Some remarks on sense-perception

Abstract

Philosophical analysis of sense-perception requires a rigorous categorization of ostensible perception, defined as the phenomenological experience of perceiving regardless of its veridicality. Every such experience consists of a sensational core and a state of perceptual acceptance, the latter being a dispositional response shaped by innate aptitudes and past sensory sequences rather than an explicit linguistic judgment. Sensation can be systematically analyzed through the act-object, internal accusative, or neutral monist frameworks. The act-object model supports the “Sensum Theory,” which suggests that sensibilia possess determinate qualities independent of the act of sensing, though the existence of unsensed sensa remains a point of causal and logical contention. While the elucidation of technical terms and linguistic usage is a necessary preliminary, it cannot resolve the core problems of perception. A complete synoptic view must integrate phenomenological descriptions with physical and physiological data, including the finite velocity of light and the functions of the nervous system. Restricting philosophical inquiry to ordinary language nuances fails to account for the complex interplay between veridical, illusive, and hallucinatory states. – AI-generated abstract.