Why it is wrong to be always guided by the best: Consequentialism and friendship

Abstract

End friendship consists of a non-instrumental relationship in which individuals are valued for their essential features rather than as means to an independent end. Consequentialism poses a fundamental challenge to this value by requiring that all actions and dispositions be justified through their contribution to an impersonal, agent-neutral maximization of the good. While sophisticated and indirect versions of consequentialism attempt to accommodate friendship by separating justification from motivation, these frameworks remain logically incompatible with the nature of end friendship. The necessary presence of a counterfactual condition—wherein a relationship is maintained only so long as it serves the overall good—imposes an instrumental structure on the agent’s motivations, precluding the irreplaceability essential to end love. An adequate moral theory must instead recognize friendship as intrinsically moral, structured by virtues such as benevolence, justice, and integrity that provide a justification internal to the relationship itself. By validating the personal point of view as a primary moral perspective, this approach ensures that the moral worth of personal commitments is not entirely subsumed by an impersonal metric. Consequently, the pursuit of friendship is justified as a constitutive part of a moral life rather than a mere instrument for external value maximization. – AI-generated abstract.