

CAMBRIDGE PHILOSOPHERS VIII

**The eighth of a series of articles on Cambridge philosophers
some of which were originally given as lectures in Cambridge in 1991.**

C. D. Broad

THEO REDPATH*

I

A sharp contrast had recently been drawn by one of our Cambridge Professors between Bertrand Russell and Broad¹ in respect of their characters and their intellectual and moral careers. We have been told that Russell was several times in prison, married and divorced several times, had several mistresses, was frequently short of money, and very unstable in changing his philosophical views. As far as I know Broad was never in prison for anything. Again, so far from marrying several times, he tells us with some satisfaction in his Autobiography that there was 'never any risk' of his 'catching his foot in the man-trap of matrimony.' This was one of the reasons why, in contrast with Russell, he was never short of money. Other reasons were that his tastes were simple, and that like his West Country philosophical forerunner, John Locke, and evidently like his Director of Studies, McTaggart, he paid great attention to investment. He was determined to save and invest enough to make himself 'as soon as possible independent of the vicissitudes of employment'. For a start, instead of taking up residence at Trinity when, to his surprise, he was elected to a Prize Fellowship (at his

* Editorial Note. It is a matter of sadness to have to record that while this manuscript was being prepared for publication, Dr Redpath died. The version of Dr Redpath's lecture here presented omits a long section on Broad's *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*. This has been done with regret, but there simply was not space to include it. Dr Redpath's widow, Sarah, has kindly given permission for the article to be published in its present form. We would like to thank her and Dr Adrian Poole for their help in bringing 'C. D. Broad' to publication. The Cambridge Philosophers series will end in 1998 with an article by Ray Monk on Bertrand Russell.

¹ Charles Dunbar Broad (1887–1971) b. 30 Dec 1887 at Harlesden. Only son of Charles Stephen Broad and Emily Gomme. 1900 Enters Dulwich College; 1906 Entrance Scholar in Natural Sciences, Trinity College, Cambridge; 1908 Natural Sciences Tripos, Part I, Class I; 1910 Moral Sciences Tripos, Part II, Class I with Special Distinction; 1911 Assisting Professor G. F. Stout at St Andrews; Elected to Prize Fellowship at Trinity College Cambridge; 1914

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second attempt) in 1911 he decided to stay on at St Andrews (where he had gone to assist Professor G. F. Stout), and to save and invest his Fellowship Dividend. Tenure of Prize Fellowships at Trinity at that time was six years (now four), and Broad managed to accumulate a tidy pile of capital during that time. He was good at investment, and he tells us that it was one of his main sources of interest and satisfaction in life. As for his attitude to World War I, he has said that, though he never had any clear conviction that England's entry into that war was either necessary or desirable, he had no conscientious objection to the use of force in general or to war in particular. But he was saved from having to enlist by being taken on to join an important laboratory run by Professor Irvine, Professor of Chemistry at St Andrews, which was engaged on war work for the Ministry of Munitions.

As to Russell's instability in changing his philosophical views, Broad recognized this, e.g. in his epigram 'Si Russell savait, si Moore pouvait'; but Broad was himself at times liable to change his mind, and at other times unable to form any certain opinion.

As for sexual matters, Broad, the bachelor, does not appear to have had any mistresses, but he did value his friendships with presentable and civilized young men, who, reciprocally, seemed to enjoy his company.

Perception, Physics and Reality; 1914 Outbreak of World War I; 1915–1918 Works under Professor Irvine at St Andrews for Ministry of Munitions; Father dies; 1918–20 Lecturer at University College, Dundee (University of St Andrews); 1920 Professor of Philosophy, University of Bristol; Joins Society for Psychical Research; 1922 Turner Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge; 1923 *Scientific Thought*; Succeeds McTaggart as Lecturer in Moral Science at Trinity College, Cambridge; Elected to Staff Fellowship; 1924 McTaggart dies, Broad his sole Literary Executor; 1925 *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*; 1927 Edits McTaggart's *The Nature of Existence, Vol. II*; 1930 *Five Types of Ethical Theory*; 1933 Appointed Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Cambridge; *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I*; 1934 Inaugural Lecture: *Determinism, Indeterminism and Libertarianism*; 1938 *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. II, Parts I and II*; 1939 Outbreak of World War II. Death of Broad's Mother. Succeeds David Hinks as Junior Bursar, Trinity College; 1946 First of many yearly visits to Sweden; 1952 *Ethics and The History of Philosophy*; 1953 *Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research*; retires from Knightbridge Professorship. 1953–4 Visits Universities of Michigan and of California at Los Angeles. 1959 Schilpp Volume *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad*. 1959–60 Gives Perrott Lectures on Psychical Research. 1968 *Induction, Probability, and Causation*, ed. J. Hintikka. 1971 (11 March) Broad dies at age of 83. 1971 *Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy*, ed. by D. R. Cheney. 1975 *Lectures on Leibniz*, ed. C. Lewy. 1978 *Lectures on Kant*, ed. by C. Lewy. 1985 *Lectures on Ethics*, ed by C. Lewy.

II

Though Broad was thus in some ways a sharp contrast to Russell, he had clearly, from early days, a keen admiration for Russell's high philosophical ability and achievement, and method, and even for some of his central views both on philosophy and on life. It is worth bearing in mind that Russell was about 15 years older than Broad.

There is a remarkable passage in a review Broad wrote in *Mind*, towards the end of 1918² of Bertrand Russell's *Mysticism and Logic*:

I have harped in this review mainly on points of disagreement. This should not hide the fact that I am wholly in agreement with Mr Russell's general attitude towards life and philosophy, and with his philosophical method. I only refrain from praise because praise from me to him would be impertinent. Those who agree with me in thinking that the Free Man can extract from the evils of human life a subtle comedy as well as a sublime tragedy will derive exquisite entertainment from reading this book and noting its spirit, and then reflecting that the author was recently lectured publicly on elementary morality by a complacent spiritual descendant of the late Mr Nupkins.³

That passage seems to me remarkable in several ways: first, in the assertion that one whom Broad calls 'The Free Man' 'can extract from the evils of human life a subtle comedy as well as a sublime tragedy'. To have written such words just after the end of World War I seems to show Broad to have been a man of unusual balance and somewhat teasing complexity. The passage also shows the wholehearted agreement Broad at that time felt, not only with Russell's philosophical method, but also with 'his general attitude towards life and philosophy'. Indeed, without being formally a pacifist himself during World War I, Broad admired Russell for his courageous stand for his pacifistic ideals. He evidently also found Russell's untrammelled free-thinking attractive. The phrase 'The Free Man' clearly alludes to Russell's essay 'The Free Man's Worship', first published in *The Independent Review* in 1903⁴. And that in turn no doubt alludes to Spinoza's reflection: 'The last thing that the Free Man thinks about is death; and his wisdom is a meditation, not of death but of life.' (The contrast with Montaigne, and ultimately with Plato, is obvious.) Broad had a high admiration for the character of Spinoza, calling him 'a prophet without being a prig—and a saint without being a sponger'⁵.

² *Mind* (n.s.) Vol. XXVII (1918), pp. 484–492, at p. 491.

³ The self-righteous magistrate in *The Pickwick Papers*.

⁴ *The Independent Review*, v.I, Dec. 1903, pp. 415–424.

⁵ *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, London, 1939, pp. 49, 51

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1903, the date of ‘The Free Man’s Worship’, was also the year of publication of a much larger work of Russell’s, *The Principles of Mathematics*⁶. That book came out when Broad was 16, and still at school at Dulwich, where he was studying Mathematics and Physics under another Russell, F. W. Russell, who had been a Mathematical Scholar at Trinity, Cambridge, and later Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. When Bertrand Russell’s book came out in 1903, F. W. Russell bought it, but handed it over to Broad, having decided that it was more in Broad’s line than his (i.e., presumably, as mathematical philosophy rather than straight mathematics). Broad tells us that he tried to read it just before he went up to Cambridge in 1906, but had not understood much of it. Bertrand Russell was away at the time Broad entered Trinity, but he came back as a College Lecturer in 1910, ‘in Logic and the Principles of Mathematics’, and Broad saw a great of him and says that he owed much to him. In Broad’s first big book, *Perception, Physics and Reality* (1914), he acknowledges little debt to books, but much to Russell’s lectures and conversation; he adds, however, that he would have found Russell’s ‘little book on Philosophy’ (no doubt *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912)) useful if it had appeared when he had been writing.

It is hard to gauge how far Russell’s influence on Broad had extended beyond the matters treated in *Perceptions, Physics and Reality*, by the time that book was written; but as we may gather from the passage I quoted from Broad’s review of Russell’s *Mysticism and Logic*, it had by 1918 apparently become both general and deep.

In view of the vastness of scope of Broad’s philosophical work, I thought it might be a good idea to shape this essay largely round some of the relations between Broad’s philosophical views and Russell’s. First, then, I want to indicate some of the big matters in life on which Russell’s attitude seems to have been *fairly* constant, and to point out how far Broad seems to have shared it: I mean the matters of free will, immortality, and God. Later I hope to add something on the influence Russell’s views on sense-perception clearly had on Broad’s, how they both contrast with those held by Moore, and how both Russell and Broad fail to take account of the importance of the intense study of the *learning* of language, such as Wittgenstein insisted upon in *Philosophical Investigations*. In between, however, I will say something about Broad’s achievement in general and about some of the characteristics of his philosophical method.

⁶ *The Principles of Mathematics* (Cambridge University Press, 1903).

III

In Russell's account of *his* 'mental development' in the early pages of the Schilpp volume devoted to him⁷ he says that 'at fourteen or fifteen' he became 'passionately interested in religion, and set to work to examine successively the arguments for free will, immortality, and God'. He had an agnostic tutor at that time with whom he could talk about such matters, but the tutor was sent away, presumably, Russell imagined, because he was thought to be undermining Russell's faith. Russell says he thought about religion for three years, determined not to let his thought be influenced by his desires. He tells us:

I discarded first free will, then immortality; I believed in God until I was just eighteen when I found in Mill's *Autobiography* the sentence: 'My father taught me that the question "Who made me?" cannot be answered since it immediately suggests the further question "Who made God?".' In that moment I decided that the First-Cause argument is fallacious⁸

A somewhat rash dismissal perhaps?

Broad gave all these matters careful thought at various stages during his philosophical career. Free Will he discussed notably in his Inaugural Lecture in 1934 after his Election to the Knightbridge Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge⁹. Immortality, or, as Broad preferred to call it 'Human Survival of Bodily Death', most fully in Section D of *The Mind and its Place in Nature*¹⁰, but also in many contributions to psychical research¹¹. As for the existence of God, Broad's most thorough treatment is perhaps in the two articles he contributed in 1939 to *The Journal of Theological Studies*¹², 'Arguments for the Existence of God'. Broad's reflection on these matters was probably as strenuous as Russell's had been.

⁷ *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, (ed. by P. A. Schilpp) (New York, 1944, 1951), pp. 1–20.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

⁹ *Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism* (Cambridge University Press, 1934), pp. 48. (Reprinted in *Ethics and the History of Philosophy*, London, 1952.)

¹⁰ London, 1952, pp. 487–551.

¹¹ See *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, *passim*, and the section on Psychical Research in Broad, *Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research*, London, 1953. See also *inter alia*, his lecture *Human Personality and the Possibility of its Survival*. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955).

¹² Reprinted in *Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research* (London, 1953), pp. 175–201.

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It seems, however, to have been well before he met Russell that Broad himself had lapsed from Christianity. He had been brought up as a Christian both at home and at school, more disturbed by the fear of Hell, he tells us, than cheered by the hope of Heaven. His father did, however, tell him 'fairly early' that the story of the creation in Genesis was not to be taken literally, and, somewhat later, that the reliability of the Gospels on detail had not survived scholarly criticism. But the collapse of Broad's faith in Christianity came about when he was 15 or 16, studying natural science. He read avidly cheap reprints, issued by The Rationalist Press Association, of works by T. H. Huxley, Haeckel, and other agnostic scientists, and by sceptical scholars including Renan and Leslie Stephen. Reading H. G. Wells and Bernard Shaw moved him in the same direction. His lapse was apparently painless, and he was sensible enough not to try to disturb the faith of vulnerable members of his family. Interestingly, he used to have long arguments at Dulwich with a highly intelligent boy who was moving towards Roman Catholicism, and ultimately became a Catholic priest and a master at Downside, where he was known as Father Anselm. Broad was to write much later (in 1954): 'If *per impossibile* I were to become a Christian, I think I should become a Roman Catholic.¹³ However, the only great religion which made any serious appeal to him was Buddhism.

On Free Will Broad's conclusion, after a lengthy argument of fine texture, was that volitions can only be caused in the course of occurrent¹⁴ causation, but that both determinism and indeterminism are *prima facie* possible. What is *not* possible, according to him, is Libertarianism. And Libertarianism he carefully defines as the conjunct of two propositions: (1) Some (and it may be all) voluntary actions have a causal ancestor which contains as a cause-factor the putting-forth of an effort which is not completely determined in direction and intensity by occurrent causation, and (2) In such cases the direction and intensity of the effort are completely determined by non-occurrent causation, in which the self or agent, taken as a substance or continuant, is the non-occurrent total cause. Libertarianism clearly entails Indeterminism, but Indeterminism does not entail Libertarianism. This is all *metaphysics*, of course, but Broad (I think rightly) believed that it may have important implications for Ethics.

In his Lectures on Ethics (version of 1952–3) as edited by Dr

¹³ In Broad's Autobiography in the Schilpp volume on Broad, at p. 44.

¹⁴ For the terms 'occurrent' and 'continuant' invented by W. E. Johnson, see his *Logic* (Cambridge, 1921–24), especially Vol. 1, pp. 199–201 and Vol. III, p. xxi and Chapters VI and VII *passim*.

Lewy, indeed, Broad carefully considers the consequences of Determinism and of Indeterminism for moral responsibility. He differentiates men from machines, in that men have motives and intentions. The question, however, arises whether intentions and intentional acts are completely determined by occurrent causation. If so, they are eventually determined by the innate character and dispositions with which a person started at the moment of conception, and only by the external situation, with its agents and processes at that moment. The individual concerned is not morally responsible for any of that, and so cannot be responsible for any of his intentional acts, or for their effects on his character. Broad deems that argument valid, and all the premises as obviously true, except *one*: that human minds start to exist at the moment of conception. That premise is questionable, he thought, but if it were dropped, then the individual mind would have to be regarded as having always existed.

Finally, Broad considers whether moral responsibility is compatible with *Indeterminism*, and he concludes that it is not. Only Libertarianism would support it, and Libertarianism, as he showed in his Inaugural Lecture, was a nonsensical doctrine.

In holding moral responsibility not compatible with *Indeterminism*. Broad seems by 1952–53 to have shifted his position somewhat from a more tentative view expressed in 1934 in his inaugural lecture.

As to 'Human Survival of Bodily Death', Broad's view was that people have believed in survival for five reasons: (1) Because they thought it self-evident or divinely revealed; (2) Because they accepted it on authority; (3) Because they thought it could be proved by general metaphysical arguments; (4) Because they thought it followed from ethical premises; (5) Because there is special empirical evidence in favour of it. Broad was not impressed by (1): self-evidence or divine revelation. As to (2), authority, Broad admits that Plato and St Thomas Aquinas were greater philosophers than he; but he could follow their arguments and they did not seem valid, and the premises seemed doubtful. Moreover, there was no consensus among expert philosophers. Kant thought the arguments logically faulty, and Spinoza rejected the premises. As to belief on the authority of a religious teacher, one would need to be reasonably satisfied (a) that the teacher was either divine or divinely inspired, (b) that he had been properly reported, (c) that the divine being knows the truth about this particular matter, (d) that the divine being is not deceiving us, or just falling in with current beliefs, or speaking metaphorically, (e) if the authority is not divine, but only divinely inspired, we need to be sure that he has not deliberately or unwittingly falsified the message. Broad says he knows of no his-

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torical case in which there is any strong reason to believe that all these conditions have been fulfilled.

And, having sounded that note, with a supporting passage from Hobbes, Broad passes to (3) General metaphysical arguments for survival. These were now out of fashion, and, in Broad's view, Kant had refuted the old arguments. The only important modern philosopher, to Broad's knowledge, who claimed to prove the immortality of the soul by general metaphysical arguments was McTaggart. Such arguments have an *a priori* and an empirical part. Broad says that all such arguments he was acquainted with seemed extremely doubtful in either or both parts: and he dismisses such arguments with the somewhat tetchy reflection:

And they are so much bound up with elaborate metaphysical systems, and have persuaded so few men besides their authors, that I propose to ignore them here.

That leaves (4) Ethical Arguments and (5) Special Empirical Arguments; and Broad devotes lengthy chapters to each. Before doing so, however, he issues a final signal that his own view is that, if human survival can be even rendered probable, this can only be done by empirical arguments based on the phenomena which are treated by Psychical Research.

Broad does not dismiss *ethical* arguments for survival out of hand, but he cannot see that the question of mortality or immortality makes any appreciable difference to the duties of people here and now.

He discusses the position of A. E. Taylor, whose ethical arguments for survival he thought as good as any¹⁵. A. E. Taylor (an Anglo-Catholic) had contended that the reasonable course of life for a Christian, believing in survival, must be radically different from that of someone believing in his mortality, who, according to Taylor, would reasonably follow a life dedicated to earthly pleasures and lusts. Taylor terms such a life 'Horatian', which seems hardly fair to Horace. Broad, in any case, held out higher prospects for a moralist. He agrees with Taylor that the highest human values 'are roughly the discovery and knowledge of truth, the attainment and exercise of virtue, and the creation and fruition of beauty'; together with the relation of love between persons. But he holds that these values stand whether human beings survive bodily death or not. Here it is worth having a peep at Broad's nimble ingenuity in action. To prove his case Taylor needed, according to Broad, to indicate some act fulfilling the following conditions: (a) that the man con-

¹⁵ A. E. Taylor, 'The Moral Argument for Immortality', *The Holborn Review*, 1920, pp. 213-234.

cerned recognizes that it is his duty to do it; (b) that it would not be his duty to do it if he were not immortal; (c) that he can *know* that it is duty to do it without having to know beforehand whether he is immortal or not, in spite of the fact that it can *only* be his duty to do it if he is in fact immortal. Broad doubted whether any action could fulfil conditions (a) and (b); and even if such an action could be indicated, he thought it most unlikely that it would also fulfil (c).

Broad argues closely in similar fashion against a few more of Taylor's arguments, and rejects them all.

That leaves (5) the Special Empirical Arguments for Survival. Broad was impressed strongly by the dependence of mental events on events in the body, and especially by the impairment of mental processes by bodily injury. So much so that he did not think that there is anything in *normal* phenomena which requires us to suppose that a mind depends for its existence and functioning on anything but the body and its processes. However, well-investigated abnormal phenomena such as occur in sittings with a medium described in reports of the Society for Psychical Research inclined Broad to believe in compound substances each consisting of a bodily factor and a psychic factor, which probably persists in certain cases for some period after the death of the body of the individual concerned and might unite with a medium's organism on occasion, to form what Broad calls 'a little temporary mind (a "mindkin")'. His Special Empirical arguments do, however, seem to leave the whole matter very inconclusive.

As to the existence of God, in typical style Broad classifies the arguments¹⁶. Setting aside those bound up with some particular philosophical system, e.g. Berkeley's argument that God must exist order to cause the bundles and sequences of sensations which plain men mistakenly believe to be manifestations of material things, he divides more general arguments into three classes: (1) Those whose premises include neither specifically ethical nor specifically religious propositions; (2) those whose premises include specifically ethical but not specifically religious propositions; (3) those whose premises include specifically religious propositions. Class (1) includes St Anselm's *Ontological Argument*, which Broad analyses carefully, and dismisses as sophistical. Russell, in contrast, tells us of a typically impulsive episode from his own undergraduate days at Cambridge.

I remember the precise moment one day in 1894, as I was walking along Trinity Lane, when I saw in a flash (or thought I saw)

¹⁶ *The Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. 40, Jan. 1939, pp. 16–30; Apr. 1939, pp. 156–67 (reprinted in Broad, *Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research* (London, 1953), pp. 175–201.

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that the ontological argument is valid. I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco; on my way back, I suddenly threw it up in the air, and exclaimed as I caught it: 'Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound.'¹⁷

Russell was in good company in thinking so. Those who thought the argument valid included outstanding philosophers, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. But Russell later rejected *all* arguments for an *omnipotent* deity.

Broad's view of the Cosmological Argument is also negative, despite its having seemed valid to a goodly array of great philosophers, including Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Locke. Broad holds that the backward chain of causation never arrives at a First Cause, and he sees no reason to believe in a substance outside nature upon which all natural events and substances depend for their existence.

As for the Argument from Design, Broad considered that Hume and Kant had satisfactorily disposed of it, and he had nothing to add to their criticisms.

Broad considers as an argument containing a specifically ethical premise: 'Unless God existed it would not be our duty to address private prayers to him. It is our duty to address private prayers to him. Therefore God must exist.' This argument Broad believes to be circular, on the ground that it could not possibly be maintained that I could know that it is my duty to address private prayers to God unless I already know that God exists.

All that is left is argument from religious experience. Broad states plainly that he cannot claim to have mystical experiences himself, but he does not deny that other people may have had them, and he even considers, fair-mindedly, that they should be accepted as veridical unless there are positive grounds for believing them delusive. And Broad recognizes no general grounds for believing them delusive. One just needs to be cautious about cases where claims of revelation are made.

IV

I want now to leave Broad's views on those three great metaphysical and religious matters, and turn to say something of his achievement in general and of some of the features of his philosophical method.

¹⁷ *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (ed. P. A. Schilpp), (New York, 1944, 1951), p. 10.

Anyone who reads through the Bibliography of Broad's writings up to the end of July 1959, compiled by Dr Casimir Lewy, which appears at the end of the Schilpp volume, *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad*, can hardly fail to be impressed by the massiveness and variety of Broad's philosophical achievement.

Starting in 1906 with Broad's article in *The Westminster Review* on the philosophy of Omar Khayyam and its relation to the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Lewy's Bibliography ends with a review of the first edition of Norman Malcolm's memoir of Ludwig Wittgenstein published in 1958.

Broad made major contributions to the study of philosophical method, to metaphysics, ethics, psychology, logic, philosophy of science, the philosophy of psychical research, the history of modern philosophy, and also to biography (including his own fascinating *Autobiography* contributed to the Schilpp volume).

There are his big books, *Perception, Physics, and Reality* (1914) (which he later, puckishly accused of precipitating World War I); *Scientific Thought* (1923); *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* (1925); *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (1930); and his monumental *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (Vol. I, 1933; Vol. II, Parts I and II, 1938) in which he paid tribute to his old Director of Studies and his ingenious philosophical system by giving what is generally considered to be a lucid and fair exposition of it, and then submitting it to rigorous criticism, with some further thoughts of his own on the topics discussed.

Besides those big books, there are many reviews, lectures, and essays on a wide variety of subjects. Broad also joined with other philosophers in symposia mainly recorded in the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society. Some of the lectures he gave in the Faculty of Moral Science (now the Faculty of Philosophy) have been valuably edited by Casimir Lewy since Broad's death in 1971. So we have three volumes of such lectures in their latest versions: on Leibniz (1949–50 version)¹⁸; on Kant (1951–52 version)¹⁹ on Ethics (1952–53 version)²⁰.

Broad always wrote his lectures out in full, and well before the intended date of delivery. He was temperamentally averse to being hurried or disconcerted, and, in contrast to Moore and also to Wittgenstein, he did not care to be involved in the rough and tumble of public discussion. I cannot remember there ever being any open discussion after any of the lectures I attended in the 1930s; but I remember finding the lectures intensely interesting for their mat-

¹⁸ *Leibniz: An Introduction* (ed. C. Lewy), (Cambridge, 1975).

¹⁹ *Kant: An Introduction* (ed. C. Lewy), (Cambridge, 1978).

²⁰ *Ethics* (ed. C. Lewy), (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 1975).

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ter, their clarity, their mental agility, their fair-mindedness, and their touches of wit. They were welcomingly easy to follow, since Broad said virtually every sentence twice, and some sentences even three times. Note-taking was no problem! I can also remember with pleasure the lilt of Broad's voice, and the steady, unflinching progress which characterized his delivery. Broad certainly had a sense of literary style. He habitually read English novels and poetry, as well as philosophical and historical works. In Latin he had a high regard for Virgil, from whom he often quoted. Among English poets he admired Milton and Pope, and also Hardy. And among novelists he liked Dickens and Hardy, Arnold Bennett and Wells. Although he had Huguenot ancestry on his father's side of the family I cannot remember his ever quoting French poetry, though he seemed well-versed in French philosophy. Curiously enough, he never made an extensive visit to France at all. Yet he had a somewhat French streak of scepticism in his character, which helped to make him an acute critic, and also a despiser of fanaticism and what he often referred to as 'hot air'.

This may be a convenient moment to mention Broad's political views. His parents were Liberals, and he was brought up, as he tells us, in the tradition of political Liberalism. He became very sceptical, however, about parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, he was acutely aware of the dangers of uncontrolled free enterprise, the wastage of resources, the damage to the environment, and the harmful exploitation of people. He was concerned with the problem of achieving a balance between political freedom and political organization. He was never a Socialist, and still less a Communist; he thought a Liberal vote in contemporary England was a wasted vote, and settled down as a regular Conservative voter, mainly to keep out the Labour party. The longest review or essay that Broad had published before 1914 was an essay in *The International Journal of Ethics* on Lord Hugh Cecil's *Conservatism*²¹. This was a powerfully reasoned piece of work; strongly critical of some of Cecil's views and arguments, though showing a lively interest in them, and written typically in the clear, civilized style, with an occasional deft sally of caustic or whimsical wit, characteristic of Broad's written work, as well as of his talk. He utterly despised demagoguery. His attitude to Marxism and Leninism was steadily hostile, and it was, indeed, a sinister joke to suggest that Broad was the Fifth Man, as was done recently in an article in *The Sunday Express* (20 May 1990). It would be worth knowing exactly how such an idea was mooted.

²¹ *The International Journal of Ethics*, vol. 23, July 1913, pp. 396–418.

V

Broad regarded Philosophy as of two kinds: (1) Critical, (2) Speculative. (1) Critical Philosophy had two main tasks: (a) 'to take the concepts that we daily use in common life and science, to analyse them, and thus determine their precise meanings and their mutual relations'; (b) 'to examine the uncriticized beliefs, which we constantly assume to in ordinary life and the sciences', and to submit them to rigorous criticism. As to (2) Speculative Philosophy, Broad took this to consist in taking over the results of the various sciences, adding to them the results of religious and ethical experiences, and then reflecting on the whole. The aim was 'to reach some general conclusions about the Universe, and our position and prospects in it'. Broad stressed that Speculative Philosophy must be firmly based on Critical Philosophy, and he even thought that the time for Speculative Philosophy might not yet have come.

Broad was not himself inclined to construct grand speculative systems; but he studied a number of them closely, e.g. those of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Bradley, and most thoroughly of all that of his former Director of Studies, McTaggart, whose fantastic creation he not only examined in great detail, but on which he even undertook some pieces of repair work. His final judgment on all those speculative systems was that they were all flawed. For virtuosity he placed McTaggart far above any other metaphysician whose work we knew. McTaggart was scarcely ever obscure, and for sustained and ingenious argument his only rival, Broad thought, was Leibniz. Bradley and Hegel were often evasive, and so was Kant, whom Broad thought a much greater thinker than either; but Leibniz and McTaggart never glossed over their difficulties. Broad considered that philosophers who tried to construct deductive systems needed more than most men the consolation that the shipowner offered to the insurer, that 'to travel hopefully is better than to arrive!' Yet he valued highly attempts to take a synoptic view of what is known or conjectured about the universe, and the results obtained by such men as Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel he rated as 'among the greatest intellectual achievements of the human mind'²².

Broad kept his own work almost entirely within the bounds of Critical Philosophy²³. There was more than enough to be done there.

²² Broad *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1933–38, Vol. II, Part III, p. 788.

²³ The only possible exception would be in Ethics. In that field Broad does offer something in the nature of a system in his *Lectures on Ethics*, (ed. Casimir Lewy).

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He clearly realized that the tasks of Critical Philosophy abounded in difficulties, but he obviously enjoyed enormously trying to sort them out. This, together with a streak of mischievousness, led him at times to exaggerate the *interest* of Critical Philosophy while depreciating its *practical application*, and even devaluating the comparative worth of what practical application it might have. In the case of Ethics, for instance, in a passage at the end of *Five Types of Ethical Theory*²⁴, Broad wrote that the interests of Ethics is almost wholly theoretical, like the interest of the mathematical theory of golf or of billiards. He conceded only a 'slight practical application' to ethical theory. Salvation did not lie in dialectic; but *that*, Broad wrote, was no objection to dialectic; salvation was not everything, and 'to try to understand in outline what one solves *ambulando* in detail is quite good fun for those people who like that sort of thing'. It was that passage which had exasperated Professor Hare of Oxford when he first read it as a young man hoping for more from moral philosophy in confronting hard moral questions²⁵.

As we have seen, however, Broad had a sense of moral values. He registered his general view of what experiences are among the most worthwhile in human life. His moral approval and disapproval of individuals and of kinds of behaviour come out in many passages in his work. We have encountered the high positive moral value-charge in his estimate of the character of Spinoza, and there are instances of warm moral admiration in his biographies of such diverse figures as Henry Sidgwick, McTaggart, and W. E. Johnson. On the negative tack he expressed his disapproval, for instance, of fanaticism, and of some features in his own character. He seems, however, to have had a high degree of reserve about interfering with individual judgment in moral matters, and was chary of laying down general moral rules. In so far as he was concerned to influence moral practice, he regarded it as more his function to clarify people's ideas on moral matters, so that *they* could make moral decisions in awareness of actual circumstances and of the probability of particular consequences. But he was chiefly concerned to promote clarity concerning moral concepts and beliefs for its own sake. His concentrated work on Moral Psychology is also concerned with clarifying concepts, and it shows acute insight into human minds, their processes, experiences, motives, intentions and conflicts²⁶. As to clarifying ethical concepts themselves, Broad seemed fairly confident on some

²⁴ Op. cit. p. 285.

²⁵ See R. M. Hare, 'Broad's Approach to Moral Philosophy', in the Schilpp volume on Broad, pp. 563–577.

²⁶ *Lectures on Ethics* (ed. C. Lewy) (Dordrecht, 1985), pp. 8–123.

controversial cases, e.g. the narrower forms of Psychological Egoism, and therefore Psychological Hedonism, were both untenable; whereas on other topics he was evidently uncertain and often changed his views. Although, rightly I think, he considered Ethics an especially suitable area of study for Part I of the *Tripod*, he also rightly found it to bristle with difficulties. Professor Frankena, in his article 'Broad's analysis of Ethical Terms' in the Schilpp volume for Broad²⁷, surveyed what he called Broad's '*meta*-ethical views' from 1934 until 1952, and confessed to great puzzlement as to what those views were. They seemed to keep changing. Frankena therefore put four questions to Broad, which Broad re-formulated before answering them. As a preliminary he introduces the phrase 'moral sentence in the indicative', to denote 'a sentence in the indicative mood, in which the grammatical subject is a name or a description of a person, an action, an experience, or a disposition (or of a class of such), and the grammatical predicate is some word like 'ought' or 'ought not', 'right' or 'wrong', 'good' or 'evil', used in its *specifically moral* sense'. He then interprets Frankena's questions to be:

Have I [Broad] any decided opinion, and, if so, why do I hold it, on the following interconnected questions:

- (1) Do moral sentences in the indicative express *judgments* or not?
- (2) If *not*, what does the utterance of such a sentence express?
- (3) If *so*, do words such as 'ought' and 'ought not', etc, when used in their specifically moral sense, stand for predicates of a *certain peculiar kind*, which has been described as 'non-natural'?
- (4) If such words stand for predicates which are '*natural*', what account should be given of the 'natural' characteristics for which typical words of this kind stand?

Broad's short answer is that he has no decided opinion on any of those points, and he adds that he could say the same about almost any philosophical question. And then he offers a general reflection on philosophical questions, and a valuable glimpse of his own philosophical method and his practice about arriving at decisions:

The reasons which incline one to or against a certain opinion on any one philosophical question are always highly complex, and they are always bound up with the reasons which incline one to or against certain opinions on many other philosophical questions. Here, as elsewhere in philosophy, I have tried to clear up the questions and to indicate logical connections between certain

²⁷ *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad*, ed. P. A. Schilpp, New York, 1959, pp. 537–61.

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answers to some of them and certain answers to others. These are necessary preliminaries to an attempt to come to a reasoned decision about them. But it does not follow that it is sufficient to enable a person to do this. So far as I am concerned, I find myself now inclined to favour one kind of alternative and now another, but never to come down decisively in favour of any. At most I feel fairly confident that some proposed answers to some of the questions are *inadequate* by themselves.²⁸

VI

Within the scope of Critical Philosophy the convincingness of Broad's analytical work varied. I want now to say something about his work on a topic on which he seems far from persuasive: sense-perception.²⁹ I could have ended my remarks on Broad's analytical work on a more positive note, by adding a tribute to Broad's admirable treatment of various topics in Ethics, e.g. his refutation of the narrower forms of psychological egoism and psychological hedonism³⁰, or I might have referred to his work on other subjects from his wide field, such as induction and probability, to whose high quality and originality expert opinion has testified³¹. But it seemed more consonant to say something on a matter, exemplifying once more the enormous effect that the brilliance of Russell's work had upon Broad's thought, whether for good or ill.

Broad's discussion of sense-perception in *Scientific Thought* and in *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* is one of the parts of his philosophy which was long rated very highly. It is ingenious and closely argued, but ultimately it does not carry conviction. Once again it derives most immediately from the influence of Russell, and it is also connected with Broad's strong reaction against attempts to solve the philosophical problems of sense-perception by studying 'the usages, implications, suggestions and *nuances* of the ordinary

²⁸ *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad* (ed. by P. A. Schilpp), p. 813.

²⁹ For my discussion of Broad's views on sense-perception I have derived enormous help from many relevant articles by G. E. Moore and Professor John Wisdom, and from Martin Lean's Woodbridge Prize Essay, *Sense-Perception and Matter* (1953); and also, of course, from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

³⁰ See e.g. C. D. Broad, *Ethics* (ed. by C. Lewy) (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, 1985), pp. 86–96, and *Broad's Five Types of Ethical Theory*, (London, 1930), passim, and especially Chapter II on Joseph Butler, pp. 53–83.

³¹ See e.g. Professor G. H. von Wright's essay 'Broad on Induction and Probability' in the Schilpp Volume on Broad, pp. 313–352.

speech of contemporary Englishmen.³² Broad contemptuously dismissed the idea that such attempts could be valuable as ‘one of the strangest delusions which has ever flourished in academic circles’. Broad was here attacking what he considered the baneful influence of Moore’s essay ‘A Defence of Common Sense’³³ which had, Broad thought, encouraged such ‘delusions’. Broad mistakenly undervalued such a degree of respect for ordinary language. He shared the view which I heard Russell express in Cambridge in the winter of 1947–48 that ‘one can never do philosophy if one insists on regulating it by ordinary language’; and Broad never realized the relevance and value of the intense study of the *learning* of language, such as Wittgenstein insisted upon in *Philosophical Investigations*.

Russell seems to have coined the term *sense-data* in 1912 in his stimulating little book *The Problems of Philosophy*³⁴. He suggested it as the name for ‘things immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardness, roughness, and so on’. These entities had been given various names over the centuries since ancient times. Broad chose to call them *sensa*. Russell and Broad both held that these entities are never identical with any part of any physical object, or even with any part of its surface.

To focus discussion, let us confine it to visual sensations, and consider the frequently vented case of seeing a round flat coin, a *penny*. Russell and Broad both held that, in a *loose* sense of the words, it can be quite true to say ‘I see the penny’; but that in the really *strict* sense what I see is a *sense-datum* (or *sensum*), which has some relation to the physical object which I ‘see’ in the *loose* sense—if, indeed, such objects exist, for both Russell and Broad allow the possibility that physical objects do not exist. Moore held, on the contrary, that it is quite certain that physical objects exist, and that it is perfectly correct (and not simply loose) usage of language, and often true, to say: ‘I see the penny’ (meaning the physical object). On the other hand, in that famous essay, Moore was hesitant as to what the relation is between a sense-datum of the penny and the physical object. He believed that there are only three possibilities: (1) that the sense-datum is part of the surface of the physical object; (2) that the sense-datum, which alone we directly ‘see’, ‘represents’ the physical object in some way; (3) that the physical object is a

³² In Broad’s article ‘Philosophy and Common Sense’ published in *Inquiry*, Vol. I, no. 2, 1959, as reprinted in *G. E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect*, (ed. by Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz), (London and New York, 1970), pp. 193–203, at p. 203.

³³ In *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 2nd Series (ed. by J. H. Muirhead) (London and New York, 1925), pp. 193–223.

³⁴ *The Problems of Philosophy* (London, 1912), p. 17.

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hypothetical construction out of sense-data related to this sense-datum in a certain way or ways. (Answer (3) was favoured by Russell.)

Strangely, in view of Moore's certainty about the existence of physical objects in the sense ordinarily understood, he thought any one of the three views might possibly be true³⁵; though it seems quite clear that (2) and (3) both leave open the possibility that none of the entities ordinarily understood by the term 'physical object' may exist. For Russell and Broad, of course, that sceptical possibility was fully on the cards. Yet for Moore it almost certainly ought not to have been; and it would have been more satisfactory if he had followed the course he would have liked best, and held the sense-datum to be identical with the observed surface of the penny.

Broad, however, is my topic, and the view I have just expressed about Moore's opinions will need to emerge from what I have to say about Broad's treatment of the relation between *sensa* and physical objects.

Sensa are, for Broad, the 'objective constituents' in a perceptual situation, the 'subjective constituents' being the perceivers. To the perceivers *sensa* seem to refer to something beyond themselves. In the case of a *sensum* of a penny, this 'external reference' is to the penny itself, or, at all events, to its observed surface. This external reference may, however, according to Broad, *in all cases*, turn out to be a delusion.

In Broad's terminology, it may be a perception with 'an epistemological object' but without 'an ontological object', e.g. where a drunkard 'sees pink rats'. Moreover, for Broad there is no means of being certain *in any instance* that there is an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological object, the visual *sensum*, which alone, in Broad's opinion, is directly 'seen'. Broad holds that we do not and indeed cannot *infer* the existence of an ontological object (i.e. a physical object or a part or surface of one) from our experience of a *sensum*. That is quite right. On the other hand, his suggestion that a physical object is a mere hypothesis to explain the perceptual experiences we have is not convincing. If it were a matter of a single perceptual experience, and the question were whether that was caused by a physical object or not, it would make sense to regard that as a hypothesis, and its truth or falsehood could be determined by empirical evidence, provided by observations by the perceiver and by other witnesses; but Broad has denied that we could *ever know* that any physical object even exists. It *could not* therefore be cited as a hypothetical cause of perceptual experience.

³⁵ 'A Reply to My Critics', *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (ed. by P. A. Schilpp) (London and New York, 1942), p. 637.

As to Broad's view that *all* perceptions may be delusive, that is logically quite unsound. 'Delusive' and 'veridical' are logically opposite the very meaning of each of which depends on the meaning of its opposite: so that it is as nonsensical to assert that all perceptions are delusive as it is to say that they are all veridical. Whether a particular perception is veridical is an empirical question, and the proposition that it *is*, is a contingent proposition. Whether *all* perceptions are veridical is a pseudo-logical question empty of meaning; and the assertion that *none* are, is correspondingly vacuous.

To revert to the perception of a penny. Broad finds unacceptable the common-sense combination of the belief that the penny is round, with the view that the perceiver directly sees its observed surface. He considers that such a combination lands common-sense in difficulties. If the perceiver moves about as he looks at the penny he will see it generally as variously elliptical and as changeable in size. Broad holds that there are only two ways out on the common-sense view: (1) to regard the penny as actually changing shape and size as the observer moves around looking at it; or (2) to maintain that the apparent shapes and sizes are *only* apparent and that 'the objective constituent of the perception is all that time round and of one size'. Neither (1) nor (2), he thought, would appeal to common sense. A third possibility, however, according to Broad, is to jettison the common-sense idea that the perceiver may, and sometimes does, directly perceive the observed surface of the penny.

Broad propounds three theories to cover the three views: (1) The Multiple Inheritance Theory; (2) The Multiple Relation Theory of Appearing; (3) The Sensum Theory, which forgoes direct perception of the observed surface of the penny

Confining attention to shape and size the following are brief, but I hope substantially fair, accounts of theories (1) and (2): the Multiple Inheritance Theory holds that we can truly assert that the penny changes shape and size as the observer moves around looking at it, provided that we understand the changes of shape and size as involving a triadic relation between the sensible shape and size, the region in which the sensible shape and size inhere; and the 'region of projection' from which the eye of the observer perceives the perceptual object. Now actually this so-called 'theory' is quite unnecessary as an alternative to common sense, since common sense quite happily takes account of relative changes of position, and such factors as the laws of optics. According to the Multiple Relational Theory of Appearing, if the penny did have a determinate shape and size its relation to the perceiver would be a dyadic one, as common sense supposes, but the theory assumes a basic relation of

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'appearing', which must be at least triadic (according as one or more perceivers are involved). The perceiver will, in any case, according to his position, only perceive the *apparent* shapes and sizes of the penny. And nothing in any perceptual situation, *by itself*, will disclose whether it reveals the true shape and size of the penny. This 'theory' is adequate, since, though it rightly indicates that nothing in any perceptual situation, *by itself*, will reveal the true shape and size of the penny, it leaves out of account the normal procedure that common sense would adopt to determine the true shape and size, e.g. looking carefully at the penny from various angles, handling it, and measuring it.

As for the Sensum Theory, that theory holds that what the perceiver 'sees', in the strict sense, is not the penny, or even part of the penny's surface, but a transitory entity which is neither mental nor physical, though it has shape, size, and colour. This perceptual object will vary in size and shape, according to the position of the observer. What its relation is to the physical penny is clearly a problem; but, curiously enough, on the Sensum Theory, the relation turns out to be that the *sensum* is 'an appearance of' the physical object!³⁶ Somewhat surprisingly, moreover, Broad allows great latitude to the Sensum Theory about its view of the nature of physical objects. It could regard them, with Berkeley, as volitions in the mind of God, or, with Leibniz, as collections of mental substances, or, with Russell, as a selection of some larger groups of interrelated *sensa*; or it might try to keep closer to the common sense notion of physical objects³⁷. Yet the crunch of the matter concerns something more fundamental than this versatility of the theory's view of the nature of physical objects. The crunch, to take the visual case, is the elusiveness of the very notion of a *sensum*, if it is not identical with the observed surface of a physical object. How, for instance, could one be sure that one *sensum* was the same as another *sensum*? There would be nothing corresponding to the re-examination of the surface of a physical object.

Whether or not Broad's treatment of sense-perception is only a majestic muddle, it nevertheless illustrates Broad's philosophical sensitiveness. The problem how to reconcile the apparent shapes and sizes of the penny with what anyone can, in fact, easily ascertain to be its real size and shape, is a genuine philosophical problem. Yet it is one which is soluble by the very means which Broad himself scorned: the close consideration of the language which people have learned in an ostensive way, partly in their early years.

When Broad grants that such phrases as 'I see a penny' indicate

³⁶ *The Mind and its place in Nature*, p. 182.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

states of affairs which actually exist from time to time, but holds that what is meant by 'I', 'see', and 'penny' is very different from what we normally mean by those words, he makes a profound and vital mistake. These words have been learned ostensively in various contexts, and they have precisely the meanings which fit the statement 'I see a penny' and make it a true statement in cases where the perceptual situation is veridical, and false in cases where the perceptual situation is delusive, e.g. in a case of hallucination.

Broad makes great play with delusive cases, e.g. hallucinations, mirror-images, and cases where the finiteness of the velocity of light makes us believe that a distant star is where it seems to be, whereas it may be thousands of miles away from that, or even have ceased to exist. Broad, however, must have known quite well that, though there are delusive cases of these various kinds, there are a host (possibly, indeed, a far larger number) of veridical cases, in which it is not only correct usage (solidly based on language ostensively learned), but also true, to say both that the perceiver sees the physical object, and that he sees its observed surface, and even that he sees the observed surface directly. Moreover, there is no stricter usage of language than that which convention has established, and convention has established that it is true, in veridical cases, to make all such assertions as those just indicated.

It may seem doubtful whether it is solidly based on correct usage of language to say that the perceiver sees *the observed surface* of the physical object, and still more doubtful whether it is solidly based on correct usage of language to say that one sees the observed surface *directly*. Such doubts, however, I suggest, only derive from the assumption that sense-data exist independently of the physical objects in veridical cases; and this there seems no good reason to believe. At all events, neither Broad nor Russell has offered any ground for believing such things as that there is, in a veridical situation, a hardness independent of a surface that is hard, or a roughness independent of a rough surface, to take two of the instances of *sense-data* which Russell offered us in *The Problems of Philosophy* in 1912.

VII

Broad tells us in his Autobiography that he believes that his best philosophical work was done in his *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, Part I (1933), Part II (1938). Unfortunately a discussion of this would take us too far from Broad's own concerns and the Russellian framework they are set against.

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It would, though, be a mistake to omit, in conclusion, at least a few references to Broad's wisdom and at least one or two examples of his wit.

Though Broad was not inclined to build speculative systems, he did take a large view of life and reality. He was disturbed by the great discrepancy between the rapid growth, since Galileo and Newton, of human control over inorganic matter, and the slow progress of knowledge of living organisms and control over them. Broad thought that even if we were to gain enough knowledge of biology, physiology, and genetics to produce ever healthier bodies, and better and better brains, there might be insuperable *psychological* difficulties in applying that knowledge, because of resistance by primitive superstition and theological dogma. He thought perpetual mental progress not logically impossible, but certainly not causally inevitable, or causally impossible. Towards the end of his book *The Mind and its Place in Nature* he asserts that 'the possibility [of unending mental progress] depends on our getting an adequate knowledge and control of life and mind before the combination of ignorance on these subjects with knowledge of physics and chemistry wrecks the whole social system'. And he ends with some words typifying his blend of depth with tonal and metaphorical detachment: 'Which of the runners in this very interesting race will win, it is impossible to foretell. But physics and death have a long start over psychology and life'³⁸.

Broad's seriousness here is evident, but so is the poise of his prose. His balanced rationality is pervasive, and the metaphor of the vital issue as 'a very interesting race' is typical of his avoidance of overstatement.

There are many passages in which Broad shows wisdom, but I only have time to refer to two more, both of which concern personal ethics. In one he expresses the view that the pleasure of successful activity in the face of obstacles is 'probably the most important pleasure that human beings can enjoy'. Though they are less intense than many sensuous pleasures, they last longer, are far more varied, do not lead to satiety, and are felt to be more worthwhile. The high value set on them is shown, according to Broad, by the invention and practice of a host of games, contests of bodily skill and endurance, and mental puzzles and games of mental skill, like chess. Broad also refers to the pleasure felt in appreciating a certain degree of difficulty or subtlety in a work of art. This general view is, I think, very valuable.

The second passage concerns Broad's indication of what he considers 'a very important condition for securing happiness, or at least avoiding unhappiness'. The passage contains much wisdom, though

³⁸ *The Mind and its place in Nature*, p. 666.

I do not find it wholly true. The 'condition' Broad means is the ability to adjust oneself first to growing-up, and later to growing old. One should not remain in a Peter Pan stage or hark back nostalgically to it when it is past. One's main desires and interests should be directed to the kinds of experiences and activities appropriate to the stage of life one has reached.

That all seems to be good sense, but when Broad turns to 'the last lap of a long life' his view of it is reminiscent of Gibbon's. Broad holds that the last lap 'can scarcely be very happy except for a person who is effectively convinced that he will survive bodily death and there is a good chance that he will pass into a state of enlarged opportunities for pleasant experience and enjoyable activities when his present body is destroyed'. Broad points to an old person's consciousness of decaying powers, the loss of contemporary friends and relatives, and the difficulty of adjusting to changes in material and social environment. There is also 'growing bodily discomfort and weakness and sometimes almost constant pain, and the humiliating awareness that one is becoming a useless burden to others and is being treated more and more as a child by them'. This will hardly fail to make an old person 'somewhat melancholy', in Broad's opinion. Broad's phrase is quite moderate, in view of the troubles he has referred to, and it may be that it was an ironical understatement. Yet it could be a genuine expression of Broad's temperamental balance. Sophocles expressed the woes of old age more violently³⁹; though in the same play he also rises to a height of joy in the beauty of Colonus and the vigour of Athens and its horses and the splendour of the sea⁴⁰. The truth is, surely, that different old people react very diversely to their last lap.

Broad's recommendations to people past middle age, are, on the other hand, much to the point: to take an interest in persons and institutions that will survive them. These are sources of great happiness. Yet, as Broad clearheadedly adds, they can be causes of great unhappiness too. Broad, however, incites the old to prefer taking the risk, rather than to adopt a policy of self-insulation: Taking the risk is likely to result in greater happiness.

Broad also makes a recommendation to people of all ages: not to think too constantly about obtaining happiness, but from time to time to review one's mistakes, take stock of what one has learnt about oneself and others, and 'to make such changes as seem desirable' (the moderate, civilized tone is again apparent). And Broad's final recipe for happiness once more eschews grandiosity, and offers instead sensible, unpretentious wisdom:

³⁹ *Oedipus at Colonus*, lines 1211–48.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, lines 668–719.

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But for the greater part of one's life one will be most likely to secure happiness if one thinks mainly about other things, and carries on one's ordinary work, and play, and hobbies, and social relationships without explicitly considering the pleasure or unpleasure which one is getting from them.⁴¹

Broad was a careful literary stylist. His ideals included crystalline clarity, and civilized elegance, with touches of pointed wit. The tone he preferred was urbane, and he was fond of that variety of wit. Yet when his feelings were roused to a high pitch he could write with Swiftian savagery, as in the following passage which springs from his virulent hatred of the cruelties that can arise from superstition. Here the force derives added impetus from its context, which is an objective psychological discussion of the respective powers of conceptual cognition in men and animals:

Through lack of conceptual cognition animals cannot design and build reservoirs to hold water in dry seasons, and so they often perish miserably from thirst. On the other hand animals cannot imagine, as some quite intelligent men have done, that the water supply is controlled by the God Moloch, and that the best way to secure a good rainfall is to burn their first-born children alive in an iron idol of the god.⁴²

Writing of Locke in comparison with Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume he operates in a gentler vein, with a wit that borders in humour. Locke he suggests 'is not so much cleverer than ourselves as to be capable of playing tricks wit us even if he wanted to do so'. Broad dubs him 'the Mr Baldwin of philosophy, deriving from his literary style some of the advantages which that statesman owed to his pipe and his pigs'.⁴³

Broad's sceptical mind often made him express a disparaging estimate of philosophy; but this was probably only half-serious. There was a charming scene on Broad's eightieth birthday, when he had tea with the Senior Bursar of Trinity, Dr Bradfield, Mrs Bradfield, and their son. There was a superb birthday cake, with eighty lighted candles. Broad was proud of his feat in blowing them all out with a single breath. Commenting on his exploit, Broad writes: 'The practice of emitting hot air, of which philosophy so largely consists, had no doubt been a good training for me.'

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⁴¹ C. D. Broad's *Ethics* (ed. by C. Lewy), (Dordrecht, 1985), p. 51

⁴² C. D. Broad's *Ethics* (ed. by C. Lewy), (Dordrecht, 1985), p. 24–25.

⁴³ C. D. Broad's Biography of John Locke, printed in *Ethics and the History of Philosophy* (London, 1952), p. 39.