Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?

Abstract

Intentions do not constitute reasons for action. The bootstrapping objection demonstrates that agents cannot generate reasons for themselves simply by forming intentions; to suggest otherwise would imply that a decision could make an action mandatory even when it was previously unjustified. While intentions are essential for the rational management of life, their normative force derives from requirements of consistency rather than the provision of reasons. These normative requirements are strict but relative: they govern the relationship between mental states without necessarily justifying the content of those states. For example, intending an end normatively requires intending the believed necessary means, yet it does not provide a reason for those means if the end itself is not worth pursuing.

This distinction between reasons and normative requirements clarifies the rational process of carrying out intentions over time. An agent must act on an intention unless they deliberately repudiate it; failure to do so constitutes a normative lapse. However, because an intention can be repudiated without reason, the requirement does not forbid changing one’s mind. Applying this distinction further resolves the problem of choosing between incommensurate values. When values are incommensurable, no objective reason determines a single correct choice. Rationality instead maintains consistency through the normative requirement of the chosen intention, preventing arbitrary shifts in behavior while acknowledging that the initial decision remains fragile. Consistency in practical reason is thus maintained not by the creation of new reasons, but by the demand for coherence among an agent’s intentions. – AI-generated abstract.