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Julia Annas and Peter Singer Review of Peter Singer, <em>Practical Ethics</em> article The application of utilitarian principles to practical ethical dilemmas often relies on the unargued premise that the moral point of view consists exclusively in the equal consideration of interests. By equating objectivity with universalizability, this framework necessitates a total abstraction from personal concerns, effectively shifting the locus of moral value from the individual to the interest itself. Such a methodology renders distinctions based on species, natural endowment, or self-consciousness as morally arbitrary, leading to the conclusion that non-self-conscious beings are replaceable aggregates of experience rather than intrinsic unities. This revisionary approach to ethics frequently lacks a robust metaethical defense for its foundational definitions, assuming a utilitarian calculus to be the minimal requirement for any moral position. However, this shift risks alienating moral agents from natural sympathies and ignores the possibility that the unity of an individual life possesses value independent of utility calculations. Ultimately, the claim that rational morality mandates a total focus on interests remains a controversial assertion that dictates practical conclusions without successfully establishing its own necessity or addressing the potential for moral confusion inherent in conflicting value systems. – AI-generated abstract.

Review of Peter Singer, Practical Ethics

Julia Annas and Peter Singer

The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 123, 1981, pp. 180–182

Abstract

The application of utilitarian principles to practical ethical dilemmas often relies on the unargued premise that the moral point of view consists exclusively in the equal consideration of interests. By equating objectivity with universalizability, this framework necessitates a total abstraction from personal concerns, effectively shifting the locus of moral value from the individual to the interest itself. Such a methodology renders distinctions based on species, natural endowment, or self-consciousness as morally arbitrary, leading to the conclusion that non-self-conscious beings are replaceable aggregates of experience rather than intrinsic unities. This revisionary approach to ethics frequently lacks a robust metaethical defense for its foundational definitions, assuming a utilitarian calculus to be the minimal requirement for any moral position. However, this shift risks alienating moral agents from natural sympathies and ignores the possibility that the unity of an individual life possesses value independent of utility calculations. Ultimately, the claim that rational morality mandates a total focus on interests remains a controversial assertion that dictates practical conclusions without successfully establishing its own necessity or addressing the potential for moral confusion inherent in conflicting value systems. – AI-generated abstract.

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