works
David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns Philosophy of suffering: Metaphysics, value, and normativity book This is a volume about the nature and value of suffering. Suffering is a central part of the lives of all human beings. Those of us who are lucky enough to escape the ravages of war, famine, poverty, and oppression still have lives in which suffering of various kinds plays a large part, for we all, to a greater or lesser extent, experience different forms of physical and emotional suffering: pain, hunger, fatigue, grief, guilt, and many others. Given this, it is surprising that suffering has received little in the way of serious consideration from researchers in core disciplines like philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. Insofar as researchers in these subjects have considered the issue, they have often neglected questions about suffering as such. There has been considerable research on pain (somewhat to the exclusion of other kinds of physical suffering) and also on negative emo- tions, such as guilt, shame, and grief, but very little has been done to address the most general questions that arise. What do all these negative states have in common? How is their negativity related to their affective or hedonic dimensions – that is, to their being unpleasant? When, and in virtue of what, are these various states involved in, or themselves kinds of, suffering? And what is the role, purpose, or value of suffering? These questions have all been neglected

Philosophy of suffering: Metaphysics, value, and normativity

David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns

2020

Abstract

This is a volume about the nature and value of suffering. Suffering is a central part of the lives of all human beings. Those of us who are lucky enough to escape the ravages of war, famine, poverty, and oppression still have lives in which suffering of various kinds plays a large part, for we all, to a greater or lesser extent, experience different forms of physical and emotional suffering: pain, hunger, fatigue, grief, guilt, and many others. Given this, it is surprising that suffering has received little in the way of serious consideration from researchers in core disciplines like philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. Insofar as researchers in these subjects have considered the issue, they have often neglected questions about suffering as such. There has been considerable research on pain (somewhat to the exclusion of other kinds of physical suffering) and also on negative emo- tions, such as guilt, shame, and grief, but very little has been done to address the most general questions that arise. What do all these negative states have in common? How is their negativity related to their affective or hedonic dimensions – that is, to their being unpleasant? When, and in virtue of what, are these various states involved in, or themselves kinds of, suffering? And what is the role, purpose, or value of suffering? These questions have all been neglected