Unprincipled virtue: An inquiry into moral agency

Abstract

Moral psychology frequently prioritizes conscious deliberation and self-control, yet human agency is often characterized by non-deliberative processes that remain rational and morally significant. Moral worth is not derived from an agent’s adherence to conscious principles or the motive of duty de dicto, but rather from a substantive responsiveness to moral reasons de re. Under this framework, instances of “inverse akrasia”—acting against one’s best judgment—can be rational and praiseworthy if the action is motivated by the right-making features of the situation. This responsiveness to moral reasons occurs even when the agent lacks conscious awareness or reflective endorsement of their motives. Consequently, agent-autonomy and deliberative self-governance are not necessary conditions for moral responsibility. Instead, praise and blame are determined by the quality of the agent’s will, specifically the degree of their concern for morally relevant considerations. By situating moral agency within a broader psychological context that includes unconscious motivations and emotional responses, it becomes possible to account for “inadvertent virtue” and other complexities of human behavior that standard theories of autonomy and rationality fail to accommodate. – AI-generated abstract.