Praise, blame and the whole self

Abstract

Moral accountability is frequently restricted to actions originating from an agent’s “Real Self,” typically identified with reflective reason or higher-order volitions. Such frameworks fail to explain inverse akrasia, a phenomenon where agents act against their conscious moral convictions to perform right actions yet remain intuitively praiseworthy. A more comprehensive account, the “Whole Self” theory, posits that moral praise and blame depend on the degree to which the psychological factors underlying an action are integrated within the agent’s overall personality. Integration is defined by the depth of the relevant beliefs and desires and their lack of conflict with other deep-seated psychological states. Under this model, an action expresses the agent’s self not because it stems from a privileged faculty like reason, but because it aligns with a cohesive network of motives, whether those motives are rational or appetitive. This approach provides a nuanced evaluation of accountability across a spectrum of behaviors, including kleptomania, addiction, and out-of-character actions. It acknowledges that the self is a complex and often divided entity whose expressions cannot be reduced to a single psychological layer, such that the degree of integration determines the extent to which an agent is truly representative of their conduct. – AI-generated abstract.