The chairman asked Eizenstat and his antagonist, the chief European negotiator, Britain’s deputy prime minister John Prescott, to go with him into an adjacent green room. The conference at this point was down to the issue of emissions trading. Prescott adamantly held to the European position, insisting that trading be no more than “supplementary,” a secondary tool. Eizenstat said that the United States would not budge, and it was not bluffing. “It’s very simple, John,” he said. “We’re not going to sign, we are not going to do it. All of this time over 15 days will be wasted. Do you really want to go back to Europe with no agreement?” “Or,” he added, “we can have an historic agreement.” Prescott recognized that Eizenstat would not budge, ard reluctantly agreed to the central role of trading. With that, the Kyoto Protocol was effectively done and negotiated, the carpenters could continue, and the follow-on conference could move into the hall.

Daniel Yergin, The quest: Energy, security and the remaking of the modern world, New York, 2011, p. 516