Reply to van Fraassen

Abstract

Pervasive regularities in the natural world require a robust explanation, as their occurrence is a priori surprising. These regularities are manifestations of laws of nature, understood as contingent relations of necessity between universals. Such necessity is grounded in the direct experience of causation, such as physical pressure or the operation of the will. This theoretical framework provides a logical link between the relations of universals and observed regularities, justifying the inference from particulars to types. In the context of probabilistic laws, the relation between universals serves as a truth-maker for probabilities, even when instances are finite, by establishing the nomic possibility for infinite populations. Induction is a rational form of inference to the best explanation, moving from observed phenomena to the underlying strong laws that govern them. The distinction between observable and unobservable entities holds no ontological weight that would invalidate the application of these explanatory principles beyond the empirical sphere. Preferring simpler, strong-law explanations over treating regularities as brute facts remains the only viable alternative to radical skepticism. – AI-generated abstract.