Moral bias and corrective practices: a pragmatist perspective

Abstract

Dominant methods in analytic moral philosophy, such as a priori abstraction and reflective equilibrium, often fail to account for the social epistemology of moral belief. These methods presume that fundamental moral principles can be derived independently of empirical social conditions or through thought experiments remote from lived experience. However, moral principles function as tools for adjudicating social conflicts rooted in empirical realities, making them subject to biases derived from social power and hierarchy. Historical analysis of the American abolitionist movement demonstrates that traditional philosophical arguments, including the Golden Rule, were largely ineffective at overcoming moral biases entrenched by racism and social inequality. Reliable moral progress requires pragmatist methods of intelligent updating, specifically through bias correction and experiments in living. Correcting systemic moral bias necessitates contentious politics—disruptive collective action that destabilizes existing norms—and the active inclusion of marginalized groups in interpersonal claim-making. Such practices shift moral inquiry from abstract, third-person speculation to second-person accountability, compelling those in power to recognize the authority of the oppressed. Moral philosophy must therefore integrate empirical insights from history and the social sciences and prioritize the inclusion of diverse perspectives to reliably identify and counteract the distorting effects of social privilege. – AI-generated abstract.