Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?

Abstract

Critical evaluations of the sense-datum theory based on ordinary language analysis often fail to address the underlying logical motivations for distinguishing between sensory experience and physical objects. Perceptual judgments regarding material things are inherently inferential because they incorporate assumptions about permanence, tangibility, and public accessibility that exceed immediate sensory content. Although ordinary usage typically avoids characterizing normal perception as evidence-based, the logical gap between experiential data and material object claims persists; the existence of a physical object is never strictly deducible from a finite set of experiential statements. Linguistic arguments concerning the qualitative differences between veridical and delusive experiences do not invalidate this framework, as the internal character of an experience cannot logically guarantee its veridicality. Furthermore, material object statements function at a theoretical level relative to sensory data, making the formulation of neutral experiential descriptions a necessary epistemological task. While critiques of the theory provide valuable nuance regarding the diverse uses of terms like “look” or “real,” they do not dismantle the thesis that empirical knowledge is fundamentally grounded in sensory presentations. The sense-datum theory remains a robust model for analyzing the structure of perception, as its logical foundations are not contingent upon the conventions of everyday speech. – AI-generated abstract.