One more axiological impossibility theorem

Abstract

Population axiology encounters persistent challenges through impossibility results demonstrating that considered beliefs regarding welfare and population size are often mutually inconsistent. A formal impossibility theorem proves that no population axiology can simultaneously satisfy five intuitively compelling adequacy conditions: Egalitarian Dominance, General Non-Extreme Priority, Non-Elitism, Weak Non-Sadism, and a Weak Quality Addition Condition. This theorem advances the field by utilizing logically weaker assumptions than previous results, specifically focusing on the avoidance of the Very Repugnant Conclusion—the claim that a high-welfare population is worse than a population comprising both suffering and a large number of lives barely worth living. By demonstrating that even the most minimally demanding principles of population evaluation cannot be co-satisfied, the result suggests that the fundamental paradoxes of population ethics cannot be resolved simply by accepting the standard Repugnant Conclusion. The proof relies on a series of logical lemmas showing how these five conditions generate a formal contradiction, illustrating a deep-seated tension in how goodness is ordered across varying population sizes and welfare levels. – AI-generated abstract.