Ought

Abstract

The central normative concept is ‘ought,’ a primitive term distinct from evaluative concepts and non-normative descriptions of ideal states. This concept is fundamentally categorized by ownership: whereas unowned ‘oughts’ describe desirable states of affairs, owned ‘oughts’ implicate specific agents and serve as the core of practical rationality. The centrality of the owned ‘ought’ is established through the rational requirement of krasia, which dictates that an agent who believes they themselves ought to perform an action must intend to do so. This normative ‘ought’ functions as an all-things-considered judgment, synthesizing requirements from various sources—including morality, prudence, and rationality—into a single directive. Consequently, true deontic conflicts are impossible, as they would render rational coherence unattainable. While ‘ought’ is often divided into objective (outcome-based) and subjective (evidence-based) senses, the central normative usage is that which is directly practical and evidence-relative. Despite linguistic constraints in English grammar that obscure the relationship between agents and propositions, the distinction between owned and unowned ‘oughts’ remains essential for a rigorous account of normative requirements and rational intention. – AI-generated abstract.