Broad's critical essays in moral philosophy

Abstract

Analytical and epistemological investigations into moral philosophy reveal a complex landscape of linguistic, psychological, and metaphysical problems. Central to these inquiries is the analysis of moral judgments: whether moral sentences express propositions ascribing unique, non-natural attributes to subjects or merely evince emotional attitudes and commands. While non-predicative theories avoid postulating non-empirical concepts, they often struggle to account for the cognitive appearance of moral discourse. The distinction between natural and non-natural properties remains fundamental, though criteria based on intrinsic nature or descriptive utility remain difficult to define precisely. Regarding moral motivation, psychological egoism is found wanting; human motives are more accurately categorized into self-confined, self-centred, and other-regarding but self-referential desires, suggesting an irreducible pluralism of ultimate ends. Theoretical frameworks for obligation must navigate the conflict between teleological principles, which prioritize the maximization of good, and ostensibly non-teleological claims like truth-telling or promise-keeping. These tensions are further complicated by the distinction between formal, material, and subjective rightness, which acknowledges that an agent’s factual or ethical ignorance can decouple intention from objective outcome. Furthermore, the relationship between “ought” and “can” raises significant difficulties for moral responsibility, as categorical obligability appears to require a form of substitutability that is difficult to reconcile with either deterministic or libertarian accounts of causation. Ultimately, attempts to ground ethical standards in descriptive sciences, such as evolutionary biology, fail to bridge the logical gap between the historical development of social habits and the normative validity of moral principles. – AI-generated abstract.