Religious disagreements and doxastic practices
Philosophy and phenomenological research, vol. 54, no. 4, 1994, pp. 885–890
Abstract
The justification of beliefs depends upon participation in socially established and irreducibly plural doxastic practices. While foundational practices like sense perception exhibit high levels of consensus, superstructural practices—including philosophy, ethics, and religion—are inherently characterized by persistent interpersonal disagreement. In these contexts, the rationality of a practice is determined less by social uniformity and more by individual reliability and the psychological embeddedness of beliefs. Mastery of superstructural practices necessitates the ability to maintain autonomous judgment in the face of conflict, making self-reliance an essential component of the practice itself. Consequently, interpersonal disagreement does not constitute a fundamental overrider of prima facie rationality. This framework also addresses the challenge of religious diversity by distinguishing between basic doxastic practices and the theoretical theological systems derived from them. Diverse religious traditions can be viewed as possessing limited reliability and being in touch with reality without necessitating the acceptance of their specific doctrinal formulations. By acknowledging that different mystical practices may have a common cognitive or practical fruitfulness, the epistemic threat posed by religious pluralism is significantly mitigated, preserving the practical rationality of adherence to a specific tradition. – AI-generated abstract.
