works
Kenneth J. Arrow et al. The Promise of Prediction Markets article Prediction markets aggregate dispersed information through financial incentives, frequently generating forecasts with lower error rates than traditional polling or expert evaluations across domains including politics, public health, and corporate planning. Despite their utility in guiding private and public decision-making, widespread implementation in the United States is constrained by overlapping state and federal anti-gambling statutes. To address these legal impediments without promoting illicit gambling, regulatory frameworks should establish safe-harbor provisions for small-stakes, non-profit exchanges. Specifically, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission could issue formal safe harbors covering research institutions, government bodies, and internal corporate operations running low-capital contracts on economically meaningful events. Furthermore, federal legislation should reinforce this structure by clarifying that approved safe-harbor markets preempt conflicting state and federal anti-gambling laws, thereby enabling controlled experimentation in market design while safeguarding consumer interests. Lowering these regulatory barriers will foster innovation in information aggregation and improve societal risk management. – AI-generated abstract.

The Promise of Prediction Markets

Kenneth J. Arrow et al.

Science, vol. 320, no. 5878, 2008, pp. 877--878

Abstract

Prediction markets aggregate dispersed information through financial incentives, frequently generating forecasts with lower error rates than traditional polling or expert evaluations across domains including politics, public health, and corporate planning. Despite their utility in guiding private and public decision-making, widespread implementation in the United States is constrained by overlapping state and federal anti-gambling statutes. To address these legal impediments without promoting illicit gambling, regulatory frameworks should establish safe-harbor provisions for small-stakes, non-profit exchanges. Specifically, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission could issue formal safe harbors covering research institutions, government bodies, and internal corporate operations running low-capital contracts on economically meaningful events. Furthermore, federal legislation should reinforce this structure by clarifying that approved safe-harbor markets preempt conflicting state and federal anti-gambling laws, thereby enabling controlled experimentation in market design while safeguarding consumer interests. Lowering these regulatory barriers will foster innovation in information aggregation and improve societal risk management. – AI-generated abstract.

PDF

First page of PDF