Coordination, good and bad

Abstract

Coordination serves as a primary catalyst for social and institutional progress, yet its benefits are non-linear; partial coordination, frequently termed collusion, allows small groups to profit at the expense of the broader public. Because the observable actions of colluders often overlap with those of independent actors, identifying harmful coordination requires evaluating the underlying incentive structures rather than individual behaviors. Cooperative game theory demonstrates that many systems, particularly majority games, are inherently unstable as coalitions can consistently deviate to seize rewards. To mitigate these risks, robust mechanism design must implement barriers to undesired coordination while facilitating beneficial collective action. Decentralization functions as a critical defense by introducing moral hurdles, internal negotiation failures, and the risk of defection among potential conspirators. Furthermore, technical solutions such as secret ballots and cryptographic tools disrupt bribery by making individual actions unverifiable to third parties. When collusion succeeds, resilience depends on counter-coordination mechanisms like forking, which allow dissidents to reorganize and impose financial costs on attackers. By integrating “skin in the game” and ensuring individual accountability, designers can structure coordination to align sub-group incentives with the interests of the wider community. – AI-generated abstract.