The expected value of extinction risk reduction is positive

Abstract

There are good reasons to care about sentient beings living in the millions of years to come. Caring about the future of sentience is sometimes taken to imply reducing the risk of human extinction as a moral priority. However, this implication is not obvious so long as one is uncertain whether a future with humanity would be better or worse than one without it. In this article, we try to give an all-things-considered answer to the question: “Is the expected value of efforts to reduce the risk of human extinction positive or negative?”. Among others, we cover the following points: What happens if we simply tally up the welfare of current sentient beings on earth and extrapolate into the future; and why that isn’t a good idea Thinking about the possible values and preferences of future generations, how these might align with ours, and what that implies Why the “option value argument” for reducing extinction risk is weak How the potential of a non-human animal civilisation or an extra-terrestrial civilisation taking over after human extinction increases the expected value of extinction risk reduction Why, if we had more empirical insight or moral reflection, we might have moral concern for things outside of earth, and how that increases the value of extinction risk reduction How avoiding a global catastrophe that would not lead to extinction can have very long-term effects