Broad's theory of emotion

Abstract

Emotions are intentional cognitions accompanied by specific psychical qualities or tones, a structure that distinguishes them from non-intentional states like localized sensations or physical fatigue. This framework permits a systematic taxonomy based on the mode of apprehension—intuitive, perceptual, or conceptual—and enables the evaluation of emotional states through categories of placement, appropriateness, and motivation. Emotional qualities function analogously to a color spectrum, wherein a limited number of primary dispositions blend to form complex sentiments and nuanced shades of feeling. In the context of moral theory, this analysis facilitates a transition from rationalist intuitionism toward a dispositional moral-sense theory. Under this view, moral judgments such as “right” or “wrong” are not intuitions of objective properties but are registrations of final, toti-resultant emotional reactions to various situational aspects. Terms like “rightness” thus serve as omnibus labels for pro-emotions triggered by specific natural characteristics, such as utility or gratitude. While this introspective methodology provides a detailed topography of subjective experience, its reliance on the primacy of explicit cognition may underemphasize the active, conative dimensions of desire and the potential for pre-discursive feelings to precede formal thought. Ethical concepts are consequently grounded in the structured and often habitual emotional responses of the human psyche to its environment. – AI-generated abstract.