for this denial is suggested by Williams in 'Are Persons Bodies?', reprinted in *Problems of the Self*, p. 78. If we accept such an argument, the reasoning in the text should be re-applied. We should ask ourselves: granted that in this case there is no identity, is there still what matters? If we insist that there is not, on the ground that identity is what matters, we seem to be assuming that identity is a further fact—we seem to be rejecting the kind of view advanced in the text. According to such a view, the fact that there is not here identity (if it is a fact) just consists in the fact that there is not, here, continuity of the whole body. Why should this matter, if there is still psychological continuity (caused, moreover, in the normal way)?

20. We seem to believe, as I said, that there is *more* to personal identity than psychological and physical continuity. It is of course hard to imagine, or to suggest coherently, what this 'more' might be. But there are other areas (Free Will?) where common sense reveals, under pressure, beliefs which are either quite opaque or incoherent. (Here is a different reaction to the prospect of division. I might think that the relation between me and the two resulting people does not preserve what matters, not because, without identity, 'something is missing', but because multiplication brings *too much*. Multiplication, I may feel, threatens my integrity.) This reaction (suggested to me by Michael Woods) may not rest on any

false belief. But it only seems defensible if the reaction is that multiplication isn't *quite* as good as ordinary survival. (We might claim that being married twice can't be quite as good as being married only once; but it would be absurd to claim that it amounts to remaining single.)

21. The claim that (non-branching) psychological continuity is a sufficient condition of identity came in PI, p. 13. The requirement of a normal cause came in the definition of 'q-memory' (p. 15), which provided the model for the other components of continuity.

22. Cf. Perry, p. 83, and OIS, pp. 689-690.

23. Perry's two objections to speaking of identity here seem inconclusive. The first is that the psychological continuity has a cause which is 'too unlike' its normal cause (p. 83). But there seem to be grounds in such cases for allowing any reliable cause; (see, for instance, Williams, 'Are Persons Bodies?', p. 79, and Strawson's remarks in 'Causation and Perception', in *Freedom and Resentment* (London: Methuen, 1974). Perry gives a different objection when he discusses the case of 'brain-rejuvenation' (p. 85). Against saying that the resulting person would here be the original person, Perry writes: 'The more abstract relation we would thereby be choosing for our unity relation for persons does not have the empirical guarantee of transitivity that normal maturation does'. But the obvious version of this more abstract relation would be (roughly): any relation which is a reliable cause of psychological continuity—and this relation seems to be, like continuity itself, logically transitive. (We can easily specify that it provides the 'unity relation' for persons only when it takes a one-one form. [Though against this see again Williams, 'Are Persons Bodies?', p. 78.] If we accepted Williams's point, the remainder of n. 19 [above] would apply.)

24. PI, n. 17.

25. Even on the few points where Perry thinks that we disagree, we don't. Commenting, for instance, on my version of the case of Methuselah, Perry writes, 'Parfit takes this to show that there can be identity without survival' (p. 85). What I in fact took the case to show was that there could be continuity without connectedness (PI, p. 24). Perry next criticises my proposed 'way of thinking'. The proposal that I meant, as opposed to the one he takes me to mean, seems to me to avoid his criticisms. But in PI I hardly explained myself (in OIS I tried to make amends). Briefly: Perry thinks that on my proposal we should take the 'special relations'—i.e., a sufficient degree of connectedness—as 'our unity relation for persons' (p. 87). But the descriptive equivalent of the concept of a person was on my proposal the concept, not of a single self, but of a series of successive selves; and for this series the unity relation is—as it is for persons—psychological continuity. (This was implied in PI, p. 24 [last sentence], and asserted in OIS p. 687.) *Connectedness*, if sufficiently strong, provides the unity relation not for the whole series but for each successive self (PI, pp. 24-25). Perry also says that when we know 'the rules of predication' for successive selves, we can find out 'what kind of objects these are' (p. 88). But 'successive selves' were not intended to be thought of as a new *kind of object*, any more than (say) 'Medieval England' is a kind of object. That was one reason why the rules of predication were so loose—why the distinction between selves was 'left to the choice of the speaker' and 'allowed to vary from context to context' (PI, p. 25). (Cf. 'The point of these remarks is to assign to some event, like a change in character, particular importance. So the remarks can only be more or less defensible. They cannot be [literally] false', OIS, p. 686.) In LSMP I have sketched a case where this

way of talking seems better than our normal way; but—as I should have said—I did not intend ‘dropping talk about persons’. Finally, Perry says that in my view ‘various misconceptions’ are ‘rooted in our concept of personal identity’ (p. 86). The direct cause of the misconceptions I took to be, not the *concept*, but our beliefs about the *nature* of personal identity (PI, p. 3). These beliefs I did take to be partly caused by the concept (‘This use of language . . . can lead us astray’, PI, p. 11); but I added that, to undermine these beliefs, we should need to discuss their various other causes—such as ‘the projection of our emotions’ (PI, p. 4 and p. 7, n. 11). Much of this (and much else) seems to me excellently done in Perry’s paper.