Deontology, individualism, and uncertainty: A reply to Jackson and Smith

Abstract

Deontological moral theories utilizing a threshold of “moral certainty” to navigate uncertainty are frequently criticized for violating the principle of agglomeration. This critique posits that while it may be permissible to act against individuals X and Y separately when the probability of their innocence is low, the cumulative probability that at least one is innocent might exceed the permissible threshold, creating a moral dilemma for the joint action. This challenge is overcome by adopting an individualistic, patient-based deontological framework where moral constraints and rights are grounded in the status of individual persons rather than mereological sums or groups. Under such a view, the normative status of a complex action is entirely derived from its constituent parts; if the threshold for moral certainty is met for each specific individual, the aggregate probability of error across a group remains normatively epiphenomenal. Furthermore, the distinction between intending and foreseeing addresses concerns regarding systemic risks, such as those found in criminal punishment. While a policy may foreseeably result in the punishment of innocent persons, such outcomes do not constitute intentional violations of the deontological constraint provided that the evidentiary threshold is satisfied in every discrete instance. Consequently, individualistic deontology provides a consistent method for handling uncertainty without succumbing to the paradoxes of agglomeration. – AI-generated abstract.