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Robert J. Aumann, Received November, and Robert J. Aumann Agreeing to disagree article Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event E if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

Agreeing to disagree

Robert J. Aumann, Received November, and Robert J. Aumann

The Annals of Statistics, vol. 4, no. 6, 1976, pp. 1236–1239

Abstract

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event E if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

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