A sensible metaphysical realism

Abstract

Metaphysical realism posits that substantial portions of reality exist and maintain their essential natures independently of human conceptualization, language, or theoretical frameworks. While global anti-realism—the claim that all of reality is constituted by cognitive relations—suffers from internal incoherence and infinite regress, a defensible realism must acknowledge that certain domains exhibit constitutive dependence on conceptual choices. This sensible approach distinguishes between entities thrust upon us by the nature of things, such as natural kinds and fundamental physical structures, and those that are relative to specific theoretical organizations, such as mereological sums or particular individuations of propositions and beliefs. Large stretches of the physical world remain absolute, yet specific metaphysical descriptions, such as the choice between substance and process ontologies, may be underdetermined by objective facts, allowing for a degree of conceptual relativity without lapsing into universal idealism. By treating realism as the default position, the objective status of artifacts and organisms is maintained while conceding that the precise boundaries and categories of certain abstract or marginal entities depend on the optional schemes employed by cognitive subjects. Ultimately, the scientific and commonsense interpretations of the physical world are reconcilable as absolute accounts through semantic refinement rather than through total relativization to competing frameworks. – AI-generated abstract.