A paradox for significant freedom

Abstract

Significant freedom is frequently defined by two seemingly compatible yet logically inconsistent conditions: the independence of an agent’s actions from the antecedent state of the universe (T0) and their independence from the states of affairs strongly actualized by a creator (T1). A paradox arises because these principles cannot simultaneously hold across all possible worlds. If an agent acts freely according to the creator-based definition (T1), the total state of the universe in a given world includes facts regarding the agent’s behavior in alternative possible worlds where the same creator-actualized states obtain. These transworld facts, when coupled with the actualized states of affairs, logically entail the agent’s choice in the current world, thereby violating the requirement for independence from antecedent conditions (T0). This entailment constitutes a non-trivial determination of action that is incompatible with libertarian models of autonomy. The existence of such worlds forces a choice between two unpalatable conclusions: either an omnipotent creator cannot guarantee the creation of significantly free agents, or prior facts and causal laws can logically entail the actions of free agents. Both options challenge foundational assumptions within the philosophy of religion and libertarian metaphysics. – AI-generated abstract.