Motive utilitarianism

Abstract

After a review of possible utilitarian views on the moral evaluation of motives, Motive utilitarianism (mu) is defined as the theory that one pattern of motivation is morally better than another to the extent that the former has more utility than the latter. It is argued that: (1) it can be better, By motive utilitarian standards, To have a pattern of motivation that will lead one to act wrongly, By act utilitarian standards. (2) mu is not a theorem of act utilitarianism (au), Because the ethics of motives is about what motives it is best to have, Not what motives it is best to try to have. (3) mu and au are incompatible as moral theories. Finally a variety of forms of mu are sketched; problems in formulating a plausible version are noted; and the author’s qualifiedly unfavorable opinion of mu is stated.