On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future
2013
Abstract
This dissertation argues that shaping the far future, spanning millions, billions, and trillions of years, is of paramount importance. The central thesis is that we should prioritize actions that optimize the long-term trajectory of humanity’s development, considering the potential for existential risks, the impact of our choices on future generations, and the ethical implications of influencing the trajectory of life itself. The dissertation explores key concepts such as existential risk, development trajectories, and the distinction between broad and targeted interventions. It defends methodological assumptions for normative theory, examines empirical and normative assumptions supporting the thesis, and addresses objections based on population ethics and decision-theoretic paradoxes. The author concludes by advocating for a nuanced approach to decision-making, acknowledging the inconsistencies in our current understanding of ethics and advocating for continued exploration of these complex issues.
Quotes from this work
[O]ur moral judgments are less reliable than many would hope, and this has specific implications for methodology in normative ethics. Three sources of evidence indicate that our intuitive ethical judgments are less reliable than we might have hoped: a historical record of accepting morally absurd social practices; a scientific record showing that our intuitive judgments are systematically governed by a host of heuristics, biases, and irrelevant factors; and a philosophical record showing deep, probably unresolvable, inconsistencies in common moral convictions. I argue that this has the following implications for moral theorizing: we should trust intuitions less; we should be especially suspicious of intuitive judgments that fit a bias pattern, even when we are intuitively condent that these judgments are not a simple product of the bias; we should be especially suspicious of intuitions that are part of inconsistent sets of deeply held convictions; and we should evaluate views holistically, thinking of entire classes of judgments that they get right or wrong in broad contexts, rather than dismissing positions on the basis of a small number of intuitive counterexamples.