Should we value population?
Journal of political philosophy, vol. 13, no. 4, 2005, pp. 399–413
Abstract
What good does it do you to continue living? Or—an equivalent question—what harm would it do you to die now? These questions have exercised philosophers since antiquity,1 and they are not mere philosophers’ questions. An answer to them is important in practice. An answer might help you when you are wondering whether to take the risk of hang-gliding, and it would help a government that is wondering whether to increase its investment in health. Here is an answer. The benefit to you of continuing to live—and equivalently the harm to you of dying now—is the difference between the overall goodness your life will have if you continue to live and the overall goodness it will have if you die now. This answer is hard to fault. Given one way of using ‘benefit’ and ‘harm’, this difference is simply what we mean by the benefit of continuing to live and the harm of dying now.