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Richard J. Arneson Equality and equal opportunity for welfare article Distributive equality requires equal opportunity for welfare rather than equal distribution of resources or equality of welfare outcomes. Resource-based standards fail to account for the differential ability of individuals to convert goods into life satisfaction due to physical handicaps or varying talents. Attempting to include internal talents as tradeable resources results in the “slavery of the talented,” where those with high-demand skills are penalized for their desire for personal liberty. Conversely, straight equality of welfare is insufficient because it ignores personal responsibility. If individuals arrive at lower welfare levels through voluntary risks, negligence, or the cultivation of expensive tastes, justice does not demand compensation. Equal opportunity for welfare obtains when individuals face effectively equivalent arrays of options, or “decision trees,” in terms of their prospects for preference satisfaction. This condition is met when any resulting welfare inequalities are traceable to voluntary choices for which agents are held responsible, with welfare measured by the satisfaction of ideally considered, second-best preferences. This approach improves upon capabilities-based models by indexing the value of opportunities to an individual’s rational preferences rather than external perfectionist measures. – AI-generated abstract.

Equality and equal opportunity for welfare

Richard J. Arneson

Philosophical Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 1989, pp. 77–93

Abstract

Distributive equality requires equal opportunity for welfare rather than equal distribution of resources or equality of welfare outcomes. Resource-based standards fail to account for the differential ability of individuals to convert goods into life satisfaction due to physical handicaps or varying talents. Attempting to include internal talents as tradeable resources results in the “slavery of the talented,” where those with high-demand skills are penalized for their desire for personal liberty. Conversely, straight equality of welfare is insufficient because it ignores personal responsibility. If individuals arrive at lower welfare levels through voluntary risks, negligence, or the cultivation of expensive tastes, justice does not demand compensation. Equal opportunity for welfare obtains when individuals face effectively equivalent arrays of options, or “decision trees,” in terms of their prospects for preference satisfaction. This condition is met when any resulting welfare inequalities are traceable to voluntary choices for which agents are held responsible, with welfare measured by the satisfaction of ideally considered, second-best preferences. This approach improves upon capabilities-based models by indexing the value of opportunities to an individual’s rational preferences rather than external perfectionist measures. – AI-generated abstract.

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