Author Archives: Pablo Stafforini

Peter Richerson & Robert Boyd

Some scholars, including most economists, many psychologists, and many social scientists influenced by evolutionary biology, place little emphasis on culture as a cause of human behavior. Others, especially anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, stress the importance of culture and institutions in shaping human affairs, but usually fail to consider their connection to biology. The success of all these disciplines suggests that many questions can be answered by ignoring culture or its connection to biology. However, the most fundamental questions of how human came to be the kind of animal we are can only be answered by a theory in which culture has its proper role and in which it is intimately intertwined with other aspects of human biology.

Peter Richerson & Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution, Chicago, 2005, p. 4

Jorge Luis Borges

He declarado nuestro anverso de luz y nuestro reverso de sombra; que otros descubran la secreta raíz de este antagónico proceso y nos digan si la fecha que celebramos merece la tristeza o el júbilo.

Jorge Luis Borges, ‘A 150 años de la Revolución’, Sur, no. 267 (November-December 1960)

Adolfo Bioy Casares

Entre las cosas maravillosas que se manifiestan en la posesión algunas duran toda la vida, otras un instante. […] Fugaces: luego de una larga ausencia, en el primer despertar en el campo, la luz del día en las hendijas de la ventana; en medio de la noche, despertar cuando el tren para en una estación y oír desde la cama del compartimiento la voz de gente que habla en el andén; al cabo de días de navegación tormentosa, despertar una mañana en el barco inmóvil, acercarse al ojo de buey y ver el puerto de una ciudad desconocida[.]

Adolfo Bioy Casares, De las cosas maravillosas, Buenos Aires, 1999, pp. 17-18

Henry David Thoreau

You ask particularly after my health. I suppose that I have not many months to live; but, of course, I know nothing about it. I may add that I am enjoying existence as much as ever, and regret nothing.

Henry David Thoreau, letter to Myron Benton, March 31, 1862

William Wordsworth

OH! pleasant exercise of hope and joy!
For mighty were the auxiliars which then stood
Upon our side, we who were strong in love!
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven!—Oh! times,
In which the meagre, stale, forbidding ways
Of custom, law, and statute, took at once
The attraction of a country in romance!
When Reason seemed the most to assert her rights,
When most intent on making of herself
A prime Enchantress—to assist the work,
Which then was going forward in her name!
Not favoured spots alone, but the whole earth,
The beauty wore of promise, that which sets
(As at some moment might not be unfelt
Among the bowers of paradise itself)
The budding rose above the rose full blown.
What temper at the prospect did not wake
To happiness unthought of? The inert
Were roused, and lively natures rapt away!
They who had fed their childhood upon dreams,
The playfellows of fancy, who had made
All powers of swiftness, subtilty, and strength
Their ministers,—who in lordly wise had stirred
Among the grandest objects of the sense,
And dealt with whatsoever they found there
As if they had within some lurking right
To wield it;—they, too, who, of gentle mood,
Had watched all gentle motions, and to these
Had fitted their own thoughts, schemers more mild,
And in the region of their peaceful selves;—
Now was it that both found, the meek and lofty
Did both find, helpers to their heart’s desire,
And stuff at hand, plastic as they could wish;
Were called upon to exercise their skill,
Not in Utopia, subterranean fields,
Or some secreted island, Heaven knows where!
But in the very world, which is the world
Of all of us,—the place where in the end
We find our happiness, or not at all!

William Wordsworth, ‘French Revolution’, 1805

Vlady Kociancich

El hombre no era joven, pero a mi edad (quizá también la suya) se hace difícil traducir a números la imagen oscilante de caracteres físicos de una persona que ronda la salida de los treinta. Hay un día, no marcado en el almanaque, cuando uno deja atrás la confiada aritmética de los años y con azoramiento e indefinible melancolía empieza a preguntarse si ese otro fantasma nacido entre la juventud y la vejez es mayor o menor. Que uno, por supuesto.

Vlady Kociancich, ‘Un hombre de familia’, in Todos los caminos, Buenos Aires, 1991

Adolfo Bioy Casares

Mi pensamiento es pesimista; mi sentido vital es optimista. A mí me encanta la vida, yo me divierto con vivir. Si oigo una frase que me hace gracia, estoy contentísimo; si he soñado un sueño que me parece divertido, de algún modo estoy encantado; si se me ocurre una idea, lo mismo… Me gusta leer, me gusta ir al cine… Yo tengo la impresión de que, cuando hago el balance de mis días, en general puedo decir que me he divertido y que, en los días estériles, tampoco lo pasé tan mal. En cambio, si yo reflexiono sobre la vida, pienso que nada tiene demasiada importancia porque seremos olvidados y desapareceremos definitivamente. Eso es lo que yo pienso. Yo creo que nuestra inmortalidad literaria es a corto plazo, porque un día habrá tanta gete, que no se podrán acordar de todos los escritores que hubo en un momento. O se acordarán muy imperfectamente. Ya no seremos materia de placer para nadie: seremos materia de estudio para ciertos especialistas, que quieran estudiar tal y tal tendencia de la literatura argentina de tal año. Y, después de todo eso, un día la Tierra chocará con algo, ya que la Tierra, como todas las cosas de este mundo, es finita. Un día desaparecerá la Tierra, y entonces no quedará el recuerdo de Shakespeare, y menos aún el de nosotros. Así que pienso que, teniendo en cuenta todas estas cosas, nada de la vida es muy importante. Entonces, yo casi podría reducir la importancia de la vida a una idea: la idea de que son importantes las cosas que, por lo menos, nos hacen estar complacidos. Vale decir: a mí, por ejemplo, me duele algo que es cruel o es deshonesto. O inclusive algo que sea desconsiderado con otra persona: eso me duele. Entonces, salvo hacer esas cosas y salvo hacer las que dan placer y dan alegría, nada tendría importancia.

Adolfo Bioy Casares, in Fernando Sorrentino, Siete conversaciones con Adolfo Bioy Casares, Buenos Aires, 1992, pp. 240-241

Adolfo Bioy Casares

Pensé alguna vez que mi cara no era la que yo hubiera elegido. Entonces me pregunté cuál hubiera elegido y descubrí que no me convenía ninguna. La del joven del guante, de Tiziano, admirable en el cuadro, no me pareció adecuada, por corresponder a un hombre cuyo género de vida no deseaba para mí, pues intuía que en él la actividad física prevalecía en exceso. Los santos pecaban del defecto opuesto: eran demasiado sedentarios. A Dios padre lo encontré solemne. Las caras de los pensadores se me antojaron poco saludables y las de los boxeadores, poco sutiles. Las caras que realmente me gustan son de mujer; para cambiarlas por la mía no sirven.

Adolfo Bioy Casares, ‘Yo y mi cara’, in Sara Facio y Alicia D’Amico (eds.), Retratos y autorretratos, Buenos Aires, 1973

Michael Gazzaniga

To some, the possibility that great religious figures might have been influenced by epileptic experiences negates the reality of the religious beliefs that resulted from them. Yet to others, the resulting revelations are “no less expressive of truth than Dostoevsky’s novels or Van Gogh’s paintings.” Evidence does exist of an organic basis for instinctive reactions that give rise to beliefs about a moral order resulting in a religious experience. However, some would argue that this is merely the way by which a spiritual God interacts with us mortal beings.

Michael Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain: The Science of Our Moral Dilemmas, New York, 2005, p. 159

John Skorupski

About other people’s ideas, Mill says, Bentham’s only question was, were they true? Coleridge, in contrast, patiently asked after their meaning. To pin down the fundamental norms of our thinking calls for careful psychological and historical inquiry into how people think, and also into how they think they should think—what kind of normative attitudes they display in their actions and their reflection. These must be engaged with to be understood. So thinking from within is inherently dialogical. And it always remains corrigible. Both points are significant in Mill’s argument for liberty of thought and discussion.

What gives this method a critical and systematic edge? It can examine whether some normative dispositions are reducible to other such dispositions. It can also consider whether some are explicable in a way that subverts their authority. Suppose I can explain your low opinion of your brother’s intelligence as the product solely of sheer envy and resentment. That will subvert this opinion: it may be true, but your grounds for thinking it is are not good ones. Or an example Mill would have liked: normative notions of what women’s role should be may simply reflect unequal power relationships between men and women. That, if true, subverts these normative views. It does not show they are false but it does show that they are not justified. Thinking from within seeks to establish what basic normative dispositions are not subvertible in this way, but are resilient under reflection and thus preserve normative authority.

John Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today?, London, 2006, pp. 9-10

Brian Charlesworth & Deborah Charlesworth

The relentless application of the scientific method of inference from experiment and observation, without reference to religious or governmental authority, has completely transformed our view of our origins and relation to the universe, in less than 500 years. In addition to the intrinsic fascination of the view of the world opened up by science, this has had an enormous impact on philosophy and religion. The findings of science imply that human beings are the product of impersonal forces, and that the habitable world forms a minute part of a universe of immense size and duration. Whatever the religious or philosophical beliefs of individual scientists, the whole programme of scientific research is founded on the assumption that the universe can be understood on such a basis.

Few would dispute that this programme has been spectacularly successful, particularly in the 20th century, which saw such terrible events in human affairs. The influence of science may have indirectly contributed to these events, partly through the social changes triggered by the rise of industrial mass societies, and partly through the undermining of traditional belief systems. Nonetheless, it can be argued that much misery throughout human history could have been avoided by the application of reason, and that the disasters of the 20th century resulted from a failure to be rational rather than a failure of rationality. The wise application of scientific understanding of the world in which we live is the only hope for the future of mankind.

Brian Charlesworth & Deborah Charlesworth, Evolution: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, 2003, pp. 2-3

Samuel Butler

One can bring no greater reproach against a man than to say that he does not set sufficient value upon pleasure, and there is no greater sign of a fool than the thinking that he can tell at once and easily what it is that pleases him. To know this is not easy, and how to extend our knowledge of it is the highest and the most neglected of all arts and branches of education.

Samuel Butler, The Note-Books of Samuel Butler, London, 1912, ‘On Knowing what Gives us Pleasure’, sect. 1

Derek Parfit

Strawson describes two kinds of philosophy, descriptive, and revisionary. Descriptive philosophy gives reasons for what we instinctively assume, and explains and justifies the unchanging central core in our beliefs about ourselves, and the world we inhabit. I have great respect for descriptive philosophy. But, by temperament, I am a revisionist. […] Philosophers should not only interpret our beliefs; when they are false, they should change them.

Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984, p. x

Carlos Santiago Nino

[T]he rejection of the aggregative approach which characterizes utilitarianism does not mean that it is completely displaced from the moral arena. It remains in reserve to be resorted to when arguments on the basis of rights are not sufficient to reach a conclusion: when reasons about what is correct do not indicate one course of action, because all of them are equally correct or equally incorrect, we must resort to reasons about the maximization of some social goods.

Carlos Santiago Nino, ‘Liberty, Equality and Causality’, Rechtstheorie, vol. 15, no. 1 (1984), p. 31

David Pears

Most people know their own identities. I know who I am, and I can produce enough facts to establish who I am. Anyone who wonders what these facts would be in his own case has only to imagine himself being questioned by the police.

David Pears, ‘Hume on Personal Identity’, in David Pears (ed.), David Hume: A Symposium, London, 1963, p. 43

Yew-Kwang Ng

Consider Mr. C. He believes that, in the presence of uncertainty, the appropriate thing to do is to maximize the expected welfare. (Welfare is used interchangeably with net happiness. For simplicity, consider only choices that do not affect the welfare of others.) Suppose you put C in the privacy of a hotel room with an attractive, young, and willing lady. C can choose to go to bed with her or not to. C knows that the former choice involves a small but not negligible risk of contracting AIDS. He also calculates that the expected welfare of this choice is negative. Nevertheless, he agrees that, provided the lady is beautiful enough, he will choose to go to bed with her. This choice of C, though irrational (at least from the expected welfare point of view), is far from atypical. Rather, I am confident that it applies to at least 70% of adult males (the present writer included).

Yew-Kwang Ng, ‘Happiness, Life Satisfaction, or Subjective Well Being?’

Quentin Smith

[W]e cannot concentrate only on benefactors to humans. Perhaps Peter Singer, the most influential person in promoting the welfare and rights of animals, will ultimately have contributed more to the development of the universe than benefactors merely of humans. Perhaps Singer’s book Animal Liberation will (over the centuries) have increased the happiness, health, and lives of animals to such an extent that it adds up to a greater amount of goodness than the human development that will be the total consequence of (say) Gandhi’s actions.

Quentin Smith, Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language, New Haven, 1997, p. 217

Yew-Kwang Ng

I myself regard enjoyment and suffering (defined more broadly to include milder pain and discomfort) as not only the most important, but ultimately the only important things. Freedom, knowledge, and so on are all important but only because they ultimately promote net welfare (enjoyment minus suffering). Even if they do not completely agree with this strong view regarding enjoyment and suffering, most people will accept that enjoyment and suffering are the most important considerations. Given their importance, the amount of scientific research devoted to them is dismally inadequate. The neglect is partly due to the methodological blunder, which prevents the publication of important results on things that are difficult to measure precisely.

Yew-Kwang Ng, ‘The Case for and Difficulties in Using “Demand Areas” to Measure Changes in Well-Being’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 13, no. 1 (1991), p. 30

Gordon Gallup

I used to tell students that no one ever heard, say, tasted, or touched a mind. So while minds may exist, they fall outside the realm of science. But I have changed my mind.

Gordon Gallup, ‘Do Minds Exist in Species Other than Our Own’, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, vol. 9 (1985), p. 633

F. M. Kamm

Nonconsequentialists argue for the moral importance of many distinctions in how we bring about states of affairs. I try to present and consider the elements of some of these distinctions. A good deal of section I focuses on providing a replacement for a simple harming/not-aiding distinction and revising and even jettisoning the significance for permissibility of conduct of the intention/foresight distinction. A good deal of section III is concerned with examining the possible moral significance of other distinctions (collaboration versus independent action; near versus far). Some moral philosophers (such as Singer and Unger) think that many nonconsequentialist distinctions have no moral importance, and other philosophers (such as Gert) employ distinctions other than harming/nod-aiding and intending/foreseeing. The work of yet others (Kahneman) could be used to argue that the distinctions that some consequentialists emphasize are reducible to distinctions (loss/no-gain) that are suspect. Some of the chapters examine these alternative views. Finally, some philosophers hold foundational theories, like contractualism, that could be used to derive and justify the nonconsequentialist distinctions by an alternative method from the heavily case-based ones I employ.

F. M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm, Oxford, 2007, pp. 7-8

David Hume

[U]pon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of it veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, London, 1748, sect. 10, pt. 2

Edward Said

I reject the ultrapostmodern position (like that taken by Richard Rorty while shadowboxing with some vague thing he refers to contemptuously as “the academic Left”), which holds, when confronting ethnic cleansing or genocide as was occurring in Iraq under the sanctions-regime or any of the evils of torture, censorship, famine, and ignorance (most of them constructed by humans, but by acts of God), that human rights are cultural or grammatical things, and when they are violated, they do not really have the status accorded them by crude foundationalists, such as myself, for whom they are as real as anything we can encounter.

Edward Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, New York, 2004, p. 136

Douglas Hofstadter

In those early days, I often wondered how some of my personal idols—Albert Einstein, for instance—could have been meat eaters. I found no explanation, although recently, to my great pleasure, a Web search yielded hints that Einstein’s sympathies were, in fact, toward vegetarianism, and not for health reasons but our of compassion towards living beings. But I didn’t know that fact back then, and in any case many other heroes of mine were certainly carnivores who knew exactly what they were doing. Such facts saddened me and confused me.

Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop, New York, 2007, p. 13

Steven Pinker

[T]he biology of consciousness offers a sounder basis for morality than the unprovable dogma of an immortal soul. It’s not just that an understanding of the physiology of consciousness will reduce human suffering through new treatments for pain and depression. That understanding can also force us to recognize the interests of other beings–the core of morality.

[…] Th[e] power to deny that other people have feelings is not just an academic exercise but an all-to-common vice, as we see in the long history of human cruelty. Yet once we realize that our own consciousness is a product of our brains and that other people have brains like ours, a denial of other people’s sentience becomes ludicrous. “Hath not a Jew eyes?” asked Shylock. Today the question is more pointed: Hath nor a Jew–or an Arab, or an African, or a baby, or a god–a cerebral cortex and a thalamus? The undeniable fact that we are ll made of the same neural flesh makes it impossible to deny our common capacity to suffer.

Steven Pinker, ‘The Mystery of Consciousness’, Time, January 19, 2007