Mill versus paternalism
Ethics, vol. 90, no. 4, 1980, pp. 470–489
Abstract
J.S. Mill’s absolute prohibition of paternalism remains defensible against modern critiques that seek to justify state intervention on the grounds of maximizing an individual’s long-term freedom or rationality. A necessary distinction exists between freedom, defined as the opportunity to act on desires, and autonomy, defined as the right of an agent to make voluntary self-regarding choices and assume responsibility for the consequences. While paternalism might increase an agent’s future range of choices, it necessarily diminishes autonomy by usurping the individual’s decision-making power. Proposed justifications for paternalism based on a strict “voluntariness” standard are problematic because they often conflate voluntary choice with rational choice, thereby authorizing interference whenever an agent acts against their own best interests. Authenticity in human life is not limited to acts of deliberate, calm reflection; impulsive or irrational actions may still express an agent’s settled character or self-conception. Maintaining a social atmosphere that encourages individuality and diverse experiments in living requires an uncompromising ban on paternalistic coercion, even when individuals choose paths that result in personal harm. This framework ensures that the responsibility for one’s own welfare remains with the individual, preserving the intrinsic value of the choice process itself. – AI-generated abstract.
