El sujeto romántico encuentra siempre dentro de sí la impresión de que fuera de él algo colosal acontece; pero a menudo, cuando quiere precisar esa enorme contingencia, se sorprende sin nada entre las manos.
José Ortega y Gasset, ‘Leyendo el “Adolfo”‘, in El espectador, vol. 1, Madrid, 1916
[D]eveloped states have been more willing to appeal to moral values and to use such appeals in justification of initiatives—such as the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia—that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War. But these appeals only heighten the puzzle. If it makes sense to spend billions to endanger thousands of lives in order to rescue a million people from Serb oppression, would it not make more sense to spend similar sums, without endangering any lives, on leading many millions out of life-threatening poverty?
Thomas Pogge, ‘Priorities of Global Justice’, in Thomas Pogge (ed.), Global Justice, Oxford, 2001, pp. 6-7
If one looks at the works of the major apologists for capitalism, Milton Friedman, for example, or F. A. Hayek, one finds the focus of the apology always on the virtues of the market and on the vices of central planning. Rhetorically this is an effective strategy, for it is much easier to defend the market than to defend the other two defining institutions of capitalism. Proponents of capitalism know well that it is better to keep attention directed toward the market and away from wage labor or private ownership of the means of production.
David Schweickart, ‘Market Socialism: A Defense’, in Bertell Ollman (ed.), Market Socialism: the Debate Among Socialists, New York, 1998, p. 11
A story that supports the status quo is generally considered to be neutral and is not questioned in terms of its objectivity while one that challenges the status quo tends to be perceived as having a ‘point of view’ and therefore biased.
Sharon Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism, Devon, 1996, p. 205
Call them soldiers, call them monks, call them machines: so they were but happy ones, I should not care.
Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon, Dublin, 1787, letter 21
Provided we agree about the thing, ’tis needless to dispute about the terms.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, London, 1739, bk. 1, pt. 3, sect. 7
Deflating the exclusive question “A or B?” with the inclusive answer “Let’s have both!” is apt to look like a cop-out. [M]oving from monism to pluralism invariably raises more questions than it answers.
Tim Mulgan, ‘Two Conceptions of Benevolence’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter, 1997), p. 78
No longer enslaved or made dependent by force of law, the great majority are so by force of poverty; they are still chained to a place, to an occupation, and to conformity with the will of an employer, and debarred, by the accident of birth both from the enjoyments, and from the mental and moral advantages, which others inherit without exertion and independently of desert. That this is an evil equal to almost any of those against which mankind have hitherto struggled, the poor are not wrong in believing.
John Stuart Mill, Chapters On Socialism, London, 1879, ‘Introductory’
The modern conservative is engaged in one of man’s oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness.
John Kenneth Galbraith, ‘Stop the Madness’, Toronto Globe and Mail, July 6, p. 38
Libertarians often equate capitalism with the absence of restrictions on freedom. Anthony Flew, for example, defines libertarianism as ‘opposed to any social and legal constraints on individual freedom’. He contrasts this with liberal egalitarians and socialists who favour government restrictions on the free market. Flew thus identifies capitalism with the absence of restrictions on freedom. Many of those who favour constraining the market agree that they are thereby restricting liberty. Their endorsement of welfare-state capitalism is said to be a compromise between freedom and equality, where freedom is understood as the free market, and equality as welfare-state restrictions on the market. This equation of capitalism and freedom is part of the everyday picture of the political landscape.
Does the free market involve more freedom? It depends on how we define freedom. Flew seems to be assuming a neutral definition of freedom. By eliminating welfare-state redistribution, the free market eliminates some legal constraints on the disposal of one’s resources, and thereby creates some neutral freedoms. For example, if government funds a welfare programme by an 80-per-cent tax on inheritance and capital gains, then it prevents people from giving their property to others. Flew does not tell us how much neutral freedom would be gained by removing this tax, but it clearly would allow someone to act in a way they otherwise could not. This expansion of neutral freedom is the most obvious sense in which capitalism increases freedom, but many of these neutral freedoms will also be valuable purposive freedoms, for there are important reasons why people might give their property to others. So capitalism does provide certain neutral and purposive freedoms unavailable under the welfare state.
But we need to be more specific about this increased liberty. Every claim about freedom, to be meaningful, must have a triadic structure-it must be of the form ‘x is free from y to do z’, where x I specifies the agent, y specifies the preventing conditions, and z specifies the action. Every freedom claim must have these three elements: it must specify who is free to do what from what obstacle. Flew has told us the last two elements––æhis claim concerns the freedom to dispose of property without legal constraint. But he has not told us the first-i.e. who has this freedom? As soon as we ask that question, Flew’s equation of capitalism with freedom is undermined. For it is the owners of the resource who are made free to dispose of it, while non-owners are deprived of that freedom. Suppose that a large estate you would have inherited (in the absence of an inheritance tax) now becomes a public park, or a low-income housing project (as a result of the tax). The inheritance tax does not eliminate the freedom to use the property, rather it redistributes that freedom. If you inherit the estate, then you are free to dispose of it as you see fit, but if I use your backyard for my picnic or garden without your permission, then I am breaking the law, and the government will intervene and coercively deprive me of the freedom to continue. On the other hand, my freedom to use and enjoy the property is increased when the welfare state taxes your inheritance to provide me with affordable housing, or a public park. So the free market legally restrains my freedom, while the welfare state increases it. Again, this is most obvious on a neutral definition of freedom, but many of the neutral freedoms I gain from the inheritance tax are also important purposive ones.
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford, 1990, pp. 146-147
When Hume’s reflections confronted him with the baselessness of all human reasoning and belief, he found it most fortunate that “nature herself” ensures that he would not long linger in such dark skepticism: “I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, so strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any farther.”
When Parfit’s reflections led him to a reductionist view of personal identity, he found it unfortunate that one cannot long maintain this view of the world, which removes the glass wall between oneself and others and makes one care less about one’s own death. Focusing on his arguments, one can only briefly stun one’s natural concern for one’s own future by reconceiving oneself in accordance with the reductionist view.
Our world is arranged to keep us far away from massive and severe poverty and surrounds us with affluent, civilized people for whom the poor abroad are a remote good cause alongside the spotted owl. In such a world, the thought that we are involved in a monumental crime against these people, that we must fight to stop their dying and suffering, will appear so cold, so strained, and ridiculous, that we cannot find it in our heart to reflect on it any farther. That we are naturally myopic and conformist enough to be easily reconciled to the hunger abroad may be fortunate for us, who can “recognize ourselves,” can lead worthwhile and fulfilling lives without much thought about the origins of our affluence. But it is quite unfortunate for the global poor, whose best hope may be our moral reflection.
Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, Cambridge, 2002, p. 26
A distinction is sometimes drawn between ‘man-made’ famines and famines caused by nature. […] Blaming nature can, of course, be very consoling and comforting. It can be of great use especially to those in positions of power and responsibility. Comfortable inaction is, however, typically purchased at a very heavy price—a price that is paid by others, often with their lives.
Jean Drèze & Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action, Oxford, 1989, pp. 46-47
It is […] nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely strangled the holy curiosity of enquiry; for this delicate little plant, aside from stimulation, stands mainly in need of freedom; without this it goes to wreck and ruin without fail. It is a very grave mistake to think that the enjoyment of seeing and searching can be promoted by means of coercion and a sense of duty.
Albert Einstein, ‘Autobiographical Notes’, in Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Berkeley, 1949, p. 17
Amoralits are sceptics about the claims of morality. They do not have to be ruthlessly selfish—they may have generous impulses and care about other people—but they are sceptical about claims that they ought to do things for others. An amoralist says about ‘ought’ what Oscar Wilde said about ‘patriotism’: it is not one of my words. The generous, caring amoralist is in practice not much of a problem. It is the ruthlessly selfish amoralist who arouses the hope that amoralism can be refuted.
Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, New Haven, 1999, p. 18
In order to lessen the number of people who’ll die very prematurely, you needn’t cause anyone any serious loss, and you certainly needn’t cause anybody to lose her life. Indeed, all you need do is send money to UNICEF, or to OXFAM, or, for that matter, to CARE, whose address you can also know:
CARE
151 Ellis Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30303From this chapter’s first paragraph, most get what, for the bulk of our adult lives, is the most important moral message we need.
Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence, New York, 1996, p. 84
For one thing, France does not have a civil-libertarian tradition of the Anglo-Saxon variety. For another thing, there simply is a totalitarian strain among large sements of the French intelligentisa. Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism, for example, were much more viable and significant doctrines among the French than in England or the United States. What’s called the Left, especially in France, has a large segment that is deeply authoritarian.
Carl Oglesby, Boston Magazine, December 1981, p. 130
It is by no means inconceivable that the special character of our art and our personal relationships depends upon the cognitive biases and limits that prevent us handling philosophical problems, so that philosophical aptitude would deprive our lives of much of their point. Philosophy might require even more self-sacrifice than has traditionally been conceded.
Colin McGinn, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993, p. 156
[I]f ultimate values are incompatible, a perfect world in which all ultimate values—goodness, truth, justice, liberty, self-realization, equality, mercy, beauty—are combined cannot be conceived, let alone exist.
Isaiah Berlin, ‘A Philosophical Self-Portrait’, in Thomas Mautner, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, London, 1996, p. 68
One way for the utilitarian to deal with the Inquisitor is not to argue with him at all. You don’t argue with the sharks; you just put up nets to keep them away from the beaches. Likewise the Inquisitor, or any other utilitarian with dangerously wrong opinions about how to maximize utility, is simply a danger to be fended off. You organize and fight. You see to it that he cannot succeed in his plan to do harm in order—as he thinks and you do not—to maximize utility.
A second way is to fight first and argue afterward. When you fight, you change the circumstances that afford the premises of a utilitarian argument. First you win the fight, then you win the argument. If you can make sure that the Inquisitor will fail in his effort to suppress heresy, you give him a reason to stop trying. Though he thinks that successful persecution maximizes utility, he will certainly agree that failed attempts are nothing but useless harm.
David Lewis, ‘Mill and Milquetoast’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 67, no. 2 (June, 1989), p. 159
Dualidad valorativa es personalidad dividida.
Claudio Amor, ‘Liberalismo y esquizofrenia’, Revista latinoamericana de filosofía, vol. 25, no. 2 (1999), p. 235
He that sees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too: which yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again.
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, bk. 4, chap. 11, sect. 7
As could be shown at much greater length, there is no truth in the notion of our governments and their foreign ministers, diplomats, and negotiators being motivated by humanitarian concerns that international law as it stands obliges them to suppress. […]
There are no humanitarian heroes among those who exercise power in our names. This is why we are treated to a purely hypothetical example. This hypothetical appeals irresistibly to the good sense of any person whose humanity has not been thoroughly corrupted. Yes of course, we exclaim, the law (and much else) may and must be set aside to save 800,000 people from being hacked to death merely because they are Tutsis or want to live in peace with them. But when the lesson will be accepted and the plain meaning of the Charter will be viewed as unworthy of defense, then it is not the good sense of Thomas Franck and us citizens that will fill the vacuum. Rather, outcomes will then be determined by the “good sense” of those whose humanity has been corrupted through their ascent to national office, through their power, and through the adversarial character of their role: by the good sense of people like Clinton, Albright, and Kofi Annan, who enabled the genocide in Rwanda, by the good sense of people like Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld, who are more interested in liberating oil fields abroad than human beings. To be sure, the overt or covert violence unleashed by such politicians—regularly rationalized as humanitarian—sometimes happens to prevent more harm than it produces. But the overall record over the last 60 years is not encouraging.
Thomas Pogge, ‘Power v. Truth: Realism and Responsibility’, in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, New York, 2006, p. 166
Philosophy should provide edification and concern, but it too often encourages escape through rationalization.
Robert Solomon, ‘Peter Singer’s Expanding Circle’, in Dale Jamieson (ed.), Singer and His Critics, Oxford, 1999, p. 78
The eradication of malaria would offer us enhanced travel opportunities in tropical regions. It would greatly improve the economic performance in many (especially African) countries which, through trade, would have direct and indirect positive economic effects on ourselves. And it would gain us a great deal of good will for poor populations who are currently, quite understandably, suspecting our humanitarian concerns to be highly selective: We are willing to spend billions to protect disaffected Kosovars and Iraqis from the brutalities of Milosovic and Saddam Hussein, but ignore very much larger numbers of human beings who are exterminated by genocide (Rwanda) or starvation and could be saved at very much lower cost.
Thomas Pogge, ‘Testing Our Drugs on the Poor Abroad’, in Ezekiel Emanuel and Jennifer Hawkins (eds.), Exploitation and Multi-National Research, Princeton, 2008
Advocates of capitalism are very apt to appeal to the sacred principles of liberty, which are embodied in one maxim: The fortunate must not be restrained in the exercise of tyranny over the unfortunate.
Bertrand Russell, ‘Freedom in Society’, in Sceptical Essays, London, 1928
[L]os anarquistas no van precisamente contra una clase social, ni contra un sistema económico, ni proceden ellos exclusivamente de una determinada clase social sino de todas. Van contra un principio—el principio de autoridad—contra la organización social que es autoritaria en todos los órdenes de la vida desde el político hasta el moral y desde el intelectual hasta el económico, y contra todas las clases sociales que se opongan a la libertad, a la anarquía.
Eduardo Gilimón, ‘La Anarquía’, La Protesta, 20 de agosto de 1908
[T]he plain duty of each and all of us is to try to make the little corner [of the world] he can influence somewhat less miserable and somewhat less ignorant than it was before he entered it.
Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘On the Physical Basis of Life’, in Fortnightly Review, vol. 5, no. 5 (February, 1869), p. 43
[T]he appeal to reason is implicitly authorized by the [subjectivist] challenge itself, so this is really a way of showing that the challenge is unintelligible. The charge of begging the question implies that there is an alternative—namely, to examine the reasons for and against the claim being challenged while suspending judgment about it. For the case of reasoning itself, however, no such alternative is available, since any considerations against the objective validity of a type of reasoning are inevitably attempts to offer reasons against it, and these must be rationally assessed. The use of reason in the response is not a gratuitous importation by the defender: It is demanded by the character of the objections offered by the challenger.
Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, New York, 1997, p. 24
Nun aber kann man sich zwar willkürlich appliciren auf Lesen und Lernen; auf das Denken hingegen eigentlich nicht. Dieses nämlich muß, wie das Feuer durch einen Luftzug, angefacht und unterhalten werden durch irgend ein Interesse am Gegenstande desselben[.]
Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena, 1851, sect. 257
[W]hen defenders of capitalism frequently compare socialist East with the industrialized West, they choose the richest and most liberal capitalist countries for the comparison. This is analogous to defending feudalism by drawing attention to the happy condition of the nobility, while forgetting that their wealth and leisure are the obverse of the poverty of their serfs. So, similarly, the rich capitalist countries are paraded as exemplars of a wholesome social order. However, when the West is acknowledged to be far from self-sufficient and is seen to be part of an international economic system which includes the exploitation of the Third World as a basis for the high standard of living experienced in the developed nations, or at the very least is seen to induce underdevelopment in other parts of the, then it is this internationally exploitative system as a whole which must be compared with the socialist countries. And in this comparison capitalism (which must include Third World misery) dose not fare so well.
Alan Carter, Marx: A Radical Critique, Brighton, 1988, p. 4
All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 30
[I]n my specially isolated cell I was, to a very considerable extent, undisturbed, especially in the first five months after the sentence when I was in the dark and therefore necessarily inactive physically. In the dark there is little one can do except thjink, and the absence of anything to divert one’s thoughts gives them an intensity seldom experienced in normal conditions.
Edith Bone, Seven Years Solitary, London, 1957, p. 103
“No republicanos”: regímenes que reglaron el juego sucio como regla del juego—revistieron peculado de peculio—, normalizaron la anomia—invistieron la ley de la fuerza de fuerza de ley—y travistieron inseguridad jurídica (léase en clave económica: incertidumbre) en jurisprudencia cierta—tradujeron la letra de la ley en letra muerta—; repúblicas sin republicanismo; civilidad sin civismo; barbarie sin civilización; sociedad civil con Sociedades del Estado; poder estatal (poder gubernamental potenciado con poder corporativo, e impotente ante él) sin contrapoder societal; patriarcalismo sin Padres de la Patria; bonapartismo parasitario; Nomenklatura con nomenclatura hispana (en pésimo español).
Claudio Amor, ‘La riqueza y la pobreza de las democracias liberales’, Cuestiones públicas, vol. 2, no. 2 (abril-junio, 2001), p. 16
Durante años de oprobio y bobería, los métodos de la propaganda comercial y de la litérature pour concierges fueron aplicados al gobierno de la república. Hubo así dos historias: una, de índole criminal, hecha de cárceles, torturas, prostituciones, robos, muertes e incendios; otra, de carácter escénico, hecha de necedades y fábulas para consumo de patanes. […] Ya Coleridge habló de la willing suspension of disbelief (voluntaria suspensión de la incredulidad) que constituye la fe poética; ya Samuel Johnson observó en defensa de Shakespeare que los espectadores de una tragedia no creen que están en Alejandría durante el primer acto y en Roma durante el segundo pero condescienden al agrado de una ficción. Parejamente, las mentiras de la dictadura no eran creídas o descreídas; pertenecían a un plano intermedio y su propósito era encubrir o justificar sórdidas o atroces realidades.
Jorge Luis Borges, ‘L’illusion comique’, Sur, no. 237 (noviembre-diciembre, 1955), pp. 9-10
On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it does. There should be no question of competition between these two notions of mind. Neither of them is the correct analysis of mind. They cover different phenomena, both of which are quite real.
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford, 1996, p. 11
[L]a filosofía moral tiene marcada relevancia moral: en la medida en que ella se proponga esclarecer las reglas constitutivas de una institución que satisface ciertas funciones sociales sumamente valiosas, se fortalecerá la operatividad y eficacia de esa institución, puesto que los que pariticipan en ella (todos nosotros cuando discurrimos acerca de la justificación de una acción o institución) tendrán una visión más perspicua del “juego” que practican y lo harán mejor. Esto no sirve, obviamente, para justificar sin circularidad la moral y la filosofía moral, pero, como nuestra conciencia no tiene demasiados escrúpulos lógicos, sirve al menos para que ella esté tranquila mientras nosotros nos dedicamos a esta acividad en vez de encarar alguna otra obra más obviamente benéfica.
Carlos Santiago Nino, El constructivismo ético, Madrid, 1989, p. 71
A nadie se le puede aconsejar que compre libros. Los que los particulares adquieren, después de leídos, forman parte de un mueble de lujo que se llama Biblioteca. Este es un sepulcro familiar. Casi siempre pasa a otra generación como un legado de familia. Muy cultos serían los vecinos de una pequeña ciudad, si diez o cincuenta de ellos tuviesen el mismo libro, cuya lectura serviría acaso para una decena de sus allegados. Es éste un sistema antieconómico y estéril. Las Bibliotecas Populares remedian el mal de la limitada circulación de los libros y de su estagnación en estantes. Una aldea, una villa, una ciudad, se convierte por aquella institución en un individuo que posee o puede poseer todos los libros; en una familia dueña de un depósito de conocimientos. Un ejemplar, acaso tres o cuatro, satisfacen la curiosidad de todos sucesivamente, proveyendo de novedades todos los días a los más curiosos o adelantados, y reservando para los rezagados el mismo nutrimiento que ya sirvió, sin deterioro, a los que le precedieron.
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Carta a Hachette y Cía., in Páginas selectas de Sarmiento sobre bibliotecas populares, Buenos Aires, 1939, p. 131
[A] critique of reason, democracy and humanism that originated on the German Right during the 1920s was internalized by the French Left.
Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Princeton, 2004, p. 247
At a conference a group of philosophers were playing guitars and singing folk songs after the formal sessions were over. They asked Kripke to join in and he replied “If anyone else did, that would be the end of it, but if I do, it will be just another Kripke anecdote.” (This is what we philosophers call technically a “meta anecdote.”)
Colin McGinn, The Making of a Philosopher: My Journey Through Twentieth-Century Philosophy, New York, 2002, p. 67
Like playing the violin or the piano, thinking needs everyday practice[.]
Charles Chaplin, My Autobiography, New York, 1964, p. 251