Practical reasoning and ethical decision
London, 2006
Abstract
Practical reasoning functions as an inferential process that explains human action, connects deliberation with intention, and provides a justificatory basis for ethical decisions. This process typically involves a motivational premise expressing an agent’s end and a cognitive premise indicating a means to that end, resulting in a normative practical judgment. Historically informed by Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian traditions, the structure of practical reasoning facilitates an understanding of intentional action and its causal dynamics. It further illuminates key topics in moral psychology, including weakness of will, self-deception, and rationalization, by distinguishing between the explanatory reasons for which an agent acts and the justificatory reasons that rationalize conduct. Within the domain of normative ethics, practical reasoning applies concrete moral principles to complex scenarios, offering a systematic approach to resolving conflicting obligations and evaluating the rationality of moral choices. By treating rationality as the well-groundedness of actions in reasons, this framework demonstrates how practical judgment serves as a directive force, bridging the gap between motivation and behavior across diverse evaluative contexts. – AI-generated abstract.