Emergence and the mind

Abstract

This commentary deals with the mind-body problem from the point of view of a general systems theory. It starts by elucidating the notions of thing, property, state and process. In particular it shows how the concept of a state space can be used to represent the states and changes of state of a concrete thing such as the central nervous system. Next the concepts of emergence and of level are discussed. An emergent property is defined as a property possessed by a system but not by its components. The notion of level and the peculiar relation existing between levels are clarified, only to show later on that the mental cannot be regarded as a level on a par with the physical or the social. The upshot is a rationalist and naturalist pluralism.The second half of the paper expounds and examines the various versions of psychoneural monism and dualism. Dualism is found unclear, at variance with the general framework of science, and untestable. Eliminative materialism and reductive materialism are rejected for ignoring the peculiar (emergent) properties of the central nervous system. A variety of psychoneural monism called emergentist materialism is found the most acceptable because of its compatibility with our present knowledge and because of its heuristic power. However, it is emphasized that emergentist materialism is still largely a programmatic hypothesis in search of detailed theories, in particular mathematical ones, of the various emergent functions of the central nervous system and its subsystems.