Collection of discussions of epistemic modesty, "Rationalist/EA Exceptionalism", and similar

Abstract

Comment by MichaelA - Collection of discussions of epistemic modesty, “rationalist/EA exceptionalism”, and similar. These are currently in reverse-chronological order. Some thoughts on deference and inside-view models - Buck Shlegeris, 2020. But have they engaged with the arguments? - Philip Trammell, 2019. Epistemic learned helplessness - Scott Alexander, 2019. AI, global coordination, and epistemic humility - Jaan Tallinn, 2018. In defence of epistemic modesty - Greg Lewis, 2017. Inadequate Equilibria - Eliezer Yudkowsky, 2017. Common sense as a prior - Nick Beckstead, 2013. From memory, I think a decent amount of Rationality: A-Z by Eliezer Yudkowsky is relevant. Philosophical Majoritarianism - Hal Finney, 2007. Somewhat less relevant/substantial. This comment/question - Michael Aird (i.e., me), 2020. Naming Beliefs - Hal Finney, 2008. Likely relevant, but I’m not yet sure how relevant as I haven’t yet read it. Are Disagreements Honest? - Cowen & Hanson, 2004. Uncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes - Robin Hanson, 2006. Aumann’s agreement theorem - Wikipedia. I intend to add to this list over time. If you know of other relevant work, please mention it in a comment.