Moral limits on the demands of beneficence?

Abstract

Peter Singer’s principle of beneficence mandates that individuals prevent significant harm whenever the cost of doing so does not involve a sacrifice of comparable moral importance. This requirement imposes an exceptionally stringent burden on inhabitants of affluent societies, potentially necessitating a radical redistribution of personal resources until marginal utility is equalized. Theoretical attempts to establish moral limits on these demands—whether based on fairness and collective compliance, the requirements of self-respect and authenticity, or the existence of an agent-centered prerogative—fail to provide a theoretically satisfying rationale for rejecting the underlying consequentialist logic. Although these strategies prove unviable, the counterintuitive rigor of the Singer Principle can be mitigated by distinguishing between what is morally right and what is morally obligatory. Under this framework, an act remains wrong if it fails to produce the best impartially assessed consequences, yet the agent may not be blameworthy or subject to moral sanction if compliance is exceptionally difficult. Decoupling rightness from blameworthiness preserves the ideal of maximal beneficence while accounting for the psychological realities of human nature and the pragmatic function of social punishment. – AI-generated abstract.