Reality
In James Hastings (ed.) Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, New York, 1919, pp. 587–592
Abstract
Philosophical distinctions between reality and existence rest on specific logical and linguistic structures. Historically, the prioritization of substantives over relations fostered monistic or monadistic ontologies by reducing all propositions to subject-predicate forms. However, the recognition of relations as irreducible entities and the mathematical resolution of transfinite paradoxes demonstrate that infinite collections are not inherently self-contradictory. Existence is primarily predicated of particular individuals, such as minds and physical objects, whereas reality possesses a broader intension encompassing universals and abstract entities like numbers. While sense-data—such as the elliptical appearance of a circular object—constitute real objects of awareness, they are distinguished from physical reality by their failure to adhere to physical laws. This distinction extends to the concept of appearance, where perceived internal inconsistency in the attribution of predicates often leads to the theorization of varying degrees of reality. Parallelly, Buddhist metaphysics utilizes a “middle theory” of causal becoming to navigate between the extremes of permanent substance and nihilism. This tradition differentiates between conventional designations (paññatti) and ultimate, irreducible facts (paramattha), categorizing the permanent “self” as a linguistic label rather than a substantial entity. Across these disparate frameworks, reality is characterized by internal coherence and the formal relationships between immediate phenomenal data and the structural entities they signify. – AI-generated abstract.