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Robert Merrihew Adams Existence, self-interest, and the problem of evil article Individual identity is inextricably linked to the specific causal history of the actual world, such that many historical evils constitute necessary conditions for the existence of any particular person. Because a different series of events would have resulted in the creation of different individuals, those whose lives are overall worth living cannot be said to have been wronged by the occurrence of the prior evils requisite for their coming to be. This existential dependence suggests that a perfectly good being may permit evils as the logically necessary means of producing specific individuals rather than alternative creatures. Furthermore, personal identity is defined not merely by metaphysical origins but by the concrete projects, relationships, and character traits shaped by one’s history. A counterfactual life stripped of significant hardships would often lack a “self-interest relation” to the actual individual, rendering that alternative existence effectively equivalent to non-existence from the subject’s retrospective perspective. Consequently, gratitude for one’s own existence implies a rational, if bittersweet, acceptance of the historical and natural conditions—including systemic evils—that facilitated it. This perspective shifts the problem of evil from an abstract moral calculus to a question of whether the existence of specific human beings justifies the historical costs incurred, a position that ultimately requires an eschatological faith to maintain that every life will be made worth living. – AI-generated abstract.

Existence, self-interest, and the problem of evil

Robert Merrihew Adams

Noûs, vol. 13, no. 1, 1979, pp. 53

Abstract

Individual identity is inextricably linked to the specific causal history of the actual world, such that many historical evils constitute necessary conditions for the existence of any particular person. Because a different series of events would have resulted in the creation of different individuals, those whose lives are overall worth living cannot be said to have been wronged by the occurrence of the prior evils requisite for their coming to be. This existential dependence suggests that a perfectly good being may permit evils as the logically necessary means of producing specific individuals rather than alternative creatures. Furthermore, personal identity is defined not merely by metaphysical origins but by the concrete projects, relationships, and character traits shaped by one’s history. A counterfactual life stripped of significant hardships would often lack a “self-interest relation” to the actual individual, rendering that alternative existence effectively equivalent to non-existence from the subject’s retrospective perspective. Consequently, gratitude for one’s own existence implies a rational, if bittersweet, acceptance of the historical and natural conditions—including systemic evils—that facilitated it. This perspective shifts the problem of evil from an abstract moral calculus to a question of whether the existence of specific human beings justifies the historical costs incurred, a position that ultimately requires an eschatological faith to maintain that every life will be made worth living. – AI-generated abstract.

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