Panexperientialism, pain, and ethics

Abstract

If panexperientialism is true, the qualia experienced by noncognitive systems in states functionally analogous to human pain are morally isomorphic to human suffering. Pain is defined by a functional state of avoidance and alteration effort, necessitating a representational component rather than inherent qualitative badness. Because qualia are not intrinsically undesirable absent these functional properties, any qualia accompanying such functional states constitute pain. While certain theories suggest noncognitive systems lack the bound qualia or reflective capacity necessary for genuine suffering, alternative models posit that intrinsic experiential properties are universal and unified even in basic systems. Assigning moral weight to these experiences presents significant practical difficulties; however, the principle of moral isomorphism suggests that functionally identical states warrant equivalent ethical consideration. Although such a conclusion might result in an impracticable morality, metaethical frameworks like emotivism or nihilism allow for the navigation of these implications through subjective preference rather than objective realism. Ultimately, the intersection of panexperientialism and functionalism necessitates a reevaluation of the moral status of noncognitive entities and the definition of suffering. – AI-generated abstract.