Must God create the best?

Abstract

The proposition that a perfectly good creator must produce the best of all possible worlds is not a necessary component of Judeo-Christian theism. This requirement, often associated with utilitarian standards of moral goodness, may be rejected without compromising the concept of divine perfection. No moral obligation is owed to merely possible beings to bring them into existence; therefore, no rights are violated when a less excellent world is created, provided the resulting creatures have lives worth living and are not personally harmed by their creation. Furthermore, the selection of a less-than-optimal world does not signify a defect in the creator’s character. Instead, it expresses the virtue of grace—a disposition to love that is independent of the intrinsic merit or comparative excellence of the object of love. Although moral intuitions typically condemn the deliberate procreation of deficient human offspring, such judgments are rooted in specific obligations to respect divine intentions for human life rather than a general duty to maximize the excellence of all created things. Consequently, a perfectly good God may consistently choose to create a good world that is nonetheless inferior to other logically possible alternatives. – AI-generated abstract.