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Robert Merrihew Adams Anti-consequentialism and the transcendence of the good article Naturalist moral realism typically identifies moral properties through their causal roles within homeostatic property clusters, often resulting in a welfarist consequentialism where the good is defined by human flourishing. However, this framework fails to account for excellence as a primary and constitutive form of value that transcends mere well-being. Diverse excellences lack the causal unity required by naturalist theories and are better understood as varying reflections of a transcendent Good. Furthermore, consequentialism remains inadequate for individuals in states of helplessness; when social or political agency is limited, the moral significance of a life often resides in the non-consequentialist value of “standing for” the good through symbolic action rather than the effective promotion of outcomes. Metaethically, a “critical stance” is necessary to maintain the distinction between current moral convictions and the good itself. While naturalism attempts to ground the referents of moral terms in the explanatory successes of social sciences, it risks identifying the good with finite, potentially problematic natural properties. A theistic or transcendent framework better preserves the critical stance by positing a Good that is inexhaustible and beyond full human comprehension. This allows for a persistent normative challenge to any natural property and acknowledges that moral identification requires affective responses, such as Eros and admiration, which ensure the good remains a proper object of devotion rather than a mere subject of epistemic inquiry. – AI-generated abstract.

Anti-consequentialism and the transcendence of the good

Robert Merrihew Adams

Philosophy and phenomenological research, vol. 67, no. 1, 2003, pp. 114–132

Abstract

Naturalist moral realism typically identifies moral properties through their causal roles within homeostatic property clusters, often resulting in a welfarist consequentialism where the good is defined by human flourishing. However, this framework fails to account for excellence as a primary and constitutive form of value that transcends mere well-being. Diverse excellences lack the causal unity required by naturalist theories and are better understood as varying reflections of a transcendent Good. Furthermore, consequentialism remains inadequate for individuals in states of helplessness; when social or political agency is limited, the moral significance of a life often resides in the non-consequentialist value of “standing for” the good through symbolic action rather than the effective promotion of outcomes.

Metaethically, a “critical stance” is necessary to maintain the distinction between current moral convictions and the good itself. While naturalism attempts to ground the referents of moral terms in the explanatory successes of social sciences, it risks identifying the good with finite, potentially problematic natural properties. A theistic or transcendent framework better preserves the critical stance by positing a Good that is inexhaustible and beyond full human comprehension. This allows for a persistent normative challenge to any natural property and acknowledges that moral identification requires affective responses, such as Eros and admiration, which ensure the good remains a proper object of devotion rather than a mere subject of epistemic inquiry. – AI-generated abstract.

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