Objective epistemic consequentialism

Abstract

Objective epistemic consequentialism establishes that the normative status of beliefs and decision procedures depends on the production of epistemic value. This framework comprises a theory of contributory final value, a theory of all-things-considered value, and a deontic theory. The safety Brier score serves as the fundamental measure of epistemic utility, prioritizing credences that are both accurate and reliably formed. By adopting a global consequentialist perspective, the theory evaluates various focal points—including cognitive acts, decision procedures, and character traits—according to their actual outcomes rather than mere expectations. This actualist approach avoids the necessity of subjective epistemic “oughts” by demonstrating that optimal decision procedures naturally account for an agent’s cognitive limitations and the reliability of their methods. When applied to the problem of peer disagreement, the model reconciles externalist accounts of evidence with conciliatory intuitions. It demonstrates that while non-conciliatory responses might be optimal if executed perfectly, fallible agents maximize epistemic utility by committing to conciliatory decision procedures. Thus, objective epistemic consequentialism offers a unified normative framework capable of resolving higher-order evidence conflicts and clarifying the nature of epistemic obligations. – AI-generated abstract.