Animal consciousness
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, December 23, 1995
Abstract
Questions about animal consciousness — in particular, whichanimals have consciousness and what (if anything) that consciousnessmight be like — are both scientific andphilosophical. They are scientific because answering them will requiregathering information using scientific techniques — no amount ofarm-chair pondering, conceptual analysis, logic, a prioritheory-building, transcendental inference or introspection will tellus whether a platypus, an iguana, or a squid (to take a few examples)enjoy a life of subjective experience — at some point we’ll haveto learn something about the animals. Just what sort(s) of science canbear on these questions is a live question, but at the least this willinclude investigations of the behavior and neurophysiology of a widetaxonomic range of animals, as well as the phylogenetic relationshipsamong taxa. But these questions are deeply philosophical as well, withepistemological, metaphysical, and phenomenologicaldimensions. Progress will therefore ultimately requireinterdisciplinary work by philosophers willing to engage with theempirical details of animal biology, as well as scientists who aresensitive to the philosophical complexities of the issue.
