John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living
Ethics, vol. 102, no. 1, 1991, pp. 4–26
Abstract
Evaluative conceptions of the good are tested through “experiments in living,” where the validity of ethical claims is measured by the lived experience of those who inhabit them. This empiricist approach reveals the limitations of quantitative hedonism and empirical naturalism, specifically their failure to account for qualitative differences between higher and lower pleasures. Theories that define the good strictly through non-evaluative empirical concepts are self-effacing, as they lack the normative force required to sustain human flourishing and the higher sentiments. A viable ethical theory instead necessitates a hierarchy of goods—such as dignity, beauty, and nobility—realized through the cultivation of imagination and feeling. These higher pleasures are not merely sensations but constitute pleasurable recognitions of excellence. Within a post-positivist framework, ethical empiricism remains valid by treating evaluative concepts as theoretical terms that are testable through their ability to provide a compelling perspective for self-understanding and the resolution of psychological crises. The superiority of a conception of the good is demonstrated when it accounts for fundamental human needs and provides a stable basis for agency that reductive naturalist theories cannot replicate. – AI-generated abstract.
